Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Flowers CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR THE PEOPLE, B341182 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA109227) v. STEVE FLOWERS, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed. Dale Dombkowski, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Steve Flowers appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 We affirm. In 1994, two armed men entered a home under the guise of buying marijuana. Flowers and a fourth man joined them about 10 minutes later. Once inside, over the course of 30 to 60 minutes, the intruders bound, beat, and robbed the occupants. They stabbed and shot one victim. They then fatally shot a bystander who interrupted the incident. There is no evidence suggesting that Flowers was the shooter or was armed. Flowers was convicted of murder, torture, and robbery, with the enhancement that a principal used a firearm and the special circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of the robbery. In 2019, Flowers petitioned for resentencing. He argued that he was not the shooter, was not a major participant in the robbery, and did not act with reckless indifference to human life. The trial court denied the petition following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Flowers argues that the evidence showed only that he “walked in” on an armed robbery. He asserts that he did not participate and instead objected when the others threatened to kill the victims. We are not persuaded that Flowers has established error. The record contains evidence that Flowers was at the scene as support for the first two robbers in case things went wrong and that he was present in the house while his armed confederates tied up the victims, then repeatedly threatened, beat, stabbed, and shot them. He also participated in the crimes by looking for string to tie up the victims and gathering items to steal from the house. After the fatal shooting of one victim, he fled, leaving the other victims bound and unable to render aid. In sum, examining the totality of the evidence, the trial court 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Flowers was a major participant in the robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Thus, we do not find that the trial court erred in denying the petition for resentencing. FACTUAL BACKGROUND We take the following factual summary from the transcripts of the trial. The parties and the trial court relied on the trial record for the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. We granted the unopposed motion by Flowers to augment the record on appeal with those transcripts. I. The Robbery and Shooting The four perpetrators of the robbery were Flowers, Edgar Pitts, Vince Young, and Steven Arnold. They were accompanied by Paul Banks, who remained outside for the entire incident.2 Young and Arnold were partners who had previously made money by robbing drug dealers in California and then selling the stolen drugs at higher prices in Virginia. Young decided to start making “legit” drug purchases. He asked Banks, his childhood friend, to locate marijuana sellers for this purpose. Banks helped set up a meeting at the home of Bobby H.3 for Young to purchase marijuana. On March 24, 1994, Young and Banks met in advance of the planned drug purchase. Young was accompanied by Arnold, Pitts, and Flowers. Young told Banks that the other men were there “just in case something happened,” that is, in case the sellers “tried to turn on them and take the 2 Four of the surviving victims testified at trial. Banks also testified for the prosecution. 3 We refer to living victims by first name and last initial to protect their privacy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).) 3 money.” The group drove to Bobby’s house in two cars; Banks drove Pitts and Flowers in his car. Young and Arnold went into Bobby’s house while the other three waited outside in Banks’s car. Bobby was inside, as was his friend, John P., who was watching television. Alex A. and his friend, who went by the nickname “Feo,” arrived with ten pounds of marijuana for the sale. Young handed the money to Alex, which he began to count. Young and Arnold stood up and pulled handguns from their waistbands. One of them told everyone “[g]et down now. I’ll kill you, it’s a jack.” Arnold went outside and told Flowers and Pitts to come inside. Banks testified that this concerned him, because the inclusion of Flowers and Pitts made it clear that the men were “in there robbing.” Banks did not think the purchase of that amount of marijuana would require more than two people. There were now four intruders and four victims in the house. Some of the intruders used telephone cords, belts, and shoelaces to tie the hands and feet of the victims on the floor. The victims were tied face down and were kicked or threatened if they looked up. John testified that he could hear Alex getting beaten while the intruders demanded more marijuana. Alex and Feo were kicked and struck in the head. They were also “stomped” on by at least three of the intruders. When Alex said he did not have any more drugs, an intruder responded, “You think I’m playing with you? … I will shoot you.” One of the intruders shot Alex in the buttocks and then said, “Let’s burn these motherfuckers.” One of the intruders said, “Don’t shoot any more, it makes too much noise, go get a knife.” An intruder cut or stabbed Alex repeatedly with a knife.4 An intruder also suggested cutting the victims’ 4 Arnold later told Banks that he had shot and stabbed Alex. 4 throats. Bobby heard one intruder say to “kill them all.” Bobby did not hear any of the intruders objecting to the violence or threats in any way. The intruders kicked Bobby and John, including striking John in the head. The intruders also removed money, jewelry, and other valuables from the victims. The victims testified that they heard the intruders