People v. Campos CA4/1

Filed 10/22/26 P. v. Campos CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D088377 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. RIF2203365) v. ORACIO CAMPOS, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Valerie A. Navarro, Judge. Affirmed. Zulu Ali & Associates and Zulu Ali, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Christine Y. Friedman, and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant Oracio Campos was tried before a jury on charges related to two assaultive incidents. In the first incident, Campos violated a restraining order, punched his brother and father in the face, knocking them both to the ground, and kicked his brother in the head. In the second incident, which occurred approximately five months later, he commandeered his pregnant girlfriend’s car by pulling her hair and demanding she drive him to get drugs. She got out of the driver’s seat and ran. He drove off with her car. The jury convicted Campos as charged in both incidents. The jury convicted him of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(4), count 1); misdemeanor elder abuse (§ 368, subd. (c), count 2); misdemeanor violation of a protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (b), count 3); carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a), count 4); and misdemeanor domestic battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1), count 5). As to count 1, the jury found true an allegation that Campos inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). In addition, the court found that Campos suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c), & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and imposed a 10-year prison sentence. On appeal, Campos contends reversal is required because the trial court erred by declining to suppress his statements to police in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda); there was insufficient evidence he used force or fear in the commission of carjacking; the court erred in declining to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense; the court abused its discretion by consolidating his criminal cases; the court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence electronic recordings, medical records, and body-worn footage of his brother’s prior statements to the police; the court erred because of potential sentencing 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 irregularities; and the errors were cumulatively prejudicial. We reject each of these contentions and affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On May 16, 2022, a protective order prohibited Campos from being within 100 yards of his father and brother. Nevertheless, Campos went to his father’s house, demanded entry, and damaged the screen door. His father came outside to calm him down. Campos grabbed his father, punched him in the face, and knocked him to the ground. When his brother came outside, Campos punched him in the face, knocking him to the ground too. While his brother was on the ground, Campos kicked him in the head. After his father grabbed a broom handle, Campos walked away. His brother, his nephew, and a neighbor called 911 and reported the incident to police when they arrived on scene. Later, his brother was taken to the hospital by ambulance for medical treatment as there was blood streaming down his face from a swollen bump on his head. After Campos was taken into custody, a deputy advised him of his rights under Miranda, and he spoke to the police. He admitted that he knew he was not supposed to be at his father’s house and that he had punched his father in the face. He also stated that his brother “attacked” him and in response he “used [his] legs real quick like that, yeah.” A videotape of the interview (Exhibit 23) was played for the jury at trial, and the jurors were provided with a transcript (Exhibit 23A) to follow along. The videotape was admitted into evidence and the transcript is included in the clerk’s transcript on appeal. Campos was later released on bail. Five months after the first incident, Campos and his girlfriend were living together. At the time, she was seven months pregnant with his child. 3 Her cousin texted her that Campos was walking around the neighborhood looking for her. She drove to pick him up. When she found him, she parked on the side of the road. After he got in the car, they started arguing. He accused her of stealing his methamphetamine, pulled her hair, and demanded she drive him to get more. She got out of the car and ran down the street. Campos then moved to the driver’s seat and drove off in her car. She called 911 and told the dispatcher “my boyfriend tried beating me up,” “pulled my hair and he wanted to hit me,” and then “he took off with my car.” When the police responded to the call, she described what happened, including that Campos demanded that she drive him to get more methamphetamine and pulled her hair. Campos was charged with crimes arising from both incidents. Before trial, the court granted the prosecutor’s consolidation motion over Campos’s objection. Campos did not file any motion to sever the charges. The court also denied Campos’s motion to suppress his statements to police. At trial, Campos’s family and girlfriend gave testimony that conflicted with the statements they made during their recorded 911 calls and recorded police interviews shown to the jury. His brother testified he remembered arguing and “slipped, I knocked out, and when I woke up, that’s what I remember.” His father testified he could not remember telling officers at the scene that Campos struck him. He said that he didn’t want anything bad to happen to Campos “because he’s my son.” His girlfriend testified that Campos did not pull her hair, though admitting she reported to police that Campos did. The prosecutor asked the girlfriend, “And your desire to repair this relationship with the defendant, is that the reason your story to the police and 911 from last November has changed between then and now?” She responded, “Yes, because I want him to get back together.” 