People v. Russo
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledJune 12, 2026
DocketC103388
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 5/22/26; certified for publication 6/12/26 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Siskiyou)
THE PEOPLE, C103388
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 24CF01675)
v.
JOSEPH CHARLES RUSSO,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Joseph Charles Russo 1 appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for
mental health diversion. (See Pen. Code, 2 § 1001.36.) We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At defendant’s preliminary hearing there was evidence that in February 2024,
defendant’s mother told defendant to leave her property. Defendant responded by
punching his dog approximately 20 times, calling it racial slurs, and dragging it down the
street. When defendant’s mother tried to call 911, defendant stated, “You better not be
calling the cops on me, [b]itch. I’ll burn your fucking house down.”
1 Defendant’s name appears in the record as both “Joseph Charles Russo” and
“Joseph Russo.” We use defendant’s name as it appears on the order being appealed.
2 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
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Defendant was charged with dissuading a witness by force or threat, cruelty to an
animal, and possession of drug paraphernalia. It was further alleged defendant sustained
a prior strike for first degree burglary in 2013.
On May 20, 2024, defendant filed a request for mental health diversion pursuant to
section 1001.36. In support of this request, defendant attached his mental health
diagnosis and treatment plan. Defendant was recommended for outpatient treatment with
substance use disorder services to address his bipolar I disorder, posttraumatic stress
disorder, methamphetamine use disorder, and cannabis use disorder. Defendant also
provided an acceptance letter from an Adult and Teen Challenge residential program
“that provides help to adults struggling with any life‑controlling issues such as drugs and
alcohol.” (Capitalization omitted.) The program “teaches people how to discipline their
lives spiritually, emotionally, and physically and become productive citizens in [the]
community.” Defense counsel’s supplemental letter to the trial court supporting the
request for diversion noted defendant previously attended an Adult and Teen Challenge
program and “hop[es] to have a better exit strategy” upon his return.
The prosecution opposed mental health diversion because defendant was aware of
his mental health disorders and “failed to maintain ongoing care to curb his criminality.”
In support of its opposition, the prosecution attached a 2021 presentencing report
reflecting defendant completed an Adult Teen Challenge program in 2020 but relapsed
shortly after. Subsequently, defendant violated his probation—due to possession of a
firearm and methamphetamine—and failed to comply with a probation order to apply to a
housing program.
The trial court tentatively denied defendant’s request for mental health diversion
on September 26, 2024. The trial court reviewed all filed documents, pretrial service
reports, and the preliminary hearing transcript. The court then explained: Defendant was
“admitted [into] prior mental health programs but he never gave a hundred percent. [¶]
That he engaged in Adult and Teen Challenge one time before, relapsed shortly after his
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completion. [¶] … [¶] [A]lthough he has successfully engaged in the Adult Teen
Challenge … his sobriety … didn’t hold up for very long … I don’t think that he’s a very
good candidate for mental health diversion.” The trial court also noted “concerns of
public safety” based on defendant’s prior strike.
The trial court affirmed its tentative ruling on January 7, 2025, finding, “Even
though [defendant] may very likely qualify [for mental health diversion], he’s certainly
not a suitable candidate.” The trial court considered defendant’s failure to reform his
behavior despite opportunities to receive drug and mental health treatment. Specifically,
the trial court reiterated defendant’s previous completion of an Adult and Teen Challenge
program and found “he immediately went back to using methamphetamine [and] not
taking his medication.” Thus, the court concluded, “[T]he past portends the future, so
[the c]ourt finds [defendant’s] not suitable.”
Defendant later pled no contest to dissuading a witness by force or threat and
admitted the prior strike allegation. The prosecution dismissed the remaining charges.
The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years in prison.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for
mental health diversion because it applied the wrong definition of suitability. We
disagree.
“Section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial mental health diversion for defendants with
qualifying mental health disorders.” (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138,
1147.) The trial court “may, in its discretion … grant pretrial diversion” if it finds the
defendant eligible and “suitable” for diversion, based on the criteria set forth in
section 1001.36, subdivisions (b) and (c) respectively. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) If the
defendant is both eligible and suitable, the trial court must also be “satisfied that the
recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the
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specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (f)(1)(A)(i).) “This is not an additional eligibility or suitability requirement the
defendant must meet. Rather … an ongoing assessment to assure that defendants will
receive appropriate treatment for their particular conditions as part of the diversion
program.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892.)