ransacking the house and “filling up bags” with items to steal. Wayne R. came to the house and knocked on the door. Pitts and Young dragged him inside, threw him to the floor, and tied him up. Both Pitts and Young were holding guns. An intruder kicked Wayne in the head and ribs. Chris Williams unexpectedly knocked on the front door. He was dragged inside, thrown to the floor and kicked. Williams began fighting back. One of the intruders shouted, “Kill him, shoot him, shoot him.” An intruder then fatally shot Williams in the back. After Williams was shot, the intruders fled the house, taking the marijuana with them. Flowers and Pitts ran to Banks’s vehicle and the group reconvened at a restaurant. On the drive, Flowers and Pitts talked about how much marijuana they got. Pitts said he shot Williams because “he was acting real crazy,” but he “didn’t mean to.” Bobby testified that the assaults, robberies, and ransacking of the house occurred after Flowers and Pitts entered the residence. Alex estimated that the incident lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. II. Arrest and Statements to Police On April 12, 1994, federal law enforcement agents attempted to stop a van in Virginia. Occupants of the van fired at the agents. The van attempted to evade capture but was eventually stopped at a roadblock. The van held five occupants, including Flowers, Arnold, and Pitts. Agents found four firearms in the van. 5 A few months after his arrest, Flowers spoke with a detective from the Los Angeles Police Department. Flowers stated that at the start of the robbery, he waited in Banks’s vehicle while Young and Arnold entered the house. Ten minutes later, Arnold came out and told Flowers to come inside. Inside the house, Flowers saw four men tied up on the floor and Arnold and Young holding guns. Flowers recognized Arnold’s gun as one that Arnold had stolen during another incident. Flowers said that he told the others, “You guys are crazy.” The detective asked Flowers why he did not leave. Flowers replied, “they might try to do me or something” and also that he did not know his way around California. Flowers admitted that he went through the house looking for drugs and things to steal. He “was messing around with” a TV and other items, but did not remove them from the house. Young and Arnold told Flowers to get some string to tie up the victims. Flowers admitted that he looked for string but did not find any. When Arnold mentioned killing the victims, Flowers claimed that he said, “‘Y’all can’t ... you just can’t kill people just like that.’” Flowers admitted witnessing the beatings, stabbing, and shootings, but contended he was unarmed and did not participate. Flowers testified for the prosecution in a case in Virginia that he was involved with Arnold and Young in transporting cocaine and marijuana from California to Virginia. Flowers stated that they stole most of the drugs from dealers. PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. Conviction and Sentence In November 1997, a jury convicted Flowers of the first degree murder of Williams (§ 187, subd. (a)), the torture of Alex (§ 206), and four counts of robbery (§ 211). The jury further found true that during the commission of 6 each offense, a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and the special circumstance that the murder was committed during the commission of the robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The trial court sentenced Flowers to life without parole for the murder and a consecutive life term for the torture count, plus one year for the firearm enhancement on each of those counts. The court imposed concurrent sentences for the robbery counts. This court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal. (People v. Flowers (June 29, 2000, B118501) [nonpub. opn.].) II. Section 1172.6 Proceedings In 2019, Flowers filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.5 He contended that he could not now be convicted of murder because he was not the actual killer, was not a major participant in the robberies, and did not act with reckless indifference to human life during the course of the robberies. The trial court summarily denied the petition based on the jury’s true finding of the robbery-murder special circumstance, which included a finding that he either (1) aided and abetted the murder with the intent to kill; or (2) was a major participant in the robberies who acted with reckless indifference to human life. We reversed because the special circumstance finding predated the Supreme Court’s guidance on this issue in People v. Banks 5 At the time, the statute was numbered section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without substantive changes. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the statute as section 1172.6. 7 (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).6 (People v. Flowers (Sept. 1, 2021, B301439) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court appointed counsel for Flowers and the parties filed briefs. In opposition to the petition, the People submitted the transcript from the jury trial. The People argued that Flowers was ineligible for relief because he was a major participant in the robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court held an evidentiary hearing on September 20, 2024. Following argument, the court denied the petition. The court detailed its factual findings weighing against resentencing, including that Flowers was “brought to that location to assist in case anything happened…. That means it escalated into something else.” The court agreed that there was no evidence Flowers had a gun or shot anyone, but found that “when he came into the house, there were people tied up; there were people with guns. And he was aware of that. He was asked to go get something to tie somebody else up. He willingly did that; although, he didn’t find anything to tie the person up with. He didn’t have any objection to putting that person in the same predicament as the other victims.” The court found it was not “inconceivable that Mr. Flowers was aware that there was a potential for someone to get shot. Someone who was disabled by being either tied up or attacked.” 