People v. Reeves CA2/8
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketB348409
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Reeves CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B348409
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A368127)
v.
EVA REEVES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Drew E. Edwards, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert A. Werth, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
Appellant Eva Reeves appeals the trial court’s denial of
appellant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.61 after an evidentiary hearing. At the time of the
initial conviction in 1982, Reeves’s name was Michael Hernandez
Contreras. For clarity, we refer to appellant as Reeves, the name
appellant uses in this appeal.
Decades after Reeves’s underlying conviction, the
Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1437) to eliminate murder liability under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine and to limit application of
the felony-murder rule. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
448–449.) Now, except in cases of felony murder, a principal
must act with malice aforethought to be convicted of murder, and
malice “shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) In addition to
changing the law of murder prospectively, Senate Bill 1437
allowed defendants convicted of murder under a now-invalid
theory to petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 (former
section 1170.95). (Curiel, at pp. 449–450.)
Under section 1172.6, a defendant convicted of murder may
petition the sentencing court to have a conviction vacated and to
be resentenced on any remaining counts. (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708.) The defendant must allege: (1) the
information allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of
murder or attempted murder in which malice is imputed to the
defendant based solely on the defendant’s participation in a crime
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) the
1 All further undesignated section references are to the Penal
Code.
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defendant was convicted following a trial or accepted a plea in
lieu of trial at which the defendant could have been convicted of
murder or attempted murder; and (3) the defendant could not
now be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to the law made by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a).) If the petitioner establishes a prima facie case for
relief, the matter proceeds to an evidentiary hearing. (Id.,
subd. (d)(3).) In the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder under the current law. (Ibid.)
“[T]he court may consider evidence previously admitted at any
prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law.”
(Ibid.)
On January 26, 2022, Reeves filed a petition under
section 1172.6 seeking resentencing of the 1982 conviction for
second degree murder. The matter proceeded to an evidentiary
hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), with Reeves
represented by appointed counsel. Prior to the hearing, the
People and Reeves both filed evidentiary briefs. In that brief,
counsel for Reeves argued that the 1980 preliminary hearing
transcript was inadmissible.
The reporter’s transcript from the jury trial is not in the
record because of the age of the case. However, the preliminary
hearing transcript is in the record. At the preliminary hearing,
Cyndy Guillen testified that she lived with her husband in
Cudahy, California, where she was an apartment manager.
At 4:00 a.m., Guillen heard a disturbance in an apartment. She
went to the disturbance and saw that Jojo was injured with blood
3
on him.2 Guillen stayed in the apartment for a while and spoke
to a woman about cleaning the blood off the wall. Guillen then
went downstairs and saw Reeves walking to the parking lot.
Guillen stood by the foot of the stairs. Guillen’s husband and her
father then went to the second floor to ask the people to quiet
down. As they were going down the stairs, Reeves came up the
stairway with a gun. Reeves then shot Guillen’s husband in the
back of the head. Although Guillen identified Reeves in the
preliminary hearing, she was unable to make a positive
identification of Reeves from a photo lineup prior to the hearing.
At the evidentiary hearing, Reeves testified being present
at the shooting but denied being the shooter. Reeves claimed
that a friend named Jojo shot the victim, and that Jojo resembled
appellant at the time.
After taking the matter under submission, the trial court
issued a written ruling denying the petition. The court found
that Reeves was the actual killer and was therefore ineligible for
relief.
On July 7, 2026, appellate counsel for Reeves filed a brief
under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo),
finding no arguable issues. Counsel notified Reeves of the filing
and Reeves’s right to file a supplemental brief. Thereafter,
Reeves filed a supplemental brief.
Reeves argues various issues, some of which (1) are
forfeited for failing to raise them below, or (2) are claims of
alleged error related to the underlying trial with no application to
this section 1172.6 appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Palacios (2024)
2 We note that the name is also spelled “Joe Joe” in the
record.
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101 Cal.App.5th 942, 946 [section 1172.6 does not provide the
petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error
unrelated to section 1172.6].)
Reeves first argues that double jeopardy applies here,
citing Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, among other
cases. Second, Reeves argues the trial court did not
appropriately accommodate appellant’s deafness at the 1980
preliminary hearing. Third, Reeves denies waiving a sign
language interpreter at the 1980 preliminary hearing. Fourth,
Reeves argues that the trial court improperly precluded Reeves’s
self-representation at the preliminary hearing, citing to Faretta
v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, among other cases. Fifth,
Reeves contends trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel in the preliminary hearing. These arguments are both
forfeited and beyond the scope of this appeal.
Reeves also argues counsel provided ineffective assistance
of counsel at the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing and in this
appeal. In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court explained that “ ‘there
is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel’ in
state postconviction proceedings.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 226.)
However, even assuming a due process right exists in such
proceedings where, as here, there is a state-created statutory
right to the appointment of counsel, Reeves has failed to meet the
high bar of demonstrating ineffective assistance. “To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that
(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and
(2) counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial.” (People v.
Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1211 (Scott); Strickland v.
5
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) Such claims are more
appropriately resolved in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
(People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.)
Courts defer to an attorney’s reasonable tactical decisions
and presume that the attorney acted within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. (People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) An attorney’s performance will be found
deficient “only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had
no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission,
(2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or
(3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Ibid.)
Prejudice is shown only when there is a reasonable probability
that but for counsel’s error or omission the result of the
proceeding would have been different. “ ‘A reasonable probability
is [one] sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”
(Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1211–1212.)
Reeves faults trial counsel for failing to secure evidence
that Reeves was at Los Angeles County General Hospital at the
time of the shooting. Appellant claims trial counsel rejected this
narrative. But the record does not affirmatively show that trial
counsel lacked a rational tactical reason for this choice, as this
theory is inconsistent with Reeves’s testimony at the evidentiary
hearing where Reeves claimed to be present at the apartment
building at the time of the shooting. (People v. Mai, supra,
57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) Reeves also incorrectly asserts that trial
counsel did not challenge the use of preliminary hearing
transcript. But the record demonstrates trial counsel did object
to the use of preliminary hearing transcript in the evidentiary
brief.
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Reeves faults appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the
use of the preliminary hearing transcript, to consult with Reeves
on the issues, and to consider the possibility Reeves had falsely
claimed to kill the victim. Section 1172.6 allows for admissible
testimony to be considered, including from the preliminary
hearing, and relatedly, Reeves has not demonstrated ineffective
assistance for appellate counsel choosing to forego the argument
that the first-hand testimony of a witness was inadmissible.
(§1172.6, subd., (d)(3).) Reeves also has failed to affirmatively
rebut the presumption that counsel provided appropriate
assistance. (People v. Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) As for
Reeves’s claim that Reeves falsely claimed to kill the victim, the
trial court found that Reeves was the actual killer, and there is
substantial evidence to support that conclusion based on
Guillen’s testimony.
DISPOSITION
The order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6 is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
SCHERB, J.
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