Full Opinion

Filed 10/30/26 P. v. Tribble CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D085982 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. v. FSB24002155, 24CJ-001607, FVI24002599) DAQUAN ELI TRIBBLE, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Rafael A. Arreola, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions. Michelle T. LiVecchi-Raufi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In August 2024, Daquan Eli Tribble pled no contest to bringing controlled substances into a jail (Pen. Code, § 4573; count 2) in exchange for 1 dismissal of the remaining charge against him and mandatory supervision with a suspended four-year upper-term jail sentence. The information alleged Tribble had a strike prior. Within weeks, Tribble violated the terms to which he had agreed. The court revoked mandatory supervision and executed the suspended sentence. On appeal, Tribble argues (1) the trial court erred in accepting the plea agreement because it resulted in an unauthorized sentence, thus requiring his jail sentence to be changed to a prison sentence; and (2) the minute order from his resentencing must be amended to reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of credits. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we remand for the trial court to amend the minute order but otherwise affirm. I. While on mandatory supervision in late August 2024, two uniformed police officers contacted Tribble in response to a call for service. Upon searching Tribble, the officers discovered a “glass smoking device” used to smoke methamphetamine. The officers arrested Tribble. Tribble resisted being placed in handcuffs and kicked the knee of the officer trying to place him into the police vehicle. In December, following a combined preliminary examination on a resisting arrest allegation and probation revocation hearing, the court concluded Tribble had violated several terms of his mandatory supervision: that he “violate no law,” that he “not possess any type of drug paraphernalia,” and that he “submit to search and seizure . . . by any law enforcement officer with or without cause.” The People argued Tribble’s plea deal was “an illegal plea” because he had a strike prior and was therefore ineligible for mandatory supervision; instead, he “need[ed] to be sentenced to state prison.” 2 At the February 2025 hearing at which Tribble was resentenced, the court offered to let him “either serve out the 4 years” or spend 365 days in custody and serve the remainder of his sentence on mandatory supervision. Tribble indicated he wanted to take advantage of services available in prison and said, “They’re telling me it’s an illegal plea bargain. The plea bargain is 4 years [in] county jail.” The People responded, “He has a prior strike; however, he didn’t admit it as part of this plea so he’s not eligible for state prison at this time.” The court stated, “It doesn’t sound like he wants me to consider putting him back on mandatory supervision. It sounds like he’s refusing it, right, so you can just serve your 4 years.” After asking if that was what Tribble wanted, Tribble responded he “would like to go to a program that’s gonna help” him. The court asked if a future date was necessary, but defense counsel said, “No. I think we should move forward.” Tribble said he “need[ed] a future date” and wanted to “talk about an appeal” because “[t]his is just an illegal plea bargain.” The court later confirmed Tribble “already has the 4 years” because it “offered [365 days] to him” but “[h]e refuse[d].” The court ultimately terminated Tribble’s mandatory supervision and sentenced him to the upper term of four years in local custody. II. A. Tribble argues his plea agreement was contrary to law and the trial court erred in approving it, requiring reversal. We conclude Tribble’s sentence is unauthorized but he is estopped from challenging it because he accepted the benefits of the plea agreement. 3 Section 1170(h)(1) provides that certain felonies are subject to a sentencing triad for “a term of imprisonment in a county jail.” Under section 1170(h)(2), “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (3), a felony punishable pursuant to this subdivision shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for the term described in the underlying offense.” Under section 1170(h)(3), however, a defendant with a strike prior must serve any felony sentence in state prison. Section 1170(f) indicates that “an allegation that a defendant is eligible for state prison due to a prior or current conviction . . . shall not be subject to dismissal pursuant to section 1385” for purposes of section 1170(h)(3). Section 1170(h)(5)(A) provides that, “[u]nless the court finds, in the interest of justice, that it is not appropriate in a particular case, the court, when imposing a sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2), shall suspend execution of a concluding portion of the term for a period selected at the court’s discretion.” Under section 1170(h)(5)(B), during the suspended portion of the sentence—called “mandatory supervision”—the defendant is subject to “supervis[ion] by [a] probation officer in accordance with the terms, conditions, and procedures generally applicable to persons placed on probation.” The parties agree that, given Tribble’s strike prior—which, under section 1170(f), cannot be dismissed (People v. Avignone (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1233, 1243)—he was ineligible for a split jail sentence under section 1170(h)(5)(B). (See People v. Griffis (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 956, 962- 964 [prior conviction need not be admitted by defendant to render defendant ineligible].) Tribble argues his sentence was unauthorized, so the trial court “should have refused to accept the illegal plea agreement which resulted in an unauthorized sentence.” This is true. But we part ways with Tribble’s 4 argument that he “is not precluded from raising the error on appeal based upon the estoppel doctrine.” “The rule that defendants may challenge an unauthorized sentence on appeal even if they failed to object below is itself subject to an exception: Where the defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence, appellate courts will not find error even though the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in reaching that figure, so long as the trial court did not lack fundamental jurisdiction.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.) “The rationale behind this policy is that defendants who have received the benefit of their bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to better the bargain through the appellate process.” (Ibid.) “[L]ack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence or power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties.” (People v. Ramirez (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425-1426 [cleaned up].) “By contrast, when a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, actions in substantial disregard of constitutional or statutory limitations, or that deny fundamental rights or defenses, are acts in excess of jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 1426.) As the People note, the trial court had fundamental jurisdiction over Tribble and the subject matter of his criminal case. In imposing an unauthorized sentence, the court exceeded its jurisdiction. But the “illegal plea bargain” was not, as Tribble contends, “null and void.” The case on which Tribble relies for this proposition concerns the distinguishable issue of whether double jeopardy attaches to an unlawful guilty plea. (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550.) Instead, as the People argue, the court’s sentence was voidable rather than void. (Citing Ramirez, 159 Cal.App.4th at 5 p. 1422.) Such rulings are “subject to forfeiture if not timely asserted.” (Ibid.) Here, rather than contest the unauthorized sentence he received at the time of his original sentencing, Tribble accepted the benefit of the plea agreement: immediate release on mandatory supervision rather than serving the four years he otherwise faced in state prison. While Tribble was no longer benefiting from the plea bargain at the time of his resentencing, he nonetheless accepted and benefited from the favorable terms the prosecutor offered and the court approved. Having accepted the benefit of the court’s specified—albeit unauthorized—sentence imposed as part of the negotiated plea bargain, Tribble is “estopped from complaining of [the] sentence[] to which [he] agreed,” which included a suspended sentence of four years in jail rather than prison. (Hester, 22 Cal.4th at p. 295.) In light of this conclusion, we do not need to reach the People’s remaining counterarguments. B. Tribble also contends the February 7, 2025 minute order must be corrected to reflect the 456 days of credit the trial court orally pronounced during his resentencing. “Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.) We thus accept the People’s concession the matter should be remanded for the trial court to correct the number of credits on the minute order. (See People v. Hartland (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 71, 81.) 6 III. We remand for the trial court to correct the February 7, 2025 minute order to reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of 456 days of credits. In all other respects, we affirm. CASTILLO, J. WE CONCUR: MCCONNELL, P. J. AMIN, J. 7