6 The standard for felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3) is the same as the standard for finding a special circumstance under section 190.2, subdivision (d). (In re Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 561.) Because the Supreme Court provided guidance as to the meaning of section 190.2 in Banks and Clark, a jury’s true finding of the special circumstance that predates those opinions does not satisfy the prosecution’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. 8 The court further found that Flowers “went around looking for property to steal.” After that, “he fled knowing that people were tied up and somebody had been shot.” The court thus found beyond a reasonable doubt that Flowers was a major participant in the robbery, because he willingly assisted in the robbery and in “the plan to tie up anybody who resisted.” The court further found that Flowers acted with reckless indifference, noting that he “did nothing to ... render aid to anybody. And fled the jurisdiction.” Flowers appealed. DISCUSSION I. Legal Principles A. Section 1172.6 The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) “‘to more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides.’” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448.) SB 1437 “‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Ibid.; see § 189, subd. (e)(1)- (3).) Section 1172.6 provides “a procedural mechanism for defendants who could not be convicted of murder under the amended laws to seek retroactive relief.” (People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457.) If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing for relief, the trial court must issue an order to show cause for an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d).) At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution bears the burden “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or 9 attempted murder” under current law. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3).) “In addition to evidence admitted in the petitioner’s prior trial, both ‘[t]he prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.’ [Citation.] ‘If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.’” (People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869, quoting § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) B. Standard of Review We review the trial court’s factual findings following an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. (People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 111.) We “review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found” beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was ineligible for resentencing. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 (Zamudio); see also People v. Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 652, 663.) The record must disclose substantial evidence to support this finding—“i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (Zamudio, supra, at p. 357.) “In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the [order] the existence of every fact the [superior court] could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 663, quoting Zamudio, supra, at p. 357.) We reject Flowers’s contention that we should independently review the trial court’s findings because they were based on a “cold record.” None of the cases he cites involve the standard of review for a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. (See People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 524 [motion to vacate under § 1473.7]; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 10 491, 529 [juror challenge for cause].) Indeed, in Vivar, the court expressly noted, “Our decision addresses only the independent standard of review under section 1473.7. Nothing we say here disturbs a familiar postulate: when reviewing a ruling under the substantial evidence standard, ‘an appellate court should defer to the factual determinations made by the trial court,’ regardless of ‘whether the trial court’s ruling[s are based] on oral testimony or declarations.’” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 528, fn. 7.) Moreover, contrary to the claim by Flowers that a “long line of consistent Supreme Court holdings” supports independent review, the Supreme Court has consistently reviewed resentencing petitions for substantial evidence. (See People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 885 (Emanuel) [conducting a review of “the denial of Emanuel’s section 1172.6 petition, following an evidentiary hearing, for substantial evidence”]; People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 [“Ordinarily, a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition is reviewed for substantial evidence”].) We follow this authority and join our sister courts in declining to extend Vivar to govern the standard of review in evidentiary hearings under section 1172.6. (See, e.g., People v. Njoku (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 27, 43 [“the issue here is a factual one traditionally afforded substantial evidence review”]; People v. Werntz (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1109; People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 480; People v. Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 232–233; People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 590–591.) C. Banks and Clark Factors In Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788, and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, our Supreme Court set forth “a nonexhaustive list” of factors relevant to determining whether a defendant is a major participant in a felony who acted with reckless indifference to life. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.) 11 These factors “‘significantly overlap’” in that “‘the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Clark, supra, at p. 615, quoting Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 153 (Tison).) “The ultimate question pertaining to being a major participant is ‘whether the defendant’s participation “in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death” [citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered “major” [citations].”’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611.) To assist in answering this question, Banks articulated the following considerations: “What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.) Similarly, in Clark, the Supreme Court set forth considerations relevant to whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life, “including use of or awareness of the presence of a weapon or weapons, physical presence at the scene and opportunity to restrain confederates or aid victims, the duration of the crime, knowledge of any threat the confederates might represent, and efforts taken to minimize risks.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884, quoting People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 706; see also Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–623.) Ultimately, reckless indifference “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) 12 to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.” (Clark, supra, at p. 617.) Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective element, namely, “the defendant’s conscious disregard of risks known to him or her.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617; see also In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677 (Scoggins) [defendant “must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death his or her actions create’”].) It also contains an objective element. “‘The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’” (Scoggins, supra, at p. 677.) As the Supreme Court recently explained, “‘“[a]wareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient” to establish reckless indifference to human life; “only knowingly creating a ‘grave risk of death’” satisfies the statutory requirement.’” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.) Thus, “participation in a ‘garden- variety armed robbery,’ i.e., one in which the only factor supporting a reckless indifference finding is that a participant was armed with a gun, is insufficient without more to establish reckless indifference.” (Ibid.) No single Banks or Clark factor is “‘necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Instead, courts must assess the totality of a defendant’s culpability along a spectrum spanning from Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, in which the defendant getaway driver for an armed robbery was minimally culpable for the murder that ensued, to Tison, supra, 481 U.S. 137, in which the defendants helped convicted murderers escape from prison, provided weapons, and stood by as their confederates debated killing, then killed, an 13 innocent family. (See Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 794, 801–803; Clark, supra, at pp. 609, 612–614, 618; see also Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 883 [court must conduct a “‘fact-intensive, individualized inquiry’ into where a defendant’s conduct falls on the spectrum of culpability”].) Some cases have held that a defendant’s youth at the time of the crime is a circumstance that may be relevant to his or her placement on the culpability spectrum. (See In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 453–454 (Moore).) These cases have reasoned that children tend to act more immaturely or impetuously than adults and may fail to appreciate the risks and consequences of their actions. (Id. at p. 454.) Courts that have considered youth as a factor have also concluded that, like all the other factors, youth alone is not dispositive. (In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 470.) II. Analysis The People concede that Flowers was not the actual shooter. Instead, he was convicted of first degree murder under a felony murder theory based on his participation in the robbery. Therefore, to sustain his murder conviction under section 1172.6, the People had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Flowers was a major participant in the robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life during the commission of the crime. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Flowers contends there was not substantial evidence to support a finding of either element. We examine each in turn. A. Major Participant We apply the Banks factors and consider the totality of the circumstances. We conclude substantial evidence supports a finding that Flowers was a major participant in the robbery. 14 The first factor, as noted, considers the defendant’s role in planning the crimes. We agree with Flowers that there is no evidence he was the mastermind in planning the robbery. However, he admitted to participating in other instances where Young and Arnold stole drugs from dealers to sell out of state. He also agreed to serve as backup. Implicitly, this meant that he agreed to respond to potential violence during the event. The second factor concerns the defendant’s role in supplying or using lethal weapons. The trial court found that there was no evidence Flowers supplied or used any of the firearms during the incident. We agree. This factor weighs against a finding that Flowers was a major participant. The third factor examines the defendant’s awareness of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants. Flowers focuses on the lack of evidence that he knew of past violence by Young, Arnold, or Pitts. However, as noted above, there was evidence from which the trial court could find that Flowers had previously assisted Young and Arnold in robbing drug dealers. There was also evidence that Flowers knew that his role in the incident at issue in this case was to step in if something went wrong. With this knowledge, he willingly entered the house when summoned. Once inside, he was confronted with a scene far from a “garden-variety armed robbery.” Instead, he was present for an event lasting more than 30 minutes. Four victims were tied on the floor. His armed confederates threatened and attacked the victims with increasing ferocity as their demands for more drugs were not met. Then, when two separate individuals—unrelated to the robbery in progress— knocked on the front door, they were pulled inside and subjected to the same violence. It is reasonable to conclude from this evidence that Flowers recognized that the robbery posed particularly serious dangers. 