Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Smith CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, E083641 v. (Super. Ct. Nos. FVI22001810, FVI22001811) TONY LAWRENCE SMITH et al., OPINION Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. John P. Vander Feer, Judge. Affirmed with directions. Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Tony Smith. Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Kenny Smith. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, and Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 1 I. INTRODUCTION Tony Smith and several cohorts shot multiple rounds at three victims. The next day, he and his brother, Kenny Smith, burglarized one of the victim’s apartments and stole several things, including a security camera. After the Smiths were arrested a few 1 hours later, the three shooting victims and an eyewitness identified Tony as one of the shooters. A jury convicted Tony of three counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 2 § 245, subd. (a)(3); counts 4-6) and found that he personally used an assault weapon during its commission (§ 12022.5, subd. (b)). The jury also convicted him of burglary (§ 459; count 10) and found that he was personally armed with an assault weapon during its commission (§ 12022, subd. (a)(2)). Finally, the jury convicted him of possession of an assault weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a); count 12). The trial court sentenced him to 25 years in prison. The jury convicted Kenny of burglary (§ 459; count 11) and found that during its commission he knew that a principal (Tony) was personally armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (d)). The jury also convicted him of being a felon in possession of a 1 Because appellants share the same last name, we refer to them by their first name. We mean no disrespect. 2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 14). The trial court sentenced him to 32 years to life. Tony contends the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of three witnesses’ identifying him as involved with the shooting. Kenny argues the trial court erroneously imposed sentence on count 14 instead of staying it under section 654. Kenny also argues, the People concede, and we agree, that the trial court erroneously failed to award him presentence conduct credits. We direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect Kenny’s entitlement to presentence credits but otherwise reject defendants’ contentions and affirm 3 the judgments. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND M.A. was visiting her sister, T.A., at her apartment complex, and they were hanging out with their friend, A.R., as their children were playing together. Around 6:00 p.m., one of T.A.’s neighbors walked by and T.A. began to talk to her to discuss a situation between their children. As they spoke while walking down the hallway, M.A. noticed that the woman was getting angry and eventually yelled and walked away. M.A. approached the woman to discuss the situation, and the woman said, “‘So what’s up?,’” which M.A. interpreted as the woman saying she wanted to fight. The 3 We deny Tony’s April 2, 2025, request for judicial notice of copies of various Barstow Police Department policies as unnecessary to resolve this appeal. 3 woman threw a punch, and M.A. began fighting with her. Several people, including T.A. and A.R., ran to break up with the fight. As the fight broke up, M.A. saw some people exit the apartment opposite T.A.’s apartment. M.A. saw a big guy say, “Who jumped my sister?” The man, who M.A. and T.A. identified at trial to be Tony, then said he was going to go get his big brother. Tony aggressively walked up to M.A. and A.R. and had to be held back by others as he asked them questions about the altercation. T.A. heard Tony then say, “Go get big bro.” M.A., T.A., A.R., and their children got into cars and drove away. They went to T.A. and M.A.’s mother’s house and stayed there until around 12:30 a.m. They decided to go back to T.A.’s apartment to get some clothes so they could spend the night at T.A. and M.A.’s mother’s house. As they parked in the parking lot, they saw several men wearing ski masks holding guns. More people exited the apartments opposite T.A.’s apartment and went into the parking lot. The crowd started surrounding T.A., M.A., and A.R. as they parked. As the three women walked toward the middle of the parking lot, a masked man with a gun approached M.A., as did a woman, who asked M.A. who had “jumped” her sister. This woman turned to the woman who fought with M.A. earlier and asked, “‘Who do you want to fight?’” She replied that she wanted to fight “‘[t]he lady of the household,’” meaning T.A., who lived in the apartment complex. 4 This woman then “bum rushed” T.A. while M.A. started fighting with the same woman from earlier. Three other women joined in, and one of them pepper sprayed M.A. and T.A. T.A. heard someone say, “I’m going to light this shit up,” and observed masked men holding Glocks and “military-style” guns. M.A. could not see because of the pepper spray, but she made it back to the car. T.A. could still see despite the pepper spray because she had glasses on. As T.A. got in the car to drive away, she told M.A. to “duck,” and they both heard gunshots. M.A. thought she heard the car’s rear window break from a gunshot, but T.A. testified the car was not shot. When they reached safety, M.A. saw a bullet hole in the rear middle head rest, a bullet in a jacket, and a broken window. Barstow Police Officer Bryce Carson responded to a report about the shooting. As he arrived at the apartment complex, he saw a white Chrysler SUV with silver rims leaving. Outside of the complex, Officer Carson and other officers found a car with major front-end damage, a broken-in window, and eight total bullet entries in the windshield and the rear of the car. Inside the apartment complex, Officer Carson found spent cartridges and another vehicle with several bullet entries and a broken window. K.O. told Officer Carson that he heard 15 to 20 gunshots all at once, which sounded like they came from three different guns. K.O. looked outside and saw two white SUVs leaving the parking lot