In re L.J. CA2/6

Filed 11/12/26 In re L.J. CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX In re L.J., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B352120 Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. FJ57786- Law. 012822) (Los Angeles County) THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. L.J., Defendant and Appellant. L.J. is the subject of two separate petitions under Welfare & Institutions Code section 6021 alleging that he committed murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664), rape of an unconscious All statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions 1 Code unless otherwise stated. or asleep person (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(4)(A)) and sodomy of an unconscious or asleep person. (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (f)(1).) He appeals the juvenile court’s order transferring him from the juvenile court to criminal court. (§ 707.) Appellant contends the trial court misapplied the statutory framework by treating “offense mechanics and planning” as dispositive of criminal sophistication without giving adequate weight to other relevant factors, when it concluded he could not be rehabilitated within the time remaining for the juvenile court to exercise jurisdiction over him, and when it relied on the gravity of his offenses without considering his mental and emotional development. We affirm. Facts The Offenses Appellant was born in July, 2004. On the night of October 25, 2021, when he was 17 years, three months old, appellant and a younger fellow gang-member approached the passenger side of a car that was parked in the territory of a rival gang, shouted “West Side,” and then fired multiple rounds into the car. J.M., who was sitting in the driver’s seat, was shot in the jaw and thigh. He survived his injuries. J.P., who was sitting in the front passenger seat, was shot in the right side of his head and in his right shoulder. He died as a result of these gunshots. A passenger in the back seat, K.T., was uninjured. After the shooting, appellant and his cohort walked to a car they had parked about one block away and drove from the scene. The car was owned by his cohort’s mother. A couple of weeks before the shooting, appellant used social media to communicate with another gang member about getting a gun to use in the shootings. He eventually decided it was better to buy a new gun than risk using one that was tied to 2 another crime. Appellant avoided taking his own cell phone with him to the shooting. The day after, appellant sent social media messages discussing the need to dispose of the gun. Additional social media communications established that appellant fled to Mexico after the shooting. In November 2021, when appellant was 17 years and four months old, M.R. visited him at the converted garage where he was staying. Appellant instructed her to put her phone on “airplane mode.” Then, they smoked marijuana together. M.R. declined when appellant tried to remove her shirt. Shortly thereafter, she lost consciousness. When M.R. regained consciousness, she found herself naked. Her clothes were on the floor. She felt pain in her vaginal and anal areas. A few minutes later, someone knocked on the door and a male voice yelled, “Villa.” Appellant re-entered the room, retrieved a handgun from under a pillow and told M.R., “Get out, bitch.” She gathered her things and complied. M.R. reported the incident to her therapist and to staff at the group home where she lived. Staff contacted law enforcement. M.R. underwent a sexual assault examination which revealed appellant’s DNA on her body. The Transfer Petition The hearing on respondent’s motion to transfer jurisdiction over appellant to criminal court took place over 18 days. It included testimony from 15 witnesses and extensive written records including detention observation reports documenting his conduct while in detention. After reviewing all of this material, the juvenile court gave a lengthy and detailed statement explaining its finding that appellant was not amenable 3 to rehabilitation while under juvenile court jurisdiction. It ordered the matter transferred to criminal court. The Juvenile Court’s Decision Appellant does not contend the juvenile court misstated the evidence or that its findings are unsupported by the record. He does not challenge the credibility or veracity of the witnesses at the transfer hearing. Instead, appellant’s contentions focus on the court’s analysis of the evidence received at the transfer hearing and the weight it gave to certain statutory factors. For that reason, our discussion centers on the juvenile court’s detailed explanation of its decision, rather than on the testimony of the individual witnesses or the documents reviewed by the juvenile court. In explaining its transfer order, the juvenile court first addressed the “degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(1).) It found appellant showed a high degree of criminal sophistication because he planned the shootings “rather extensively.” He “took great pains” to get the gun, recruited a younger gang member to be his accomplice and criticized the accomplice for not putting in enough “ ‘work’ ” for their gang. Appellant conducted a surveillance of the area where the shooting occurred before the night of the murder. He also took steps to avoid being arrested. On the advice of a third party, appellant did not take his cell phone with him so that his location could not be established by cell phone data. He arranged for a getaway car, drove away from the scene without headlights, discussed how to dispose of the gun and fled to Mexico. The juvenile court found that appellant’s conduct in ambushing the victims also showed criminal sophistication. 