Full Opinion

Filed 11/13/26 P. v. Carrillo CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, B344405 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. A805030) MARK MICHAEL CARRILLO, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michael Terrell, Judge. Affirmed. William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorneys General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________________________ Mark Carrillo appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). We affirm. BACKGROUND When he was 16 years old, appellant tricked an elderly woman who lived nearby to let him into her home. He then stabbed her 40 times, had sex with her dead body, stole her jewelry, and then bragged to his friends about what he had done.2 In 1985, appellant pleaded guilty to second degree murder (§ 187), first degree burglary (§ 459), and robbery (§ 211) in exchange for a sentence of 15 years to life. In 2023, appellant petitioned the trial court for recall and resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), which the trial court denied because appellant had not received a sentence of LWOP or its functional equivalent. DISCUSSION Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) generally permits a juvenile offender who “was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole” and has been incarcerated for at least 15 years to “submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.” (§ 1170, subd.(d)(1)(A).) Based on equal protection principles, People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard) extended relief under this provision to juvenile offenders who were sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Heard, at pp. 612, 629, 633–634 [sentence of 103 years was functional equivalent of LWOP]; accord, People v. Sorto (2024) 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 These facts are drawn from the probation officer’s report. 2 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 440, 447 [sentence of more than 100 years was functional LWOP].) Not all lengthy sentences are functional LWOP sentences. (E.g., People v. Olmos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 580, 590 [33 years to life was not functional LWOP].) In determining whether a sentence is a functional LWOP sentence, “the relevant inquiry is whether the sentence offers the juvenile offender a realistic hope of release and a genuine opportunity to reintegrate as a productive and respected member of the citizenry.” (People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1130; People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 367–368, 372.) There is no doubt that appellant’s sentence of 15 years to life, imposed when he was still a teenager, allows him the meaningful opportunity to be released and reintegrated upon a showing of rehabilitation. Appellant does not dispute that he became eligible for parole when he was 24 years old. He points to the fact the parole board has repeatedly found him unsuitable for release to argue that he is serving a function LWOP sentence. Nothing in the case law supports this position. 3 DISPOSITION The trial court’s order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. LUI, P. J. We concur: CHAVEZ, J. GOORVITCH, J. 4