People v. Steele CA4/1

Filed 10/30/26 P. v. Steele CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D086182 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCN462018) v. AARON JAHROOTZ STEELE, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kelly C. Mok, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part. Mytili G. Bala, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Monique Myers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  I INTRODUCTION Aaron Jahrootz Steele appeals a judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of two counts of resisting an executive officer with force or violence (Pen. Code,1 § 69; counts 1 and 5); one count of misdemeanor trespass (§ 602, subd. (o)(1); count 2); and three counts of threatening a public officer (§ 71; counts 3, 4, and 6). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that Steele committed counts 5 and 6 while he was released from custody on bail or his own recognizance. (§ 12022.1, subd. (b).) The court struck the on-bail enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c), and placed Steele on felony probation for two years subject to various terms and conditions including the completion of 281 days of custodial confinement.2 In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, Steele presents several claims of error. He contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support one of his convictions for resisting arrest (count 1), his trespassing conviction (count 2), and two of his convictions for threatening a public officer (counts 3 and 4); (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not request a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact for one of the charges of threatening a public officer (count 6); (3) the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional due process rights when 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Counts 1 through 4 arose out of an incident at a shopping center on December 13, 2024, and were originally charged in Case No. SCN462018 (hereafter, Case ‘018). Counts 5 and 6 arose out of a separate incident outside a gas station on January 1, 2025, and were initially charged in Case No. SCN462463 (hereafter, Case ‘463). The trial court consolidated the two cases under Case ‘018. 2 it refused to sever his criminal charges; and (4) two of his probation conditions impermissibly delegate judicial authority to the probation department and improperly require him to bear the costs of any treatment programs that might be ordered by the probation department. While this appeal was pending, Steele filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus presenting two additional claims of error. (In re Steele, D087757.) In that petition, he reiterates his claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact for count 6. He also argues that he suffered violations of the Racial Justice Act of 2020 (hereafter, the RJA; § 745) because (1) one of his arresting officers exhibited bias or animus towards him because of his race (id., subd. (a)(1)); and (2) he was charged or convicted of more serious offenses than similarly situated defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins (id., subd. (a)(3)). In a separate order filed concurrently herewith, we have accepted Steele’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and granted the relief requested in connection with that claim—reversal of his count 6 conviction. In that same order, we have denied relief as to Steele’s RJA claim, without prejudice, subject to refiling in the San Diego County Superior Court. Our disposition in the related habeas corpus proceeding moots Steele’s second claim of error in this appeal and renders it unnecessary for us to address his fourth claim. We reject Steele’s remaining arguments on the merits. Therefore, as set forth in our separate order granting Steele’s petition for writ of habeas corpus in part, the count 6 conviction is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. 3  II BACKGROUND A. Prosecution Case3 1. December 13 Incident (Case ‘018) George Y. owns Felicita Village Shopping Center, a shopping center in Escondido consisting of several commercial establishments and a parking lot. The shopping center has multiple “no loitering” signs on display. Despite these signs, unhoused individuals sometimes loiter or camp on the property. To address this situation, George regularly dons a vest with the word “security” on it, patrols the shopping center, and asks unhoused persons to leave the premises. George has had multiple encounters with Steele, an unhoused Black man, at the shopping center. In August 2024, George saw Steele sitting on the shopping center’s plumbing and electrical equipment. George asked Steele to leave the premises, and Steele complied. About two weeks later, Steele again left the property as he was being approached by George. However, during multiple subsequent encounters, George asked Steele to leave the premises and Steele ignored him. On the morning of December 13, 2024, George saw Steele at the shopping center and immediately called the police to have him removed. Escondido Police Department Officers Jeff Bolton and Christian Baechli responded to the call while dressed in their agency uniforms. Upon their arrival at the shopping center, Bolton and Baechli approached Steele, who sat on the ground outside an insurance office with his personal belongings 3 The trial court admitted into evidence the arresting peace officers’ body worn camera footage for both incidents giving rise to Steele’s convictions. 