right after the shots. E.R., another resident of the apartment complex, told Officer Carson that the residents of Apartment 20 (Tony’s apartment) and another apartment were involved with 5 the shooting. E.R. said the individuals associated with Apartment 20 had a “machine gun.” One of them “got a lot of his friends” and “[t]hey had a shootout.” E.R. did not give a description of anyone involved in the incident. In the early morning hours on the following day, while sleeping at her mother’s house, T.A. received notifications from her apartment’s security camera system. When she turned on a live feed, she saw five men inside her apartment and heard glass breaking. The feed then stopped. When later surveilling the damage, T.A. noticed several things were missing, including one of the security cameras. Around the time T.A. saw the men inside her apartment, Officer Carson responded to a report of a burglary in progress at T.A.’s apartment complex. When he approached the apartment, Officer Carson saw someone inside. He drew his gun and ordered the person to show his hands, but he took off running. Officer Carson and other officers then pursued three men fleeing from the building. They eventually apprehended Tony and Kenny and arrested them. An AR-15 rifle was found near where Tony was detained. III. DISCUSSION A. Witness Identifications Tony’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence that T.A., M.A., and A.R. identified him as one of the shooters. We disagree. 6 1. Background Before trial, Tony moved to exclude all evidence from T.A., M.A., A.R., and E.R. identifying him as one of the shooters. The court thus held a hearing under Evidence Code section 402 during which Officer Carson and Sergeant Jose Barrientos testified. Officer Carson testified that, shortly after Tony and Kenny were arrested, he interviewed T.A. and E.R. at the apartment complex. When Officer Carson asked T.A. if she saw who “‘was out there shooting,’” T.A. said “‘there was a lot of them.’” Officer Carson asked if T.A. could identify any of them if he showed her a picture of them, and she responded, “‘they were wearing masks . . . . It wasn’t like I could see their face.’” When asked, “‘What about the size of them? Did the size of any of them stick out?,’” T.A. replied, “They was skinny, fat. It was a variety of them . . . . It was an army.’” Officer Carson showed T.A. a picture of Tony’s white Chrysler SUV and she confirmed it had been there on the night of the shooting. She also identified the firearm law enforcement found on the top of the apartment complex as one used during the shooting. E.R. said “a big dude” associated with Apartment 20 and a white Chrysler SUV was one of the shooters. E.R. also claimed that the “big guy” used an assault rifle-type firearm. Officer Carson briefly spoke with M.A. at the apartment complex as well. She reported that she was with T.A. during the shooting and they were shot at. 7 At Officer Carson’s request, T.A., M.A., and E.R. went to the police station to do a show-up of Tony and Kenny. Tony was brought into the courtyard while the witnesses stayed in the building and looked at him through a glass door. All three witnesses immediately told Officer Carson that they were “100% certain” that Tony was one of the shooters. T.A. and M.A. claimed they recognized Tony as the “big guy” with a large gun during the shooting. Sergeant Jose Barrientos testified at the hearing that A.R. participated in a photograph lineup at the police station in the evening after the burglary. He testified that before doing so, he read her five admonishments on a form and she signed the form. A.R. was then given a “six-pack photo lineup” and was asked to identify anyone she saw during the shooting. A.R. selected the third photograph, which was a picture of Tony. She explained that Tony was the man who said during the altercation, “‘[w]ho had 4 jumped my sister?’” A.R. did not see Tony shooting a gun, but saw him moments before the shooting began. After hearing this testimony and argument from counsel, the trial court denied Tony’s motion to exclude evidence of T.A., M.A., E.R. and A.R.’s identifications of him as involved with the shooting. 4 A.R.’s trial testimony differed. She said she was shown three photographs on three separate pieces of paper, and she identified a photograph of Tony as someone she saw during the altercation. She testified that officers asked her if she saw any of the men in the photographs at the shooting, and she told them she did not because it was dark and they were wearing ski masks. 8 At trial, E.R.’s testimony was largely consistent with his statements to Officer 5 Carson. In particular, he testified that he looked out his apartment window after hearing gunshots and saw Tony holding a “larger rifle.” T.A. and M.A., however, recanted at trial. T.A. denied that she told officers that she had seen Tony during the shooting and that he was carrying an automatic weapon. She also denied recognizing the gun officers had showed her. M.A. testified that she did not know whether Tony was in the group during the shooting. Both T.A. and M.A. admitted that they did not want to testify, but they were subpoenaed and brought to court by the prosecution. The trial court, however, admitted their statements to Officer Carson identifying Tony as one of the shooters. III. DISCUSSION A. Witness Identifications of Tony Tony contends the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting T.A. and M.A.’s statements to Officer Carson identifying him as one of the shooters and by admitting E.R.’s testimony likewise identifying him as involved with the shooting. In his view, their admission violated his right to due process because they were the unreliable byproduct of the unlawful one-person show-up of him. We disagree. 5 The prosecution did not introduce evidence of E.R.’s statements made to Officer Carson identifying Tony. 9 To determine whether the admission of the identification evidence violates a defendant’s right to due process, courts must consider “(1) whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary, and, if so, (2) whether the identification itself was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances, taking into account such factors as the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the offense, the witness’s degree of attention at the time of the offense, the accuracy of his or her prior description of the suspect, the level of certainty demonstrated at the time of the identification, and the lapse of time between the offense and the identification.