People v. Samoata CA4/1

Filed 10/28/26 P. v. Samoata CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D085418 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD288011) v. MATATOA SAMOATA, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kimberlee A. Lagotta, Judge. Affirmed. James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Stephanie Chow, Deputy Attorney General, and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent. After appellant Matatoa Samoata’s case was remanded for resentencing on his murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter convictions, the trial court gave him additional time and set a status hearing to confirm whether he wished to keep his retained counsel, who had represented him at trial, for resentencing. At the status hearing, counsel conferred privately with Samoata, then confirmed her representation. Counsel filed sentencing papers on Samoata’s behalf, made arguments to the court, and presented a statement by Samoata’s father. The prosecution argued for the same sentence as originally imposed. Just as two family members of the murder victim were about to address the court, Samoata called out, “Marsden. Marsden. Marsden. Judge, Marsden.” The court allowed the family members to speak, then in an ex-parte hearing informed Samoata that Marsden1 did not apply to retained counsel, and found no good cause to continue the sentencing for Samoata to retain new counsel. Samoata contends that the trial court erred in applying the Marsden standard and requiring him to show “good cause” to relieve his retained attorney. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely what it construed as Samoata’s request to continue the sentencing to be represented by appointed counsel, where Samoata made the request after the court confirmed retention of counsel on the record at a status hearing for that purpose, the parties made sentencing submissions 1 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). 2 and arguments, Samoata’s family member had addressed the court, and the murder victim’s family members were about to speak. The judgment is affirmed. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Samoata lured a drug dealer to an elementary school by agreeing to buy a pound of marijuana for $1,500, only he brought $700 of counterfeit money and a loaded gun. During the transaction, Samoata shot the drug dealer and the drug dealer’s friend. Samoata seriously injured the dealer and killed the friend. (People v. Samoata2 (Aug. 2, 2024, D080333) [nonpub. opn.].) A jury found Samoata guilty of first degree murder with a firearm enhancement (Pen. Code,3 §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d); count 1), and attempted voluntary manslaughter with firearm and great bodily injury enhancements. (§§ 664/192, subd. (a), 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (a); count 2.) Attorney Michelle Cameron-Hunsaker appeared as Samoata’s retained attorney starting in September 2021. She represented him at his trial starting January 28, 2022 and at his sentencing in April 2022. At sentencing five of the murder victim’s family and friends addressed the court. The court sentenced Samoata to 50 years to life in prison and an additional determinate term of 10 years in prison. Samoata appealed and argued the trial court committed three errors, two of which pertained to his sentence. This court initially affirmed and 2 Petition for review granted on February 24, 2024, remanded for resentencing with directions. 3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 declined to remand for resentencing. (People v. Samoata, supra, D080333.) The Supreme Court granted a petition for review in February 2024 and remanded for resentencing with directions. After remand, the trial court held a status hearing in October 2024. Samoata was not present. The court noted that Samoata had filed a handwritten petition for resentencing and for appointment of counsel in the trial court in February 2024. It was unclear whether the request pertained to counsel for his appeal. The parties agreed to set a status conference at which Samoata would be produced, to determine whether he wished to have counsel appointed for the resentencing. Samoata appeared at the status hearing on November 1, 2024 via Zoom from his correctional institution. Cameron-Hunsaker indicated that she had spoken to Samoata and he agreed that she would continue to represent him. The trial court confirmed the resentencing date of December 13, 2024, with filings due on December 10. The prosecutor stated that the murder victim’s family members would likely attend. Prior to resentencing, Cameron-Hunsaker filed a 10-page mitigation brief on Samoata’s behalf, pointing out that Samoata was only 20 years old at the time of the crime, expressed remorse, and had a “real, substantial, and not entirely unreasonable belief” that he needed to act to save his own life. She moved to strike the firearm and great bodily injury enhancements, recommended a total sentence of 25 years to life, and urged the court to order the sentences on both counts to run concurrently. Samoata appeared in person at sentencing on December 13, 2024. The court stated it had reviewed the People’s sentencing statement, Samoata’s mitigation brief, statements the murder victim’s relatives made at the initial sentencing, and the probation report. 