People v. Mosby CA1/2

Filed 11/9/26 P. v. Mosby CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A172506 v. PHILIP CHRISTIAN MOSBY, (Solano County Super. Ct. No. F23-00099) Defendant and Appellant. A jury convicted Philip Christian Mosby of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code,1 § 288.5, subd. (a)). On appeal, Mosby argues reversal is required because the trial court erroneously removed a juror who did not appear for the first full day of deliberations, precluded Mosby from impeaching the victim’s father with a 17-year-old prior felony conviction, and admitted expert testimony about Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). We see no error and affirm. BACKGROUND Between the ages of six months and five years old, S.D. attended an in- home daycare provided by Mosby’s spouse, Linda.2 In December 2022, then 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Except for Mosby, we use first names for clarity and privacy; we intend no disrespect. 1 five-year-old S.D. told her father that Mosby was “ ‘touching [her] in the bathroom’ ” at daycare and “ ‘giving [her] candy’ ” afterwards. S.D. said Mosby touched her “ ‘bum-bum’ ” and then put her hand inside “the front part” of her diaper, saying he “ ‘does it like this’ ” while placing her hand against her vagina. S.D.’s parents called the police, and S.D. underwent a forensic interview later that month. A felony complaint charging Mosby with the continuous sexual abuse of a child was filed in March 2023. The operative amended information, filed in November 2024, charged Mosby with continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (§ 288.5, subd. (a); count 1) and, in the alternative, lewd acts with a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 2, 3 & 4). As to all counts, the amended information alleged Mosby had substantial sexual conduct with a child under the age of 14 (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)) and, as aggravating factors, further alleged that the victim was particularly vulnerable and Mosby took advantage of a position of trust or confidence (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3), (11)). A bifurcated jury trial began in December 2024. During jury selection, the court gave the prospective jurors the trial schedule with an allowance for deliberations and confirmed that trial would not go past Friday, December 20.3 When testimony began on December 11, seven-year-old S.D. qualified to testify after demonstrating an understanding of the difference between a 3 During the voir dire process, multiple prospective jurors had represented vacation and holiday conflicts, and the individual sworn as Juror No. 11 verbally stated that he would be “out of the country” on December 22. 2 truth and a lie.4 When asked why she was testifying, S.D. responded, “because [Mosby] was touching my private parts.” S.D. explained that Mosby would use his fingers to touch the area where she goes “pee-pee” from, which she sometimes called her “butt.” When S.D. would go to the bathroom, Mosby “would just come in” and “touch [her] private parts” while she was “[o]n the toilet.” S.D. testified that Mosby would touch her “[e]veryday of the week and sometimes Saturday” and would touch her for “a couple seconds” each time. According to S.D., Mosby did not use toilet paper to touch her and was not helping her go to the bathroom. After he touched S.D., Mosby would say, “ ‘don’t tell your parents,’ ” and give her “candy,” “Sometimes chocolate, sometimes little Gummies that are sour.” S.D. explained that she “first told” her parents about the touching after her father asked if she had eaten any candy because “Candy makes me crazy” and she was being “extra crazy” one day. A video of S.D.’s December 2022 forensic interview was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. In the video, S.D. stated that at daycare, Mosby “touches my butt and gives me candy” and circled the vaginal area on a diagram of a little girl; S.D. said she goes pee “from her butt.” Mosby would touch her vagina “inside and outside, anywhere” and “in the pink part.” S.D. explained Mosby would touch her “A[s] much [as] he wants” and that she “can’t control him. He just controls me.” S.D. said Mosby touches her with “One or two” fingers and “It doesn’t feel so good.” Afterward, Mosby would give S.D. candy and tell her “not to tell anybody.” 4 Although Mosby does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, we discuss the trial testimony to the extent necessary to address Mosby’s appellate arguments and provide context. 