Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 175 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-25-589 Opinion Delivered: November 5, 2026 PIERRE WRIGHT APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 16JCR-24-236] V. HONORABLE SCOTT A. ELLINGTON, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED. CODY HILAND, Associate Justice Pierre Wright appeals his convictions for aggravated robbery and theft for which he received a life sentence as a habitual offender. On appeal, he asserts that (1) the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds; (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in finding his prior Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions comparable to Arkansas aggravated residential burglary; and (3) his resulting mandatory life sentence under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(d) (Repl. 2024) was improper. His arguments are meritless. Accordingly, we affirm. I. Background On February 8, 2024, a masked individual entered Plato’s Closet in Jonesboro, threatened the employees behind the register with what appeared to be a handgun, and fled the scene with $598 in a gray Mercury sedan. Shortly thereafter, law enforcement stopped Wright, who was driving a matching suspect vehicle. Inside the vehicle, officers found a variety of items: attire that matched a description given by a witness, an imitation firearm, and a Plato’s Closet bag containing exactly $598. GPS data, cell-phone evidence, and surveillance footage further linked both Wright and the vehicle to the crime. The State charged Wright with aggravated robbery and theft of property and requested that he be sentenced as a habitual offender under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(d). At trial, Wright timely moved for directed verdicts, arguing there was insufficient proof that he was the robber. The circuit court denied Wright’s motions, and the jury convicted him of aggravated robbery and theft of property. At sentencing, the State introduced certified records of Wright’s prior Tennessee convictions for one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated burglary. The State argued that the Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions were comparable to Arkansas aggravated residential burglary—a qualifying offense under the Arkansas habitual-offender statute. Wright did not present evidence to controvert the State’s proof but argued only that the statutes were not comparable. After careful consideration, the circuit court found “sufficient overlap,” and Wright was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(d). Wright now appeals. II. Law and Analysis A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Wright first argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motions for a directed verdict because the State failed to present substantial evidence identifying him as the robber. We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Mott v. State, 2026 Ark. 123, at 5, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___. When reviewing the appellant’s 2 challenge, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support that verdict. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___. We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___. Substantial evidence is evidence of a sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___. Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___. Furthermore, in resolving conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence, it is the jury’s role to assess witness credibility and resolve discrepancies in the evidence. Clevenger v. State, 2025 Ark. 128, at 6, 719 S.W.3d 453, 459–60. A person commits robbery, a Class B felony, if, with the purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension immediately after committing a felony or misdemeanor theft, the person employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force, or creates a circumstance that would cause a reasonable person to believe the use of physical force is imminent, upon another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102(a) (Repl. 2024). A person commits aggravated robbery, a Class Y felony, if the person commits robbery as defined in section 5-12-102(a) and “represents by word or conduct that he or she is armed with a deadly weapon.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5- 12-103 (Repl. 2024) Finally, a person commits Class A misdemeanor theft of property if the person takes, or exercises unauthorized control, over the property of another person with the purpose of depriving the rightful owner of said property that is valued at less than $1,000. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(b)(4)(A) (Repl. 2024). 3 Substantial evidence clearly supports Wright’s convictions. Video surveillance corroborated witness testimony that a masked man dressed in a dark-gray hoodie, blue cargo jeans, gloves, and boots walked into Plato’s Closet; brandished a realistic-looking novelty handgun concealed in a sock, which the assailant pointed at employees; and then demanded that money from the cash register be placed into a store-branded bag. The same footage showed the suspect arriving in a gray Mercury sedan with no license plate and leaving the scene with the money in the same vehicle. After a description of the vehicle was submitted to the Jonesboro Police Department’s Realtime Intelligence Center, the vehicle was tracked through traffic cameras. Within approximately one hour, Wright was apprehended wearing the same clothing as seen in the footage and described by witnesses. The vehicle contained a realistic-looking silver imitation firearm, a Mississippi license plate, and a Plato’s Closet bag containing the exact amount of money reported stolen from the store. Additionally, Wright’s cell phone contained evidence that Wright had searched for the Plato’s Closet address earlier the same day, and the gray Mercury sedan’s GPS data showed that the vehicle traveled to the