Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 174 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-25-516 Opinion Delivered: November 5, 2026 DANNY MAURICE BROWN, JR. APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 60CR-23-2516] V. HONORABLE KAREN WHATLEY, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED. CODY HILAND, Associate Justice Danny Maurice Brown, Jr., appeals his conviction for first-degree murder and resulting sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years for a firearm enhancement. On appeal, Brown argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying his midtrial request to dismiss retained counsel and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm. I. Factual and Procedural Background On March 27, 2023, Brown shot and killed his wife, Edwina, in the living room of their Little Rock home. In the days preceding the murder, Brown sent Edwina a series of disturbing, at times incoherent, and threatening text messages: BROWN: I know he work at Tyson BROWN: He probably in a Challenger in your name BROWN: You slow BROWN: You gay for n*ggas, okay? N*ggas, b*tches, somebody – you take me. He then sent her pictures of her mother’s 2012 obituary. Two days before the shooting, Brown sent additional messages, including: BROWN: N*gga say you talk bad about me but you a sl*t he said he was nothing all in your face BROWN: D*mn you let a n*gga nut in your face BROWN: What you say he do him so you do you BROWN: You slow like he said BROWN: Next you’re about to do the same way you will see BROWN: Next guy about to do the same way The day before the shooting, Brown again sent Edwina messages accusing her of engaging in the behavior and criticizing her decision to attend church. His final message stated: BROWN: See now you charge going have a good day at church. It won’t do no good for you cuz you’re going to be home soon, b*tch, tomorrow. On the day of the shooting, Brown, Edwina, and their daughter, Danyalle, were at home. Danyalle did not attend school that day because she needed to have her windshield repaired and planned to look at houses with her mother. Edwina was looking for a house because she intended to leave Brown and take their two children with her. Danyalle later testified that Brown physically abused Edwina and threatened to harm her every day. At 3:05 p.m., Danyalle left home to pick up her brother from school, a departure confirmed by camera-surveillance footage covering the front of the Browns’ home. After school let out at 3:50 p.m., the siblings went to Walmart before returning home. 2 After Danyalle left to pick up her brother, family friend Demetrius Riddle arrived at the Browns’ home carrying a .40-caliber Glock handgun he had purchased in the preceding days. Brown and Edwina began arguing, and Riddle left, leaving his handgun on the couch where he had been sitting. As he was leaving, Riddle heard gunshots and ran to his truck. He then went back into the home and found Edwina lying face down on the living-room floor and Brown sitting on the couch where Riddle had left the handgun. Riddle did not see his handgun. Riddle went back outside to move his vehicle, which was blocking Brown’s 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe. Brown told Riddle to “take care of her” but refused to give him the address of the home. Brown then fled in his vehicle. Riddle found the address on a piece of mail in the Browns’ mailbox and called 911. Police arrived at 3:58 p.m. Edwina was transported to the hospital but could not be saved. When Danyalle and her brother returned home, they encountered a crime scene. Police told them that a woman had been shot. Danyalle called her uncle and asked him to check local hospitals, and then she called her father. Brown told her, “your mama dead,” and hung up. Using Flock cameras, which capture license-plate information and record the time and location of a vehicle when it passes a camera, officers located Brown’s vehicle near the Briarwood Apartments on South Rodney Parham Road in Little Rock. Police searched the area but did not find Brown. They placed a GPS tracker on Brown’s vehicle, which never moved, and no one entered. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a drop of blood on the driver’s-side seat. 3 A few weeks later, United States Marshals apprehended Brown in Dallas, Texas. He had changed his appearance. While in jail, Brown called Danyalle and instructed her to lie for him. Brown asked her to “do something for [him]” and explained that the police would question her about whether he and Edwina had been fighting. He instructed Danyalle to tell them, “Hell no. You know, they argue and sh*t, but that’s it.” He then told her to “just . . . ma[k]e that shit up” and added, “[I]f you look up the old case, like with your mama and me . . . we don’t cooperate with them folk.” The medical evidence established that Edwina sustained three gunshot wounds: one on her chest, one to her right arm, and one to the right side of her abdomen. The barrel of the .40-caliber Glock was touching Edwina’s chest when it was fired. The bullet passed through her lung and caused multiple rib fractures. All three bullets were .40-caliber Smith & Wesson bullets fired from a .40-caliber Generation 5 Glock. Brown was originally charged with capital murder. On the second day of the trial, he told his retained attorney that he wanted to dismiss him. Defense counsel brought the request to the circuit court, and Brown confirmed that he wanted to fire his attorney. Brown complained that counsel had failed to check phone records and expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the home-surveillance footage was admitted in separate clips. Counsel supported the request, arguing that Brown faced a capital offense and should be permitted to obtain new