Kevin Dixon v. State of Arkansas
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 12, 2026
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. 188
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-26-347
Opinion Delivered: November 12, 2026
KEVIN DIXON
APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE
MILLER COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT
V.
[NO. 46CR-09-392]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE L. WREN AUTREY,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
CORY COX, Special Justice
Appellant Kevin Dixon appeals the denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas
corpus filed pursuant to Act 1780 of 2001 as amended by Act 2250 of 2005, codified at
Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-112-201 to -208 (Repl. 2016). In his petition, Dixon
sought new DNA testing of various items of evidence, contending the method of testing
sought would prove his actual innocence. The trial court denied the petition, finding that
the items designated for testing did not produce any DNA evidence, nor would testing of
the proposed evidence provide additional information of significant consequence in a matter
that relied on no DNA evidence produced at trial. Dixon v. State, 2011 Ark. 450, 385
S.W.3d 164. We affirm.
Dixon argues on appeal that he made clear in his petition for forensic testing that the
requested method, M-VAC testing, would show that his DNA is not present on any of the
evidence presented to the jury, including the .22-caliber pistol recovered from a lake, a used
shell casing found near the victim’s body, and currency taken from his possession when he
was arrested—items not previously tested—but could identify the real culprit. Dixon also
contends that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Act 1780 of 2001 provides that a writ of habeas corpus may be issued upon the
discovery of new scientific evidence proving a person actually innocent of the offense for
which he or she was convicted. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201; Marshall v. State, 2017 Ark.
208, 521 S.W.3d 456. Under section 16-112-202(10)(B), there is a rebuttable presumption
that a petition filed more than thirty-six months after the entry of judgment is untimely. To
rebut this presumption, a petitioner must establish one of the following: (1) the petitioner
was or is incompetent, and the incompetence substantially contributed to the delay; (2) there
is newly discovered evidence; (3) the motion is more than an assertion of innocence, and a
denial of the motion would cause a manifest injustice; (4) new technology exists that is
substantially more probative than the prior testing; or (5) other good cause. Hooper v. State,
2021 Ark. 110, 622 S.W.3d 641.
Although the trial court did not address the timeliness of Dixon’s petition, the first
prerequisite for establishing a prima facie claim under Act 1780 is to identify evidence or
scientific methods of testing that were not available at the time of trial or could not have
been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-
112-201(a)(1)(2); McLaughlin v. State, 2021 Ark. 216. Dixon not only failed to file his
petition within thirty-six months from the date of his conviction but also failed to make
claims regarding either scientific testing or newly discovered evidence that was not available
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at the time of trial or that could not have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence. See McArty v. State, 2020 Ark. 68, 594 S.W.3d 54.
Dixon’s petition and argument on appeal contain nothing more than his own
assertions of innocence and fail to show that newly discovered evidence, manifest injustice,
or good cause prevented Dixon from filing his petition within the thirty-six-month time
limitation.
Affirmed.
WEBB, J., not participating
Kevin Dixon, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen.; by: Jacob Jones, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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