In re I.C. CA2/6

Filed 11/12/26 In re I.C. CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX In re I.C., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B349653 Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. EL1296A) Law. (Los Angeles County) THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. I.C., Defendant and Appellant. I.C. appeals from the dispositional order adjudicating him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging he carried a loaded firearm in public. (Pen. Code,1 § 25850, subd. (a).) I.C. contends the 1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. juvenile court erred in declining to reduce his offense to a misdemeanor. He also challenges probation conditions referring to “mind altering substances” on the grounds that they are vague and overbroad. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In September 2024, a witness saw I.C. with a group of young men at a bus stop. I.C. “raised his hand with a gun” and the other young men applauded. The witness saw another young man run away. The witness called 911, and when the police came, he identified I.C. as the person with the firearm. I.C. admitted he had a firearm. The police found a loaded firearm in I.C.’s front waistband. At trial, the juvenile court admitted into evidence a certified firearm history for the firearm found on I.C. The firearm was registered to another person and reported stolen seven days before it was found on I.C. The Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging I.C. committed assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 1) and carried a loaded firearm (§ 25850, subd. (a); count 2). It was also alleged the firearm was stolen and I.C. knew or had reasonable cause to believe it was stolen (§ 25850, subd. (c)(2)). Following a contested adjudication hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition only as to count 2. Count 1 was dismissed. I.C. moved for the juvenile court to reduce count 2 to a misdemeanor because there was no evidence to support the People’s theory that I.C. knew or had reasonable cause to believe the firearm was stolen. Counsel admitted that the firearm was not registered to I.C. When the court asked where counsel 2 thought the firearm had come from, he did “not have an answer to that question.” The court denied I.C.’s motion. The juvenile court declared I.C. a ward of the court. The court ordered probation with terms and conditions and set the maximum term of confinement at two years. The court ordered suitable placement at Rite of Passage. DISCUSSION Designation of the offense as a felony I.C. contends the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to reduce count 2 to a misdemeanor because there was insufficient evidence he knew the firearm was stolen. He also contends the court misunderstood its discretion to designate his offense as a “wobbler.” (People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 685. We disagree. Section 25850, subdivision (a) provides that a “person is guilty of carrying a loaded firearm when the person carries a loaded firearm on the person . . . in any public place or on any public street.” Carrying a loaded firearm is punishable as a felony where “the firearm is stolen and the person knew or had reasonable cause to believe that it was stolen.” (§ 25850, subd. (c)(2).) The offense is a “wobbler” where the “person is not listed . . . as the recorded owner of the handgun.” (§ 25850, subd. (c)(6).) Here, the prosecution charged the offense as a felony, alleging that the firearm was stolen and I.C. knew or had reasonable cause to believe it was stolen (§ 25850, subd. (c)(2)). The juvenile court implicitly found the offense was punishable as a felony. Because we review this finding for substantial evidence (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809), we review the record 3 in the light most favorable to the judgment. (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630–631.) “Conscious possession of recently stolen property alone is insufficient to permit the inference defendant knew the property was stolen, however, ‘the attributes of the possession—time, place, and manner—may furnish the additional quantum of evidence needed. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘[P]roof of knowing possession by a defendant of recently stolen property raises a strong inference of the other element of the crime: the defendant’s knowledge of the tainted nature of the property. This inference is so substantial that only “slight” additional corroborating evidence need be adduced in order to permit a finding of guilty. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 984–985.) We conclude substantial evidence supports a finding that I.C. knew or had reasonable cause to know the firearm was stolen. The firearm was registered to another person and was reported stolen a mere seven days before I.C. was found in possession of it. I.C. was a minor who could not lawfully possess a firearm (see § 29610), and there was no explanation of how he obtained the firearm. He displayed the firearm at a public bus stop for his companions to see. The firearm was not registered to any of his companions. Based on this “slight” additional corroborating evidence, a rational finder of fact could find I.C. knew or had reasonable cause to know the firearm was stolen. Probation conditions I.C. contends two probation conditions are vague and overbroad in violation of his due process rights. Probation condition 17 states: “You must not knowingly drink or possess any alcoholic beverages nor knowingly use or possess illegal 4 drugs or mind altering substances except as prescribed by a physician including marijuana.” Probation condition 18 states: “You must not be around persons you know to be users or sellers of illegal drugs or mind altering substances.” A probation condition that “imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) “A probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness.” (Ibid.) A probation condition should not be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague if it can be given any reasonable and practical construction. (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 501.) “A probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’ ” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382 (Olguin).) The “question before us is not whether this degree of precision would be desirable in principle, but whether it is constitutionally compelled.” (Hall, at p. 503.) I.C. contends probation conditions 17 and 18 are overbroad and vague because the phrase “mind altering substances” is not “sufficiently precise” in context. Specifically, as to condition 18, he contends that “mind altering substances” can refer to illegal or legal substances such as coffee, chocolate, energy drinks, or legally prescribed drugs. We are not persuaded. When reading the phrase “illegal drugs or mind altering substances,” a “ ‘reasonable, objective reader’ ” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 382) would understand that “illegal” referred to both 5 “drugs” and “mind altering substances.” In our view, the reasonable and practical reading of the conditions prohibits use of, and association with persons I.C. knows uses or sells illegal drugs and illegal mind-altering substances. Coffee is not an illegal “mind altering substance.” And a physician who prescribes “mind altering substances” is not a person who “uses” or “sells” drugs. Similarly, and as I.C. concedes, pharmacists are “legal sellers” of “mind altering substances.” Nor do the conditions prohibit I.C. from associating with persons who use legal “mind altering substances,” such as coffee. The record reflects I.C. understood the probation conditions when discussing them at the disposition hearing. During the juvenile court’s oral reading of the probation conditions, the court said the probation report mentioned I.C.’s use of nitrous oxide, which was “highly addictive.” It is also illegal. (§ 381b.) I.C. acknowledged that nitrous oxide was “really bad” and replied, “I don’t use any substances at all, and I don’t crave it at all.” The court said that it was going to order I.C. “not to do those things” and then ordered I.C. was not to “knowingly use or possess any illegal drugs or mind-altering substances including marijuana . . . and including nitrous oxide,” and “not to hang around with people that you know to be a user or seller of illegal drugs or mind altering substances, including marijuana . . . and nitrous oxide.” I.C. said he understood these terms and conditions. We conclude probation conditions 17 and 18 are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad and can be reasonably read to refer to illegal mind-altering substances. 6  DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. BALTODANO, J. We concur: CODY, P. J. HIPPACH, J. 7  Christina L. Hill, Judge Superior Court County of Los Angeles ______________________________ Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.