representation. Brown had not retained another attorney to try the case that day, did not wish to represent himself, and never hired another attorney. The circuit court denied the request, noting that the case had been pending for two years, the defense knew the evidence presented against him, and the defense could not cause 4 its own mistrial. At the close of the State’s evidence, Brown moved for a directed verdict on the capital-murder charge, arguing that the State had failed to prove he was Edwina’s murderer. The circuit court denied the motion. Brown renewed it after the defense rested, and the circuit court again denied it. The jury found Brown guilty of the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder and sentenced him as a habitual offender to life imprisonment with an additional fifteen years for the firearm enhancement. Brown now appeals. II. Law and Analysis A. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his brief, Brown raises his sufficiency-of-evidence challenge second, but we address it first in accordance with double-jeopardy principles. Clevenger v. State, 2025 Ark. 128, at 6, 719 S.W.3d 453, 459 (citing Bush v. State, 2024 Ark. 77, at 5, 687 S.W.3d 570, 573). Brown argues that the circuit court erred in denying his directed-verdict motion. Specifically, he relies on the points made in his motion below: DNA and fingerprint evidence did not tie him to Edwina’s murder, Riddle was not investigated as a potential suspect, cell-phone data would have exonerated him, and the home-surveillance footage simply showed him exiting the home. We disagree. Substantial evidence supports Brown’s conviction. On appeal, we treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Mott v. State, 2026 Ark. 123, at 5, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___. When reviewing the appellant’s challenge, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting that verdict. Id., ___ S.W.3d at 5 ___ (citing Parris v. State, 2026 Ark. 57, at 5, 727 S.W.3d 603, 607). We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___. Substantial evidence is evidence of a sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Clevenger, 2025 Ark. 128, at 6, 719 S.W.3d at 459. Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Id., 719 S.W.3d at 459. Furthermore, in resolving conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence, it is the jury’s role to assess witness credibility and resolve discrepancies in the evidence. Id., 719 S.W.3d at 459. The jury is entitled to accept the State’s version of the facts over the defendant’s, resolve any inconsistent testimony, and accept or reject any alternative theories. Id., 719 S.W.3d at 459–60. The jury may also consider evidence of the accused’s flight to avoid arrest as probative of their guilt. Id. at 7, 719 S.W.3d at 460. And just as evidence of flight may demonstrate a defendant’s consciousness of guilt, a defendant’s deliberate alteration of his physical appearance after the commission of a crime may constitute a circumstance corroborating his guilt. See Carmichael v. State, 296 Ark. 479, 484, 757 S.W.2d 944, 947 (1988) (“[T]he fact that appellant admittedly changed his appearance by shaving off his mustache immediately after the event is a corroborating circumstance.”); see also Martin v. State, 346 Ark. 198, 204–05, 57 S.W.3d 136, 141 (2001). Lastly, asking a witness to lie about the circumstances surrounding the commission of a crime is also indicative of one’s guilt. Stephenson v. State, 373 Ark. 134, 139, 282 S.W.3d 772, 777 (2008). 6 At trial, the State bore the burden of proving that Brown, with the “purpose of causing the death of another person,” caused the death of another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102(a)(2) (Repl. 2013) (the legal standard for the offense of first-degree murder).1 Brown simply argues that he was not Edwina’s murderer. The record, however, contains substantial evidence to the contrary. Brown and Edwina’s daughter, Danyalle, testified that Brown had physically and verbally abused her mother and threatened to harm her daily. Cell-phone records further revealed a series of disturbing and threatening text messages Brown sent to Edwina in the three days preceding her murder. On the day of the shooting, Riddle arrived at the Browns’ home carrying a .40-caliber Glock handgun. During an argument between Brown and Edwina, Riddle left the handgun on the living-room couch and began to leave the home. As he was leaving, Riddle heard gunshots and ran to his truck. He then went back inside the home and found Edwina lying face down on the living-room floor and Brown sitting on the couch where Riddle had left the handgun. The handgun was no longer there. Forensic evidence established that Edwina had sustained three gunshot wounds, one inflicted at point-blank range, and that all three bullets were .40-caliber Smith & Wesson ammunition fired from a .40-caliber Generation 5 Glock. Before fleeing in his 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, Brown told Riddle to “take care of her.” 1 Though Brown was originally charged with capital murder, which bears a heightened burden of proof, the State was also inherently required to prove the elements of first-degree murder because first-degree murder is a lesser-included offense of capital murder. 