3  S.D.’s father, Michael, and mother, Kristie, then testified about S.D.’s report of the touching to them.5 Michael testified he typically picked up S.D. from daycare around 5:00 p.m. Mosby, who lived at the house with Linda, would be present about half of the days Michael picked up S.D., sometimes watching television in the living room where S.D. would be playing. Michael stated he had previously spoken with Linda and Mosby about not giving candy to S.D. because he believed that candy made S.D. “hyperactive.” Michael testified that one evening after daycare in December 2022, when S.D. was five years old, Michael told S.D. he knew she had been eating candy because she was being “super hyperactive”; Michael said S.D. would not be “in trouble” if she told “the truth” about what she had been eating. According to Michael, after initially denying that she had eaten any candy, S.D. admitted to eating two gummy bears that Mosby gave her. Michael testified that, when picking up S.D. the next day, he asked Linda if S.D. was getting candy at daycare, which Linda denied, and “it turned into almost an argument with her.” S.D. tried to interrupt, but Michael stopped her and, after they left the house, S.D. “grabbed” Michael and said, “ ‘[Mosby] gave me three pieces of candy.’ ” When they got home, Michael was “very upset” and testified that when putting S.D. to bed later that night, he talked to her in a “stern” voice about not accepting candy from anyone. In response, S.D. told Michael that Mosby was “giving her candy in the bathroom” and that Mosby “can do whatever he wants” and “doesn’t have to listen to me.” 5 As is discussed below, prior to trial, two different judges had rejected Mosby’s request to be able to impeach Michael with a 2007 felony conviction for the manufacture of methamphetamine. 4  Michael asked why Mosby was in the bathroom, “ ‘is he in there to help you with anything, like, help clean you, help with anything?’ ” S.D. answered, “ ‘No. He just shows up.’ ” Michael asked, “why is [Mosby] there,” and S.D. replied, “ ‘I don’t know. He’s in there giving me candy and he’s touching me.’ ” S.D. said “ ‘he does it like this’ ” and demonstrated by placing her hand on her vagina inside her diaper. Michael testified that he brought in Kristie, and S.D. repeated what she had told Michael. Kristie then testified and confirmed that after Michael called her in to talk to S.D., S.D. reported, “ ‘[Mosby] was touching me.’ ” When Kristie asked S.D. what she meant by touching, S.D. said, “ ‘[Mosby] was tickling my bum- bum [and] giving me candy.’ ” S.D. demonstrated by holding out her hand and “put[ting] it near her vagina.” S.D. explained Mosby would touch her while Linda was “ ‘cooking or doing the dishes’ ” using “either his hand or his finger” and had been touching her since preschool. S.D.’s parents put S.D. to bed and discussed what to do; they called the police the following morning. Mosby’s wife, Linda, testified that she had watched S.D. for four years, “since she was three months old,” and that Mosby had lived with her “the whole time.” According to Linda, Mosby would come home from work in the afternoons and watch TV in the living room. Linda initially denied that Mosby and S.D. were ever alone together but acknowledged that if she went to change another child’s diaper, they would be alone.6 Linda testified that Mosby had “diabetes real bad” and could not “eat candy because of his diabetes.” 6 The parent of another child who joined the daycare about a year before S.D. reported the touching also testified to observing Mosby alone with the children when she picked up her child. 5  Investigating Detective Ashley Wright testified to executing a search warrant of Mosby’s house in January 2023 and discovering a shopping bag in the hallway that contained three bags of red and blue gummy candies; no one in the household claimed ownership at the time.7 A video recording of Wright’s interview with Mosby after his arrest was also admitted into evidence and played for the jury. In it, Mosby denied touching “anybody” or going into the bathroom with any child at his house even for potty training. Dawn Blacker, Ph.D., then testified as a CSAAS expert called “to disabuse the jury of common misconceptions relating to child sexual abuse or assault victims and their behavior.” Blacker testified that she had not reviewed any materials related to the case and had never met S.D. or Mosby. Blacker generally explained the “commonly known factors that occur in the context of child sexual abuse” and clarified that displaying one or more of those factors “does not mean that the sexual abuse occurred or not.”8 For the defense, four of Mosby’s friends and neighbors testified that Mosby was honest and they did not believe he had a character for sexual deviance. After hearing closing arguments and jury instructions, the jury was released to begin deliberations at 3:40 p.m. on Wednesday, December 18, 2024. The jury deliberated “for 20 or 25 minutes” that day before recessing at 4:00 p.m. 7 At trial, Linda and Mosby’s adult daughter testified that she had recently moved back into the house with her parents and the three bags of candy belonged to her. 8 Prior to the start of Blacker’s testimony, the court held a hearing concerning its scope pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 and ordered her testimony be limited to “[s]ecrecy, helplessness, accommodation, [and] delays [in reporting].” Blacker testified consistently with the court’s order, and Mosby does not argue differently on appeal. 