4 spread on the ground around him. Steele repeatedly told the officers that someone had stolen something from him. Steele later specified that his “bag” had been stolen. Rather than inquiring about the alleged theft, Bolton said, “they got no loitering signs, man. They called in about you.” Bolton and Baechli told Steele they recognized him from prior contacts with law enforcement, including an encounter in which Steele refused to give his name to Baechli. Steele responded that the officers already knew his name and knew he was not a criminal. Shortly after, Steele told the officers they had “a fake badge,” and they were “not even real.” Baechli asked Steele if they were “going down that route again,” and said he did not know Steele’s name. In response, Steele called the officers “fake police,” said that someone had stolen something from him, and stated, “It’s Aaron, you bitch. You want me to stand up, or you gonna get too scared?” Steele then stood up, said he had not done anything wrong, and repeated his claim that someone had stolen something from him. Baechli replied, “you can’t stay here.” An increasingly agitated Steele responded, “I’m not, you bitch ass [n-word], I said somebody stole something from me, ‘cause you work with the [vulgar word] [n-words] around here. But you won’t take–dog, take that badge off, I swear to God, I’ll swing on you so fast. You not even a real police.” Baechli perceived this statement as a threat. Steele’s statement to Baechli formed the basis for count 3, the first of three charges of making a threat to a public officer. After making this statement, Steele slowly took a step towards the officers. They responded by warning Steele twice not to take another step or they would use force against him. In reply, Steele said, “Whoa, whoa, if you try to use force on me, I’m gonna fucking crack your neck, dog. Stop playing with me. I’m gonna keep doing–I’m gonna put my shit in my bag and step off. 5 I’m gonna put my shit in my bag and step off. That’s what I’m gonna do.” As Steele made these statements, Baechli turned on his Taser and pointed it towards the ground in front of Steele. At that point, Steele packed his belongings into a backpack while cursing, calling the officers vulgar names, and repeating that someone had stolen his “shit.” As Steele finished gathering his belongings, Baechli instructed him not to come back to the property. Steele walked a few feet away to a public sidewalk bordering the shopping complex, stood facing the officers from the sidewalk, and paced in a circle. After about 35 seconds, Baechli warned Steele not to come back to the property. In response, Steele claimed “the owner” said he could be there.4 Bolton said “the owner” had called the police about Steele’s loitering and did not want him there. Bolton instructed Steele to leave, and Steele replied that he was standing “on the sidewalk.” The officers told Steele they were waiting for him to leave, but if he wanted to “hang out there all day,” he could “[g]o for it,” and they could “play this game all day.” Steele remained on the sidewalk while the officers repeatedly said the owner of the shopping center wanted him to leave. As Steele stood on the sidewalk, Baechli asked him, “Why do you have a problem with the police.” Steele responded, “Because you’re harrassive” and “don’t do no work.” In response, Bolton asked Steele, “What work do you do?” (Italics added.) An exasperated Steele cursed and walked away. As he walked away, Bolton shouted after him, “Go fly your flag at the intersection. Goodbye.” Bolton also hollered at Steele to “keep going.” In response, Steele 4 An insurance agent who leased office space at the shopping center testified that he had assured Steele he would not call the police on him. 6 marched back towards the officers, accused them of “talk[ing] shit,” and cursed at them. He then stormed away from the officers while remaining on the sidewalk. As Steele was seemingly about to leave the area, he spotted George inside the shopping center, walked towards him, and crossed the boundary between the sidewalk and the shopping center. At some point thereafter, Steele returned to the sidewalk. From his vantage point on the sidewalk, Steele confronted George and asked him, “Where’s the bag, I seen you take that bag. Where the bag you stole? Where’s the bag that you stole?” Baechli warned Steele to “keep walking,” and “stay off th[e] property.” Steele began walking away, but then reentered the parking lot through a driveway located about 50 feet from the place where the officers originally initiated contact with him. Baechli told Steele he could not be anywhere in the “entire mall,” but Steele said, “Nah,” claimed he could be there, and continued