15 The fourth factor considers whether Flowers was present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the murder, and whether his actions or inaction played a particular role in the death. Flowers admits he was present at the scene. But he argues that the others ignored his verbal objection to the shooting, citing his statement to police. After that, he contends there was little he could do, as he was unarmed. Flowers misapprehends our role in a substantial evidence review. “Our role is not to reweigh the evidence, nor is it our role to judge the credibility of witnesses.” (People v. Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 112–113.) The evidence that Flowers objected during the robbery was disputed. Bobby testified that he did not hear anyone object. The trial court found that Flowers made no objection. Instead, the trial court noted, Flowers looked around for something to tie up a victim despite seeing other victims already helpless on the floor and then gathered items to steal. Substantial evidence supports that finding. We are not persuaded otherwise by Flowers’s reliance on cases in which it was undisputed that the defendant made some effort to act as a restraining influence. (See Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 890– 891.) Flowers also contends the killing was “a spontaneous act against a surprise visitor,” and thus he had little chance to try to prevent the shooting. His suggestion that this crime unfolded “quickly” is not supported by the evidence. While the final series of events involving Williams unfolded quickly, the violence against the victims had begun long before. We evaluate whether there was a “‘prolonged period of restraint of the victims’” and/or a lengthy period of violent contact between the robbers and the victims. (See Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 886, 892 [“where violence unfolds ‘quickly,’ a defendant may ‘lack control’ over the actions of his confederates”]; Moore, 16 supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 452 [the “short duration of the robbery and the sudden and unprovoked nature of the shooting” reinforced the conclusion that the defendant could not have restrained his accomplice’s actions].) Thus, the court could reasonably conclude that Flowers was in a position to at least attempt to prevent violence that ended in murder, but he did not do so. Instead, when asked to assist, he entered the house, and then facilitated the restraint and robbery of the victims. The final factor, the defendant’s actions after lethal force was used, also weighs in favor of the finding that Flowers was a major participant. After Williams was shot, Flowers and the other robbers immediately fled, leaving the other victims tied up and unable to call for or render aid. (See In re Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 462 [evidence the defendant was “close enough [to the murder scene] to hear the gunshot,” but “did not go back inside and try and help the [victim],” and instead carried stolen merchandise out to the car weighed in favor of a finding of major participation].) In the car, he discussed with Pitts the amount of marijuana they had taken and then he met with the other robbers at a restaurant before fleeing the state. This post-shooting conduct could reasonably be viewed, in concert with the other Banks factors, as elevating the degree of Flowers’s participation in the robbery and his culpability under the totality of the circumstances. In sum, substantial evidence supports a finding that Flowers was a major participant. B. Reckless Indifference Similarly, applying the Clark factors, and considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the record demonstrates Flowers acted with reckless indifference to human life. 17 The first Clark factor overlaps with the second Banks factor: what did the defendant know about the weapons used in the felony? Did the defendant use a weapon? How many weapons were used in the crime? (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) There is no evidence that Flowers personally stabbed or shot the victims. It is also unclear whether he knew before entering the house that his confederates were armed. However, he knew at the time he entered the house that his presence was required only if the drug “purchase” had not gone as planned. Further, there could be no dispute upon entering the house that Young and Arnold were engaged in an armed robbery. Flowers saw the victims being bound and lying on the floor, the other intruders brandishing guns and threatening to kill the victims, and then saw some of his confederates kicking, beating, stabbing, and shooting the victims. While the mere fact that a robbery involved a gun is insufficient by itself to support a finding of reckless indifference to human life (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617), the presence of multiple lethal weapons and the intruders’ demonstrated willingness to violently use them are factors relevant to the required mens rea and weigh in favor of the trial court's finding. (See Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 682 [anyone who plans or participates in armed robbery anticipates lethal violence might be used]; but see People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 559 [no evidence that defendant knew codefendant’s gun was loaded].) Based on the evidence presented, this factor weighs in favor of the trial court’s finding that Flowers was “aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed, demonstrating reckless indifference to the significant risk of death his or her actions create.