People v. Savoy

Filed 10/30/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A175134 v. (Alameda County FRANK SAVOY, JR., Super. Ct. No. 163568A) Defendant and Appellant. Frank Savoy, Jr. was convicted of murder and other crimes in 2011 and resentenced for those crimes in 2025. He appeals from the result of this resentencing, asserting the trial court improperly failed to “consider and afford great weight to evidence” that application of a gun enhancement “would result in a discriminatory racial impact as described in” the Racial Justice Act (RJA). (Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (c)(2) (§ 1385(c)(2)); all statutory references are to this code.) We disagree with his reading of the RJA and with his view of how the RJA relates to section 1385(c)(2), which is the statute that directs courts to give great weight to certain mitigating evidence in deciding whether to dismiss a sentencing enhancement. We will accordingly affirm. BACKGROUND Savoy was charged with committing the first degree murder of Bobby Hall on July 19, 2008 (count 1) and with a series of felonies—first degree residential robbery, forcible rape, attempted murder, and two counts of 1 forcible oral copulation—against Jane Doe on July 31, 2008. A jury convicted him of these crimes and found true various enhancements including, with regard to count 1, that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d) (§ 12022.53(d)).) In a bifurcated proceeding, the court also found true that Savoy had served three prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) In July 2011, the court sentenced Savoy to state prison for 78 years to life. This sentence comprised three consecutive sentences of 25 years to life— one each for murder, the section 12022.53(d) enhancement, and rape—plus two years for gun enhancements associated with the crimes against Jane Doe and one year for a prior prison term. All other terms of imprisonment were imposed to run concurrently or were stayed. Savoy appealed, and this court affirmed the judgment. (See People v. Savoy (Oct. 31, 2013, A132866) [nonpub. opn.].) After a change in the law made Savoy no longer eligible for a sentence enhanced by one-year prison priors, he petitioned for resentencing. (See § 1172.75.) The court held a hearing on his petition on November 18, 2025 and then recalled his previous sentence, struck the section 667.5 prison priors, and resentenced him. This time, Savoy received an aggregate prison sentence of 77 years to life, comprising all the same segments as the original sentence minus one year for the prison priors. At the hearing, the court explained its reasoning in some detail. Addressing Savoy’s argument that it should strike the gun enhancement, the court articulated the legal standard as follows: “A finding of the factors under [section] 1385(c) weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” It then found both that “dismissal of the 2 enhancements in this case would endanger public safety” and that none of the section 1385(c) factors Savoy had urged was established. Savoy, in his sentencing memorandum, had urged the court to strike the gun enhancement based on several section 1385(c) factors, including that “the bias exhibited by the judge at sentencing violated the Racial Justice Act.” (Capitalization omitted.) At the hearing, the court explained that after reviewing the sentencing transcript it concluded the judge’s “statements were not cognizable under the Racial Justice Act” because they were a response to the victim impact statements and an expression of the judge’s view of the evidence, rather than exemplary of racial bias. DISCUSSION There are both procedural and substantive explanations for the resentencing judge’s failure to “afford great weight” to what Savoy calls evidence of a racially discriminatory impact from applying a gun enhancement in this case. The procedural reason is that Savoy did not make this argument to the sentencing court, except in a footnote in his sentencing memorandum. The substantive reason is that the evidence he presented does not show “discriminatory racial impact as described in paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of Section 745.” (§ 1385(c)(2)(A).) I. To provide context, we begin with an introduction to the Racial Justice Act (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1; § 745)1 and the statute governing dismissal of a sentencing enhancement in the furtherance of justice (§ 1385). The RJA declares, “[t]he state shall not seek or obtain a criminal 1 Section 745 has been repeatedly amended, but the amendments that took effect after Savoy’s resentencing do not affect our analysis. (See Stats. 2025, ch. 784, § 2.5 [effective Jan. 1, 2026].) 3 conviction or . . . sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. A violation is established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, any of” four enumerated circumstances. (§ 745, subd. (a) (section 745(a)).) The first and fourth circumstances are potentially relevant: first, the judge or another involved person “exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race” (§ 745(a)(1)), and fourth, “[a] longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race . . . than on defendants of other races . . . in the county where the sentence was imposed” (§ 745(a)(4)(A)). 2 Where the court finds a violation of section 745(a), it “shall impose a remedy specific to the violation found,” drawing on a list of possible remedies specified in the statute. (§ 745, subd. (e) (section 745(e)).) Statutory remedies include dismissing an enhancement, if judgment has not yet been entered and the court finds doing so “would be in the interest of justice.” (§ 745(e)(1)(C).) For a sentencing-specific violation established only after judgment has been entered, “the court shall vacate the sentence . . . and impose a new sentence” that is no greater than the previous sentence. 2 The statute speaks repeatedly of “race, ethnicity, or national origin,” but for purposes of this case we focus on race. The statute’s second and third enumerated circumstances involve: “racially discriminatory language” or other evidence of racial bias (§ 745(a)(2)), and a defendant who “was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races . . . who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated . . . ” (§ 745(a)(3)). Also, the fourth circumstance includes an additional provision addressing sentencing disparities based on the race of the victim (§ 745(a)(4)(B)), but that provision is not at issue in this case. 4 (§ 745(e)(2)(B).) One portion of the RJA is expressly incorporated by reference into section 1385(c), which is the statute directing courts to dismiss an enhancement “if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” Whether to dismiss an enhancement is a discretionary decision, but one informed by strong guidance from the Legislature. (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029 (Walker).) Section 1385(c)(2) provides: “In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.” And the circumstance in subparagraph (A) is: “Application of the enhancement would result in a discriminatory racial impact as described in paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of Section 745.” (§ 1385(c)(2)(A).) Section 745(a)(4), which addresses disproportionately severe sentencing, is the only portion of the RJA mentioned in section 1385(c). Other mitigating circumstances listed in section 1385(c) address other issues, such as whether “[t]he current offense is connected to . . . childhood trauma.” (§ 1385(c)(2)(E).) “Proof of the presence of one or more of [the enumerated] circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385(c)(2).) II. “The forfeiture doctrine is a ‘well-established procedural principle that, with certain exceptions, an appellate court will not consider claims of error that could have been—but were not—raised in the trial court.’ ” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) The Attorney General argues Savoy forfeited his RJA challenge to the gun enhancement by failing to make the argument in the trial court that he now makes here. 5  It is true that Savoy barely mentioned in the trial court any disproportional racial impact from applying the section 12022.53(d) enhancement. Savoy filed with the resentencing court a memorandum arguing the gun enhancement should be struck in light of three mitigating factors enumerated in section 1385(c). The first two (childhood trauma and decades-old priors) are not relevant to this appeal, and the third is a bit of a muddle. Savoy’s third mitigating factor was racial “bias exhibited by the judge at sentencing,” which mirrors section 745(a)(1). (Capitalization omitted.) Although the sentencing memorandum quoted the language of section 1385(c)(1)(A) referencing section 745(a)(4)—the disparate sentencing provision—the argument it developed over the course of several pages was that comments the original sentencing judge made about the death penalty “crossed the line . . . drawn by the RJA.” The death penalty, like lynching in an earlier era, has been disproportionately deployed against African Americans, the memorandum explained, so the trial court’s mention of the death penalty was said to be evidence of racial bias. Only in a footnote did the memorandum mention that statewide statistics showed sentencing enhancements, including gun enhancements, have been applied disproportionately against people of color. At the hearing, Savoy did not mention his footnoted argument. Generally, a litigant forfeits a claim that is raised “only in a footnote . . . and without any substantive legal analysis.” (Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 419.) And Savoy’s footnote provides no substantive legal analysis. It consists of two sentences of statistical information drawn from the Committee on Revision of the Penal Code, 6 Annual Report and Recommendations (Feb. 2021) (CRPC Report) 3, followed immediately by the bald conclusion that the data establishes a violation of the RJA. Although Savoy has forfeited the claim he now brings, we have discretion to hear a forfeited claim. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161–162, fn. 6.) Given the importance of addressing allegations of racial bias in the judicial system and the legal, as opposed to factual, nature of the argument Savoy makes on appeal, we will proceed to address his claim on its merits. III Savoy contends that because the trial court failed to consider and afford great weight to evidence that imposing the gun enhancement would have a racially discriminatory impact, we should vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. We decline to take that step because we conclude Savoy’s evidence falls far short of what the RJA or section 1385(c)(2)(A) requires. The relevant RJA provision requires a two-part showing. (§ 745(a)(4)(A).) The first part is defendant-specific and involves comparing the defendant and his case to other individuals. Savoy must show he received “[a] longer or more severe sentence . . . than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense.” (Ibid., italics added.) The second part compares people of defendant’s race with other defendants, usually by way of statistical analysis. Savoy must show “longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for [his] offense on people that share [his] race . . . than on defendants of other races . . . in the county where the sentence was imposed.” (Ibid., italics added.) The italicized terms are defined in the RJA. “ ‘[M]ore frequently imposed’ means 3 CRPC Report <https://clrc.ca.gov/CRPC/Pub/Reports/CRPC_AR2020.pdf> (as of Oct. 30, 2026). 