Full Opinion

Filed 11/16/26 P. v. Guereca CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Siskiyou) THE PEOPLE, C103313 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22CF01094) v. JOSE ALFREDO PATRON GUERECA, Defendant and Appellant. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his car, defendant Jose Alfredo Patron Guereca pleaded no contest to various controlled substances offenses, driving without a valid driver’s license, and resisting a peace officer. On appeal, defendant challenges the ruling denying his motion to suppress, arguing the detention was unduly prolonged beyond issuing a traffic citation and the search of the car was not supported by probable cause. We affirm the judgment. FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS The Information An information charged defendant with transportation of controlled substances, to wit, methamphetamine, for sale from one county to another noncontiguous county. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (d); count 1; statutory section citations that follow are to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise stated); possession for sale of a 1 controlled substance, to wit, methamphetamine (§ 11378; count 2); possession of a smoking device, to wit, a glass methamphetamine pipe (§ 11364, subd. (a); count 3); driving a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count 4); and resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer, peace officer, or emergency medical technician (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1); count 5). As to counts 1 and 2, the information alleged that the substance containing methamphetamine exceeded 10 kilograms (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.4, subd. (b)(3)). Several aggravating factors also were alleged. Defendant pleaded not guilty and denied the enhancements and aggravating factors. The Preliminary Hearing The facts that follow were established at the preliminary hearing: On December 15, 2022, Sergeant Michael Yates, an officer with the Lake Shastina Police Department stopped defendant on Interstate 5 just north of Yreka for speeding. When Yates asked defendant for his driver’s license, defendant was unable to provide Yates with a valid driver’s license. Once Yates decided to arrest defendant, Yates asked defendant for the key to the car but defendant put the key in his underwear, keeping his hands there while being handcuffed. Defendant eventually gave the officer the keys to the car and said he was reluctant to give up the keys to the car because there was “crystal” in it. A search of the car disclosed six pounds of crystal methamphetamine, an amount exceeding personal use. The search also revealed a used glass methamphetamine pipe, loose marijuana, and a little more than $1,200 in U.S. currency. The Motion to Suppress After being held to answer at the preliminary hearing, defendant moved to suppress “all observations and physical evidence obtained as a result of the detention, search, and seizure of [his] person” and “3 kilograms of suspected methamphetamine, paraphernalia (glass meth pipe), $1,226 USD, and all statements made by [him].” 2 Defendant claimed detention of him and his vehicle were unjustified arguing, “there was no reasonable justification for extending the stop beyond issuing a citation,” and there was “no lawful reason to search his vehicle.” The People noted the automobile exception to warrantless searches and asserted reasonable suspicion of traffic violations justified the detention, the duration of the stop was reasonable based on reasonable suspicions of additional criminality, and, based on the totality of the circumstances, probable cause existed to search the car. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. At the hearing, Sergeant Yates testified that, assisted by Mount Shasta Police Department Sergeant Walter Moore and his K-9, Yates initiated the traffic stop of the car because defendant was driving more than 65 miles an hour and because the front window was tinted illegally. Sergeant Yates speaks enough Spanish to conduct “[b]asic traffic stops” and spoke to defendant in Spanish. Sergeant Yates’s body camera recorded his interactions with defendant. Clips 1, 2, and 3 were played for the trial court at the suppression hearing and admitted as Defendant’s Exhibit A. When asked for his license, defendant provided an identification card or license from Mexico. Sergeant Yates initially testified that defendant provided an ID card from Mexico. On cross-examination, defense counsel showed Sergeant Yates a photocopy of a Mexico driver’s license, which Sergeant Yates believed defendant had shown him. He denied incorrectly noting in his report that defendant had only shown him an ID and not a license. Sergeant Yates testified that visitors to the United States can drive with their national driver’s licenses if accompanied by a passport. He did not ask defendant for his passport. At some point while Sergeant Yates spoke to defendant, defendant locked his car and rolled up the windows. 