store’s vicinity and departed shortly after the robbery. Although no witnesses made a positive in-court identification of Wright as the robber, such identification is not required. See generally Wright v. State, 2022 Ark. 103, at 1–9, 644 S.W.3d 236, 238–42 (where we recently discussed that a positive in-court identification is not required when other substantial evidence supports the conviction). Further, Wright’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in witness descriptions and a gap in the GPS data timeframe amount to nothing but a mere request that this court reweigh the evidence—we will not do so. It is the prerogative and responsibility of the jury to resolve 4 any inconsistencies and determine the credibility of the evidence presented. See Wilson v. State, 2022 Ark. 158, at 7, 651 S.W.3d 717, 722. They did so here. The jury convicted Wright, notwithstanding any evidence presented related to witness inconsistencies or gaps in the GPS data timeframe. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Wright committed the offenses. Thus, the circuit court did not err when it denied Wright’s motions for directed verdict. B. Comparability of Wright’s Prior Convictions Wright next argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in determining that his prior Tennessee convictions for aggravated burglary under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-403 were “comparable” to Arkansas aggravated residential burglary under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-39-204 (Repl. 2024) for the purpose of a sentencing enhancement pursuant to Arkansas’s habitual-offender statute. We disagree. That statute requires a defendant convicted of a Class Y felony who has previously been convicted of two or more felonies involving violence be sentenced to life imprisonment. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(d)(1)(A). A felony conviction from another jurisdiction is considered a qualifying prior violent felony if the foreign offense is “comparable” to a corresponding Arkansas violent felony. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4- 501(d)(2)(B). The determination of whether a felony conviction from another jurisdiction is comparable to an enumerated felony involving violence under Arkansas’s criminal code lies within the circuit court’s discretion at the time of one’s sentencing. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(d)(3)(B). “Abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error 5 in the circuit court’s decision, but requires that the circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.” Clevenger, 2025 Ark. 128, at 15, 719 S.W.3d at 464. Here, Wright was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class Y felony, under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(d)(1)(A). Thus, a mandatory life sentence is imposed if the defendant “previously has been convicted of two (2) or more . . . felonies involving violence”—which, as relevant here—includes the offense of “aggravated residential burglary” under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-39-204. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4- 501(d)(2)(A)(xi). A person commits aggravated residential burglary if the person commits residential burglary as defined in § 5-39-201 of a residential occupiable structure, and either: (1) The residential occupiable structure is occupied by another person; or (2) He . . . is armed with a deadly weapon or represents by word or conduct that he . . . is armed with a deadly weapon. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-204(a). For comparability in this instance, the State relied on Wright’s two Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14- 403. That statute criminalized burglary of a “habitation,” which was defined to include structures designed or adapted for overnight accommodation and, in some circumstances, self-propelled vehicles used for overnight accommodations that are actually occupied at the time of entry. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-401(1), (2) & -403. Wright argues the Arkansas and Tennessee statutes are “fundamentally different statutory schemes” because the Tennessee statute creates an offense based on “the nature of the structure entered” while the Arkansas statute creates an offense based on “the 6 circumstances of entry.” This, however, does not make the statutes too dissimilar for comparison. Wright’s focus on the absence-of-an-express-weapon element under Tennessee law misses the mark because it ignores the text of the Arkansas statute. As stated above, aggravated residential burglary in Arkansas may be committed in one of two ways: (1) when the occupiable structure is occupied or (2) when one is armed with a deadly weapon. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-203(a). Notably, however, the habitual-offender statute lists the violent offense as a whole; it does not limit comparability to the weapons-based prong. Thus, Wright’s emphasis on the absence of an explicitly violent act with a weapon does not show that the statutes are incomparable. As stated in Strong v. State, “comparable” only means “able to be compared” (i.e., capable of comparison). 2021 Ark. App. 142, at 7, 620 S.W.3d 199, 230. The term chosen by the General Assembly, “comparable,” need not be parsed further. Thus, the standard is similarity; the crimes need not be identical or a precise, mirrored match. Here, both statutes reach unlawful entry into a dwelling-type places associated with human occupancy, which—as the circuit court determined—is enough to pass the comparability test under Arkansas law. It followed the correct side-by-side comparative approach and acted within its statutory discretion in finding sufficient overlap between the respective Arkansas and Tennessee statutes. Additionally, Wright offered no evidence to controvert the State’s proof of comparability, relying solely on legal argument. Section 5- 4-501(d)(3)(A) gives a defendant the opportunity “to hear and controvert” the State’s evidence of prior felony convictions. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(d)(3)(A). Despite this 7 option, Wright chose not to offer rebuttal evidence. Given the discretionary standard and the circuit court’s thoughtful consideration of the two statutes coupled with Wright’s failure to challenge the State’s proof, we cannot say the circuit court abused its discretion. C. Sentencing Finally, Wright challenges his life sentence. This argument is derived from his comparability claim. The enhanced sentencing provisions of section 5-4-501(d) are designed to impose heightened penalties on defendants with demonstrated histories of violent criminal conduct. It is undisputed that Wright was convicted in Tennessee of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated burglary. Now, in Arkansas, he has been convicted of one count of aggravated robbery. Because we affirm the circuit court’s determination that Wright’s prior Tennessee convictions qualify as violent felony offenses in Arkansas, the life sentence imposed was mandatory under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(d)(A). Accordingly, because the imposition of the sentence was mandatory, we affirm. III. Conclusion In light of our well-established precedent regarding sufficiency challenges, our review of whether the circuit court abused its discretion in finding Wright’s prior Tennessee convictions comparable under Arkansas law, and our determination that his life sentence was mandatory pursuant to statute, we affirm. Affirmed. Special Justice CORY COX joins. 8 BAKER, C.J., and HUDSON and BRONNI, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part. WEBB, J. not participating. KAREN R. BAKER, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority that Wright’s convictions are supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. However, I would reverse and remand for resentencing. As the majority notes, whether a felony conviction from another jurisdiction is comparable to an enumerated felony involving violence for purposes of habitual-offender sentencing lies within the discretion of the circuit court at the time of sentencing. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(d)(3)(B) (Repl. 2024). However, we have explained that an abuse of discretion may be manifested by an erroneous interpretation of the law. See State v. Gray, 2016 Ark. 411, at 7, 505 S.W.3d 160, 164–65. That is what happened here. Because the circuit court erroneously interpreted the relevant statutes, it abused its discretion in concluding that Wright had been convicted of two or more prior felonies involving violence. The circuit court’s error was then amplified when it imposed a mandatory life sentence in a case where the defendant did not qualify as a two-time, violent felony offender under Arkansas law. In accordance with Arkansas law, Wright’s aggravated-robbery conviction subjected him to a mandatory extended sentence of life imprisonment as a habitual offender only if he had previously been convicted of two or more other “felonies involving violence.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(d)(1)(A). A conviction of a “comparable” felony involving violence from another jurisdiction qualifies for purposes of subjecting a defendant to an extended sentence as a habitual offender. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(d)(2)(A)–(B). The 9 circuit court ruled that Wright’s two prior Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions constituted felonies involving violence because there was “sufficient overlap” between the Tennessee convictions and Arkansas’s aggravated-residential-burglary offense. I disagree. In March 2010, Wright pled guilty to two separate counts of aggravated burglary in Tennessee for crimes he committed in November 2008 and December 2009. With respect to the underlying facts supporting the prior convictions, our record is limited to the following information from the respective charging documents: PIERRE WRIGHT . . . On November 10, 2008 in Shelby County, Tennessee, and before the finding of this indictment, did unlawfully and knowingly enter the habitation of NICHOLAS ANDERSON, not open to the public, without the effective consent of the said NICHOLAS ANDERSON, with the intent to commit theft, in violation of TCA 39-14- 403, against the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee. Case No. 10- 00224. .... PIERRE WRIGHT, in Shelby County, Tennessee, did, on December 7, 2009 and prior to this Criminal Information, commit the offense of Aggravated Burglary, in that the said PIERRE WRIGHT did unlawfully and knowingly enter the habitation of SHELIA JOHNSON, not open to the public, without the effective consent of the said SHELIA JOHNSON, with intent to commit theft, in violation of T.C.A. 39-14-403, against the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee. Case No. W10-00122. In determining whether these prior aggravated-burglary convictions are sufficiently comparable to Arkansas’s aggravated residential burglary, the majority suggests that a “side- by-side” comparison of the relevant statutes is the “correct” approach. Yet, the majority’s cursory analysis contends with mere fragments of the implicated statutes. A thorough review of the complete statutory text from both Arkansas and Tennessee is required for a proper comparability analysis because “close enough” is not, and should not be, the standard for 10 determining something as consequential as whether a criminal defendant receives an extended term of imprisonment. My analysis begins with a review of Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute. The version of section 39-14-403 that was in effect at the time of Wright’s prior offenses provided that aggravated burglary was “burglary of a habitation as defined in §§ 39-14-401 and 39-14-402.