Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 171 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-25-552 Opinion Delivered: November 5, 2026 FERRAD MCCOY APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 60CR-22-4163] V. HONORABLE MELANIE MARTIN, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED. RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice Ferrad McCoy appeals his capital-murder and other convictions. The State’s proof at trial was that McCoy drove with an accomplice from Memphis to Little Rock, where the accomplice fired from the car and killed the victim in the parking lot of an apartment complex. McCoy now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and raises other points of error. We hold that there was substantial evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, and we find no reversible error in the circuit court’s remaining rulings. We affirm. I. Factual Background The following facts were developed at a jury trial. Sequoia Daniels visited The Ridge apartment in Little Rock on October 18, 2022. Around 11:30 p.m., she heard three gunshots and saw a white car speed away. She saw a man who had been shot lying on the ground. She called 911. The victim did not survive and was later identified as Broderick Blueford. Later that evening, Special Agent Nuckels with the Arkansas State Police encountered Mason Abraham and Ferrad McCoy, the appellant, in Lonoke County on Interstate 40. The agent first tried to stop a white Infiniti with Tennessee tags for crossing the center line of the interstate, driving eastbound toward Memphis. The car took an off- ramp and, due to heavy traffic, evaded the trooper. The car soon returned to the interstate, and the agent initiated a high-speed pursuit that reached 140 miles an hour. The car eventually crashed into a ditch, but by the time the agent arrived, both the driver and the passenger had fled on foot. The agent found a Taurus .40-caliber pistol in the driver-side floorboard; an AR- style pistol (American Tactical 556) in the passenger-side floorboard; and a cell phone. The cell phone had the Google Maps application open, which showed a route from Little Rock to Memphis. The agent noted that the bolt-carrier group on the AR-style pistol was missing. The bolt-carrier group contains the firing pin, the mechanism that initially hits the primer on the round (bullet) and causes the gun to fire. Another trooper found blood on the passenger-side door and a rifle-round casing on the passenger-side floorboard. Agent Nuckels initially saw a black hoodie with yellow stripes tangled in a barbed-wire fence near the crash site. It was later recovered. More law enforcement officers were called to the area, including a canine unit and a drone with a thermal imaging system. Eventually, Abraham and McCoy were apprehended in the middle of a field. McCoy was barefoot and wearing a torn white T-shirt. Abraham was wearing a black hoodie. Though the temperature was in the 30s, they claimed they were walking in the field smoking marijuana. 2 Roy Williams, a homicide detective for the Little Rock Police Department, testified about the investigation into Blueford’s murder. He obtained several surveillance videos showing the movement of the white Infiniti on the day of the murder. The videos from the apartment complex where the murder took place showed a white vehicle enter the complex around 11:35 p.m., drive up to a person standing outside in the parking lot, stop briefly while the passenger shot the person, and exit at 11:36 p.m. Detective Williams contacted the Realtime Crime Center to request a review of any cameras in the vicinity of the homicide and to review footage for the identified vehicle in the relevant time frame. Two other videos, taken from traffic cameras, showed the white car both before and after the murder driving to and from the apartment complex. Williams also traveled to Lonoke County and observed the crashed Infiniti and testified that it matched the car on the “BOLO.” Williams observed blood on the passenger-side door and, having noticed from the video that the victim fell onto the vehicle, collected a sample. After discovering a Mapco receipt, Williams also obtained a video from that Mapco in Memphis, which had footage of a white car along with the driver and a passenger at 7:47 p.m. until it exited the parking lot at 8:05 p.m. Williams identified at that time that the passenger of the vehicle was McCoy, who wore a black top with a yellow design going down the sleeve. Williams then identified Mason Abraham as the driver of the white car. He testified the positions were reversed on the apartment complex video. Williams also searched the victim’s cell phone and phone records. The records showed the victim had been in contact with both McCoy’s and Abraham’s cell phones. Williams also discovered two pictures on social media. One showed Abraham, McCoy, and 3 the victim together. Another showed just McCoy and Abraham together. There was evidence that the victim had provided the apartment complex’s address to the number on the phone recovered from the vehicle and that address was entered into Google Maps. The forensic evidence admitted at trial continued to implicate McCoy in the murder. Firearm analysis showed that shell casings recovered from the Infiniti and two shell casings recovered from the murder scene had been fired from the same gun. And blood analysis showed that the blood found on the passenger-side door was consistent with the victim’s DNA. Cell-phone-location data showed that Abraham’s phone was at the apartment complex when the murder took place. At the end of the trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts for capital murder; first- degree unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle; and firearm enhancements for both crimes. McCoy received life imprisonment for capital murder plus ten years for the firearm enhancement, and he received thirty years for unlawful discharge with ten years for the firearm enhancement. McCoy filed this appeal. II. Law and Analysis A. Sufficiency of the Evidence McCoy’s first set of arguments involves the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.1 McCoy argues the evidence failed to show his presence at the murder scene or that he was 1 McCoy asserts the criminal information was defective for failing to specifically charge him as an accomplice. But a criminal information need only sufficiently apprise the defendant of the specific crime charged as needed to enable preparation of a defense. Holsombach v. State, 368 Ark. 415, 431, 246 S.W.3d 871, 882 (2007). And as explained in the text of the opinion, there is no distinction between principals and accomplices for purposes of establishing criminal liability. Id. McCoy fails to argue how the information 4 an accomplice. In the alternative, he claims the State failed to show evidence beyond his “mere presence” at the scene, and if anything, he was only an accomplice after the fact. We reject these arguments because there was substantial evidence to sustain the convictions. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and will affirm if substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, supported the verdict. Doucoure v. State, 2024 Ark. 162, at 4, 698 S.W.3d 643, 645. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Hartman v. State, 2015 Ark. 30, at 5, 454 S.W.3d 721, 724. To be substantial, circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the accused’s guilt. Kellensworth v. State, 2021 Ark. 5, at 4, 614 S.W.3d 804, 807. Whether circumstantial evidence excludes every hypothesis consistent with innocence is for the jury to decide. Id. The criminal code outlines when a person acts as an accomplice: (a) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, the person: (1) Solicits, advises, encourages, or coerces the other person to commit the offense; (2) Aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing the offense; or (3) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make a proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense. rendered him unable to prepare his defense at trial, so we summarily reject his conclusory argument that the information was defective. 5 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-403 (Repl. 2024). Under this statute, a defendant may properly be found guilty not only of his own conduct but also of his accomplice’s conduct—the law does not distinguish between an accomplice’s and a principal’s criminal liability. Winters v. State, 2013 Ark. 193, at 13, 427 S.W.3d 597, 605. A summary of the evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, showed the following.2 McCoy and Abraham were together in a white car roughly three and a half hours before the homicide. McCoy was wearing a black hoodie with yellow stripes—a similar hoodie was discovered near the post-murder car wreck in Lonoke County, where McCoy and Abraham were apprehended. Cell-phone-location data reflected that McCoy and Abraham were in Little Rock at the time of the murder. