Full Opinion

Filed 11/9/26 P. v. Petty CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT THE PEOPLE, B346745 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MA070863-01) v. DUSTIN JEFFREY PETTY, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Emily Cole, Judge. Affirmed. Nikhil Ramnaney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Patricia Rosman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________ INTRODUCTION We find this matter appropriate for disposition by a memorandum opinion in accordance with the California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. (See People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 850–855 [use of memorandum opinions].) On May 15, 2017, the People charged appellant Dustin Petty with driving under the influence of alcohol causing bodily injury in violation of Vehicle Code1 section 23153, subdivision (a); driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent causing bodily injury in violation of section 23153, subdivision (b), with an enhancement pursuant to section 23578 that his blood alcohol concentration was 0.15 percent or higher; and driving without a valid license in violation of section 12500, subdivision (a). On September 18, 2017, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petty pled guilty to driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent causing bodily injury and admitted the enhancement that his blood alcohol concentration was 0.15 percent or higher (count two). Petty waived his right to a speedy sentencing hearing and was not sentenced on that date. Instead, the trial court stated it was putting the sentencing over for 18 months so Petty could “accomplish a number of obligations.” The court ordered Petty to enroll in an 18-month alcohol program within 30 days and provide proof of enrollment on the next court date; install an ignition interlock device within 30 days and provide proof of installation on the next court date; complete 40 days of community service and provide proof of enrollment and progress on the next court date; and enroll in the hospital and morgue 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code. 2 program within the next 30 days and file proof of enrollment on the next court date. The minute order states: “The plea agreement includes a reduction to a misdemeanor upon successful compliance with all the terms as set forth herein.” The court orally told Petty that if he followed through with “all of these obligations, as well as following the court’s terms and conditions pending sentencing, he will earn the right to have count 2 reduced to a misdemeanor. And, also, part of the agreement, it would be a three-year grant of summary probation from the date of sentencing on the misdemeanor. [¶] If, on the other hand, Mr. Petty does not follow through with his obligations, if he fails to follow through with all of these obligations, any one of the obligations, or if he violates the law in any way or violates any of the terms and conditions of his release pending sentencing, he will lose the benefit of earning a misdemeanor, he will end up with a felony conviction as to count 2 and it becomes an open plea to the court, and the court would decide the appropriate sentence, and it could be anywhere from time-served probation, up to three years in the state prison.” The court set the next court date as March 20, 2018. On March 20, 2018, Petty appeared and reported on his progress. The trial court ordered him to complete an additional 20 days of community service for a total of 60 days and to appear on March 19, 2019 to show further progress. On April 19, 2019, Petty admitted that he had violated the terms and conditions of his release pending sentencing. The trial court found Petty was not in compliance with the terms and conditions of his release pending sentencing and remanded him into custody. On May 13, 2019, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Petty on five years of formal 3 probation and ordered him to serve 180 days in county jail, pay various fines and fees, complete 40 days of community service, and complete a three-month first-time offender alcohol program. The remaining counts were dismissed. On April 25, 2024, the trial court revoked Petty’s probation and set a violation hearing for May 31, 2024. On May 31, 2024, Petty submitted proof that he had completed the three-month alcohol program and performed 77 of the required 320 hours of community service. Probation remained revoked. The trial court warned Petty that if he was not in full compliance with his probation by the next court date, he would be remanded to custody. The court set the next court date for September 4, 2024. On September 4, 2024, the trial court reviewed Petty’s progress report and informed him that probation would remain revoked until he had satisfied all remaining conditions of probation. On April 23, 2025, Petty submitted proof that he had completed the hospital and morgue program and had completed 285 of the required 320 hours of community labor. Probation remained revoked and he was ordered to return on May 14, 2025. On May 14, 2025, almost eight years after his plea and after five years of formal probation, Petty submitted proof that he had completed all the required community service hours, the last remaining condition of probation. The court revoked and reinstated probation which expired that day. That day Petty asked the court to reduce the felony conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b) and to dismiss the charge pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.4. Petty asked for relief in the interest of justice. He stated: “I have a job offer pending background check for good employment . . . . [I]t’s required by the company that I pass an 4 ATF background check. [¶] This job is a great new opportunity in a new area of work for me. It will prove to be a good career choice for me. Your Honor, I want to thank this Court for all of your patience during my grant of probation and I’m so happy it’s over. I’d very much like to put this behind me and move forward in life with a good job. [¶] Thank you very much.” On June 3, 2025, the trial court denied both requests in a minute order: “The Court having read and considered the petition pursuant to Penal Code sections 17(b) and 1203.4, rules as follows: [¶] Petition is denied. [¶] Order for Dismissal is signed and filed.” Petty timely appealed. DISCUSSION