4  Turning to the remaining statutory factors, the juvenile court acknowledged that appellant had “borderline intellectual functioning,” had been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and had been placed in special education classrooms at school. It noted, however, that appellant had a “high degree . . . of adaptive skills.” He was able to graduate from high school despite his learning disability and had even taken some college classes while in detention. In addition, he had been on probation before his detention and was able to improve his behavior and his attendance at school while under supervision. The juvenile court found no evidence of impetuosity because it found these crimes “very well planned and very well executed, and it was just a very, very deliberate plan that was thought out and executed.” It also considered the evidence that appellant fled to Mexico as evidence he did not act impetuously. For the same reasons, the juvenile court found that appellant demonstrated an appreciation for the risks and potential consequences of his actions. The juvenile court found that appellant’s family and community environment did not “substantially affect the analysis” of his criminal sophistication. The family had some issues, but appellant seemed to have a good relationship with his mother, stepfather and brother. He grew up in the Pasadena- Altadena area where he attended public schools. The court noted that appellant denied childhood trauma. Although there were several referrals to child welfare services for general neglect, only one was substantiated, and that occurred when appellant was 17 years old. There was no evidence appellant had been subjected to sexual abuse or human trafficking. 5  The court next considered whether appellant “can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i).) Appellant was 21 years and 6 months old when the transfer hearing occurred. Juvenile court jurisdiction would expire in 3 years, 6 months, when appellant reaches 25 years of age. The court concluded appellant was not amenable to rehabilitation within that time frame. In reaching this conclusion, it noted that appellant had been in detention for almost four years by the time of the transfer hearing. During that time, appellant exhibited both good and bad behaviors. He completed some college classes, participated in counseling and was sometimes cooperative with staff. On other occasions, appellant exhibited defiance, engaged in fights, and possessed a vape pen and a contraband cleaning solution. Appellant also participated in “ ‘tormenting a female staff member,’ ” and had “shown disrespect.” Appellant participated in telephone conversations where he used coded language to talk about drugs and possibly firearms. He had been in possession of a contraband “film that can be placed on your tongue which contains or is laced with . . . either THC or methamphetamine.” The author of appellant’s transfer report, Deputy Probation Officer Anselmo, described appellant as “gang entrenched,” and noted that he appeared to be leading other gang entrenched youth in the detention facility. Appellant’s entrenchment in the “gang life,” was, for the court, “probably the keystone in terms of him rehabilitating.” The court had “very little hope” that appellant would rehabilitate if he did not reject his gang membership. There was, however, evidence that appellant continued to participate in gang activity while detained, including his possession of a contraband cell phone and 6 his participation in recorded phone conversations regarding drugs and weapons. The court noted that, even while appellant was facing a transfer petition, he continued to “act as if he was an active member of a criminal street gang.” This behavior did not “bode well for [appellant’s] rehabilitation.” Appellant had the potential to change, but the remaining 3 years, six months of juvenile jurisdiction was not enough time to address all of his issues. The court next considered appellant’s “previous delinquent history,” including the seriousness of those incidents and “the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii).) Here, the juvenile court concluded this criterion weighed in favor of appellant’s amenability to rehabilitation. There was no “overwhelming, mitigating evidence” that appellant’s family had a negative effect on his delinquent history. Appellant had four arrests before the petitions at issue here resulting in two sustained petitions. The first of these involved a misdemeanor assault on a staff member at a truancy program. The second petition involved an “extremely serious” incident in which appellant and three other males fired multiple shots at rival gang members. No one was injured in the incident. Appellant admitted one firearm charge (Pen. Code, § 29610) and was placed on formal probation. While on probation, his attendance and performance at school improved. He completed probation in November 2021, after the offenses alleged in the current petitions occurred. Because appellant had only one “serious” prior petition and successfully completed probation, the 7 juvenile court found that appellant is amenable to rehabilitation under this criterion. The fourth statutory criterion requires the court to consider the, “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor,” including “the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)-(ii).) The court found that, while on probation, appellant received “wrap around services,” “family preservation services,” and counseling. He was under “gang supervision” and had access to a therapist and a psychiatrist or psychologist as needed. These interventions resulted in “[i]mproved grades, improved behavior, improved attendance [and] negative drug tests.” The court concluded that appellant received “every possible form of supervision that was appropriate, available through probation during that period of time.” The court found these services were adequate based on the behavior that was brought to the attention of the probation department. “The new charges, obviously, indicate that a more rigorous and lengthy treatment plan is required, and the court finds, all