6  The following morning, Thursday, December 19, Juror No. 11 did not return to court. The court informed counsel that Juror No. 11 had called that morning and said, “he had to take his mother to her first chemotherapy appointment,” which would be “six hours long,” so he “was not going to be able to be here today.” After further inquiry, Juror No. 11 represented “that he could be [in court] tomorrow” but would not be available “after tomorrow,” as stated during jury selection. The court questioned the remaining jurors as to their availability: Four jurors stated they would be unavailable to deliberate on Monday, December 23 (in addition to Juror No. 11),9 and at least two jurors objected to returning on Tuesday, December 24, due to preplanned vacations and work obligations.10 During related discussions outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel requested that deliberations resume “tomorrow,” Friday, December 20, so that Juror No. 11 could participate and argued that excusing Juror No. 11 was “not a mandated necessity” and that jurors “should only be excused where manifest necessity is apparent.” The court disagreed, questioning defense counsel’s characterization of the law and stating, “if manifest [necessity] is actually required I think we have it here because of the danger we’re going to lose other jurors either tomorrow or next week, and this Juror, as I indicated, it would have been cause to excuse him in the first place if he had mentioned this.” “[G]iven the totality of the circumstances” 9 One juror represented their vacation had started “today,” Thursday, December 19, and another stated theirs started on Friday, December 20, but both agreed to continue appearing to deliberate that week. 10 The trial court judge also informed counsel that he would not be available the following week or “the week after next.” He offered, “Another judge could fill in for me,” but noted, “There could end up being a couple-week hiatus if I really need to finish presiding over the trial.” 7 including “the holiday period,” the court found “good cause” to discharge Juror No. 11. Thereafter, the court swore an alternate juror and directed the recomprised panel of 12 to “set aside and disregard all past deliberations and begin your deliberations all over again.” The new jury began their deliberations at 9:55 a.m. on Thursday, December 19 and returned a unanimous verdict at 2:40 p.m. the same day, finding Mosby guilty of count one (continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14) and finding true that Mosby had substantial sexual conduct with a child under 14. The trial court directed verdicts of not guilty as to the remaining alternatively pleaded charges in counts 2, 3, and 4 (lewd acts with a child under 14).11 On January 22, 2025, the court sentenced Mosby to a midterm of 12 years in state prison. Mosby filed a notice of appeal two days later. DISCUSSION On appeal, Mosby makes three claims of error. First, Mosby argues the removal of Juror No. 11 violated Mosby’s statutory and “constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury.” Second, Mosby asserts precluding the use of Michael’s 2007 felony conviction to impeach his testimony “not only violated state law, it deprived [Mosby] of his state and federal constitutional rights to confrontation and due process right to present a complete defense.” Last, while acknowledging that “CSAAS testimony is currently admissible under California law,” Mosby urges us to “reconsider the issue” and claims the trial court abused its discretion because “the [CSAAS] testimony was unreliable 11 On Friday, December 20, the day after the jury returned its verdict, the court dismissed, at the People’s request, the alleged aggravating factors, which had been bifurcated because another juror had failed to appear due to a death in the family. 8 evidence that . . . deprived [Mosby] of his constitutional due process right to a fundamentally fair trial.” I. Removal of Juror No. 11 If “a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, . . . the court may order the juror to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate, who shall then take a place in the jury box.” (§ 1089.) We review a trial court’s decision to discharge a juror for abuse of discretion and uphold the court’s decision “ ‘if the record supports the juror’s disqualification as a demonstrable reality.’ ” (People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1262.) “The demonstrable reality test entails a more comprehensive and less deferential review” than the traditional substantial evidence standard of review. (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.) “It requires a showing that the court as trier of fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion” that the juror was unable to perform his or her duty. (Id. at pp. 1052–1053; see also People v. Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1262.) Thus, “the reviewing court must be confident that the trial court’s conclusion is manifestly supported by evidence on which the court actually relied.” (Barnwell, at p. 1053.) We “consider not just the evidence itself, but also the record of reasons the court provided.” (Ibid.) Here, the court’s decision to disqualify Juror No. 11 is supported by a demonstrable reality in the record that Juror No. 11 was unable to perform his duty. Juror No. 11 was physically unavailable on Thursday, December 19, and would be “out of the country” beginning Sunday, December 22, 2024. Four jurors were also unavailable to deliberate Monday, December 23, and at least two of those four would be unavailable the entire week, like Juror No. 11 (and the trial court judge). Thus, Juror No. 11’s inability to perform 9 his duties on at least December 19 had a demonstrated impact on the entirety of the jury’s ability to deliberate. Like the trial court, we are not persuaded by Mosby’s argument that the better course would have been to wait to resume deliberations until Friday, December 20, when Juror No. 11 had represented he could return. First, assuming Juror No. 11 would be present on Friday—a representation Juror No. 11 had made before his mother’s first day of chemotherapy—and assuming the two additional jurors whose vacations had already started on December 19 and 20 did in fact return as they represented they would, then delaying the resumption of deliberations to Friday, December 20 would have left the jury that single day to conclude deliberations in the first phase of trial and for the parties to try and the jury to deliberate in the second phase concerning the aggravating factors.12 Further, trial courts are directed “to control all proceedings during the trial . . . with a view to the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the truth regarding the matters involved” (§ 1044) and have the express statutory authority to “fix the time and place for deliberations” (§ 1128) along with a legislative mandate to prioritize sex assault cases (§ 1048, subd. (b)). As such, delaying deliberations in a manner that would push time constraints and likely increase the risk of mistrial would have been contrary to the trial 12 Mosby’s appellate briefing fails to acknowledge that he had not waived his right to a jury trial on the bifurcated aggravating factors that would require additional time for evidence, argument, instruction, and renewed deliberations. In fact and as noted above, on Friday, December 20, the day Mosby wanted to resume deliberations with Juror No. 11, a different juror was unexpectedly absent because her father-in-law had passed away. This absence led to the prosecution’s decision to “dismiss [the bifurcated] two aggravating factors” to Mosby’s benefit since the alternate juror was “not the same juror . . . who deliberated for the underlying offense.” 10 court’s legislatively prescribed duties; the refusal to do so is certainly within the scope of this court’s discretion. (See, e.g., Cooper v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 291, 301 [the trial courts has “inherent power . . . to exercise a reasonable control over all proceedings connected with the litigation before it”]; People v. Bell (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 282, 289 [“given the uncertain timing of [the juror’s] return and the fact so many jurors, alternates, and witnesses were waiting, the court was well within its discretion to discharge [the juror] and replace him with an alternate juror”].) Additionally, we reject Mosby’s comparison of the instant circumstances to People v. Jones (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 694, in which, Mosby asserts, “[the] majority of Division Five of this [appellate district] concluded that [the] trial court erred by excusing a juror because the record did not show, as a ‘demonstrable reality,’ that the juror was unable or unwilling to continue deliberating.” Jones is distinguishable because it involved a physically present juror who never stated that “she was unwilling or unable to continue deliberating.” (Id. at pp. 701–702.)13 Here, there is no question of Juror No. 11’s inability to deliberate; he was physically not present on December 19 and unable to deliberate due to his mother’s medical appointment, and he would also be unable to deliberate after December 22. In sum, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s actions here. Regardless, we conclude any presumed error would be harmless. “ ‘[W]here an alternate juror, approved by defendant in voir dire, is allowed to deliberate on the jury panel, the defendant bears a heavy burden to demonstrate that he was somehow harmed thereby.’ ” (People v. Thomas 13 We also note the dissent’s criticism of the majority for “elevat[ing] the demonstrable evidence standard to a daunting new height.” (People v. Jones, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 705 (dis. opn. of Needham, J.).) 