4  Campos was convicted as charged. The court imposed a 10-year prison sentence (three years for count 4, doubled to six years because of the strike prior, two years for count 1, calculated at one-third the midterm doubled because of the strike prior, plus two years for that count’s great bodily injury enhancement using the same calculation, and concurrent one year terms for counts 2, 3, and 5). DISCUSSION A. The Record Supports the Trial Court’s Finding That Campos Knowingly, Voluntarily, and Intelligently Waived His Miranda Rights Campos contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police because his Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. We disagree. Miranda requires law enforcement “to advise a suspect, before any custodial law enforcement questioning, that ‘he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.’ ” (People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 947; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 498–499.) Unless a suspect knowingly and intelligently waives those rights, his statements are not admissible against him. (People v. Sauceda-Contreras (2012) 55 Cal.4th 203, 217.) “[A] valid waiver of Miranda rights may be express or implied.” (Id. at p. 218) “A suspect’s expressed willingness to answer questions after acknowledging an understanding of his or her Miranda rights has itself been held sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of such rights.” (Id. at pp. 218–219.) “ ‘In reviewing defendant’s claim that his Miranda rights were violated, we must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, as well as 5 its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses where supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 217.) The trial court reviewed the video footage of the interview between Campos and the deputy.2 The court listened to the Miranda advisements given to Campos and watched Campos’s body language. The court noted his observations, including that Campos said “yeah” and nodded his head “yes” during the Miranda advisements. After the advisements, Campos said he understood he was allowed to have a lawyer during the interrogation. Campos then responded in the affirmative when the deputy asked, “You want to talk to me about what happened today?” The court concluded that Campos’s Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent. Indeed, the record shows Campos responded affirmatively to the advisements and proceeded to answer the deputy’s questions, giving an “account of what happened . . . in narrative form.” (People v. Gurley (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 536, 547.) By doing so, he expressed a willingness to answer questions after acknowledging an understanding of his rights. (People v. Sauceda-Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 217.) The record contains no evidence of coercive tactics or undue pressure to respond. Although Campos made a few odd statements during 2 Campos claims that the record is inadequate for meaningful appellate review because the parties waived a court reporter for playback of certain electronic recordings. However, the record includes transcripts of each of the electronic recordings played for the jury. The recordings themselves were also admitted as trial exhibits and are deemed part of the record on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.320(e).) Campos could have requested to have any of these recordings transmitted to this court for review but did not do so (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.224), even after the People noted in their brief that he was “free to request that these four exhibits be transmitted to this court and reviewed as part of his claim.” 6 the interrogation, the record as a whole supports the trial court’s finding that his Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. B. There Is Substantial Evidence Supporting the Jury’s Finding That Campos Used Force or Fear in the Commission of Carjacking Campos argues the carjacking conviction must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence that he used force or fear to take the vehicle from his girlfriend. We are unpersuaded. When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support [the challenged findings], and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the jury. It is of no consequence that the jury believing other evidence, or drawing different inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.’ ” (People v. Ghipriel (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 828, 832.) To be considered “substantial” for purposes of appellate review, the evidence “must be more than evidence which merely raises a strong suspicion of guilt as mere suspicion will not support an inference of fact.” (People v. Martin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 687, 695.) “ ‘A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility.’ ” (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.) “Carjacking, in violation of Penal Code section 215, subdivision (a), is defined as ‘the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from the person or immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his or her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, 7 accomplished by means of force or fear.’ ” (People v. Coryell (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1302.) There is substantial evidence supporting the jury’s carjacking verdict. Deputy Thomas Craine testified to the information that Campos’s girlfriend provided him when he responded to her 911 call. She told him that “Campos grabbed her by the ponytail and demanded that she drive him to go buy more meth,” causing her to “fear for her safety.” “So she exited her vehicle” and “began running down the street.” There is thus substantial evidence Campos obtained the vehicle by means of force and fear. While Campos’s girlfriend later testified favorably to the defense at trial, it was for the jury to determine the credibility of her recantation in light of her prior inconsistent statements and her admitted desire to get back together with Campos. The jury was entitled to believe she was telling the truth when she first spoke to the police. As the court instructed (CALCRIM No. 318), the jury was permitted to use her prior statements not only to evaluate her credibility, but also “[a]s evidence that the information in those earlier statements [was] true.” “[O]ut-of-court statements may serve as the sole evidence of guilt if they satisfy the substantial evidence test.” (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 266.) The girlfriend’s prior inconsistent statements and evidence of a motive to recant supplied substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding on the force or fear element of carjacking. C. Campos Has Failed to Demonstrate Any Error in the Court’s Failure to Instruct on Simple Battery as a Lesser Included Offense of Domestic Battery Campos contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the offense of simple battery as a lesser included offense of the domestic battery charge in count 5, which is the crime he committed against his pregnant girlfriend. We reject this contention because Campos has failed to 8 demonstrate how the jury could reasonably have concluded he was guilty only of the lesser offense and not the greater. An offense that is necessarily included within a charged offense is a lesser included offense. (People v. Lopez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 254, 269.) A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on a lesser included offense if the jury could reasonably conclude that “ ‘the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.’ ” (People v. Perez-Robles (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 222, 236.) But “the obligation to instruct on a lesser included offense does not arise when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged.” (People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 702–703.) Campos contends a simple battery under section 242 is a lesser included offense of domestic battery under section 243, subdivision (e), because the latter includes the former and adds the element of a qualifying relationship, which includes “a person with whom the defendant is cohabiting, a person who is the parent of the defendant’s child, . . . or a person with whom the defendant currently has, or has previously had, a dating . . . relationship.” (See § 243, subd. (e)(1).) Other than to claim that simple battery is a lesser included offense, however, Campos makes no effort to show how the jury could have concluded he was only guilty of the lesser offense. He does not explain how the jury reasonably could have found that his relationship with his pregnant girlfriend did not qualify under section 243, subdivision (e). Specifically, he fails to demonstrate how the jury could have arrived at a conclusion that she was not “a person with whom the defendant is cohabiting” or “a person with whom the defendant currently has, or has previously had, a dating . . . relationship.” (See § 243, subd. (e)(1).) Supplying us with that legal analysis and citation to the record was essential for Campos to demonstrate that a 9 reasonable jury could have found him guilty of simple battery but not guilty of the charged offense of domestic battery. Consequently, he has not established that the court had an obligation to instruct on a lesser included offense. (People v. Wyatt, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 702–703.) D. Campos Has Failed to Demonstrate Any Error in the Consolidation Campos contends the trial court erred in granting the prosecutor’s motion to consolidate, joining the charges arising from two different occasions. We disagree. Section 954 authorizes the joinder of two or more different offenses that are “ ‘of the same class of crimes or offenses’ ” in a single trial. (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 75.) California law prefers joinder “because it avoids the increased expenditures of funds and judicial resources that may result from separate trials.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 122 (Simon).) Nonetheless, section 954 also gives the court discretion to sever properly joined charges “in the interest of justice and for good cause shown.” (See § 954; Simon, at p. 122.) “ ‘In exercising its discretion in this regard, the court weighs “the potential prejudice of joinder against the state’s strong interest in the efficiency of a joint trial.” ’ ” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 37.) On appeal, Campos concedes the point that the joinder was statutorily authorized. But he maintains the court failed to “meaningfully analyze the prejudicial effect of trying” the incidents together; he was denied a fair trial; and the court was required to “sever where consolidation creates a substantial danger of prejudice.” Campos has not made a clear showing of prejudice to establish an abuse of