things considered, that [appellant] is not amenable under [this] category.” Finally, the court evaluated the “circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition[s],” including “the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)-(ii).) It found this factor weighed against appellant’s amenability to rehabilitation. These offenses are among the most serious possible offenses. Appellant’s mental state “depicts a person who 8 seems to be very much in control of the operation, very much in control of himself, and was able to give directions and orders and perform the activities that culminated in this crime.” He did not seem to be “laboring under any type of emotional distress or duress.” Instead, appellant “was in complete possession of his faculties.” His degree of involvement in the offenses “could not have been greater,” and the level of harm he caused was enormous. The court concluded, “I find that there is no significant mitigating information that would cause this court to find that he is amenable under this category. In fact, I find the opposite that he is not amenable under the circumstances and gravity of these offenses.” Among the other evidence found relevant by the court was an opinion offered by respondent’s forensic neuropsychologist, Dr. Rogers, that appellant “was very good at deception and very good at not getting caught.” While in detention, appellant showed that he could be respectful and cooperative with staff. However, he was also capable of hiding misconduct from staff, breaking rules and possessing contraband. The court found appellant to be “adept at having other people follow his directions whether overtly or covertly given,” including one incident in which he appeared to direct other youths to fight. In addition, there was evidence that appellant was using county phones to coordinate drug and gun sales. The court concluded appellant had a “dim” prognosis for rehabilitation because he was unlikely to renounce his gang membership. To the contrary, appellant’s behavior in detention demonstrated that he was “proud of his gang affiliation,” and even acted like “somebody in a position of authority” among fellow gang members. The court acknowledged that appellant 9 participated in some “prosocial activities,” but concluded “his overall conduct indicates to me that much more time is needed for [appellant] to rehabilitate himself and become a productive member of society.” Taking into consider all of the five statutory criteria, the court found appellant was not amenable to rehabilitation within the time remaining in the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over him. Contentions Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by misapplying the section 707 criteria. First, appellant contends the juvenile court employed the “wrong conception” of the criminal sophistication criterion because its analysis was not “youth-centered,” relied too heavily on “offense mechanics,” planning and concealment, did not give enough weight to appellant’s developmental and environmental impairments, and adopted an analysis of impetuosity, intellectual functioning, trauma and peer pressure that is inconsistent with the statute. Second, appellant contends the juvenile court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence that he was not likely to be rehabilitated within the remaining time in the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Third, appellant contends the trial court erred when it found respondent proved the circumstances and gravity of the offenses by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, appellant urges this court to either reverse the transfer order or to remand the matter for a new hearing applying the proper transfer criteria. Standard of Review “We review the juvenile court's determination to transfer a minor to criminal court for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] ‘The court's factual findings are reviewed for 10 substantial evidence, and its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. [Citation.] A decision based on insufficient evidence or the court’s “ ‘erroneous understanding of applicable law’ ” is subject to reversal. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 211 (J.S.).) Because the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the appellant is not amenable to rehabilitation while under its jurisdiction, we “determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence form which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by” that standard. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005.) In doing so, however, we do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our discretion for that of the trial court. The court’s “ ‘application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ ” (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th at 152, 165, quoting Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712.) Discussion Section 707 establishes the procedure for transferring a minor from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to the adult criminal court. After the prosecutor files a motion to transfer, the juvenile court orders the probation department to prepare a report on the minor’s behavioral patterns and social history. (Id., subd. (a)(1).) The court then holds a hearing on the motion at which it considers the probation report and evidence submitted by the minor. The people have the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, “that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).) 11  In deciding whether to transfer the minor, the juvenile court must consider five criteria specified in the statute: “(A)(i) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor . . . . (B)(i) Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. . . . (C)(i) The minor’s previous delinquent history. . . . (D)(i) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor. . . . (E)(i) The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) In considering these criteria, the juvenile court is directed to “give weight to any relevant factor,” including specific factors listed in the statute as relevant to each criterion. (Id., subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).) 