Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Reeves CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT THE PEOPLE, B348409 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. A368127) v. EVA REEVES, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Drew E. Edwards, Judge. Affirmed. Robert A. Werth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________________ Appellant Eva Reeves appeals the trial court’s denial of appellant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 after an evidentiary hearing. At the time of the initial conviction in 1982, Reeves’s name was Michael Hernandez Contreras. For clarity, we refer to appellant as Reeves, the name appellant uses in this appeal. Decades after Reeves’s underlying conviction, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) to eliminate murder liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and to limit application of the felony-murder rule. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448–449.) Now, except in cases of felony murder, a principal must act with malice aforethought to be convicted of murder, and malice “shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) In addition to changing the law of murder prospectively, Senate Bill 1437 allowed defendants convicted of murder under a now-invalid theory to petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95). (Curiel, at pp. 449–450.) Under section 1172.6, a defendant convicted of murder may petition the sentencing court to have a conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708.) The defendant must allege: (1) the information allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder or attempted murder in which malice is imputed to the defendant based solely on the defendant’s participation in a crime under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) the 1 All further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code. 2 defendant was convicted following a trial or accepted a plea in lieu of trial at which the defendant could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder; and (3) the defendant could not now be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to the law made by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If the petitioner establishes a prima facie case for relief, the matter proceeds to an evidentiary hearing. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) In the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under the current law. (Ibid.) “[T]he court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law.” (Ibid.) On January 26, 2022, Reeves filed a petition under section 1172.6 seeking resentencing of the 1982 conviction for second degree murder. The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), with Reeves represented by appointed counsel. Prior to the hearing, the People and Reeves both filed evidentiary briefs. In that brief, counsel for Reeves argued that the 1980 preliminary hearing transcript was inadmissible. The reporter’s transcript from the jury trial is not in the record because of the age of the case. However, the preliminary hearing transcript is in the record. At the preliminary hearing, Cyndy Guillen testified that she lived with her husband in Cudahy, California, where she was an apartment manager. At 4:00 a.m., Guillen heard a disturbance in an apartment. She went to the disturbance and saw that Jojo was injured with blood 3 on him.2 Guillen stayed in the apartment for a while and spoke to a woman about cleaning the blood off the wall. Guillen then went downstairs and saw Reeves walking to the parking lot. Guillen stood by the foot of the stairs. Guillen’s husband and her father then went to the second floor to ask the people to quiet down. As they were going down the stairs, Reeves came up the stairway with a gun. Reeves then shot Guillen’s husband in the back of the head. Although Guillen identified Reeves in the preliminary hearing, she was unable to make a positive identification of Reeves from a photo lineup prior to the hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, Reeves testified being present at the shooting but denied being the shooter. Reeves claimed that a friend named Jojo shot the victim, and that Jojo resembled appellant at the time. After taking the matter under submission, the trial court issued a written ruling denying the petition. The court found that Reeves was the actual killer and was therefore ineligible for relief. On July 7, 2026, appellate counsel for Reeves filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), finding no arguable issues. Counsel notified Reeves of the filing and Reeves’s right to file a supplemental brief. Thereafter, Reeves filed a supplemental brief. Reeves argues various issues, some of which (1) are forfeited for failing to raise them below, or (2) are claims of alleged error related to the underlying trial with no application to this section 1172.6 appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Palacios (2024) 2 We note that the name is also spelled “Joe Joe” in the record. 4 101 Cal.App.5th 942, 946 [section 1172.6 does not provide the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error unrelated to section 1172.6].) Reeves first argues that double jeopardy applies here, citing Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, among other cases. Second, Reeves argues the trial court did not appropriately accommodate appellant’s deafness at the 1980 preliminary hearing. Third, Reeves denies waiving a sign language interpreter at the 1980 preliminary hearing. Fourth, Reeves argues that the trial court improperly precluded Reeves’s self-representation at the preliminary hearing, citing to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, among other cases. Fifth, Reeves contends trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in the preliminary hearing. These arguments are both forfeited and beyond the scope of this appeal. Reeves also argues counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel at the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing and in this appeal. In Delgadillo, our Supreme Court explained that “ ‘there is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel’ in state postconviction proceedings.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.) However, even assuming a due process right exists in such proceedings where, as here, there is a state-created statutory right to the appointment of counsel, Reeves has failed to meet the high bar of demonstrating ineffective assistance. “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial.” (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1211 (Scott); Strickland v. 5 Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) Such claims are more appropriately resolved in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.) Courts defer to an attorney’s reasonable tactical decisions and presume that the attorney acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) An attorney’s performance will be found deficient “only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Ibid.) Prejudice is shown only when there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s error or omission the result of the proceeding would have been different. “ ‘A reasonable probability is [one] sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1211–1212.) Reeves faults trial counsel for failing to secure evidence that Reeves was at Los Angeles County General Hospital at the time of the shooting. Appellant claims trial counsel rejected this narrative. But the record does not affirmatively show that trial counsel lacked a rational tactical reason for this choice, as this theory is inconsistent with Reeves’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing where Reeves claimed to be present at the apartment building at the time of the shooting. (People v. Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) Reeves also incorrectly asserts that trial counsel did not challenge the use of preliminary hearing transcript. But the record demonstrates trial counsel did object to the use of preliminary hearing transcript in the evidentiary brief. 6 Reeves faults appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the use of the preliminary hearing transcript, to consult with Reeves on the issues, and to consider the possibility Reeves had falsely claimed to kill the victim. Section 1172.6 allows for admissible testimony to be considered, including from the preliminary hearing, and relatedly, Reeves has not demonstrated ineffective assistance for appellate counsel choosing to forego the argument that the first-hand testimony of a witness was inadmissible. (§1172.6, subd., (d)(3).) Reeves also has failed to affirmatively rebut the presumption that counsel provided appropriate assistance. (People v. Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) As for Reeves’s claim that Reeves falsely claimed to kill the victim, the trial court found that Reeves was the actual killer, and there is substantial evidence to support that conclusion based on Guillen’s testimony. DISPOSITION The order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is affirmed. VIRAMONTES, J. WE CONCUR: STRATTON, P. J. SCHERB, J. 7