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 989.) Because there is no dispute regarding the facts, we independently review the trial court’s ruling that the identifications were admissible. (People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 609.) We acknowledge that single-person show-ups are criticized and “should be used very cautiously, and only when truly necessary” because they are “inherently suggestive.” (People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 37.) But we need not decide whether the identification procedure used here (the one-person line-up of Tony) was unduly suggestive and unnecessary because, even if it were, the witnesses’ identifications of him were nonetheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances. (See People v. Holmes, McClain & Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 770.) First, all three witnesses had an opportunity to view Tony at the time of the shooting. T.A. and M.A. also identified him in part because they recognized him from the confrontation they had with him just hours before the shooting. (See People v. 10 Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 990 [no substantial likelihood of a misidentification when the victim had “notice[d]” the defendant in a bar and thereafter viewed him for several minutes].) E.R. had a clear view of Tony (and the other assailants) from his apartment, and recognized him as another occupant of the apartment complex. The three witnesses’ familiarity with Tony bolstered the reliability of their identifications. (See People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 267; People v. Harris (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 944, 958-959 [where witness had seen both defendants a number of times in her neighborhood, courtroom identification was not an impermissibly suggestive one-person show up]’ People v. Yokely (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1276 (Yokely) [witness’s knowledge of defendant before photo identification suggested identification was reliable].) Although T.A. and M.A. were pepper sprayed and attacked during the melee and Tony was wearing a ski mask, they saw him from a close distance. They were not “a casual or passing observer, as is so often the case with eyewitness identification,” but were a position to pay a high degree of attention to the people attacking them at close range. (Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 115.) In our view, the circumstances potentially affecting M.A. and T.A.’s ability to recognize Tony, including his wearing a ski mask, the pepper spray, and the attack, were “matters affecting the weight of [the witnesses’] testimony, not its admissibility” and were properly left to the jury. (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1256; see also Manson v. Braithwaite, supra, 432 U.S. at 11 p. 116 [“Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature.”].) E.R., on the other hand, watched the shooting from his apartment, and thus had an opportunity to observe closely, which increased the reliability of his identification. (See People v. Martinez (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1204, 1218 [identification was reliable where one factor was victim had 20-to-30 second opportunity to observe driver in lighting provided by headlights and streetlight].) Although M.A. and T.A. did not give a description of Tony before the shooting, E.R. told Officer Carson before the show-up that the “big dude” associated with Apartment 20 (Tony) was one of the shooters and was holding a large gun. And, after the show-up, all three witnesses were “100% certain” Tony was involved with the shooting, though we recognize “empirical research that ‘“under most circumstances, witness confidence or certainty is not a good indicator of identification accuracy.”’” (People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644, 665; but see People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 990 [witness’s unequivocal identification of defendant supported finding of reliability].) Critically, the witnesses identified Tony about 24 hours after the shooting. The fact that their identifications occurred close to the time and place of the offense made their identifications more likely to be accurate. (People v. Martinez, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1219; Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 116 [11 days between the crime committed and arrest for identification found reliable]; People v. Kennedy, 12 supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 611 [length of time between crime and identification “only three weeks”], disapproved in part by People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459; People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 286 [witness’s “uncertain and equivocal” identification of defendant “several months” after crime occurred was sufficiently reliable].) Finally, the strong evidence of Tony’s guilt made the witnesses’ identifications more reliable. (See Holmes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 769 [it was “not substantially likely that [the witness] misidentified [the defendant], particularly in light of all the additional evidence”]; Sanchez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 37 [five-year-old witness’s identification during a single-photograph show-up was reliable, where “[p]art of the identification was independently corroborated by none other than defendant,” and “the physical evidence corroborated part of what [the witness] told the police”].) To begin with, Officer Carson testified that he saw Tony’s car leaving the scene after the shooting, and ammunition was found in the car after it was recovered following the burglary. An AR-15 found on the apartment complex’s roof after the burglary matched the witnesses’ description of the