1. Criminal Sophistication. The first criterion listed in section 707 is the “degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(A)(i).) In evaluating this criterion, the court is directed to give weight to “any relevant factor,” including, “the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) Appellant contends the court abused its discretion when it concluded that his degree of criminal sophistication showed he is not amenable to rehabilitation in juvenile court. In 12 appellant’s view, the court did not analyze the evidence using the requisite “developmental lens.” As a result, the court gave insufficient weight to evidence of appellant’s “borderline” intellectual functioning, ADHD, developmental delays and heightened susceptibility to peer and gang influence. At the same time, the court placed too much weight on the evidence that he planned the shooting and took steps to avoid arrest. In doing so, the court failed to consider the opinion of an expert witness who described the shooting as a relatively typical retaliatory gang crime. The expert opined that appellant was following an established pattern for a gang shooting, not exhibiting independent thought or criminal sophistication. Appellant also takes issue with the court’s finding that appellant’s planning activities show the offenses were not impetuous. He contends the court’s analysis conflates impetuosity with spontaneity, when the statute requires evidence that appellant exercised independent, adult judgment. In evaluating appellant’s criminal sophistication, the juvenile court expressly considered each of the factors enumerated in the statute. In doing so, it relied on the transfer report prepared by the probation department and the testimony of investigating police officers, the probation officers who worked with appellant and authored the transfer report, forensic psychologists, and an expert witness on gang culture. The juvenile court was not obligated to credit the opinions of appellant’s expert witnesses. (In re J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 212.) Here, it relied on the investigating officers’ description of the offenses and the probation officers’ description of appellant’s behavior while in custody. It concluded appellant demonstrated criminal sophistication because he 13 carefully planned the shootings, directed a younger gang member to accompany him and took steps, both before and after the shootings, to avoid being identified as the shooter. These behaviors are relevant to determining criminal sophistication. (Id. at p. 214 [attempts to conceal evidence showed criminal sophistication]; Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 194-195 (Kevin P.) [attempts to cover up crime are substantial evidence of criminal sophistication].) Similarly, appellant’s efforts to plan both the shooting and his escape afterwards were relevant to his degree of criminal sophistication. Substantial evidence supported the court’s findings that appellant carefully planned the shooting by obtaining a gun that was not tied to other crimes, surveilling the area before the shooting, enlisting an accomplice, arranging for transportation to and from the crime scene and then fleeing the country. (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 683-684; Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 193- 195.) Nor can we agree with appellant that the court failed adequately to consider his “developmental” status including his borderline intellectual functioning, ADHD, developmental delays and susceptibility to peer and gang influences. Appellant’s conduct in planning the crimes and his subsequent efforts to avoid arrest are relevant to a determination of his intellectual abilities and developmental status. The trial court acknowledged appellant’s intellectual ability and ADHD, but also noted that he demonstrated a high degree of “adaptive skills.” While on formal probation for a prior offense, appellant was able to improve his attendance, behavior and performance at school. Appellant’s social media communications establish that he began discussing 14 the shooting weeks in advance of the crime. His developmental status and ADHD did not prevent him from spending that time considering whether to borrow a used firearm or acquire a new one, nor did they prevent him from remembering to leave his cell phone behind during the shooting. This reasoning is consistent with the statute. For similar reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in its discretion when it concluded appellant’s conduct was not impetuous and demonstrated that he appreciated the risks and consequences of his behavior. Appellant carefully planned his retreat from the scene of the shooting to minimize the chances he would be arrested that night. He also demonstrated forethought and planning during the sexual assault. He invited the victim to the converted garage where he was living. He instructed her to put her phone on airplane mode so they would not be disturbed. He also laced the marijuana he gave her, to prevent her from resisting. All of this conduct showed that appellant considered these offenses before he committed them rather than acting in the heat of the moment. As the court noted, there is no evidence he was operating under any form of coercion or emotional distress during either incident. He was in control of himself (and of his accomplice in the shooting) as he committed these crimes. The juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that appellant exhibited a high degree of criminal sophistication, which weighed in favor of his transfer to criminal court and against his amenability to rehabilitation while under juvenile court jurisdiction. We conclude that substantial evidence exists to support that finding by the high degree of probability demanded under the clear and convincing evidence 15 standard. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1005.) There was no error. 2. Likelihood of Rehabilitation While Under Juvenile Court Jurisdiction. The second statutory criterion requires the juvenile court to determine whether appellant “can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i).) In evaluating this criterion, the court is directed to consider, “any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).) The juvenile court found this factor weighed in favor of appellant’s transfer to adult court because, at the time of the transfer hearing, appellant was 21 years, six months old and had only 3 years, six months left in the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. (§§ 607, subd. (c); 1769, subd. (b).) After noting that appellant had been detained for almost four years by the time of the transfer hearing, the court acknowledged that he had exhibited some positive behaviors. He completed some college classes, participated in counseling and was often cooperative with staff. At the same time, appellant exhibited a number of very concerning behaviors. He was defiant, engaged in fighting, possessed a vape pen and possessed some cleaning solution that was considered contraband because its smell might have been used to mask the smell of other contraband in his room. He also participated in “tormenting a female staff member.” While in detention and speaking on a recorded line, appellant used coded language to discuss possessing a contraband cell phone, selling drugs and potentially firearms, directing CashApp transactions relating to drug sales and arranging for the repair of a car that had been damaged when 16 someone was “ ‘doing a job,’ ” for appellant. He was involved in fights while in detention and acted like a “boss” or “shot caller,” exercising influence over other youth in the detention facility. Probation staff described incidents in which appellant used his size and influence to manipulate other youth into disobeying staff, control when they fought with each other and control their access to the unit phone line. One staff member described appellant’s presence on the unit as “detrimental to other minor’s safety and well-being.” Another described him as being “very respectful towards staff [to] get on [their] good sides to go under the radar.” The court properly relied on this evidence to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that there was little likelihood appellant would be rehabilitated in the three and one-half years then remaining in the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Appellant was entrenched in his gang and demonstrated no willingness to renounce it. His own expert witness acknowledged that disengaging from the gang was necessary for rehabilitation and was “about a four- to six-year process” for him. That time frame exceeded the time remaining for the juvenile court to exercise jurisdiction over appellant. We conclude the juvenile court did not err when it found this criterion supported appellant’s transfer to adult criminal court. 3. Circumstances and Gravity of the Offense. The next criterion challenged by appellant is, “The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E).) In evaluating this criterion, the court is directed to give weight to “any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of 17 involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii).) This criterion focuses on the alleged offense and is “ ‘based on the premise that the minor did, in fact, commit the offense.’ ” (Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 189, quoting People v. Superior Court (Jones), supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 682.) The seriousness of the alleged offense, however, does not “ ‘automatically require a finding of unfitness.’ ” (Jones, at p. 682.) Instead, “the sole question is whether [the minor] would be amenable to treatment in the event that he . . . is ultimately adjudged a ward of the court.” (Ibid.) The court found this criterion weighed heavily in favor of transfer. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in considering this criterion because it gave insufficient weight to his mental state and his mental and emotional development, and instead relied solely on the “abstract seriousness of the charge alone.” We disagree. The court correctly found that the gravity of appellant’s offenses could not be greater. Appellant was centrally involved in the planning and commission of each offense and his actual behavior caused immeasurable harm to all three victims. The facts of these offenses support a reasonable inference that appellant was acting intentionally and was, as the court found, “in complete possession of his faculties.” As we have already noted, appellant’s developmental delays and intellectual limitations did not prevent him from planning each of these offenses and taking the numerous steps required to carry them out. Appellant’s expert psychologist opined that the gravity of these offenses and appellant’s degree of involvement in them 18 weighed in favor of his transfer to criminal court. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion when found this factor weighed in favor of transfer to criminal court. Disposition Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it found clear and convincing evidence that appellant is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Accordingly, the order transferring appellant to criminal court is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. YEGAN, J. We concur: CODY, P. J. BALTODANO, J. 19  Christina L. Hill, Judge Superior Court County of Los Angeles ______________________________ Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Sophia A. Lecky, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.