11 (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1477, 1486; see also People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 454 [requiring prejudice for reversal].) Here, Juror No. 11 was replaced after deliberating for a maximum of 25 minutes by an alternate who, as the court noted, was not challenged for cause by either party. II. Preclusion of Impeachment with Prior Felony Before the December 2024 jury trial, the prosecution moved in limine to exclude evidence of Michael’s 2007 felony conviction for the manufacture of methamphetamine and “an even older misdemeanor conviction for misappropriation of lost property and possession of, a [section] 485” violation from 1999. The court (Hon. Robert S. Bowers) granted the motion over a defense objection, reasoning that “[Michael is] not a percipient witness. He’s one of two witnesses that [S.D.] reported to and that’s about it,” and although “[t]hey are crimes of moral turpitude,” the convictions were “very remote” in time. After further argument, the court reiterated that the convictions “are very remote,” and Michael was “someone who something was reported to and that’s it, pretty much, and as a parent. And, again, old felony; not relevant; time is passed.” Two months later, Mosby’s case proceeded to trial before a different judge (Hon. E. Bradley Nelson), who adopted and expanded on the prior ruling: “I’m echoing that ruling today, but add in as another basis it’s not really a—it is a crime of moral turpitude, but it doesn’t really have the elements of dishonesty or untruthfulness to it which is the most probative.” As for the 1999 misdemeanor conviction for “misappropriation of lost property,” the trial court explained, “typically, any misdemeanor, uncharged conduct over 10 years, is usually not very probative on credibility.” 12 Ultimately, the court concluded: “I echo [the prior] ruling and bar both those 2007 and 1999 convictions pursuant to Evidence Code section 352.” On appeal, Mosby argues the court’s refusal to allow the use of Michael’s 2007 felony drug manufacturing conviction to impeach his testimony denied Mosby the right to present a “complete defense.” Specifically, Mosby asserts that disallowing impeachment with the prior conviction “undermin[ed] the defense effort to encourage the jury to doubt [Michael’s] account, and instead conclude that S.D. concocted a false accusation against [Mosby] in order to ‘resolve the tension’ stemming from her father’s intensely emotional confrontation with S.D.’s day care person and with S.D. herself.” We are not persuaded. “A witness may be impeached with any prior conduct involving moral turpitude whether or not it resulted in a felony conviction, subject to the trial court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352.”14 (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 931.) The court may consider, among other factors, whether the prior conviction is “near or remote in time.” (Id. at p. 931.) “However, convictions remote in time are not automatically inadmissible for impeachment purposes. Even a fairly remote prior conviction is admissible if the defendant has not led a legally blameless life since the time of the remote prior.” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 918, 925–926.) Here, we see no abuse of discretion. The court considered that Michael’s first misdemeanor conviction was from 1999, “25 years ago,” and, since the 2007 felony conviction, there had been “no subsequent [bad] 14 Our Supreme Court has determined that a “conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine involve[s] an act of moral turpitude” in the context of a State Bar inquiry. (In re Menna (1995) 11 Cal.4th 975, 989.) 13 conduct” except for “a DUI in 2011,” which the prosecution noted without objection was “not a moral turpitude crime.” Moreover, as the trial court reasoned, even if the prior convictions had been admitted and used to impeach Michael’s truthfulness in testifying, his character for veracity is not indicative of whether S.D. “concocted a false accusation” because Michael was “not a percipient witness. He’s one of two witnesses that [S.D.] reported to and that’s about it.” Thus, the convictions were both remote and isolated and had little probative value. Additionally, our Supreme Court has previously rejected Mosby’s argument that the preclusion of impeachment with prior convictions violates a defendant’s constitutional rights. (See, e.g., People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 55–56 [rejecting defendant’s argument that precluding impeachment with a 33-year-old conviction “violated his rights to confrontation and counsel”].) According to Mosby, his theory of defense was that S.D. fabricated a story of abuse to “ ‘resolve the tension’ ” with Michael. Consistent with his theory, in closing argument Mosby’s counsel argued that S.D. had witnessed her father “confront” Linda about candy and “pick[ed] up on these intense, intense adult emotions” from “people that she loves,” so S.D.” “resolve[d] the tension” by “making up this story of what . . . Mosby did to her.” This reference shows Mosby presented his “complete defense” to the jury, and we cannot see how his argument would have been strengthened by reference to a 17-year-old felony conviction, particularly when Mosby’s criminal conduct was specifically reported to police investigators by S.D. in a recorded video that was shown to the jury, was testified to by S.D. at trial, and was corroborated by Kristie’s testimony in addition to that of Michael. Accordingly, we see no error. 