Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 166 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-26-345 Opinion Delivered: November 5, 2026 BROCK DAVIS APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE COLUMBIA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 14CR-24-209] V. HONORABLE DAVID W. TALLEY, STATE OF ARKANSAS JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED. COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Associate Justice Brock Davis appeals from his convictions for rape and aggravated assault, for which the circuit court sentenced him to life and six years’ imprisonment, respectively. For reversal, Davis argues that the circuit court erred by not allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1.1 We affirm. On December 17, 2024, the State charged Davis, as a habitual offender under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(a) (Supp. 2025) (more than one but fewer than four prior felonies), with kidnapping, rape, and aggravated assault. At a pretrial hearing on September 25, 2025, the parties informed the circuit court that they were working to finalize a plea agreement. They needed confirmation of the amount of time Davis would be held for his parole violation, as that would affect the amount of time set in the plea agreement. 1 Generally, there is no right to appeal from a guilty plea. However, this court has recognized that an appeal may be taken from the denial of a Rule 26.1 motion to withdraw a plea of guilty because it is not an appeal or attack on the plea itself. See Green v. State, 362 Ark. 459, 463, 209 S.W.3d 339, 341 (2005). At the parties’ request, the court removed the case from the trial calendar and set a plea hearing for October 30. On that date, the State indicated that Davis was going to “take this plea.” The written plea agreement provided that the State would nolle pross the kidnapping charge and that the recommended sentences for the remaining charges were thirty years’ imprisonment for the rape, followed by twenty years’ suspended imposition of sentence, and six years’ imprisonment for the aggravated assault, to run concurrently. The plea agreement did not state the range of possible punishments for the charges Davis faced. At the outset of the hearing, the prosecution briefly noted the terms of the plea agreement by stating, “It’s a thirty/twenty, thirty ADC and twenty S.I.S. plea, because he’s a small Hab.” Davis was sworn in, and the court discussed the plea agreement and plea-of- guilty statement with him. Davis affirmed that he had initialed and signed both documents after reviewing them with his attorney; that he understood his rights; that he had not consumed any drugs or alcohol in the past eight hours; and that no one had promised him anything or threatened him in order to get him to enter a guilty plea. The court did not address the first provision of the guilty-plea statement, which provided, “I understand that my plea agreement is an agreement between me and the State of Arkansas; the Court is not bound by the agreement and the Judge did not sign it.” The State moved to nolle pros the kidnapping charge (Count 1), and the court granted the motion. Davis pleaded guilty in open court to both remaining charges. The court then asked what the proof would have been at trial, and the State responded as follows: Judge, The State would have offered testimony and other evidence that on or about October 19th, 2024, the Defendant committed the offense of Rape by forcible compulsion and Aggravated Assault when specifically on that day, he approached a fifteen-year old female walking in the area of Columbia Road 60 and Columbia 2 Road 41 here in Columbia County; [h]e grabbed that female by the throat impeding her airway and/or blood flow and that he did digitally penetrated that victim during that time. At the time of those offenses, the Defendant would have been convicted of at least two prior felony offenses. Davis agreed with the prosecutor’s statement of facts. The circuit court then found that the plea was voluntary and knowing, that there was a factual basis for it, and that Davis was guilty of rape and aggravated assault with at least two prior felonies. Next, the court inquired about Davis’s two prior felonies. Davis stated that he had been convicted of first-degree murder and second-degree escape in Union County and that he had been released on parole in 2023 to his mother’s house in Columbia County. In response to the court’s question about how he had picked the victim, Davis stated that he “[didn’t] have any idea” because he had been drinking all day and just saw her while he was driving down the road. The State submitted a victim-impact letter from the victim’s grandmother for the court to read, and the court reviewed the proposed plea agreement, confirming the particulars with the State. The court then pronounced sentence: Mr. Brock, I’ve reviewed the sentencing guidelines that the State puts out as far as the recommendations on cases. I’ve reviewed what’s been presented to me today as far as recommendations, all the sentencing guidelines. No matter what a person’s criminal history is on this offense, whether there’s no prior history, then there’s a certain number of years. Frankly, if they have eight points on it, it’s a certain number of years, but this Court feels that given the circumstances of the case, given the fact about your violent past, that that is not a proper sentence. As noted, plea agreements are recommendations to the Court and on Count Two [rape], you will be sentenced to the term of life in the Department of Correction. As to Count Three [aggravated assault], you will be sentenced to the term of six years in the Department of Correction. 