People v. Guereca CA3
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketC103313
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/16/26 P. v. Guereca CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Siskiyou)
THE PEOPLE, C103313
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 22CF01094)
v.
JOSE ALFREDO PATRON GUERECA,
Defendant and Appellant.
After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a
warrantless search of his car, defendant Jose Alfredo Patron Guereca pleaded no contest
to various controlled substances offenses, driving without a valid driver’s license, and
resisting a peace officer. On appeal, defendant challenges the ruling denying his motion
to suppress, arguing the detention was unduly prolonged beyond issuing a traffic citation
and the search of the car was not supported by probable cause. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The Information
An information charged defendant with transportation of controlled substances, to
wit, methamphetamine, for sale from one county to another noncontiguous county.
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (d); count 1; statutory section citations that follow
are to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise stated); possession for sale of a
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controlled substance, to wit, methamphetamine (§ 11378; count 2); possession of a
smoking device, to wit, a glass methamphetamine pipe (§ 11364, subd. (a); count 3);
driving a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a);
count 4); and resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer, peace officer, or
emergency medical technician (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1); count 5). As to counts 1
and 2, the information alleged that the substance containing methamphetamine exceeded
10 kilograms (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.4, subd. (b)(3)). Several aggravating factors
also were alleged. Defendant pleaded not guilty and denied the enhancements and
aggravating factors.
The Preliminary Hearing
The facts that follow were established at the preliminary hearing:
On December 15, 2022, Sergeant Michael Yates, an officer with the Lake Shastina
Police Department stopped defendant on Interstate 5 just north of Yreka for speeding.
When Yates asked defendant for his driver’s license, defendant was unable to provide
Yates with a valid driver’s license. Once Yates decided to arrest defendant, Yates asked
defendant for the key to the car but defendant put the key in his underwear, keeping his
hands there while being handcuffed. Defendant eventually gave the officer the keys to
the car and said he was reluctant to give up the keys to the car because there was
“crystal” in it. A search of the car disclosed six pounds of crystal methamphetamine, an
amount exceeding personal use. The search also revealed a used glass methamphetamine
pipe, loose marijuana, and a little more than $1,200 in U.S. currency.
The Motion to Suppress
After being held to answer at the preliminary hearing, defendant moved to
suppress “all observations and physical evidence obtained as a result of the detention,
search, and seizure of [his] person” and “3 kilograms of suspected methamphetamine,
paraphernalia (glass meth pipe), $1,226 USD, and all statements made by [him].”
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Defendant claimed detention of him and his vehicle were unjustified arguing, “there was
no reasonable justification for extending the stop beyond issuing a citation,” and there
was “no lawful reason to search his vehicle.” The People noted the automobile exception
to warrantless searches and asserted reasonable suspicion of traffic violations justified the
detention, the duration of the stop was reasonable based on reasonable suspicions of
additional criminality, and, based on the totality of the circumstances, probable cause
existed to search the car.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress.
At the hearing, Sergeant Yates testified that, assisted by Mount Shasta Police
Department Sergeant Walter Moore and his K-9, Yates initiated the traffic stop of the car
because defendant was driving more than 65 miles an hour and because the front window
was tinted illegally.
Sergeant Yates speaks enough Spanish to conduct “[b]asic traffic stops” and spoke
to defendant in Spanish. Sergeant Yates’s body camera recorded his interactions with
defendant. Clips 1, 2, and 3 were played for the trial court at the suppression hearing and
admitted as Defendant’s Exhibit A.
When asked for his license, defendant provided an identification card or license
from Mexico.
Sergeant Yates initially testified that defendant provided an ID card from Mexico.
On cross-examination, defense counsel showed Sergeant Yates a photocopy of a Mexico
driver’s license, which Sergeant Yates believed defendant had shown him. He denied
incorrectly noting in his report that defendant had only shown him an ID and not a
license. Sergeant Yates testified that visitors to the United States can drive with their
national driver’s licenses if accompanied by a passport. He did not ask defendant for his
passport.
At some point while Sergeant Yates spoke to defendant, defendant locked his car
and rolled up the windows.
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At this time, Sergeant Yates made a number of observations: he saw a single key
in the ignition, which suggested the car did not belong to defendant; he smelled
marijuana and cologne coming from the car, the latter of which is “often use[d] to cover
up the odor of narcotics”; and he observed defendant “acting a little erratic” while
speaking to him.