3 At this time, Sergeant Yates made a number of observations: he saw a single key in the ignition, which suggested the car did not belong to defendant; he smelled marijuana and cologne coming from the car, the latter of which is “often use[d] to cover up the odor of narcotics”; and he observed defendant “acting a little erratic” while speaking to him. By this point, Sergeant Yates identified that defendant had violated Vehicle Code section 22349, subdivision (a) for speeding, Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (a) for illegal window tint, and Vehicle Code section 12500 for being an unlicensed driver. Sergeant Yates also suspected further criminality. After the defendant was asked to get out of the car and got to the front of the patrol car, Sergeant Yates patted him down and felt him trembling. Defendant was detained but not under arrest at this point. Sergeant Yates confirmed with dispatch that defendant did not have a California driver’s license and did not own the car. Sergeant Yates asked defendant for consent to search the car, which defendant refused. Because defendant did not have a valid California driver’s license, Sergeant Yates was going to have the car towed and conduct an inventory search but needed the key to do so. Sergeant Yates advised defendant that he was under arrest and asked for the key. Defendant put the key into his underwear, leading to a tussle between defendant and Sergeant Yates. Sergeant Yates recovered the key, and defendant stopped struggling and said there was “crystal” in the vehicle. Five minutes or less had passed between the initiation of the traffic stop and defendant’s statement. While Sergeant Yates spoke with defendant, Sergeant Moore conducted a vehicle sniff with his K-9, who is trained and certified for vehicle narcotics sniffs for methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine. The dog showed “alert behavior … like he was attempting to locate the source of narcotics” but, interrupted by the struggle between defendant and Sergeant Yates, did not do a final sit response. Sergeant Moore explained that before the interruption, the dog “was showing strong interest in sniffing the vehicle, 4 which is usually indicative of him either locating the source or there’s a large quantity of narcotics.” This meant that the dog “did alert to the vehicle, he did not provide his final trained response with a sit.” After the struggle, Sergeant Moore informed Sergeant Yates that the dog had alerted. Based on defendant’s statement that there was “crystal” in the car, the smell of marijuana coming from the car, and defendant’s nervousness and erratic behavior, Sergeant Yates determined he had probable cause to search the car. His search of the car revealed six pounds of crystal methamphetamine on the backseat. Sergeant Yates did not recall finding a passport or international driver’s license while searching the car. At no time did Sergeant Yates obtain a search warrant or call the car’s owner to retrieve it. At the conclusion of evidence, defense counsel argued defendant had been improperly arrested and the car improperly searched because “Sergeant Yates was not empowered to reject the valid Mexican ID,” probable cause did not support the search, and the arrest was pretextual. The People stated they were “relying on Vehicle Code inventory search probable cause and inevitable discovery.” The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, noting it would be a different situation if defendant had had his passport at the time of the stop and that it was “quite certain” the evidence would have been presented if he had. The court then found that defendant had been pulled over for speeding and having tinted windows and that during the traffic stop, Sergeant Yates smelled marijuana and cologne on defendant and saw a single key in the ignition. After a discussion, Sergeant Yates asked defendant to get out and move to the back of the car. These events happened in less than five minutes. As such, the court found that “this falls within inevitable discovery that given the stop, given the fact that he was a solo occupant and the vehicle was going to be towed, that an inventory search would have taken place and the three kilograms of methamphetamine would have been located during that inventory search.” It further found that the traffic “stop was a good stop” and was not “unduly prolonged.” The court further stated that 5 “even if there wasn’t probable cause, there would have been probable cause to search that vehicle on the inventory search.” Change of Plea and Sentence Defendant pleaded no contest to all counts and admitted the enhancements and three of the five aggravating factors. The parties stipulated to the preliminary hearing transcript and police reports as the factual basis of the plea. The trial court sentenced defendant to six years (middle term) on count 1 plus a concurrent term of 2 years (middle term) on count 2. For the Health and Safety Code section 11370.4, subdivision (b)(3) enhancements for counts 1 and 2, the court imposed a consecutive 10 years and then struck the punishments pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (b)(1). The court ordered defendant to be released after serving one year of his sentence with the remainder of his term to be served under mandatory supervision. Defendant’s appeal is timely. DISCUSSION As earlier noted, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the detention was unduly prolonged beyond issuing a citation for speeding and illegal window tint, and the search of the car was not supported by probable cause and was instead “based on an investigative pretext.” We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress. (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922.) We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, whether express or implied, when supported by substantial evidence and we independently determine whether the facts of the challenged search and/or seizure violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 563; People v. Ferguson (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 367, 371.) 