3 You’ll be remanded to the custody of the Sheriff for transportation to the Department of Correction. Given your history with the criminal justice system, it does not appear that you work well in society and it does not appear that society is protected if you are free in it. Thank you, sir. I do sincerely thank you that you did not put the victim through a trial where she would have to relive this situation. That, I give you credit, but it[’s] sort of like your comments saying you have no idea why this happened and why you picked her and Mr. Davis, I think that that means that you don’t need to be interacting with society in an unsecured manner. The hearing concluded without objection. On December 11, 2025, before a sentencing order had been entered, Davis filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. Davis argued that the parties had engaged in plea negotiations for months and alleged that the possibility of a life sentence had been mentioned only once. Davis further asserted that the circuit court was aware of the details of his plea when it removed his case from the trial docket to finalize the plea negotiations, and “it appeared . . . that the agreement was acceptable to the court.” Citing Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1(a) and (b)(iv)–(v), Davis contended that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice because he was given no notice that the court was not going to accept the recommended sentence, nor was he given an opportunity to withdraw his plea on the basis of that information. The State filed a response opposing the plea withdrawal. The circuit court considered Davis’s motion to withdraw his plea at a hearing on March 5, 2026. The parties rested on their pleadings, and the court made findings under Rule 26.1. The court found that only subsection (b) applied because the court had accepted the plea. Under that subsection, the court found that Davis had entered the plea himself; 4 that he had effective assistance of counsel; that the plea was not involuntary and “was not entered without knowledge of the nature of the charge . . . [or] knowledge about the sentence that could be imposed”; and that the concessions that the State contemplated— “primarily ha[ving] to do with the request to nolle prosequi” the kidnapping charge—had occurred. Finally, the court found that it had not at any time indicated concurrence with the recommended sentence and that subsection (b)(v) therefore did not apply. The circuit court found that a manifest injustice had not been proved such that withdrawal of the guilty plea was necessary. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court entered the sentencing order. This timely appeal followed. We review the denial of a motion under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 for an abuse of discretion. See Green v. State, 362 Ark. 459, 462, 209 S.W.3d 339, 341 (2005). The abuse-of-discretion standard is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s decision but requires that the circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Holland v. State, 2015 Ark. 341, at 7, 471 S.W.3d 179, 184. For his sole point on appeal, Davis argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We begin with the applicable rules governing plea agreements and plea withdrawals. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 25.3, Responsibilities of the trial judge, provides in part as follows: (b) If a plea agreement has been reached which contemplates entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in the expectation that the charge or charges will be reduced, that other charges will be dismissed, or that sentence concessions will be granted, upon request of the parties the trial judge may permit the disclosure to him of the agreement and the reasons therefor in advance of the time for tender of the plea. He may then indicate whether he will concur in the proposed disposition. If, after 5 the judge has indicated his concurrence with a plea agreement and the defendant has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, but before sentencing, the judge decides that the disposition should not include the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the agreement, he shall so advise the parties and then in open court call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea. (c) If the parties have not sought the concurrence of the trial judge in a plea agreement or if the judge has declined to indicate whether he will concur in the agreement, he shall advise the defendant in open court at the time the agreement is stated that: (i) the agreement is not binding on the court; and (ii) if the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere the disposition may be different from that contemplated by the agreement. (Emphasis added.) This court has stated that compliance with Rule 25.3(b) is mandatory. Bradford v. State, 351 Ark. 394, 94 S.W.3d 904 (2003). After a plea has been entered, Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 governs plea withdrawals as follows: (a) A defendant may withdraw his or her plea of guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right before it has been accepted by the court. A defendant may not withdraw his or her plea of guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right after it has been accepted by the court; however, before entry of judgment, the court in its discretion may allow the defendant to withdraw his or her plea to correct a manifest injustice if it is fair and just to do so, giving due consideration to the reasons advanced by the defendant in support of his or her motion and any prejudice the granting of the motion would cause the prosecution by reason of actions taken in reliance upon the defendant’s plea. A plea of guilty or nolo contendere may not be withdrawn under this rule after entry of judgment. (b) Withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall be deemed to be necessary to correct a manifest injustice if the defendant proves to the satisfaction of the court that: (i) he or she was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (ii) the plea was not entered or ratified by the defendant or a person authorized to do so in his or her behalf; 6 (iii) the plea was involuntary, or was entered without knowledge of the nature of the charge or that the sentence imposed could be imposed; (iv) he or she did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by a plea agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not to oppose the concessions as promised in the plea agreement; or (v) he or she did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by a plea agreement in which the trial court had indicated its concurrence and the defendant did not affirm the plea after receiving advice that the court had withdrawn its indicated concurrence and after an opportunity to either affirm