discretion. (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 774.) Even assuming the evidence would not have been cross-admissible in separate 10 trials, the relevant factors in determining prejudice from a consolidated trial are “(1) whether some of the charges are particularly likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (2) whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that the totality of the evidence may alter the outcome as to some or all of the charges; or (3) whether one of the charges (but not another) is a capital offense, or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case.” (Id. at p. 775.) Campos does not address these factors in his briefing and thus has failed to make a showing that the risk of prejudice was insufficient to outweigh the benefits of joinder. (Id. at pp. 781–782.) Based on our own review, we conclude that none of these factors was present here. Neither set of charges was particularly likely to inflame the jury against Campos. Both crimes involved domestic violence. One was an attack against Campos’s elderly father and brother and the other an attack against his pregnant girlfriend. Neither case was particularly weak in relation to the other. In both, the victims initially made statements that incriminated Campos then took them back at trial. None of the charged crimes carried the death penalty and consolidation did not convert any of them into capital offenses. Campos has also failed to establish any gross unfairness depriving him of a fair trial. (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 69.) Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. E. Campos Forfeited His Remaining Claims Campos’s remaining arguments are forfeited, including his contentions that the trial court erred in admitting medical records and electronic recordings of witness statements, and making “potential sentencing irregularities.” Each of Campos’s arguments on these issues is asserted in cursory fashion without meaningful legal argument. Because Campos has 11 failed to supply us with cogent legal analysis, citations to relevant authority, and relevant citations to the record supporting his arguments, he forfeits his remaining claims of error. (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894–895 [an appellant forfeits conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority and points urged on appeal that are not supported by accurate citations to the record].) Campos has forfeited these claims for other reasons as well. First, he has forfeited his challenge to the admissibility of the medical records because he failed to request transmission of these exhibits to this court. (See People v. Chubbuk (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 [forfeiture of issue for failure to transmit relevant exhibit for appellate review].) Without reviewing the medical records and the accompanying declaration of the custodian of records, we have no way of assessing Campos’s claims of inadmissibility. Second, the rest of Campos’s claims are forfeited because he failed to assert them in the trial court. (People v. Smith (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1468 [“The law generally requires not only a timely but a specific objection or motion to preserve an issue for appeal.”], italics omitted.) For example, he argues that the recorded witness statements should have been excluded as unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. But Campos failed to make any such objection at trial. (See People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 206 [forfeiture for failure to object under Evidence Code section 352]; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [The appellate court “is in fact barred” from “reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party” when “the issue involves the admission (Evid. Code, § 353) or exclusion (id., § 354) of evidence.”].) Campos also challenges the use of transcripts of the electronic recordings to assist the jury when they were 12 played at trial, but he never asserted any such objection in the trial court.3 (See People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1213 [objection to recordings and transcript “forfeited on appeal because defendant did not object on this ground at trial”].) Campos also complains that the court allowed the parties to waive a court reporter when electronic recordings were played for the jury. “Because [Campos] agreed that the court reporter need not transcribe the audio and video recordings, he cannot now complain of such errors on appeal.” (Ibid.; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1040(d) [“Unless otherwise ordered by the trial judge, the court reporter need not take down the content of an electronic recording that is presented or offered into evidence.”].) Finally, Campos asserts there were unspecified “sentencing irregularities” in the court’s “selection of consecutive terms” but he did not object to the court’s statement of reasons at sentencing. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 352 [“a defendant cannot complain for the first time on appeal about the court’s failure to state reasons for a sentencing choice”].) Having failed to establish any individual error, Campos’s claim of cumulative prejudice necessarily fails as well. (See People v. Sedillo (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1068 [“A predicate to a claim of cumulative error is a finding of error.”].) 3 The court repeatedly advised the jury that these transcripts were “not evidence” and were only a “guide” to assist in listening to the recording. 13  DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. BUCHANAN, J. WE CONCUR: DATO, Acting P. J. RUBIN, J. 14