I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Declining to Find Defendant Eligible for Mandatory Dismissal of the Charges Pursuant to Penal Code Section 1203.4. Petty contends the trial court erred in refusing to find him eligible for mandatory dismissal as he fulfilled the conditions of probation during the entire period of probation. Where the propriety of a trial court’s ruling on a petition for relief under Penal Code section 1203.4 turns on the interpretation of the statute, the issue presents a question of law reviewed de novo. (People v. Seymour (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1428.) Penal Code section 1203.4, subdivision (a)(1) provides in relevant part: “When a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, or has been discharged prior to the termination of the period of probation, or in any other case in which a court, in its discretion and in the interest of justice, determines that a defendant should be granted 5 the relief available under this section, the defendant shall . . . be permitted by the court to withdraw their plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty; [and] the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or information against the defendant and except as noted below, the defendant shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which they have been convicted.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.4, subd. (a)(1).) Penal Code section 1203.4, subdivision (c)(1) also provides: “Except as provided in paragraph (2), subdivision (a) does not apply to a person who receives a notice to appear or is otherwise charged with a violation of an offense described in subdivision (a) to (e), inclusive, of Section 12810 of the Vehicle Code.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.4, subd. (c)(1).) Section 12810 lists the offenses for which traffic violation points will be applied against a driver’s license. Included in the listed offenses is a violation of section 23153, the offense to which Petty pled guilty. (§ 12810, subd. (b).) “If a defendant who was convicted of a violation listed in paragraph (1) petitions the court, the court in its discretion and in the interest of justice, may order the relief provided pursuant to subdivision (a) to that defendant.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.4, subd. (c)(2).) Under the plain language of the statutes, Petty is not entitled to mandatory Penal Code section 1203.4 relief. He is entitled to relief only if a court, in the exercise of its discretion, finds such relief to be in the interest of justice. The trial court did not err in declining to afford Petty mandatory relief under Penal Code section 1203.4. 6 II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Dismiss the Charge in the Interest of Justice. Where a court denies relief under the discretionary “interest of justice” provision, the ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312, 322–323, 330.) In reviewing a trial court’s order for abuse of discretion, we presume the order is correct, indulge all intendments and presumptions to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and the appellant bears the burden to affirmatively show error. (Id. at p. 330.) “ ‘The court is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, the trial court summarily denied Petty’s request for relief, including discretionary relief. Petty argues that the court’s silence “reflects no discernible exercise of discretion” and warrants, at a minimum, remand as the default remedy unless the record clearly demonstrates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion if it had properly exercised its discretion. We disagree. It is Petty’s burden to show error. “We presume that the trial court engaged in the appropriate analysis to determine whether granting [defendant’s] requested relief was in the interest of justice.” (People v. Woodward (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 379, 399 (Woodward).) As in Woodward, nothing in the appellate record rebuts this presumption. The minute order, as well as the signed form order denying dismissal, states the trial court read and considered Petty’s request. Nothing in the record demonstrates that the trial court did not consider the merits of Petty’s motion, did not recognize it 7 possessed discretion to grant the motion in the interest of justice, or relied on improper facts or information in denying the request. Petty has failed to bear the burden to affirmatively show error by the trial court. III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Reduce the Felony Conviction to a Misdemeanor. Penal Code section 17, subdivision (d) authorizes a trial court to declare a wobbler offense—an offense punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor in the discretion of the court— to be a misdemeanor in certain circumstances. (Woodward, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 388.) The offense to which Petty pled guilty—driving under the influence causing bodily injury in violation of section 23153, subdivision (b)—is a wobbler. (§ 23554 [a violation of § 23153, subd. (b), is punishable by either imprisonment in state prison or confinement in county jail no exceeding one year].) A trial court’s ruling on an application to reduce a felony wobbler offense to a misdemeanor is reviewed for abuse of discretion. A reviewing court will not disturb the decision unless the defendant clearly demonstrates the ruling was irrational or arbitrary or that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion. (People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877, 887; People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866 (Lee).) In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives and its discretionary determination will not be set aside on review. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977– 978.) 8 Here, the minute order states the court had read and considered Petty’s request. Petty bases his contention that the trial court abused its discretion on a silent record. That is insufficient. He has neither shown the trial court acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner nor overcome the presumption that the reviewing court, without more, must affirm on a silent record. (Lee, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 867.) DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS STRATTON, P. J. We concur: WILEY, J. SCHERB, J. 9