6 As an initial matter, we agree with defendant that the record fails to demonstrate that community caretaking supported a warrantless inventory search. However, “ ‘[o]n appeal we consider the correctness of the trial court’s ruling itself, not the correctness of the trial court’s reasons for reaching its decision.’ ” (People v. Jimenez (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1360, original emphasis.) The parties agree, as do we, that the initial traffic stop was reasonable based on defendant’s speeding and a front tinted window. (People v. Watkins (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1408 [“Reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation or other criminal activity justifies a traffic stop”].) Defendant, however, argues “there was no reasonable justification for extending the stop of [defendant’s] vehicle and his detention beyond the time it took for an officer to issue a citation for the vehicle’s window tinting and/or speeding.” We disagree that the duration of the stop was unreasonable. “Circumstances which develop during a detention may provide reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention.” (People v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.) Such is the case here. The entire detention lasted five minutes or less. In that time, Sergeant Yates asked for defendant’s license, ordered him out of the car, and communicated with dispatch. These “ ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop’ ” are part of “an ‘officer’s mission.’ ” (Rodriguez v. U.S. (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 355.) And an officer may order a driver out of the car following a lawful traffic stop, pending completion of the stop. (Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1997) 434 U.S. 106, 111.) Thus, as the People argue, “[a] stop for about five minutes was a reasonable amount of time for these inquiries.” (People v. Felix (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 439, 448 [traffic stop not unduly prolonged where officer conducted ordinary inquiries during first six minutes of stop].) Defendant further asserts that “[t]he government’s endeavor to detect crime in general cannot justify prolonging an ordinary traffic stop to conduct a canine assisted narcotics investigation similar to the one in this case.” As the People correctly note, the United States Supreme Court has held that a “seizure remains lawful only ‘so long as 7 [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. at p. 355; see also People v. Esparza (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1094 [“investigations conducted by officers not directly related to the initial purpose of the stop ‘do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop’ ”].) As defendant recognizes and the record reflects, Sergeant Moore and his K-9 were present from the start of the traffic stop, and the dog alerted on defendant’s car while Sergeant Yates spoke with defendant. The dog’s alert of the car and defendant’s statement indicating he had “crystal” in the car constituted emerging circumstances providing reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention. (Russell, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 102.) These circumstances also provided probable cause for the officers to investigate a potential violation of transportation of controlled substances. “Under the automobile exception, ‘ “police who have probable cause to believe a lawfully stopped vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity or contraband may conduct a warrantless search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” ’ ” (People v. Sims (2011) 59 Cal.App.5th 943, 950.) “The historical rationale for the automobile exception was that the ‘ready mobility’ of a vehicle creates a risk that evidence of a crime or contraband will be lost while a warrant is obtained. [Citations.] Over time, courts have also recognized a second rationale for the automobile exception -- a person has a ‘lesser expectation of privacy’ in his or her vehicle due to ‘the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.’ ” (Id. at pp. 950-951.) The People argue the officers had probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of criminal activity, namely evidence of transportation of drugs. We agree. As previously discussed, defendant indicated that he had “crystal” in the car and Sergeant Moore’s drug K-9 alerted to the car. Defendant attempts to downplay Sergeant Moore’s testimony, stating he “specifically testified that his dog signaled only an initial alert to the vehicle” and “that the dog never provided a final positive response.” 8 Defendant omits portions of Sergeant Moore’s testimony, including his explanation that while the dog was interrupted before he could do his “final trained response with a sit,” the dog “did alert to the vehicle.” We do not, as defendant does, read this testimony as an incomplete alert of the car. Indeed, at no time did Sergeant Moore testify that sitting was a “final positive response,” as defendant states. Regardless, defendant’s statement that he had “crystal” in the car also provides probable cause to search the vehicle. Accordingly, we conclude the officers had probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of criminal activity. We therefore conclude the search was justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, and the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. /s/ HULL, J. We concur: /s/ EARL, P. J. /s/ KRAUSE, J. 9