People v. Brown CA1/3

Filed 11/9/26 P. v. Brown CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A173497 v. CHARLES HENRY BROWN, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 042401548) Defendant and Appellant. Charles Henry Brown filed this appeal after pleading guilty to unlawful possession of a weapon and controlled substances. He contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5; statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.) We affirm the judgment. BACKGROUND The incident that led to Brown’s convictions occurred on the evening of June 12, 2024. Brown was driving a car with an expired registration when he was pulled over by Oakley Police Officer Martinez. During the ensuing encounter, Martinez performed a patsearch and recovered a loaded firearm 1 from Brown’s waistband. A subsequent search of the car led to the discovery of controlled substances, which Brown admitted were his. In September 2024, Brown was charged with three felonies: possession of a machine gun (§ 32625, subd. (a)); possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction (§ 29900, subd. (a)(1)); and possession of a controlled substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)). The People alleged that multiple aggravating circumstances applied and that Brown has two or more prior strike convictions. In February 2025, Brown filed a motion to suppress evidence, which the trial court denied on March 7. On March 12, Brown pled no contest to all charges and admitted the prior strikes pursuant to an offer by the court, objected to by the prosecution, that Brown would be sentenced to four years in prison. At the conclusion of the plea hearing, the prosecutor requested confirmation Brown was waiving his appellate rights. The court responded that it did not think Brown could be required to waive his right to appeal the suppression ruling, but deferred the issue until sentencing. The sentencing hearing was held on April 25, 2025. After the court announced Brown’s sentence, the prosecutor asked again to clarify that an appellate waiver applied to the suppression ruling. After observing that Brown had not stated on his change of plea form that he was waiving that right, the court told Brown that in order to receive the indicated sentence he would need to waive his right to appeal. Defense counsel responded that Brown was under the impression he had not waived his appellate rights, to which the court responded, “Do you want me to set aside his plea?” Ultimately, Brown stated that he did waive his right to appeal. The People concede in this court that the waiver of Brown’s appellate rights is invalid because the trial court implicitly communicated that it would 2 extend leniency if Brown agreed to the waiver. (See People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 575 [court may not “bargain” with defendant over sentence imposed, or offer “ ‘any inducement in return for a plea’ ”].) We accept the People’s concession. Accordingly, we address the merits of Brown’s claim that his suppression motion was erroneously denied. DISCUSSION “Our federal and state Constitutions prohibit unreasonable seizures. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) ‘ “A seizure occurs whenever a police officer ‘by means of physical force or show of authority’ restrains the liberty of a person to walk away.” ’ [Citation.] A seizure can be an arrest or a detention.” (In re Antonio B. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 435, 439– 440.) While a warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause, an “investigative detention is legally justified ‘[w]hen the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.’ ” (People v. Flores (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 617, 627.) Moreover, “when an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others,” the officer may conduct a patsearch “to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon.” (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 24 (Terry).) I. Additional Background Officer Martinez testified at the hearing on Brown’s suppression motion, and video recorded on her body camera was admitted into evidence. Although we do not have the video, Martinez’s undisputed testimony establishes pertinent facts about the June 2024 traffic stop. 3  At around 9:00 p.m. on the evening in question, Brown was driving a Honda Civic when Martinez directed him to pull over because the car registration had expired. Martinez used her lights and siren to execute the traffic stop. Brown took a while to stop, passed up opportunities to pull over, and swerved within his lane. Based on her training and experience, Martinez believed Brown’s behavior was consistent with a person attempting to conceal illegal items before pulling over. After passing two parking lots, Brown stopped in a red no parking zone. When Martinez approached Brown, he seemed “very” nervous, “overly” nervous as compared to other people in that situation. He was breathing heavily, shaking, made minimal eye contact, and repeated himself several times, conduct that the officer associated with a person potentially in possession of illegal items. Martinez asked why he took so long to pull over, to which Brown responded that he did not want to stop somewhere that would be illegal. Martinez asked for Brown’s license, and he responded it was suspended. Martinez told Brown she was going to remove him from the car so she could cite him for the expired registration. She said she would not cite him for the suspended license, and he could have someone else pick up the car (which apparently did not belong to him). When Martinez told Brown she was going to remove him from the car, Brown was “very hesitant,” stating he was not on probation and questioning why he had to get out. Martinez explained she was having him exit the car so she could write the citation. She instructed Brown to put his phone and wallet on the dash, interlace his fingers, put his hands behind his head, and lean forward. Brown questioned why he needed to do that, but complied. Martinez told Brown she had everyone step out of a car in the same manner for safety purposes. As Martinez opened the driver’s door, Brown started 4 rolling up the window, but Martinez told him to stop and he complied. Martinez knew that it was “very common” for a subject to roll up the window to conceal what was inside. Martinez ushered Brown out of the car by gripping his hands, which were behind his head. They were standing near the rear of the Civic, with Martinez still gripping Brown’s hands, when she told him she was going to conduct a patsearch for weapons. Brown became “very argumentative,” stating that he did not give the officer consent to search him. Martinez explained she was not going to search Brown, just “pat him down for any weapons.” She asked if he had a weapon or anything that could poke her, and when he said no, she asked to check. Brown said no. He pulled at the officer’s grip, placed his body up against the car, and repeated that he did not have anything illegal on his person. Martinez knew from experience that it was “very common” for subjects to pull away from her grip and place their body against their car when they were “concealing something illegal like firearms in their waistband,” in an effort to avoid the item falling out or being discovered. At that point, Martinez handcuffed Brown and conducted a patsearch for weapons. When she patted Brown’s waistband, she “felt a very hard object” that she believed was a firearm. She then removed the object, which turned out to be a loaded firearm. After Brown was placed under arrest, officers found controlled substances in the Civic, including a bag of methamphetamine. Martinez testified that she made the decision to conduct the patsearch when Brown pulled away from her grip and placed his body against the car, and that her decision was based on the “totality” of Brown’s conduct: his nervous behavior of breathing heavily, shaking, and asking the same 5 question over and over again; pulling away from her grip; and placing his body against the car. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court denied Brown’s motion pursuant to the following findings: Brown was pulled over for the valid reason that he was driving a car with an expired registration, and he could have been arrested for that offense but the officer acted within her discretion by deciding to issue a citation. Brown’s “very odd driving” supported a reasonable belief that he was delaying compliance with the officer’s directive in order to hide something from her, and his explanation for taking so long to pull over was cause for more concern because he actually stopped in an unsafe place. The dashcam video showed that Martinez was pleasant and agreeable throughout the encounter, and the safety measures she employed were consistent with her small stature, given Brown’s odd behaviors. The specific decision to have Brown exit the vehicle was a reasonable way to ensure the officer’s safety in light of Brown’s “nervousness, the driving pattern, [and] the awkward behaviors.” Finally, the court found, the patsearch was based on “articulable facts” as opposed to just a hunch that Brown was armed. Brown was not just argumentative with the officer, he “actually did something with his body” that indicated he was concealing something from her. Thus, the court concluded that Martinez’s actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. II. Analysis Brown does not dispute on appeal that he was lawfully detained, but he argues the patsearch was unlawful under Terry. “In reviewing a suppression ruling, ‘we defer to the superior court’s express and implied factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, [but] we exercise our 6 independent judgment in determining the legality of a search on the facts so found.’ ” (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 563.) Terry permits a police officer who “has reason to believe” that she is “dealing with an armed and dangerous individual” to conduct “a reasonable search for weapons.” (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 27) “ ‘ “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his [or her] safety or that of others was in danger.” ’ ” (People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 488.) This objective standard requires that the officer provide “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” (Terry, at p. 21.) To determine whether this standard is met, courts consider “the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ ” a process that permits the officer to draw on her training “to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them.’ ” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274.) In this case, substantial evidence before the trial court established that when Officer Martinez conducted the patsearch of Brown she had reason to believe he was armed. Initially, he delayed pulling the car over, swerved in his lane, parked in an unsafe place, and offered an illogical explanation for those behaviors. His personal characteristics during the face to face encounter raised additional concerns for the officer, including his extreme nervousness, even given the nature of the encounter, and repeating questions in an argumentative manner. Then, he started pulling his hands from Martinez’s grip and shielded his body against the car. Considered in their totality, these facts establish that the officer’s belief Brown was carrying a weapon on his person was reasonable. 7  Disputing that the patsearch was justified, Brown makes two arguments. First, he contends that evidence of his conduct after he exited the vehicle should not be considered at all because Martinez told him she was going to conduct a patsearch before she ushered him out of the car, and at that point in the encounter she had no reason to suspect Brown was armed. This argument misconstrues the record. During her direct testimony, Martinez testified that she told Brown that she was having him exit the vehicle because she was going to write him a citation. A few questions later, she confirmed that after Brown was out of the car, she told him she was going to do a patsearch for weapons, and then she described Brown’s reaction to hearing this: first, he argued with her as they were standing near the rear of the vehicle, and then he started pulling away from her grip and placed his body up against the car. Up until this point, Martinez had been seeking permission to proceed with the patsearch, but she testified that this was the moment she decided, based on the totality of her encounter with Brown, to proceed with the patsearch. Brown’s second argument is that even if his entire encounter with the officer is considered, Martinez’s testimony supports a conclusion Brown might have been concealing something illegal, but not that it was a weapon. Again we disagree. During the incident Martinez explained to Brown that she wanted to do the patsearch “for weapons,” specifically, and that was the point at which he started pulling away and she concluded the totality of his behavior justified her concern that Brown was armed. Brown relies on People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952 to no avail. In that case, the deputy approached a stopped car on a dirt road in the middle of the day, observing “ ‘furtive movements’ ” from the man sitting in the driver’s seat, who became the defendant. The deputy questioned the car’s 8 occupants, who said they were admiring the view. (Id. at p. 954.) The car was registered to the defendant, but he was unable to produce identification or registration and twice refused to consent to a search of the car. (Ibid.) Not only did this make the deputy “ ‘angry,’ ” he found nothing in plain view to justify further intrusion. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, he searched a backpack that was on the car’s back seat after defendant and his passenger denied owning it and found inside a film canister filled with a substance the deputy believed was baking soda. (Id. at p. 955.) Then he patsearched both occupants, and while patting down defendant he felt a soft object he believed could be contraband, reached into defendant’s pocket and removed baggies containing small amounts of marijuana and cocaine. (Ibid.) The deputy explained that he patted the occupants down in part because “if I found something like contraband or something, I could possibly search the vehicle.” (Ibid.) The trial court refused to suppress this evidence but the appellate court reversed on two independent grounds. First, there were no specific or articulable facts which showed the defendant may have been armed and dangerous. (Id. at p. 956) Second, even if the patsearch could have been justified in its inception, it became unlawful when the deputy reached into defendant’s pocket to retrieve a soft item that did not have any immediately apparent incriminating characteristic. (Id. at p. 957.) Dickey does not assist Brown. The record in this case shows that there were articulable facts to justify Martinez’s concern that Brown posed a risk to her safety, including that he was the subject of valid detention; he was slow to pull over, very nervous, and argumentative; and he started pulling away from the officer’s grip when informed he would be patsearched. Moreover, there is no dispute here that Martinez did not exceed the scope of a proper patsearch for weapons. 9  DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. TUCHER, P. J. WE CONCUR PETROU, J. RODRÍGUEZ, J. People v. Brown (A173497) 10