weapon Tony was holding during the shooting. T.A.’s security cameras were among the stolen items, which suggested that the burglars wanted to take potential footage of the shooting earlier in the day. Tony’s sister was involved in the altercation with M.A. and T.A., and M.A. and R.A. claimed they heard one of the masked shooters say, “who jumped my sister?” At a minimum, the witnesses’ statements were admissible. Under these circumstances, we conclude the witnesses’ identifications of Tony were sufficiently reliable. (See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149,1181 [“No 13 inherent improbability appears in the identification testimony….”].) Their reliability was bolstered by the fact that Tony was able to cross-examine all three witnesses. (See People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 770 [identification was reliable where “[t]he defense was able to thoroughly cross-examine [the witness] and delve into factors bearing on reliability of his identifications”]; People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 903 [no due process violation where the “circumstances of the identification were disclosed to the defense, they were the subject of thorough cross- examination, and the jury was able to evaluate the reliability [of the witness’s identification]”]; People v. Cooks (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 224, 271 [identifications were reliable where “each witness who identified one of the defendants in court was cross- examined at length about his or her pretrial identification”].) B. Kenny’s Sentence The trial court imposed a 28-year sentence for Kenny’s conviction on count 11 (burglary) and a four-year sentence on count 14 (possession of a firearm by a felon). He contends the court erred in doing so because the sentence on count 14 should have been stayed under section 654. We disagree. Section 654 “prohibits punishment for two crimes arising from a single, indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 129.) This means that “if all of the crimes were merely incidental to or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating a single objective, the defendant may receive only one punishment.” (Ibid.) 14 In the context of a conviction for possession of a prohibited weapon, “‘“[w]here the evidence shows a possession distinctly antecedent and separate from the primary offense, punishment on both crimes has been approved. On the other hand, where the evidence shows a possession only in conjunction with the primary offense, then punishment for the illegal possession of the [weapon] has been held to be improper where it is the lesser offense.”’” (People v. Wynn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1217.) Put another way, “section 654 is inapplicable when the evidence shows that the defendant arrived at the scene of his or her primary crime already in possession of the firearm.” (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1145.) The statute is inapplicable, however, “where the evidence ‘demonstrates at most that fortuitous circumstances put the firearm in the defendant’s hand only at the instant of committing another offense.’” (Id. at p. 1144.) So, when a felon who arrives at the scene of a crime with a gun and then commits “another separate and distinct transaction undertaken with an additional intent which necessarily is something more than the mere intent to possess the proscribed weapon,” section 654 does not apply. (People v. Ratcliff (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1401, 1414.) This is because when a defendant arrives at the crime scene already in possession of the firearm he then uses to commit another crime, the firearm possession was a separate and antecedent offense. (People v. Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1141.) This court has thus long held that section 654 does not prohibit multiple sentences for robbery and possession of a firearm by a felon. (People v. Ratcliff, supra, 223 15 Cal.App.3d at p. 1410.) This is because the crime of possession of a firearm by a felon “is committed the instant the felon in any way has a firearm within his control.” (Ibid, italics omitted.) Here, the evidence shows that Kenny “arrived at the scene of his . . . primary crime” while Tony was “already in possession of the firearm,” and nothing suggests that Tony “fortuitously came into possession” of the gun when he arrived. (People v. Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1145, 1148.) Kenny thus had constructive possession of the firearm in violation of section 29800 before they arrived at the apartment. “It strains reason to assume that [Tony] did not have possession for some period of time before [the burglary]. Any other interpretation would be patently absurd.” (Id. at p. 1147.) Tony thus committed two separate acts: unlawfully possessing the firearm and the burglary. It was therefore a reasonable inference that [the defendant’s] possession of the firearm was antecedent to the primary crime.” (Id. at p. 1147.) As a result, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that the possession offense was complete before Tony and Kenny arrived at the apartment. Section 654 thus did not preclude separate punishment for possession of a firearm by a felon in addition to burglary, so the trial court properly imposed sentence on counts 11 and 14. (See People v. Jones, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1147; People v. Ratcliff, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1410.) 16 C. Abstract of Judgment Kenny argues, the People concede, and we agree that the trial court improperly failed to award him presentence conduct credits. Under section 2933.1, defendant was entitled to presentence conduct credits at a rate of 15 percent of his actual custody credit. We direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect this entitlement. (See People v. Brewer (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 457, 465.) IV. DISPOSITION The judgments are affirmed. The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect Kenny is entitled to presentence conduct credits. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J. We concur: MILLER Acting P. J. RAPHAEL J. 17