14  III. Admission of CSAAS Testimony CSAAS “describes the purportedly typical behavior of children who have been victims of repeated sexual abuse by a family member or an adult with whom the child has a trusting relationship” and is comprised of one or more of five elements: (1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) accommodation, (4) delayed disclosure of abuse, and (5) recantation. (In re Amber B. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 682, 690, fn. 3; People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 470.) Before trial, the court “tentatively” granted the district attorney’s motion in limine to allow a CSAAS expert to testify at trial, recognizing that “a limited amount of testimony as to [CSAAS] issues” may be relevant depending on “how the evidence goes.” At a subsequent Evidence Code section 402 hearing deciding the scope of Blacker’s testimony as that CSAAS expert, the court granted Mosby’s request to preclude Blacker from testifying about “retraction” and from “us[ing] the word entrapment” but otherwise allowed her to testify about secrecy, helplessness, accommodations, and delays in reporting associated with CSAAS. Pursuant to the request of both parties, the court instructed the jury with model jury instruction CALCRIM No. 1193 that it “may consider [CSAAS] evidence only in deciding whether or not [S.D.’s] conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of her testimony.” During closing argument, Mosby’s counsel repeatedly discounted Blacker’s testimony and asserted that S.D. was “influenced by hypervigilant parents into making up this story of what [Mosby] did to her.” On appeal, Mosby “acknowledges,” as he must, “that California law presently permits the admission of expert testimony concerning CSAAS, and 15 that [we are] bound by that precedent.” Indeed, as our Supreme Court has explained: “expert testimony on the common reactions of child molestation victims . . . is admissible to rehabilitate such witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation. [Citations.] ‘Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior.’ ” (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300–1301 (McAlpin).) However, citing extrajurisdictional case law, Mosby invites us to “reconsider the issue and conclude that CSAAS evidence is inadmissible for any purpose.” Following the principle of stare decisis, we decline Mosby’s invitation; it is “not [our] function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court.” (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [decisions of the California Supreme Court “are binding upon and must be followed by all the state courts of California”].) Indeed, multiple California appellate courts have rejected similar references to extrajurisdictional authorities. (E.g., People v. Melgoza (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 632, 655–656 [“Defendant’s out of state authorities offer no compelling reason to depart from California precedent”]; People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 216 [“Defendant’s references to decisions from other jurisdictions that reached a different position do not affect the binding nature of the McAlpin decision”]; People v. Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 468–472 [“the vast majority of jurisdictions . . . have rendered decisions that are consistent with McAlpin[, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1289]”].) Here, the trial court appropriately limited Blacker’s testimony to relevant and admissible CSAAS topics as guided by our Supreme Court and 16 collateral courts and correctly instructed the jury on the limited purpose of CSAAS. Testimony on secrecy, helplessness, accommodation, and delayed disclosure was relevant based on S.D.’s interview and trial testimony that Mosby told her to not tell her parents and that Mosby “controls” her, as well as S.D.’s delayed reporting of the abuse. To the extent Mosby challenged the factual basis for any CSAAS testimony below, the court granted his request to exclude testimony regarding retraction and preclude use of the word entrapment. The court also gave an appropriate limiting instruction clarifying the purpose for which the jury might consider the CSAAS testimony. (People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 816 [“multiple California Courts of Appeal have upheld the language of CALCRIM 1193 as accurately informing the jury of the limited use of CSAAS evidence”].) Under the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conduct, nor do we see reason not to follow binding California precedent. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. 17  DESAUTELS, J. We concur: STEWART, P. J. SWEET, J.* People v. Mosby (A172506) * Judge of the Marin Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 18