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403(a) (West, Westlaw through end of 2009 First Reg. Sess.). A person committed burglary who, without the effective consent of the property owner, (1) Enter[ed] a building other than a habitation (or any portion thereof) not open to the public, with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault; (2) Remain[ed] concealed, with the intent to commit a felony, theft or assault, in a building; (3) Enter[ed] a building and commit[ted] or attempt[ed] to commit a felony, theft or assault; or (4) Enter[ed] any freight or passenger car, automobile, truck, trailer, boat, airplane or other motor vehicle with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault or commit[ted] or attempt[ed] to commit a felony, theft or assault. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(1)–(4) (West, Westlaw current through end of 2009 First Reg. Sess.). For purposes of interpreting these statutes, section 39-14-401 defined “habitation” as follows: (A) [A]ny structure, including buildings, module units, mobile homes, trailers, and tents, which is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons; 11 (B) Includes a self-propelled vehicle that is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons and is actually occupied at the time of initial entry by the defendant; and (C) Includes each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle and each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle[.] Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-401(1)(A)–(C) (West, Westlaw current through end of 2009 First Reg. Sess.). Compare the Tennessee scheme to the relevant Arkansas statutes. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-39-204 states that a person commits aggravated residential burglary if he or she commits residential burglary as defined in § 5-39-201 of a residential occupiable structure, and either: (1) The residential occupiable structure is occupied by another person; or (2) He or she is armed with a deadly weapon or represents by word or conduct that he or she is armed with a deadly weapon. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-204(a)(1)-(2) (Repl. 2024). A person commits residential burglary if “he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a residential occupiable structure of another person with the purpose of committing in the residential occupiable structure any offense punishable by imprisonment.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-201(a)(1) (Repl. 2024). A residential occupiable structure is defined as “a vehicle, building, or other structure (i) In which any person lives; or (ii) That is customarily used for overnight accommodation of a person whether or not a person is actually present[,]” and includes “each unit of a residential occupiable structure divided into a separately occupied unit[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-101(9)(A)–(B) (Repl. 2024). 12 On appeal, Wright asserts that his Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions are not comparable to aggravated residential burglary in Arkansas because the offenses involve fundamentally different elements. Specifically, Wright contends that the Tennessee statute elevates ordinary burglary to aggravated status solely on the basis of the type of structure at issue—i.e., the structure must be a “habitation.” By contrast, in Arkansas, both types of residential burglary require that the structure at issue be residential in nature, and ordinary residential burglary is elevated to aggravated status only when the defendant was either armed with a deadly weapon or represented that he or she was so armed at the time of the burglary. Stated differently, Wright argues that aggravated burglary in Tennessee is not comparable to aggravated residential burglary in Arkansas because the Tennessee offense can be committed without any element of occupancy or possession of a deadly weapon, making it categorically broader than the Arkansas offense. Wright posits instead that aggravated burglary in Tennessee is comparable to ordinary residential burglary in Arkansas, which is not a felony involving violence for purposes of enhanced sentencing. My review of the relevant statutes and our limited record leads me to conclude that Wright’s two prior Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions are not comparable to aggravated residential burglary in Arkansas. In its analysis, the majority uses the word “comparable” in the strictest sense––devoid of context––proclaiming that the word simply means “capable of comparison.” This begs the question—are any two things not capable of comparison? Under the majority’s analysis, one could reasonably conclude that apples are comparable to oranges. After all, they are both fruits. Such an interpretation has no place in this court’s analysis concerning a legal issue as grave as whether a criminal defendant qualifies 13 as a habitual offender and should receive an extended term of imprisonment. Instead, we must employ the legal definition of “comparable.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “comparable” as “like in quality and quantity, though not identical; worthy of being considered equivalent or categorically similar because any differences are insignificant[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). When determining whether a felony conviction from another jurisdiction is comparable to an enumerated felony involving violence under Arkansas law in this context, the fact that the prior conviction and the relevant enumerated felony have different underlying elements cannot be considered insignificant. A review of the statutory language set forth above makes clear that the Tennessee statutes and the Arkansas statutes criminalize different wrongs, and it certainly cannot be said that the differences between them are so insignificant as to render the offenses legally “comparable.” The majority has declared that there was sufficient comparability between Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute and Arkansas’s aggravated-residential-burglary statute because “both statutes reach unlawful