questioning George about his missing bag from the interior of the shopping center driveway. Steele returned to the sidewalk and began pacing along the sidewalk near the parking lot driveway. At that point, Baechli told Steele, “You can leave or you can get arrested, it’s your choice.” Steele asked why he was being arrested and Bolton said, “For trespassing. Refusing to leave.” Steele and Bolton then argued about whether Steele was trespassing, and Steele claimed the officers needed a “piece of paper” barring him from the property. During this portion of the interaction, Steele straddled the boundary between the sidewalk and the shopping center driveway. Bolton then asked Steele if he was willing to leave. Steele replied that he was “already off the property.” Bolton again said Steele could leave or he would be arrested for trespassing. He then asked Steele three additional 7 times whether he would leave. Steele replied that he had already “left that place,” and Bolton said, “So no? You’re not gonna leave?” In response, Steele set his backpack down on the sidewalk and said, “Bitch [n-word], take your badge off so I can punch you in the face, man. Come over here. Come over here.” Steele’s statement to Bolton formed the basis for count 4, the second charge of making a threat to a public officer. Bolton perceived Steele’s act of setting down his bag as pre-assaultive behavior because it freed his hands to exert force. Therefore, Bolton drew his Taser, aimed it at Steele, and radioed to dispatch that he was holding a suspect at Taser point. Bolton then asked Steele if he wanted to “play this game.” Steele picked up his backpack, called Bolton a vulgar name, and asked him, “What is that supposed to do? I’m not even on the property.” Steele stood about 15 feet away from the officers, continued arguing with them, claimed he had already left the property, and asked why the officers were pursuing him. Meanwhile, Bolton kept his Taser pointed towards Steele. A backup patrol vehicle arrived at the scene and parked next to Steele. As officers exited the vehicle, Steele started walking away from the shopping center. Baechli and one of the backup officers, Sergeant Andrew Maxwell, warned Steele to stop and take a seat or else force would be used against him, but Steele disregarded these commands and continued walking. He also yelled, “I’m on the sidewalk. Man, you’re being ridiculous. You’re following me. I already left the place.” At this point, Bolton intended to arrest Steele, take him to the police station a few miles away, and issue him a citation for trespassing. The officers closed in on Steele and tried to move his arms behind his back to handcuff him, but Steele clenched his fists, tensed up, and exerted his 8 strength to keep his arms from being moved behind his back. To counteract these measures, Bolton held onto Steele’s backpack and Maxwell used a leg sweep maneuver to escort Steele to the ground. According to Bolton, the leg sweep was performed for Steele’s own safety and to prevent him from continuing to move away from the officers. Steele was noncompliant after he was brought to the ground. He tensed up, tried pulling away, and flailed his legs. Therefore, Bolton held Steele’s head to the ground while two other officers controlled his limbs. The officers then rolled Steele onto his stomach, handcuffed him, and seated him upright on a nearby curb. Once Steele was seated upright, he quickly jumped to his feet and kicked Baechli. Bolton pushed Steele back down to the ground and Baechli pinned his head to the ground at a 90-degree angle. While Steele was pinned down, he pinched Baechli hard enough to draw blood. Meanwhile, other officers placed Steele in a WRAP, a nylon mesh device that wrapped around Steele’s torso and prevented him from kicking, running away, or injuring himself or others. The officers booked Steele into custody shortly afterwards. 2. January 1 Incident (Case ‘463) Steele was arraigned in Case ‘018 and released on his own recognizance. He failed to appear for a readiness conference on December 27, 2024, and the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. On January 1, 2025, San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputy Shawn Gurren and several other deputies approached Steele outside a gas station to execute the warrant. The deputies wore their agency uniforms and drove marked patrol vehicles. Gurren handcuffed Steele, who complied with being handcuffed but was not forthcoming about identifying himself. Steele asked the deputies if they had a warrant for his arrest, and they said they did. 9 Thereafter, Steele stated multiple times that he “went to court” on the 27th. After the deputies repeatedly asked Steele to identify himself, he finally provided the deputies with his name and date of birth. Steele asked the deputies what he was being arrested for and Deputy Gurren responded that Steele had a felony warrant. Steele replied, “No, I don’t. I just – I just went to court on the 27th. My name [didn’t] show up on the thing.” The deputies then walked Steele to a patrol vehicle to perform a search for weapons and contraband. As they did so, he