By this point, Sergeant Yates identified that defendant had violated Vehicle Code
section 22349, subdivision (a) for speeding, Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (a)
for illegal window tint, and Vehicle Code section 12500 for being an unlicensed driver.
Sergeant Yates also suspected further criminality. After the defendant was asked to get
out of the car and got to the front of the patrol car, Sergeant Yates patted him down and
felt him trembling. Defendant was detained but not under arrest at this point.
Sergeant Yates confirmed with dispatch that defendant did not have a California
driver’s license and did not own the car. Sergeant Yates asked defendant for consent to
search the car, which defendant refused. Because defendant did not have a valid
California driver’s license, Sergeant Yates was going to have the car towed and conduct
an inventory search but needed the key to do so.
Sergeant Yates advised defendant that he was under arrest and asked for the key.
Defendant put the key into his underwear, leading to a tussle between defendant and
Sergeant Yates. Sergeant Yates recovered the key, and defendant stopped struggling and
said there was “crystal” in the vehicle. Five minutes or less had passed between the
initiation of the traffic stop and defendant’s statement.
While Sergeant Yates spoke with defendant, Sergeant Moore conducted a vehicle
sniff with his K-9, who is trained and certified for vehicle narcotics sniffs for
methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine. The dog showed “alert behavior … like he was
attempting to locate the source of narcotics” but, interrupted by the struggle between
defendant and Sergeant Yates, did not do a final sit response. Sergeant Moore explained
that before the interruption, the dog “was showing strong interest in sniffing the vehicle,
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which is usually indicative of him either locating the source or there’s a large quantity of
narcotics.” This meant that the dog “did alert to the vehicle, he did not provide his final
trained response with a sit.” After the struggle, Sergeant Moore informed Sergeant Yates
that the dog had alerted.
Based on defendant’s statement that there was “crystal” in the car, the smell of
marijuana coming from the car, and defendant’s nervousness and erratic behavior,
Sergeant Yates determined he had probable cause to search the car. His search of the car
revealed six pounds of crystal methamphetamine on the backseat. Sergeant Yates did not
recall finding a passport or international driver’s license while searching the car. At no
time did Sergeant Yates obtain a search warrant or call the car’s owner to retrieve it.
At the conclusion of evidence, defense counsel argued defendant had been
improperly arrested and the car improperly searched because “Sergeant Yates was not
empowered to reject the valid Mexican ID,” probable cause did not support the search,
and the arrest was pretextual. The People stated they were “relying on Vehicle Code
inventory search probable cause and inevitable discovery.”
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, noting it would be a
different situation if defendant had had his passport at the time of the stop and that it was
“quite certain” the evidence would have been presented if he had. The court then found
that defendant had been pulled over for speeding and having tinted windows and that
during the traffic stop, Sergeant Yates smelled marijuana and cologne on defendant and
saw a single key in the ignition. After a discussion, Sergeant Yates asked defendant to
get out and move to the back of the car. These events happened in less than five minutes.
As such, the court found that “this falls within inevitable discovery that given the stop,
given the fact that he was a solo occupant and the vehicle was going to be towed, that an
inventory search would have taken place and the three kilograms of methamphetamine
would have been located during that inventory search.” It further found that the traffic
“stop was a good stop” and was not “unduly prolonged.” The court further stated that
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“even if there wasn’t probable cause, there would have been probable cause to search that
vehicle on the inventory search.”
Change of Plea and Sentence
Defendant pleaded no contest to all counts and admitted the enhancements and
three of the five aggravating factors. The parties stipulated to the preliminary hearing
transcript and police reports as the factual basis of the plea.
The trial court sentenced defendant to six years (middle term) on count 1 plus a
concurrent term of 2 years (middle term) on count 2. For the Health and Safety Code
section 11370.4, subdivision (b)(3) enhancements for counts 1 and 2, the court imposed a
consecutive 10 years and then struck the punishments pursuant to Penal Code section
1385, subdivision (b)(1). The court ordered defendant to be released after serving one
year of his sentence with the remainder of his term to be served under mandatory
supervision.
Defendant’s appeal is timely.
DISCUSSION
As earlier noted, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress because the detention was unduly prolonged beyond issuing a citation for
speeding and illegal window tint, and the search of the car was not supported by probable
cause and was instead “based on an investigative pretext.”
We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order denying
the motion to suppress. (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922.) We defer
to the trial court’s factual findings, whether express or implied, when supported by
substantial evidence and we independently determine whether the facts of the challenged
search and/or seizure violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. (People v. Lomax
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 563; People v. Ferguson (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 367, 371.)