or withdraw the plea. Accordingly, Rule 26.1 does not contemplate withdrawal of a guilty plea when defense counsel has failed to seek the circuit court’s concurrence with a plea agreement. On appeal, Davis first contends that the court both accepted and concurred with the plea agreement and that he should therefore have been given an opportunity to affirm or withdraw his plea under Rule 26.1(b)(v). Davis submits that the court’s concurrence was implicit when it moved forward with the plea hearing after the prosecutor’s brief statement of the terms, granted the motion to nolle pros, and accepted his pleas of guilty. Davis relies on Drake v. State, 103 Ark. App. 87, 286 S.W.3d 728 (2008), for the proposition that express words are not required for a court to accept a guilty plea; acceptance may be implicit in the colloquy between the court and the defendant. He reasons that, if a guilty plea can be accepted without express words, so may concurrence with a plea agreement be accepted without express words. However, we are not persuaded that Drake is controlling, considering its distinct facts and procedural posture. Davis also cites Lewis v. State, 101 Ark. App. 176, 272 S.W.3d 113 (2008), in which the court of appeals reversed because the circuit court had deviated from the terms of the plea agreement. Lewis is distinguishable, however, 7 because the circuit court in Lewis had been informed of the terms of the plea agreement prior to sentencing and agreed to sentence Lewis according to the plea agreement. Here, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the circuit court expressly or implicitly concurred with the terms of the plea agreement.2 Having carefully reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that the circuit court’s silence regarding the terms of the plea agreement constituted concurrence. Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion under Rule 26.1(b)(v), which applies only when “the trial court ha[s] indicated its concurrence.” Alternatively, Davis contends that even if the circuit court did not concur with the plea agreement, the court had an obligation under Rule 25.3(c) to advise him in open court that the agreement was not binding on the court and, if he pleaded guilty, the disposition might be different from that contemplated by the agreement. Davis contends that, due to the court’s failure to follow Rule 25.3(c), he did not enter the plea with knowledge that the sentence of life imprisonment could be imposed. He argues that he should have therefore been allowed to withdraw his plea under Rule 26.1(b)(iii), which provides that “[w]ithdrawal of a plea of guilty . . . shall be deemed to be necessary to correct a manifest injustice if the defendant proves to the satisfaction of the court that . . . the plea was 2 Davis states in his brief that, although it may not be the “best practice,” plea hearings typically occur––as in this case—without the defense formally asking the court whether it concurs in the plea agreement before the plea colloquy takes place. We certainly believe that best practices require defense counsel and circuit courts to ensure that defendants are fully apprised of their rights and the potential consequences of proceeding with pleading guilty when a circuit court has not indicated that it concurs in a plea agreement. This should be apparent on the record, and an appellate court should not be left to wonder whether a defendant understood the proceedings. 8 involuntary, or was entered without knowledge of the nature of the charge or that the sentence imposed could be imposed.” However, as the State argues in its response brief, Davis did not raise this argument to the circuit court at any point in the proceedings. We have routinely held that we do not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Lovett v. State, 2025 Ark. 100, at 3. Likewise, a party is bound by the nature and scope of the objections and arguments made at trial and may not enlarge or change those grounds on appeal. Id. Because Davis failed to raise his present arguments regarding Rule 25.3 and Rule 26.1(b)(iii) below, they are not preserved for our review; therefore, we do not address them. Finally, Davis argues that the circuit court’s actions “offend[] the concept of fairness.” He essentially makes a policy argument that defendants should get their bargained-for exchange for entering a plea agreement because otherwise, defendants might be dissuaded from entering negotiated pleas. This policy argument does not present a basis for reversal. Affirmed. Special Justice CORY COX joins. WOMACK, J., concurs. BRONNI, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. WEBB, J., not participating. SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, concurring. If I were to reach the merits, I would agree with the majority’s conclusion that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. But Davis—a serial offender who had recently been released early on parole from the sentence he was serving for first-degree murder and escape 9 convictions—cannot appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea under our rules. Appealing the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is the same as appealing the guilty plea itself. Because a person generally cannot appeal his guilty plea, I would dismiss the appeal, letting Davis’s convictions and sentences stand. Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure –Criminal 1(a) provides that “[e]xcept as provided by ARCrP 24.3(b) there shall be no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” Those exceptions provided in Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.3(b) are as follows: With the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, (i) to review of an adverse determination of a pretrial motion to suppress seized evidence or a custodial statement; (ii) to review an adverse determination of a pretrial motion to dismiss a charge because [it was] not brought to trial within the time provided in Rule 28.1(b) or (c); or (iii) to review an adverse determination of a pretrial motion challenging the constitutionality of the statute defining the offense with which the defendant is charged. None of these exceptions, however, applies in this case. In Hodge v. State, this court created a common-law exception to these jurisdictional rules: when “the appeal is from a decision which was neither a part of the guilty plea acceptance nor the sentencing procedure which was an integral part of the guilty plea acceptance, the appeal is allowed.”1 Relying on Hodge, this court held in Green v. State that when a defendant “is 1 320 Ark. 31, 33, 894 S.W.2d 927, 929 (1995). On another note, the holding in Hodge is so vague that it is unclear what it really means. Any issue that could be appealed from a guilty plea (and that is not covered in Rule 24.3(b)) seems to be part of either the guilty plea acceptance or “the sentencing procedure which was an integral part of the guilty plea acceptance.” Id. But this exception swallows the rules and creates a de facto right to appeal from any guilty plea (or issue involving a guilty plea) if the appellant frames the issues on appeal in just the right way. See Bradford v. State, 351 Ark. 394, 405–06, 94 S.W.3d 904, 911 (2003) (Glaze, J., dissenting). 10 alleging error by the circuit court in proceedings under his Rule 26.1 motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he is not appealing or attacking the plea itself.”2 But this exception cannot be squared with the text of Rule of Appellate Procedure – Criminal 1(a) or Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.3(b), so I would overrule Hodge, Green, and related cases and hold that there can be no direct appeal from a guilty plea (or the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea) unless our rules explicitly provide for such an appeal. The court could choose to amend either of these rules to allow someone like Davis to appeal the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Until then, however, such an appeal is not allowed.3 The rules should control the disposition of this appeal, not our caselaw expanding those rules beyond their textual limits.4 For these reasons, I respectfully concur and would dismiss the appeal. NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. The majority opinion illustrates once again that this court places a higher premium on haste than substance. In its rush to quickly dispose of this case, the majority yet again finds an oblique reason to declare arguments unpreserved and avoid doing the hard work of judging. And once again, I find myself dissenting from that approach and arguing that we shouldn’t invent new ways to avoid resolving cases on the merits. Instead, I’d address and reject all of Brock Davis’s claims on the merits. Anything less simply hands Davis a Rule 37.1 claim— 2 362 Ark. 459, 463, 209 S.W.3d 339, 341 (2005). 3 Ark. R. App. P. –Crim. 1(a); Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b). 4 See Standridge v. Fort Smith Pub. Schs., 2025 Ark. 42, at 5–6, 708 S.W.3d 773, 777–78 (recognizing the importance of limiting statutory- or rules-based analysis to the text of the statute or rule). 11 unnecessarily prolonging this litigation and robbing the child victim of the finality she deserves. 1. Today’s opinion concludes that Davis didn’t properly preserve his arguments that (1) the circuit court violated Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 25.3(c) by failing to advise him that the sentence recommended by the State wasn’t binding; and (2) as a consequence of that alleged failure, he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1(b)(iii). See Maj. Op. at 8–9. As has happened so often before, the majority says that Davis failed to use “certain magic phrases” below that would open the door to review. Lovett v. State, 2025 Ark. 100, at 5 (Bronni, J., concurring). But, as I’ve said so many times in rebuttal, our preservation rules “shouldn’t be a trap for litigants.” Id. at 5. Instead, we should review an issue whenever a party fairly raises it— regardless of the level of wording wizardry involved. Applying that approach, Davis did enough below to preserve his Rule 25.3(c) and Rule 26.1(b)(iii) arguments. So rather than punting those claims to collateral review and unnecessarily clogging the docket, I’d address them and then reject them on the merits now. Certainly, as the majority says, Davis’s lower court pleadings didn’t directly reference either “Rule 25.3(c)” or “Rule 26.1(b)(iii).” Yet it’s difficult to see how Davis’s argument below that the circuit court concurred with the terms of his plea agreement doesn’t directly implicate both rules. In his motion, Davis argued that the circuit court violated Rule 26.1(b)(iv) and (v) by concurring with the State’s recommended sentence before giving him a much longer sentence later. The majority finds that Davis’s Rule 26.1(b)(iv) and (v) claims 12 were preserved, and it rightly rejects them on the grounds that the circuit court didn’t indicate its concurrence with the sentencing recommendation. But Davis’s argument (and the majority’s holding) also implicates Rule 25.3(c) since under that rule, whenever a circuit court doesn’t indicate its concurrence with a recommended sentence, it is automatically required to advise a defendant that a recommended sentence is not binding. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 25.3(c)(i)–(ii). And that correspondingly implicates Rule 26.1(b)(iii)’s requirement that defendants understand the sentence that could be imposed. So, unlike the majority, I’d hold that these claims were preserved and then review them on the merits. 2. Having said that, I’d reject Davis’s claims on the merits, thereby avoiding needless collateral litigation. The record confirms that the circuit court (1) asked Davis about various statements in his plea agreement and confirmed that Davis understood that the State’s sentencing recommendation did not bind the court; (2) confirmed that Davis had reviewed each statement with his attorney; and (3) confirmed that Davis understood his rights and what he was giving up by pleading guilty. That is sufficient to conclude that the circuit court asked the right questions and complied with Rule 25.3(c), and on that basis, I’d likewise reject Davis’s Rule 26.1(b)(iii) claim that his plea wasn’t voluntary. For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. Law Offices of John Wesley Hall, by: Samantha J. Carpenter, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Jason Michael Johnson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 13