Full Opinion

Filed 10/26/26 P. v. Matthews CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B348891 (Super. Ct. No. 25PT-00312) Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County) v. GENE MATTHEWS, III, Defendant and Appellant. Gene Matthews, III, appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court determined he met the criteria for commitment as an offender with a mental health disorder (OMHD) pursuant to Penal Code section 2962.1 He contends the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that his severe mental health disorder was one of the causes of or was an aggravating factor in the qualifying offense, and that he represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others. We affirm. 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. Factual and Procedural Background The Underlying Offense In January 2019, appellant stabbed his roommate with a butcher knife 13 times. The victim, who had been asleep at the time, survived the attack but required surgery for a hemothorax and a lacerated liver. The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office charged appellant with attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a), count 1), along with several related special allegations. The District Attorney later amended the information to add an additional charge of assault with a deadly weapon. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 2.) Appellant pleaded no contest to count 2, admitted a section 667, subdivision (a)(1) special allegation, and was sentenced to state prison for nine years. The Board of Parole Hearing On April 10, 2025, the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) determined appellant met the criteria for treatment through the Department of Mental Health pursuant to section 2962. Appellant filed a petition requesting a hearing for review of the BPT’s determination. (§ 2966, subd. (b).) Both sides waived jury trial and the matter proceeded to a court trial. OMHD Hearing The parties stipulated that appellant received the minimum treatment for at least 90 days prior to his petition. The parties further stipulated to the admission of numerous exhibits, including appellant’s legal and medical records.2 2These records include: a certified CLETS rap sheet for appellant (Exh. A); Los Angeles Superior Court records (Exh. B); Hawthorne Police Department records (Exhs. C & D); Los Angeles County Department of Health Services Integrated 2 The People’s Case Dr. Rebecca Aponte, a forensic psychologist at Atascadero State Hospital (ASH), testified that she interviewed appellant on June 15, 2025, met with his admitting psychologist, and reviewed appellant’s legal and medical history. Dr. Aponte opined that appellant suffers from a delusional disorder, persecutory type, which qualified as a severe mental health disorder for purposes of an OMHD evaluation. Dr. Aponte described appellant’s disorder as a type of psychotic illness characterized by delusions and paranoia. Appellant expressed his belief that numerous people were involved in conspiracies against him or were persecuting him in different ways, including sheriff’s deputies, various members of the LGBTQ community, and members of a prison gang called Gang Boy Gangsters. Dr. Aponte opined that although there “may be some kernel of truth” to appellant’s beliefs, they were “beyond what would be supported by the evidence.” Dr. Aponte testified that six weeks prior to the qualifying offense, appellant was involved in an incident in which he was being chased by police and was shot in the leg. Appellant reported he was experiencing “ ‘a lot of drama’ at the time.” Dr. Aponte explained that appellant believed he was being targeted by unidentified individuals connected to a YouTube channel that he claimed exposed celebrities and police officers as members of the LGBTQ community or the Illuminati. Correctional Health Services medical records (Exh. E); parole case records (Exh. F); California Correctional Health Care Services Report (Exh. G); ASH records (Exh. H); and a recording of the victim (Exh. I). 3 Dr. Aponte testified that appellant’s severe mental health disorder was at least an aggravating factor in the commission of his qualifying offense. Dr. Aponte based her conclusion on appellant’s “heightened paranoia” and delusions both before and after the offense. Dr. Aponte did not find appellant’s report that the victim attacked him first to be credible. Dr. Aponte noted that appellant later made comments that the victim was “gay or transgender,” which appeared to “tie in with some of his previous delusions.” In county jail, appellant reported he felt like everyone was out to get him. Dr. Aponte described an incident in which appellant claimed other inmates left a decapitated head under his chair in the dayroom. Appellant said this was done “specifically to threaten him.” When Dr. Aponte asked appellant to specify whether the head was human, animal, or a doll’s head, he was unable to do so. Dr. Aponte testified that although appellant’s mental health disorder was in remission at the time of the Board of Parole Hearing (BPH), she did not believe it could be kept in remission without treatment. She based her opinion on the fact that appellant required an “involuntary medication order, for dangerousness to others during the time he was in CDCR [California Department of Corrections], and within the year preceding his Board of Parole certification date.” Dr. Aponte found appellant represented a substantial risk of physical harm to others by reason of his severe mental health disorder. Dr. Aponte opined “the single most important factor” was appellant’s history of acting out violently due to his mental health illness. Dr. Aponte relied on appellant’s prior rule violation reports, some of which were found to be related to his mental health disorder and included battery on a peace officer. 