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As an initial matter, we agree with defendant that the record fails to demonstrate
that community caretaking supported a warrantless inventory search. However, “ ‘[o]n
appeal we consider the correctness of the trial court’s ruling itself, not the correctness of
the trial court’s reasons for reaching its decision.’ ” (People v. Jimenez (2015)
242 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1360, original emphasis.)
The parties agree, as do we, that the initial traffic stop was reasonable based on
defendant’s speeding and a front tinted window. (People v. Watkins (2009)
170 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1408 [“Reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation or other
criminal activity justifies a traffic stop”].) Defendant, however, argues “there was no
reasonable justification for extending the stop of [defendant’s] vehicle and his detention
beyond the time it took for an officer to issue a citation for the vehicle’s window tinting
and/or speeding.” We disagree that the duration of the stop was unreasonable.
“Circumstances which develop during a detention may provide reasonable
suspicion to prolong the detention.” (People v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.)
Such is the case here. The entire detention lasted five minutes or less. In that time,
Sergeant Yates asked for defendant’s license, ordered him out of the car, and
communicated with dispatch. These “ ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop’ ”
are part of “an ‘officer’s mission.’ ” (Rodriguez v. U.S. (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 355.) And
an officer may order a driver out of the car following a lawful traffic stop, pending
completion of the stop. (Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1997) 434 U.S. 106, 111.) Thus, as the
People argue, “[a] stop for about five minutes was a reasonable amount of time for these
inquiries.” (People v. Felix (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 439, 448 [traffic stop not unduly
prolonged where officer conducted ordinary inquiries during first six minutes of stop].)
Defendant further asserts that “[t]he government’s endeavor to detect crime in
general cannot justify prolonging an ordinary traffic stop to conduct a canine assisted
narcotics investigation similar to the one in this case.” As the People correctly note, the
United States Supreme Court has held that a “seizure remains lawful only ‘so long as
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[unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.’ ” (Rodriguez,
supra, 575 U.S. at p. 355; see also People v. Esparza (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1094
[“investigations conducted by officers not directly related to the initial purpose of the
stop ‘do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as
those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop’ ”].) As defendant
recognizes and the record reflects, Sergeant Moore and his K-9 were present from the
start of the traffic stop, and the dog alerted on defendant’s car while Sergeant Yates spoke
with defendant. The dog’s alert of the car and defendant’s statement indicating he had
“crystal” in the car constituted emerging circumstances providing reasonable suspicion to
prolong the detention. (Russell, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 102.)
These circumstances also provided probable cause for the officers to investigate a
potential violation of transportation of controlled substances. “Under the automobile
exception, ‘ “police who have probable cause to believe a lawfully stopped vehicle
contains evidence of criminal activity or contraband may conduct a warrantless search of
any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” ’ ” (People v. Sims (2011)
59 Cal.App.5th 943, 950.) “The historical rationale for the automobile exception was
that the ‘ready mobility’ of a vehicle creates a risk that evidence of a crime or contraband
will be lost while a warrant is obtained. [Citations.] Over time, courts have also
recognized a second rationale for the automobile exception -- a person has a ‘lesser
expectation of privacy’ in his or her vehicle due to ‘the pervasive regulation of vehicles
capable of traveling on the public highways.’ ” (Id. at pp. 950-951.)
The People argue the officers had probable cause to believe the car contained
evidence of criminal activity, namely evidence of transportation of drugs. We agree. As
previously discussed, defendant indicated that he had “crystal” in the car and Sergeant
Moore’s drug K-9 alerted to the car. Defendant attempts to downplay Sergeant Moore’s
testimony, stating he “specifically testified that his dog signaled only an initial alert to the
vehicle” and “that the dog never provided a final positive response.”
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Defendant omits portions of Sergeant Moore’s testimony, including his
explanation that while the dog was interrupted before he could do his “final trained
response with a sit,” the dog “did alert to the vehicle.” We do not, as defendant does,
read this testimony as an incomplete alert of the car. Indeed, at no time did Sergeant
Moore testify that sitting was a “final positive response,” as defendant states. Regardless,
defendant’s statement that he had “crystal” in the car also provides probable cause to
search the vehicle. Accordingly, we conclude the officers had probable cause to believe
the car contained evidence of criminal activity. We therefore conclude the search was
justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, and the trial court
properly denied the motion to suppress.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
HULL, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
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