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801.) The second factor, Flowers’s physical proximity to the murder and the events leading up to it, and the opportunities that proximity afforded to 18 restrain the crime or aid the victim, is similar to the fourth Banks factor. As already discussed, this factor also weighs in favor of the court's finding that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. “Proximity to the murder and the events leading up to it may be particularly significant where ... the murder is a culmination or a foreseeable result of several intermediate steps, or where the participant who personally commits the murder exhibits behavior tending to suggest a willingness to use lethal force. In such cases, ‘the defendant’s presence allows him to observe his cohorts so that it is fair to conclude that he shared in their actions and mental state.... [Moreover,] the defendant’s presence gives him an opportunity to act as a restraining influence on murderous cohorts. If the defendant fails to act as a restraining influence, then the defendant is arguably more at fault for the resulting murders.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) Flowers was present in the house for the majority of the events leading up to the murder, and admitted seeing the other robbers repeatedly threaten to kill and then actually stab and shoot the victims. The court could reasonably conclude that he failed to act as a restraining influence. Instead, the court could reasonably conclude that he assisted in the restraint of the victims and the robbery, which culminated in the murder. Flowers also failed to aid Williams after the shooting, despite knowing that the only other witnesses were tied up. This too weighs in favor of a finding of reckless indifference. (See People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 282–283 [defendant “inferably would have known the victims, from their physical state when he last observed them, were likely in no position to summon aid or immediately provide it”].) The third factor is the duration of the felony, particularly the duration of the interaction between victims and perpetrators. As we have discussed, 19 the evidence supported a finding that the incident here lasted from 30 to 60 minutes. Further, Flowers stated that he entered the house after about ten minutes. For the remainder of the crime, Flowers was in the house while the victims were restrained on the floor and several of the intruders threatened, beat, kicked, stabbed, and shot them. Although Flowers suggests we should focus only on the short time between when Williams entered and when he was shot, he cites no authority to support that proposition. To the contrary, courts look at the duration of the entire crime, particularly the time during which victims were restrained and violence was used. (Compare Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620 [in assessing a defendant’s mental state, “[c]ourts have looked to whether a murder came at the end of a prolonged period of restraint of the victims”] with People v. Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 560 [robbery was “a quick crime of opportunity,” and Keel had “no idea” it would happen]; see also People v. Montanez, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 283 [“the prolonged nature of the crimes and close interaction between the assailants and victims make this case like Tison”].) The trial court made no findings regarding the fourth factor—Flowers’s awareness of his confederates’ propensity for violence or likelihood of killing a victim. We do not see substantial evidence in the record supporting the application of this factor here. Finally, the fifth factor is the defendant’s efforts to minimize the risk of violence during the felony. This factor looks at the “[e]fforts at the planning stage to minimize the potential for violence.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 887–888.) There is no evidence that Flowers was involved in planning the details of this robbery. Thus, this factor does not weigh in favor of a finding of reckless indifference. 20 Flowers also argues that we should consider his youth as a mitigating factor. He was 21 years old at the time of the crimes. He does not contend the trial court failed to consider his age; rather, he urges us to weigh this factor more heavily. Assuming that Flowers’s youth was a relevant consideration in the trial court’s analysis of his eligibility for resentencing, youth alone is not dispositive (In re Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 470), and “[t]he fact of youth cannot overwhelm all other factors.” (People v. Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 595.) Here, the trial court performed a thorough inquiry, and its findings were well supported by substantial evidence. As detailed by the court, the evidence showed that Flowers facilitated the robberies and the murder of Williams. He also failed to render aid to the victim. Considering the totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence therefore supported the trial court’s finding that Flowers acted with reckless indifference to human life. We therefore find no error in the trial court’s denial of Flowers’s petition for resentencing. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS DAUM, J. We concur: ZUKIN, P. J. TAMZARIAN, J. 21