4  Defense counsel highlighted Samoata’s youth, his learning disabilities and behavioral issues that affected his decision-making, and his extreme remorse. Samoata’s father asked for forgiveness and pleaded for leniency. The prosecutor urged the court to run the sentences consecutively and not exercise its discretion to strike the enhancements, noting among other things the “brutality” of the crime, in which Samoata had “lured the victims” out to rob them, brought “fake money,” then shot one victim in the face and the ankle and shot the other victim twice in the back of the head. The prosecutor had just invited the murder victim’s relatives to address the court when the following occurred: “[Victim’s sister]: I’ll go first. “[Samoata]: Marsden. Marsden. Marsden. Judge, Marsden. “The court: Quiet down. “[Samoata]: Marsden. “The court: I heard what you said. Right now, we have an individual who is about to speak. I’ll address your Marsden motion in a moment. “[Samoata]: Thank you.” The court heard from the murder victim’s sister, aunt, and mother. The prosecutor indicated that additional family members and friends of the murder victim were in court that day to support reimposition of the original sentence. The court then turned to Samoata’s counsel to ask, “On behalf of your client, I know your client blurted out ‘Marsden’ multiple times. What’s your client’s position at this time?” The attorney answered that Samoata had a statement to make to the court. Samoata asked to be moved to a prison closer to home due to his mother’s medical condition and for his own mental health. He said nothing about his attorney. 5  The court asked Samoata, “You had also mentioned a Marsden motion. Are you requesting a Marsden motion at this time?” When Samoata answered “Yes,” the court cleared the courtroom and spoke with Samoata and his attorney. The court inquired whether counsel was retained or appointed, and when counsel indicated she was retained, the court informed Samoata that Marden applied to replacement of an appointed attorney. Counsel indicated she informed Samoata that Marsden did not apply to a retained attorney. Samoata said, “That’s fine.” The court asked if Samoata wished to withdraw his Marsden motion. Samoata answered, “No, I’m saying I want a different lawyer.” The court inquired whether he wanted a lawyer to be appointed. He said “Yes,” but then said, “Yeah, so I can get a new one retained, please.” The court noted that it had previously confirmed that Cameron- Hunsaker remained retained by Samoata’s family. The court asked Samoata what change of circumstance warranted a change of his lawyer. Samoata answered, “I just want a different lawyer. I don’t feel like she’s fighting for me as hard as I would fight for myself.” The court responded, “At this time, I have not heard good cause to continue the matter for purposes of retention of a new lawyer. Today is the date for sentencing. We did take great care before setting this hearing and this date to give Ms. [Cameron-]Hunsaker an opportunity to consult with Mr. Samoata’s family, to determine whether or not she remained retained. She has filed appropriate paperwork with the court, has made appropriate arguments before the court. At this time, I do not find good cause to continue the sentencing in this matter for purposes of retaining new counsel, which is what Mr. Samoata has indicated to the court. The motion to continue the sentencing for purposes of retaining new counsel is denied.” 6  Back in open court, the court indicated that it had denied as untimely Samoata’s request to continue sentencing to retain new counsel. The prosecutor noted that the murder victim’s family had driven from “hours and hours away” to attend the hearing. Resuming with the sentencing, the defense presented remarks by Samoata’s brother and mother. The court reimposed the original sentence of 60 years to life, declining to exercise its discretion to strike the enhancements. Samoata timely appealed. DISCUSSION A. Legal Principles “ ‘The right to retained counsel of choice is—subject to certain limitations—guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. [Citations.] In California, this right “reflects not only a defendant’s choice of a particular attorney, but also his decision to discharge an attorney whom he hired but no longer wishes to retain.” ’ ” (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 512 (Maciel); People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 983 (Ortiz).) When he wishes to discharge a retained attorney, a defendant need not demonstrate either that counsel “is providing inadequate representation [citations], or that he and the attorney are embroiled in irreconcilable conflict . . . .” (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 383.) Those standards are applicable when a defendant seeks substitution of appointed counsel. (Ibid.; see Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118.) Consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a defendant may discharge retained counsel “ ‘with or without cause.’ ” (People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 1004.) 7  “The right to discharge a retained attorney is, however, not absolute. [Citation.] The trial court has discretion to ‘deny such a motion if discharge will result in “significant prejudice” to the defendant [citation], or if it is not timely, i.e., if it will result in “disruption of the orderly processes of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 311.) “[T]he ‘fair opportunity’ to secure counsel of choice provided by the Sixth Amendment ‘is necessarily [limited by] the countervailing state interest against which the [S]ixth [A]mendment right provides explicit protection: the interest in proceeding with prosecutions on an orderly and expeditious basis, taking into account the practical difficulties of “assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time.” ’ ” (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 983–984.) “[U]nder the applicable test for retained counsel, the court should ‘balance the defendant’s interest in new counsel against the disruption, if any, flowing from the substitution.’ ” (People v. Keshishian (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 425, 429 (Keshishian).) The court “must exercise its discretion reasonably: ‘a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality.’ ” (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 984.) “[T]he trial court has discretion whether to grant a continuance to permit a defendant to be represented by retained counsel.” (People v. Jeffers (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 840, 850 (Jeffers).) In a criminal case, a continuance may only be granted upon a showing of “good cause.” (§ 1050, subd. (e).) A trial court has wide discretion in determining whether good cause exists. (People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 920.) In making that determination, trial courts consider “ ‘ “ ‘not only the benefit which the moving party anticipates but also the likelihood that such benefit will result, 8 the burden on other witnesses, jurors and the court and, above all, whether substantial justice will be accomplished or defeated by a granting of the motion.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 450.) A showing of good cause also requires that both counsel and the defendant have acted with due diligence. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037). But the trial court may not exercise its discretion “ ‘so as to deprive the defendant or his attorney of a reasonable opportunity to prepare.’ ” (Doolin, at p. 450.) A trial court’s denial of a request for continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Jeffers, at p. 850.) A trial court’s “discretion is abused only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered.” (Beames, at p. 920.) B. Analysis We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Samoata’s request to continue the sentencing as untimely. At the time Samoata made his request, retained counsel Cameron-Hunsaker had represented him for more than three years. She represented him for pretrial hearings starting in September 2021, at his January 2022 jury trial, at his initial sentencing in April 2022, on remand in October 2024, at the status hearing in November, and for the first half of the resentencing hearing in December 2024. In connection with the resentencing, counsel had filed mitigation papers, made motions, argued for a lower sentence, and asked the court to hear comments from Samoata’s father. The court had given opportunities for Samoata to request another attorney before the resentencing hearing on December 13, 2024, which the court had set two months earlier in October 2024. Due to the uncertainty engendered by Samoata’s handwritten filing from February 2024, the court set a status hearing in November 2024 expressly to allow Samoata to indicate 9 whether he wished to relieve his attorney and proceed with an appointed attorney. Samoata did not request a new attorney at the status hearing in November. He agreed to continue with his retained attorney. Samoata did not request a new attorney when the sentencing papers were due on December 10, 2024. He did not request a new attorney at the beginning of the resentencing hearing on December 13, 2024. He waited until he had heard defense counsel’s sentencing argument and the prosecutor’s argument, then interrupted the proceeding just as the murder victim’s sister was about to speak. Even thereafter, Samoata did not request a new attorney the first time the court inquired about his outburst, but merely asked the court to house him closer to home. Only when the court asked again did Samoata indicate he wanted a new attorney. (See Keshishian, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 429 [“[T]he court is within its discretion to deny a last-minute motion for continuance to secure new counsel.”]; Jeffers, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 850 [“[L]ateness of the request [for continuance] may be a significant factor justifying denial absent compelling circumstances to the contrary”].) At the time of the resentencing, the family members and friends of the murder victim had already attended the first sentencing in April 2022, at which five of them addressed the court. Two and a half years later, the victim’s supporters returned for the resentencing hearing, having driven “hours and hours” to attend. On this record, the court was within its discretion to determine that Samoata’s request in the middle of his second sentencing hearing was untimely and granting it would have resulted in the “unreasonable disruption of the orderly processes of justice.” (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 979; see also Keshishian, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 429.) 10  Not only was Samoata’s request untimely, he had shown no diligence in supporting his request. He told the court he wanted an appointed attorney, but then said he wished to retain another attorney. He did not indicate that he had already selected another attorney to retain, or that he had made efforts to find another attorney. (See Maciel, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 512– 513 [denial of a continuance for the defendant to replace counsel was not an abuse of discretion where the case had been pending for two years, trial was imminent in six weeks, the defendant had no substitute counsel in mind, and the need for new counsel to prepare for trial would result in significant delays]; cf. People v. Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784, 791 [denying a trial continuance was an abuse of discretion where, a month before trial, the defendant selected a private attorney, made efforts to raise the retainer fee, had established an attorney-client relationship with the new attorney, and sought a continuance the week before trial after he finally retained the new attorney].) Samoata contends that the trial court improperly conducted a “Marsden type in camera hearing” and applied the Marsden standard, requiring Samoata to demonstrate good cause before granting his request to relieve counsel. The record belies this claim. The court inquired whether circumstances had changed since Samoata confirmed the representation by his retained attorney in November. Samoata did not explain that the retention agreement had expired, or the attorney had withdrawn, or he could no longer afford to pay his lawyer. His comment that he did not feel she was fighting for him “as hard as I would fight for myself,” supports the court’s finding that Samoata had failed to establish good cause to continue. Samoata was not asking to represent himself, so the rationale did not support his claimed 11 reason for delaying the then-pending sentencing hearing. At this point, he had interrupted the statement by the murder victim’s sister and had already been permitted to “fight for [himself]” by addressing the court directly. The court was well within its discretion to decide that Samoata’s dissatisfaction with defense counsel’s advocacy was not good cause to delay sentencing. The court’s statement back in open court—that it denied as untimely Samoata’s request to continue sentencing to retain new counsel—made clear its inquiry about changed circumstances focused on whether Samoata presented good cause for a continuance, as required. (See § 1050, subds. (e), (f).) That the court chose to conduct this inquiry in a closed, ex parte hearing does not change the nature of the standard applied. Samoata himself invoked Marsden repeatedly. The court convened an ex parte hearing as would be expected for a Marsden motion, but almost immediately advised Samoata that Marsden did not apply. Instead of re-opening the courtroom, as it could have done, the trial court chose to conduct its good cause inquiry in the closed setting prompted by Samoata’s outburst. Samoata contends reversal is automatic, relying on People Hernandez (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 101 (Hernandez). In Hernandez, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court had improperly applied the Marsden standard to the defendant’s request to replace his public defender with private counsel. (Hernandez, at p. 108.) Because the court here did not apply the incorrect standard but properly evaluated whether there was good cause to continue the sentencing, we agree with the Attorney General that Hernandez does not support reversal here. More persuasive is the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Maciel, supra, 57 Cal.4th at page 513. As Samoata does here, the defendant in Maciel argued that the trial court erroneously applied the Marsden standard 12 for replacing appointed counsel rather than the Ortiz standard for relieving retained counsel, where the trial court conducted an ex parte in camera hearing, evaluated the defendant’s complaints regarding his attorney’s performance, and expressed the view that defense counsel was not incompetent nor had there been a breakdown in communication. (Maciel, at p. 513.) But these events reflected nothing more than the trial court properly considering “the totality of the circumstances” in evaluating whether a motion to discharge retained counsel is “timely, i.e., if it will result in ‘disruption of the orderly processes of justice,’ ” the Supreme Court explained. (Maciel, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 513.) “Although a defendant seeking to discharge his retained attorney is not required to demonstrate inadequate representation or an irreconcilable conflict, this does not mean that the trial court cannot properly consider the absence of such circumstances in deciding whether discharging counsel would result in disruption of the orderly processes of justice.” (Ibid.) The trial court here did exactly what the Supreme Court authorized. The court allowed Samoata to explain why his request to relieve counsel justified disrupting the ongoing sentencing hearing, after the court confirmed the date of the resentencing hearing in Samoata’s presence—a hearing the victim’s supporters were projected to attend, as they had attended his initial sentencing. The trial court could properly consider “the absence of [inadequate representation or an irreconcilable conflict] in deciding whether discharging counsel would result in disruption of the orderly processes of justice.” (Maciel, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 513.) In sum, we conclude the court properly balanced Samoata’s right to counsel of his choosing against the inevitable delay and disruption that would 13 be caused if it permitted Samoata to relieve his attorney halfway through his resentencing hearing. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. O’ROURKE, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. KELETY, J. 14