again told the deputies that he “went to court” on December 27, “but it wasn’t on the docket.” Steele added, “[t]here was no evidence.” The deputies positioned Steele so that he faced the patrol vehicle. Meanwhile, Steele repeatedly demanded to see a warrant and the deputies advised him they would show him a warrant at the jailhouse. Steele also repeated that he “went to court, and [his] name didn’t pop up on the docket.” The deputies began searching Steele, who repeatedly demanded a warrant, tensed and thrashed his body, and tried turning his body to face the deputies. The deputies construed Steele’s act of turning around as pre- assaultive behavior. During their search of Steele, the deputies recovered a pocketknife from his waistband and asked if he had any other weapons on him. Steele grew visibly more distressed and told one of the deputies, Deputy Ethan Hatch, “Stop reachin’ on my balls like that, slim, for real. I’ll fuckin’ run and elbow your bitch ass for not havin’ a … you think this shit a game.” Steele then tried elbowing Hatch, who had to dodge his head to avoid the blow. Steele’s statement to Hatch that he would elbow him formed the basis for count 6, the third charge of making a threat to a public officer. As the deputies placed Steele in the patrol vehicle, Steele kicked Hatch three times and continually claimed that the deputies needed a warrant. 10 Steele also repeatedly kicked at one of the backseat windows of the patrol vehicle. After the deputies transported Steele to the jailhouse, they showed him the arrest warrant in hopes it would de-escalate him. However, Steele remained aggressive and threatened one of the deputies, saying, “I’ll fuck you up … nah, for real, I’ll fuck you up. … [I]f you don’t get my shit off the ground, bro. I’m gonna fuckin’ broke kick yo’ bitch ass [n-word] so hard.” Faced with this resistance, the deputies used a leg sweep maneuver to take Steele to the ground and place him into a WRAP device. B. Defense Case Steele took the witness stand in his own defense. Regarding the December 13 incident, Steele testified that he had briefly walked away from the shopping center before the police officers arrived and, upon his return, he realized his bag had been stolen or was missing. Steele stated he did not understand why the officers approached him that morning, and he felt they were ignoring his theft complaint. He also testified that the officers did not initially communicate to him that they wanted him to leave the property entirely, nor did they advise him why he needed to leave. He claimed he threatened to crack the officers’ necks because they had “mistreated and disrespected” him. He also stated that he threatened to punch Bolton in the face because he wanted to “go mano a mano” with Bolton, who was not acting “within the scope of [his] law enforcement” duties. Steele also testified that he went to the Vista courthouse for his readiness conference for Case ‘018 on December 27, 2024, but he did not know which courtroom to enter and therefore checked the court monitors for 11 information about his case. The monitors did not list his case, so he believed the case had been dismissed for insufficient evidence.5 With respect to the January 1 incident, Steele testified that he had no idea why the deputies were approaching him. Steele testified that he requested a warrant because he had gone to the Vista courthouse on December 27 and checked the court monitors for his case. The prosecutor asked Steele how he felt when Deputy Hatch searched him, and Steele testified that he felt “extremely uncomfortable” because Hatch touched him near his groin. The prosecutor also asked Steele what was going through his mind when he threatened Hatch, and Steele replied, “That was m[e] defending myself from being touched on.” The prosecutor then asked Steele if he recalled being in the patrol car, and Steele replied, “I felt abducted, so that’s why the extra – that’s what the extra [was] for. The extra [was] for it to be alarming so that somebody realizes that this is completely illegal, like whatever’s happening to me is completely illegal, which has happened before.” Further, when Steele was asked whether he felt justified “in kicking and throwing [his] elbow,” Steele replied, “Yes. I felt like I was [being] abducted.” 5 The parties stipulated that the “television monitors in the lobby area of the San Diego Superior courthouse in Vista, California, only display traffic, family, and civil matters. The monitors do not display criminal matters. On December 27, 2024, the information booth in the lobby did not have an attendant due to staffing shortages. On December 27, 2024, the Court was open to the public and operating on a regular schedule.” 12  III DISCUSSION A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Steele challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting all four of his convictions arising out of the December 13 incident. In particular, he argues substantial evidence does not support his convictions for resisting an executive officer with force or violence in violation of section 69 (count 1), trespassing in violation of section 602, subdivision (o)(1) (count 2), and threatening officers Baechli (count 3) and Bolton (count 4) in violation of section 71, subdivision (a). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude substantial evidence supports these convictions. 1. Standard of Review “ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court ‘ “ ‘presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88 (Morales).) “When a jury’s verdict is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support it, 13 and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the jury. It is of no consequence that the jury believing other evidence, or drawing different inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.” (People v. Brown (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 968, 970.) “ ‘ “We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]” [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” ’ the [fact finder]’s verdict.’ ” (People v. Davis (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 500, 510.) 2. Count 1 (Resisting an Executive Officer) Steele contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for resisting an executive officer with force or violence in violation of section 69. That statutory provision makes it a felony for any person to “attempt[], by means of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from performing any duty imposed upon the officer by law, or … knowingly resist[], by the use of force or violence, the officer, in the performance of his or her duty ….” (§ 69, subd. (a).) “The longstanding rule in California and other jurisdictions is that a defendant cannot be convicted of an offense against a peace officer ‘ “engaged in ... the performance of ... [his or her] duties” ’ unless the officer was acting lawfully at the time the offense against the officer was committed. [Citations.] ‘The rule flows from the premise that because an officer has no duty to take illegal action, he or she is not engaged in “duties,” for purposes of an offense defined in such terms, if the officer’s conduct is unlawful.’ ” (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 815.) Thus, “ ‘[t]he lawfulness of the 14 officer’s conduct is an essential element of the offense of resisting ... a peace officer.’ ” (People v. Southard (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 424, 434 (Southard).) An unlawful arrest includes an arrest made with excessive force. (Southard, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 434; accord § 835a, subd. (a)(1) [“The Legislature further finds and declares that every person has a right to be free from excessive use of force by officers acting under color of law.”].) However, an “officer who has reasonable cause to believe that [a] person to be arrested has committed a public offense may use objectively reasonable force to effect the arrest, to prevent escape, or to overcome resistance.” (§ 835a, subd. (b); see § 835 [a “person arrested may be subjected to such restraint as is reasonable for his arrest and detention”]; Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 396 (Graham) [“the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it”].) If an officer uses excessive force to make an otherwise lawful arrest, “the arrestee may use reasonable force to protect himself in accordance with the principles of self-defense.” (People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47.) The determination whether an officer used excessive force “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he [was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” (Graham, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 396; see People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 157, disapproved on another ground by People v. Morgan (2026) 19 Cal.5th 132, 150, fn. 6 [the Graham standard applies “when an accused seeks to defend against a charge of resisting arrest … by contending the arrest was unlawful due to the officer’s use of excessive force”].) “The ‘reasonableness’ of 15 a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” (Graham, at p. 396.) This accounts “for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” (Id. at p. 397; see § 835a, subd. (a)(4) [“the decision by a peace officer to use force shall be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer … based on the totality of the circumstances known to or perceived by the officer at the time, rather than with the benefit of hindsight, and … the totality of the circumstances shall account for occasions when officers may be forced to make quick judgments about using force”].) According to Steele, substantial evidence does not support the jury’s implied finding that the officers used reasonable and necessary force to effect his arrest. On the contrary, he claims, the only rational inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that the officers used excessive force when they used a leg sweep maneuver. Steele emphasizes that trespassing is a non- bookable misdemeanor, he was “attempting to walk” away from the shopping center when the officers used the leg sweep maneuver on him, and the resistance he exhibited prior to the leg sweep maneuver was “minor” and “insignificant.” Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude there is substantial evidence from which a rational jury could find that the arresting officers exercised only reasonable and necessary force when they performed the leg sweep maneuver on Steele. Regarding the severity of Steele’s crimes, the crime of trespassing may, at first blush, appear to be a relatively minor offense in isolation. However, Steele did not merely commit a standalone crime of trespassing; instead, he had perpetrated two additional crimes of significantly greater severity before 16 the officers subjected him to the leg sweep maneuver. Besides trespassing, Steele threatened several acts of physical violence against officers Bolton and Baechli. Specifically, he told Baechli he would “swing on [him] so fast,” a statement that Baechli perceived as a threat. Shortly afterwards, Steele stepped towards Baechli and said he would “crack [Baechli’s] neck.” After making these threats against Baechli, Steele then told Bolton he would “swing on [him] so fast,” while simultaneously setting down his backpack in a gesture that Bolton considered to be pre-assaultive behavior. As we will discuss, this conduct was sufficient to establish that Steele perpetrated two separate counts of threatening the officers to influence the performance of their duties in violation of section 71. With respect to the threat Steele posed to the safety of others, Bolton testified at trial that he was concerned about George’s safety due to Steele’s aggressive behavior in the minutes preceding the arrest and leg sweep maneuver. This aggression was apparent on the officers’ body worn camera footage. That footage shows Steele following George as he tried to walk away from the encounter, repeatedly badgering George about his allegedly missing bag, and reentering the shopping center multiple times after he had been ordered to leave. George himself told Bolton—and later the jury—that he was afraid of Steele. Further, Steele ignored about two dozen orders to leave the property and its vicinity, exacerbating the possibility that he would continue posing a safety threat to George. There was also ample evidence that Steele actively and forcefully resisted arrest before the officers used a leg sweep maneuver on him. According to Bolton, Steele tensed up and used “all his physical strength” to impede the officers when they tried to pull his arms behind his back. Similarly, Baechli told the jury that Steele “pulled away” and used “muscle 17 force” to resist the officers while they tried to arrest him. Maxwell, the officer who performed the leg sweep maneuver, testified that Steele was “struggling, he was tensing his arms, dropping his body weight, and trying to prevent [the officers] from putting handcuffs on him.” The body worn camera footage of the arrest corroborates the officers’ testimony. Based on the evidence of Steele’s noncompliance and resistance, a jury could rationally find that more forceful law enforcement tactics were necessary to accomplish the arrest. Further, a jury could rationally find that the type of non-lethal force exercised here—a leg sweep maneuver—was necessary and reasonable considering the evidence we have discussed. During the leg sweep maneuver, Bolton held onto Steele’s backpack, supported his body weight, and escorted him to the ground while another officer swept behind each of Steele’s legs. As deputy Hatch testified, this maneuver is intended to enable officers to effect an arrest while ensuring the arrestee does not injure himself in the process. Although the leg sweep maneuver was undoubtedly a non-trivial use of force, a reasonable jury could conclude that such force was essential due to Steele’s resistance to the officers, his repeated threats of violence against the officers, and the continued safety threat he posed to George and the officers alike. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, as we must, we conclude there was substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that the arresting officers did not use excessive or unreasonable force when they implemented a leg sweep maneuver on Steele. Therefore, we reject Steele’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for resisting the officers with force or violence. 3. Count 2 (Misdemeanor Trespass) Steele also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his misdemeanor conviction for trespassing in violation of section 602, 18 subdivision (o)(1). That provision states, in part, “[A] person who willfully commits a trespass by any of the following acts is guilty of a misdemeanor: … Refusing or failing to leave land, real property, or structures belonging to, or lawfully occupied by, another and not open to the general public, upon being requested to leave ….” (§ 602, subd. (o)(1).) According to Steele, no reasonable jury could find that he refused or failed to leave the shopping center because the evidence irrefutably showed he had already complied, albeit slowly, with the officers’ orders to leave the property. We disagree. From the officers’ body worn camera footage, a rational jury