7 that the totality of the evidence demonstrates a significant difference . . . in imposing sentences comparing individuals who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated, and the prosecution cannot establish race- neutral reasons for the disparity. . . .” (Id., subd. (h)(1), italics added.) “ ‘Similarly situated’ means that factors that are relevant in charging and sentencing are similar,” not identical, and a defendant’s conviction history may be among the relevant factors. (Id., subd. (h)(6).) Savoy does not attempt to meet this two-part standard. He offers no individual comparator cases and therefore does not satisfy the first requirement of section 745(a)(4). This alone is fatal to his claim. (See People v. Williams (2026) 123 Cal.App.5th 350, 357 [under analogous § 745(a)(3), defendant fails to make prima facie case in part because he provides no evidence of comparable nonminority defendants who were charged with lesser crimes].) Then, to the extent Savoy offers statistical analysis, it is limited to the observation that “ ‘common enhancements are applied disproportionately against people of color and people suffering from mental illness.’ ” (Quoting CRPC Report, p. 38.) Savoy’s appellate brief elaborates on the CRPC Report’s discussion of the discriminatory impact of gang enhancements, not even mentioning the report’s statistic that 36 percent of California prisoners with a gun enhancement are Black, while only 8 percent are White. (CRPC Report, p. 38.) But his omission is immaterial, as those statistics also do not establish a prima facie case of an RJA violation. Not only are the data statewide, as opposed to county-specific, but they do not compare “individuals who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated” to Savoy. (§ 745(h)(1); see, e.g., People v. Jimenez (2026) 123 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1118–1120 [evidence that Latinx defendants are overrepresented among special-circumstance murder defendants, compared 8 to their share of the county’s population, is the wrong comparison for prima facie case].) In Savoy’s view, there is no need to satisfy section 745(a)(4) because section 1385(c)(2) requires a showing that is “less stringent than that required to establish a violation of the RJA itself.” He grounds this theory, not in any statutory language, but on the premise that violation of the RJA would be “an absolute statutory bar to the imposition of the firearm enhancement, not merely a mitigating factor weighing against imposition.” From this premise he reasons that some lesser showing should suffice for a factor that is merely weighed in mitigation. The theory is creative, but Savoy is mistaken in both his premise and his conclusion. Consider, first, the premise. If a defendant proves that application of a gun enhancement resulted in a sentence that violated the RJA, that finding does not necessarily require the court to dismiss the enhancement. A court finding an RJA violation “[b]efore a judgment has been entered” may dismiss a sentencing enhancement “[i]f the court determines that [striking the enhancement] would be in the interest of justice.” (§ 745(e)(1)(C).) Thus, the question before the trial court would be the same one it faces in finding a mitigating factor enumerated in section 1385(c)(2): Where do the interests of justice lie? (See Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033 [in applying section 1385(c), “ ‘the ultimate question before the trial court remains whether it is in the furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement’ ”].) Of course, whether applying section 745(e) or section 1385(c), the court would surely weigh proof of an RJA violation heavily in its sentencing calculus, but the decision to strike an enhancement would not be automatic; it would be guided by the interests of justice. Similarly, a court finding an RJA violation in a case where judgment has already been entered is not necessarily required to 9 strike a sentencing enhancement. A sentence “sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of” the RJA, must be vacated and the defendant resentenced. (§ 745(e)(2)(B).) At resentencing, the defendant may not then receive a greater sentence, but there is no statutory requirement that a sentencing enhancement be struck. (Ibid.) We thus reject Savoy’s premise. We also reject Savoy’s conclusion that to establish the mitigating circumstance defined in section 1385(c)(2)(A) requires some lesser showing than to establish a violation of the RJA. Instead, we interpret the language of section 1385(c)(2)(A) according to its plain meaning: To prove the presence of this circumstance weighing greatly in favor of dismissing an enhancement, a defendant must show that “[a]pplication of the enhancement would result in a discriminatory racial impact as described in [section 745(a)(4)].” (§ 1385(c)(2) & (c)(2)(A).) That is, a defendant must show that imposing the enhancement would violate this provision of the RJA. Savoy has not shown a violation of the RJA. Thus, he has not established the mitigating circumstance described in section 1385(c)(2)(A), nor any error on the part of the trial court for failing to give great weight to the statistical evidence in the CRPC Report. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. TUCHER, P.J. WE CONCUR: FUJISAKI, J. PETROU, J. People v. Savoy (A175134) 10 Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court Trial Judge: Hon. Armando Pastran Counsel: Eric S. Multhaup, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Melissa A. Meth, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent 11