4 In another incident, appellant put signs on his cell door and “acknowledged” they were “related to his persecutory beliefs about gay and transgender people.” Dr. Aponte noted that shortly after appellant was put on a forced medication order, he stopped incurring rule violations. Dr. Aponte also considered appellant’s lack of insight, his self-report of substance use, and his discharge plan. Dr. Aponte noted, to appellant’s credit, that he said he would take his medication, but he has also reported that he did not believe he had a mental illness and did not need medication. Appellant attributed his behavioral change to having been transferred away from people who were causing problems for him. Dr. Aponte opined this undermined the likelihood appellant would be treatment compliant in the future or be able to control himself in the future if symptomatic. Defense Case Dr. Guillermo Franco, a forensic psychologist with the CDCR, testified that he interviewed appellant on October 21, 2024. Dr. Franco diagnosed appellant with unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder, which met the statutory definition of a severe mental health disorder as defined in section 2960. Dr. Franco did not believe there was a “clear indication” that appellant’s underlying mental health issues were a cause or aggravating factor in the qualifying offense. In making this determination, Dr. Franco explained he had “very limited information” about the crime. The only documentation he had was the probation officer’s report, which was only four to six sentences and did not indicate any type of underlying mental health issues at the time of the offense. Dr. Franco acknowledged 5 the report used the term “mentally disturbed,” but explained this term is used “very inconsistently” and “doesn’t mean much” to him. Dr. Franco explained the “only thing” he had in terms of mental health documentation to guide him was from appellant’s prison term from 2015 to 2017. During that time, appellant did not receive any mental health treatment, was “cleared for mental health the entirety of his incarceration,” and completed Post Release Community Supervision satisfactorily. Dr. Franco acknowledged appellant had a history of exhibiting persecutory beliefs and delusions but explained a lot of it was based on “self-reports.” Dr. Franco opined that given appellant’s criminal history and past involvement in gangs, “some paranoid ideation . . . can be viewed as normally reality based.” Dr. Franco opined that appellant’s severe mental health disorder was not in remission and could not be kept in remission without treatment. Dr. Franco concluded appellant did not represent a substantial risk of physical harm. In reaching this conclusion, Dr. Franco considered that appellant was on the lowest level of mental health care in CDCR. He had not received any rule violation reports in the 18 months prior to the interview. During the interview, appellant did not engage in any delusional thinking. Dr. Franco believed appellant’s parole plans were “viable.” However, Dr. Franco did express concern regarding appellant’s marijuana use “because of the link between paranoia and longstanding marijuana abuse.” On cross examination, Dr. Franco acknowledged that he looked at the rule violation reports in connection with appellant’s 6 delusions and violent conduct, but declined to testify to any details because the reports were “all over the place,” and “not very accurate.” Dr. Franco explained his analysis focused on the “temporal proximity” of the crime. When the prosecutor asked if Dr. Franco had access to the jail records that showed appellant was behaving inappropriately and still symptomatic immediately preceding and after the qualifying offense, Dr. Franco conceded he did not. Dr. Franco also conceded he had no information as to whether appellant was taking medication at the time of the offense. Dr. Franco further acknowledged that appellant had no remorse for the qualifying offense. After listening to testimony and considering the evidence, the trial court found Dr. Aponte to be more credible than Dr. Franco. The trial court based its decision “primarily” on appellant’s “own statements . . . about his paranoia and things he was experiencing surrounding the commit[ment] offense.” The trial court found no other explanation for why appellant would have attacked the sleeping victim. The trial court found appellant met the requisite criteria in section 2962, beyond a reasonable doubt, and ordered him admitted to the Department of State Hospitals for treatment as an OMHD. Discussion Under the OMHD Act (§ 2960 et seq.), a prisoner adjudicated an OMHD may be civilly committed during and after parole if certain criteria are met. (§§ 2962, 2966.) Those criteria include the following: (1) the prisoner has a severe mental health disorder that is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment; (2) the severe mental health disorder was one 7 of the causes of, or was an aggravating factor in, the commission of a crime for which the defendant was sentenced to prison; (3) the prisoner has been in treatment for the severe mental health disorder for 90 days or more within the year prior to his parole or release; (4) by reason of the prisoner’s severe mental health disorder, he represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others; and (5) the crime for which the prisoner was sentenced falls into one of a number of specified categories. (§ 2962, subds. (a)-(d)(1), (e); People v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1075- 1076 (Clark).) We review the trial court’s findings at an OMHD proceeding for substantial evidence. (People v. Labelle (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 149, 151.) Under this standard, “[we] must determine whether, on the whole record, a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant is an [OMHD] beyond a reasonable doubt, considering all the evidence in the light which is most favorable to the People, and drawing all inferences the trier could reasonably have made to support the finding.” (Clark, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1082.) It is not our function to reweigh the evidence or redetermine witness credibility. (People v. Poe (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 826, 830 (Poe).) Appellant contends the record fails to provide substantial evidence that he meets the criteria as an OMHD. He claims Dr. Aponte’s opinions that (1) appellant’s severe mental health disorder was at least an aggravating factor, and (2) appellant presented a substantial danger of physical harm to others “lacked sufficient evidentiary foundation.” Neither contention has merit. Here, Dr. Aponte testified that appellant’s severe mental health disorder was at least an aggravating factor in the commission of his qualifying offense. She explained that leading 8 up to and after the offense, appellant was experiencing “heightened paranoia” and delusions. He was not taking his medication and was not under the influence of any substances at the time. According to Dr. Aponte, appellant’s comments “that the victim . . . was gay or transgender” were consistent with his delusional thinking. From this testimony, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude appellant’s severe mental health disorder was at least an aggravating factor in the qualifying offense. (See People v. Valdez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1018.) Appellant disagrees. He contends that Dr. Franco, “a ten- year forensic veteran,” considered the same evidence as Dr. Aponte and found it to be unreliable and speculative. But the trial court resolved any conflict in the evidence by crediting Dr. Aponte’s testimony. “It is not the role of this court to redetermine the credibility of experts or to reweigh the relative strength of their conclusions.” (See Poe, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 831.) Appellant’s second contention that insufficient evidence supports a finding that he presented a substantial danger of physical harm to others is also without merit. A substantial danger of physical harm to others means “a prediction of future dangerousness by mental health professionals.” (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 24.) A mental health professional “may and should take into account the prisoner’s entire history in making an [OMHD] evaluation. This includes prior violent offenses as well as the prisoner’s mental health history.” (People v. Pace (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 795, 799.) “A prior violent offense has a tendency in reason to show that the prisoner poses a ‘substantial danger of physical harm to others.’ ” (Ibid.) 9 Here, Dr. Aponte found that appellant represented a substantial risk of physical harm to others based on his history of acting out violently due to his mental illness, his need to be involuntarily medicated, and his substance abuse. She also cited appellant’s history of rule violation reports in prison, some of which were related to his severe mental health disorder. Dr. Aponte cited appellant’s lack of insight into his mental illness and his need for medication, which undermined the likelihood that appellant would be treatment compliant or have the ability to control himself if symptomatic in the future. This evidence supports the trial court’s commitment order. (See People v. Bowers (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 870, 879 [“A single psychiatric opinion that an individual is dangerous because of a mental disorder constitutes substantial evidence to support” the commitment order].) For the first time in his reply brief, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting and relying on hearsay evidence presented by Dr. Aponte. For example, he claims prior to testifying about the rule violation reports, Dr. Aponte had to look at the record to ascertain details, then relayed those details to the trial court by testifying to case specific information in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. He claims this was prejudicial because Dr. Aponte’s opinions were “inextricably enmeshed with details lacking in foundation, reliability, or trustworthiness.” But appellant forfeited this claim by failing to object below. “[T]he failure to object to the admission of expert testimony or hearsay at trial forfeits an appellate claim that such evidence was improperly admitted. [Citations.]” (People v. Stevens (2015) 62 Cal.4th 325, 333; see also People v. Yates (2018) 25 10 Cal.App.5th 474, 487 [forfeiture found where “defense counsel did not once object under Sanchez or, except on two occasions, on any hearsay ground at all”].) But even absent forfeiture, appellant’s contention is meritless. In finding appellant met the criteria for commitment as an OMHD, beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court expressly considered all of the evidence, including appellant’s “own statements . . . about his paranoia and things he was experiencing surrounding the commit[ment] offense.” On this record, any error is harmless. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Disposition The judgment (OMHD commitment order) is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. YEGAN, J. We concur: CODY, P. J. BALTODANO, J. 11 Timothy S. Covello, Judge Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo _____________________________ B. Jolene Lewis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.