People v. Tovar CA1/5
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 9, 2026
DocketA175030
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/9/26 P. v. Tovar CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A175030
v.
(Contra Costa County
RAYMOND TOVAR, JR., Super. Ct. No. 01-25-01470)
Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond Tovar, Jr. (appellant), appeals from his convictions on
multiple counts, including Penal Code section 288.3, subdivision (a) (count
2).1 Section 288.3, subdivision (a) provides, “Every person who contacts or
communicates with a minor . . . with intent to commit an offense specified in
Section . . . 287, 288, . . . [or other enumerated sections] involving the minor
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for the term prescribed
for an attempt to commit the intended offense.” As to count 2, the jury found
appellant intended to commit offenses specified in sections 287 and 288.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the middle term of
three years on count 2, without designating one of the two intended offenses
as the basis for the sentence. Both intended offenses have the same middle
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We
recite only those background facts relevant to the issue raised on appeal.
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term, and appellant concedes the trial court was not required to designate
one of them. (§§ 287, subd. (c)(1) [six-year midterm], 288, subd. (a) [six-year
midterm]; see also § 664, subd. (a) [attempts punished “for one-half the term”
of the attempted offense].) The abstract of judgment identified count 2 as
section 288.3, subdivision (a), with the midterm of three years imposed.
Subsequently, the trial court’s clerk signed an unreported minute order
stating: “Regarding the Abstract of Judgment filed on this matter . . . : For
Count 2 the attempt crime was PC288(a) therefore it is 3 years the Mid
term.” We agree with both parties that this minute order conflicts with the
oral pronouncement of judgment, which did not identify section 288 as the
intended offense for count 2, and we will therefore order the minute order
stricken. (People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324 [“[I]t is the oral
pronouncement of sentence that constitutes the judgment. [Citation.] To the
extent a minute order diverges from the sentencing proceedings it purports to
memorialize, it is presumed to be the product of clerical error. [Citation.]
Likewise, the abstract of judgment ‘ “cannot add to or modify the judgment
which it purports to digest or summarize.” ’ [Citations.] As with other
clerical errors, discrepancies between an abstract and the actual judgment as
orally pronounced are subject to correction at any time, and should be
corrected by a reviewing court when detected on appeal.”].)
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DISPOSITION
The March 6, 2026 minute order is stricken. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.
SIMONS, Acting P. J.
We concur.
BURNS, J.
CHOU, J.
(A175030)
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