On appeal, we review the trial court’s denial of mental health diversion for abuse
of discretion. (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448.) “A court abuses its
discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal
standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are
not supported by substantial evidence.” (Id. at p. 449.) Absent evidence to the contrary,
we presume the court knew and applied the law. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th
983, 1042.)
The trial court explicitly found defendant was “not suitable” for diversion. The
trial court’s reasoning, however, did not reflect consideration of the criteria for
determining suitability. The trial court’s analysis focused on the adequacy of defendant’s
proposed treatment. The trial court emphasized while defendant previously completed an
Adult and Teen Challenge program, he immediately relapsed and failed to take his
medication. Defendant also violated his probation and committed the present offenses
after completing the program. But the suitability requirements do not include adequacy
of the proposed treatment. (See § 1001.36, subd. (c).) Whether the defendant will “pose
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety … if treated in the community” is one
suitability factor. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) But the trial court’s brief reference to
“concerns of public safety” was overshadowed by its analysis of defendant’s treatment
history as the reason for the trial court denying his request for diversion.
The trial court’s analysis, however, mirrored the analysis under section 1001.36,
subdivision (f)(1)(A)(i). As mentioned, this looks at whether the trial court is overall
“satisfied that the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health
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treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant.”
(Ibid.) The trial court’s analysis above establishes it was not satisfied the outpatient
treatment program would meet defendant’s needs and may have conflated that analysis
with the suitability analysis. Specifically, defendant proposed a return to an Adult and
Teen Challenge program and the trial court explicitly found “he engaged in Adult and
Teen Challenge one time before[ and] relapsed shortly after his completion” so the trial
court did not “think that he’s a very good candidate for mental health diversion.” Finding
the treatment would not meet defendant’s specialized health treatment needs is an
appropriate basis to deny diversion, assuming there is no abuse of discretion with the
analysis. (See Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services Dist. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 260,
268 [“ ‘ “[W]e review the trial court’s order, not its reasoning, and affirm an order if it is
correct on any theory apparent from the record” ’ ”].)
With this understanding of the trial court’s analysis, we find no abuse of
discretion. Defendant’s central contention for error is that the trial court cannot consider
previous treatment performance in assessing the adequacy of the proposed treatment,
citing Sarmiento. We disagree. The court in Sarmiento acknowledged a trial court
analyzing its discretion under section 1001.36, subdivision (f)(1)(A)(i) “might reject
diversion if it concluded that the proposed treatment services did not target or could not
effectively address the defendant’s particular diagnosis.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 895.) But this was not satisfied in Sarmiento because the
defendant’s proposed treatment for underlying mental health diagnoses, coupled with
substance abuse treatment, differed from prior failed drug treatment. (Id. at p. 894.) The
court in Sarmiento explained: “[T]he alleged failure of prior drug treatment programs
[said] nothing about any inadequacy of the proposed plan to address [the defendant’s]
mental health needs. Indeed, [the doctor’s] evaluation specifically explain[ed] why the
current proposal [was] significantly different from [the defendant’s] prior substance
abuse-only treatment efforts.” (Id. at p. 895.)
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Unlike in Sarmiento, defendant has failed to establish the proposed treatment plan
was any different than the plan that originally failed to address his specialized health
treatment needs. Defendant does not explain how returning to an Adult and Teen
Challenge program would be different from his previous experience completing the same
program. Defendant also failed to offer a “better exit strategy,” despite acknowledging
the need for one. Absent such evidence, the trial court finding defendant’s return to an
Adult and Teen Challenge program would not meet defendant’s specialized mental health
treatment needs because it failed to do so in the past—“[t]he past portends the future”—
was not arbitrary or capricious.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s
request for mental health diversion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
ROBIE, J.
We concur:/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J. *
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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Filed 6/12/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Siskiyou)
THE PEOPLE, C103388
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 24CF01675)
v.
ORDER CERTIFYING
JOSEPH CHARLES RUSSO, OPINION FOR
Defendant and Appellant. PUBLICATION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Siskiyou County, John W.
Lawrence, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
William C. Moine, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on May 22, 2026, was not certified
for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, it now appears that the opinion
should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
ROBIE, J.
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J. *
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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