7 When Danyalle and her brother returned home, they discovered that their mother had been murdered. Danyalle called her father, who told her “your mama dead” and hung up. Brown fled to Dallas, Texas, where federal law enforcement apprehended him several weeks later. Upon his arrest, Brown had changed his physical appearance. While in jail, he called Danyalle and instructed her to lie to investigators about the circumstances surrounding his relationship with Edwina and whether the couple had been fighting. Viewing the evidence in its entirety, the jury could reasonably conclude that Brown purposefully caused Edwina’s death and convict him of first-degree murder.2 Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict, and the circuit court did not err in denying Brown’s directed-verdict motion. B. Motion to Change Counsel Next, we address Brown’s argument that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying his midtrial request to dismiss retained counsel. We disagree. A motion to change counsel made in close proximity to trial is treated as a motion for a continuance. Edwards v. State, 321 Ark. 610, 615, 906 S.W.2d 310, 313 (1995). We will not reverse the denial of such a motion absent an abuse of discretion. Id., 906 S.W.2d at 313; Mitchell v. State, 2023 Ark. 101, at 6, 668 S.W.3d 483, 488. An abuse of discretion requires more than mere error; it occurs when the circuit court acts improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Mitchell, 2023 Ark. 101, at 6, 668 S.W.3d at 488. 2 Though Brown did not specifically move for a directed verdict as to the lesser- included offense of first-degree murder, but instead the offense of capital murder, we have held that such motions preserve a sufficiency challenge on appeal if the motion challenges an essential element of the lesser-included offense, specifically one’s identity. Richardson v. State, 2024 Ark. 81, at 5, 687 S.W.3d 675, 579. 8 The United States Constitution guarantees the right to the counsel of one’s choice. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006). That right, however, is not absolute and must be balanced against the public’s interest in the prompt disposition of justice and the circuit court’s need to manage its docket. Arroyo v. State, 2013 Ark. 244, at 6, 428 S.W.3d 464, 469. The right to counsel may not be exercised in a manner that obstructs the orderly administration of justice, particularly when a defendant requests new counsel on the eve of—or during—trial without attempting to obtain substitute counsel. Id., 428 S.W.3d at 469. Moreover, we agree with the State’s argument that we should adopt our court of appeals’ recent holding in Mayfield v. State as the reasoning asserted there is logically sound: A defendant is not manifestly deprived of the right to counsel of his choice merely because their request to change counsel is denied when they have not sufficiently identified substitute counsel. 2025 Ark. App. 577, at 7, 725 S.W.3d 878, 883 (citing Abernathy v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 532, at 5, 699 S.W.3d 842, 846). This principle is buttressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. See Daniels v. Kelley, 881 F.3d 607, 611–12 (8th Cir. 2018) (“[A] fairminded state court could conclude that the public’s interest in the efficient administration of justice supported the denial of a last-minute continuance, especially when [the defendant] had not identified a different attorney to represent him as retained counsel.”) (citing Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984)). In determining whether to grant a motion to change counsel, circuit courts consider seven factors on a case-by-case basis: (1) whether other continuances have been requested and granted; (2) the length of the requested delay; (3) whether the requested delay is for 9 legitimate reasons; (4) whether the motion was timely; (5) whether the defendant contributed to the circumstances giving rise to the request; (6) whether the discharge of existing counsel was sought solely to obtain a continuance; and (7) whether the request was consistent with the fair, efficient, and effective administration of justice. Mitchell, 2023 Ark. 101, at 6–7, 668 S.W.3d at 488 (quoting Arroyo, 2013 Ark. 244, at 67, 428 S.W.3d at 469). When these factors weigh in favor of denial, the circuit court does not erroneously deprive a defendant of the right to counsel of his choice. Id. at 7, 668 S.W.3d at 488. Here, Brown sought to dismiss his retained counsel on the morning of the second day of trial. When asked whether he had another attorney available to take over the trial, Brown answered, “No, ma’am.” He had neither identified substitute counsel nor expressed a desire to represent himself or have counsel appointed for him. Although Brown complained that counsel had failed to check phone records and objected to the presentation of certain evidence, no substitute attorney was available or identified to proceed with the trial. The circuit court noted that the case had been pending since 2023, the defense knew the evidence and discovery, and the “defense [could not] cause its own mistrial.” Thus, the timing of Brown’s request, his inability to identify substitute counsel, and the resulting disruption to a trial already underway support the circuit court’s determination that granting the request would delay the prompt and fair administration of justice. Although Brown expressed dissatisfaction with his retained counsel, the circuit court was not required to interrupt the trial when Brown had no replacement counsel available. On this record, we cannot say that the circuit court acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due 10 consideration when it denied Brown’s motion to change counsel. Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. III. Conclusion In light of our well-settled precedent governing sufficiency challenges and our review of the circuit court’s denial of Brown’s motion to change counsel, we conclude that neither argument provides a basis for reversal. Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed. Special Justice CORY COX joins. WEBB, J., not participating. Nobles Law Firm, PLLC, by: Ethan C. Nobles, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christopher R. Warthen, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 11