could find that Steele refused or failed to depart the shopping center despite the officers’ repeated orders for him to leave. About two minutes into the interaction between Steele and the officers, Bolton advised Steele, who was seated on the ground of the shopping center, “they got no loitering signs, man. They called in about you.” About a minute later, Baechli stated, “you can’t stay here.” In response, Steele began collecting his belongings from the ground. As Steele collected his belongings, Baechli stated, “Don’t come back here, please.” Baechli repeated himself twice more, saying, “Don’t come back here,” and “Don’t come back to this property.” Although Steele walked to the nearby sidewalk about six minutes and 30 seconds into the interaction, he then argued with the officers about whether he had permission to be on the property. Bolton repeatedly told Steele the owner wanted him “gone,” so he should “[p]lease leave,” and “be on [his] way,” or else he would be arrested. Notwithstanding these warnings, Bolton’s body worn camera footage shows Steele reentering the shopping center through its driveway about 10 minutes and 18 seconds into the encounter, apparently for the purpose of confronting George about his missing bag. Baechli’s body worn camera footage shows that Steele briefly returned to the sidewalk, but he then 19 reentered the shopping center yet again through its driveway to continue his confrontation with George. At that point, Baechli ordered Steele to “stay off this property … [t]his entire mall here,” and Steele refused. He unequivocally said, “Nah,” and then advanced even further into the shopping center to confront George. The body worn camera footage shows Steele then returned to the sidewalk, where he straddled and occasionally crossed the boundary between the sidewalk and the shopping center while heatedly arguing with the officers about whether they needed a “piece of paper” to evict him from the property. About 16 minutes into the interaction, Steele continued arguing with the officers and paced the sidewalk near the shopping center driveway he had reentered at least twice before. The footage shows that Steele walked away from the driveway only after a backup patrol vehicle arrived at the scene and officers exited the vehicle to arrest him. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, a jury could reasonably find that Steele departed the shopping center only momentarily when he went to the sidewalk, and that he did not comply with the officers’ orders to leave the premises. Indeed, a jury could rationally find that Steele refused or failed to leave the property based on the officers’ body worn camera footage showing that he advanced into the shopping center multiple times after he was asked to leave, verbally refused when he was ordered to leave the “entire mall” and instead moved further into the shopping center, vigorously argued with the officers about whether they could evict him from the property without a warrant, straddled and repeatedly crossed the threshold between the sidewalk and shopping center, and continued to argue with the officers near the shopping center driveway until 20 a backup patrol vehicle arrived. Collectively, this evidence constitutes substantial evidence supporting Steele’s trespassing conviction. 4. Counts 3 and 4 (Threatening the Arresting Officers) Steele’s final evidentiary argument is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his felony convictions for threatening officers Baechli (count 3) and Bolton (count 4) in violation of section 71, subdivision (a). Section 71 states, in relevant part, “Every person who, with intent to cause, attempts to cause, or causes … any public officer or employee to do, or refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his duties, by means of a threat, directly communicated to such person, to inflict an unlawful injury upon any person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient of the threat that such threat could be carried out, is guilty of a public offense.” (§ 71, subd. (a).) “ ‘The purpose of the statute is to prevent threatening communications to public officers or employees designed to extort their action or inaction.’ ” (People v. Chaney (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 253, 257.) “The essential elements under Penal Code section 71 are: ‘ “(1) A threat to inflict an unlawful injury upon any person or property; (2) direct communication of the threat to a public officer or employee; (3) the intent to influence the performance of the officer or employee’s official duties; and (4) the apparent ability to carry out the threat.” ’ ” (In re Ernesto H. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 298, 308 (Ernesto).) “[I]n determining whether the element of intent has been established, we consider whether it may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence.” (Id. at p. 313; see also People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 736 [“ ‘There is rarely direct evidence of a defendant’s intent. Such intent must usually be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the defendant’s actions.’ ”].)