entry into dwelling-type places associated with human occupancy,” which is apparently “enough to pass the comparability test under Arkansas law.” But this cannot be enough. To be sure, “unlawful entry” into “dwelling- type places associated with human occupancy” are the bedrock elements of Arkansas’s ordinary residential-burglary statute. Thus, the majority’s foregoing conclusion bolsters Wright’s position that his prior Tennessee convictions are comparable to Arkansas’s ordinary residential burglary—not the aggravated form of residential burglary. To convict Wright of aggravated burglary in Tennessee, the only proof required was that he entered a habitation not open to the public, or remained concealed therein, with the intent to commit a felony, 14 theft, or assault. This is indeed legally comparable to what the State would have to prove to sustain an ordinary residential-burglary conviction in Arkansas pursuant to section 5-39- 201. In fact, Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute shares no more elements with Arkansas’s aggravated residential burglary statute than it does with Arkansas’s ordinary residential-burglary statute. Nevertheless, ordinary residential burglary in Arkansas is not an enumerated felony involving violence that habitual-offender status can be predicated upon. Rather, the State maintains, and the circuit court agreed, that Wright’s prior Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions were sufficiently comparable to aggravated residential-burglary in Arkansas to subject Wright to a mandatory life sentence as a habitual offender. To convict Wright of aggravated residential burglary in Arkansas pursuant to section 5-39-204, the State would have been required to prove aggravating elements that were not present in Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute. Namely, in addition to proving the elements of the Tennessee offense, the State would have been required to prove either that the residential structure that Wright burglarized was occupied or that Wright was armed with a deadly weapon or represented that he was so armed at the time of the burglary. In other words, the Tennessee offense is substantively broader than the Arkansas offense because it captures conduct that would not sustain a conviction under the Arkansas statute. The additional aggravating elements of occupation and possession of a deadly weapon underscore the disparity in seriousness between Arkansas’s aggravated-residential-burglary statute and Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute, and there is no proof in the record before us that Wright’s crimes in Tennessee involved these elements. Ultimately, a determination that Wright’s prior Tennessee convictions are comparable to aggravated 15 residential burglary in Arkansas requires us to treat the differences between the offenses as insignificant—which I cannot do. Moreover, the majority’s conclusion that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion due to Wright’s “failure to challenge the State’s proof of comparability” is based on a shockingly faulty premise because it improperly shifts the State’s burden of proof onto the defendant. Of course, it is the State, not the defendant, that bears the burden of proving a defendant’s prior convictions for purposes of enhanced sentencing under the habitual- offender statute. See, e.g., Ray v. State, 2009 Ark. 521, at 13, 357 S.W.3d 872, 881. Further, Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(d)(3)(A)(ii)(a) provides that, when a sentence to an extended term of imprisonment is sought, and if the defendant is found guilty of a felony involving violence, “out of the hearing of the jury the trial court shall hear evidence of whether the defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to or been found guilty of two (2) or more prior felonies involving violence and shall determine the number of prior felony involving violence convictions, if any.” As part of this proceeding, the statute provides that “[t]he defendant has the right to hear and controvert evidence . . . and to offer evidence in his or her support[.]” Id. § 5-4-501(d)(3)(A)(ii)(b) (emphasis added). In other words, Wright was not required to put on evidence at all. Even so, Wright did not deny his prior convictions in Tennessee, and the State offered no facts about the underlying offenses for Wright to controvert. Thus, whether Wright provided evidence during his sentencing hearing has no bearing on our review of the circuit court’s exercise of discretion. This court was tasked with determining whether the circuit court abused its discretion in ruling that Wright’s two prior Tennessee convictions were comparable to a 16 specific felony involving violence in Arkansas. That is, we were asked to decide whether the offenses should be considered equivalent or categorically similar because any differences are insignificant. Yet, the majority settles for “close enough,” as if it were faced with a dilemma as benign as apples versus oranges. Wright’s two prior Tennessee convictions for aggravated burglary are clearly not sufficiently comparable to aggravated residential burglary in Arkansas to subject him to a mandatory life sentence as a habitual offender pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(d). The circuit court’s interpretation of the relevant statutes was therefore erroneous, and it was an abuse of discretion to hold that there was sufficient overlap between them. As a result, the circuit court erred in sentencing Wright to life imprisonment by operation of law under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(d)(1) based upon its finding that he had been convicted of two or more prior felonies involving violence. Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part. HUDSON and BRONNI, JJ., join. Thompson & Holmes, by: Jake Holmes, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Zangari, Ass’t Att’y Gen.; and Jason Michael Johnson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 17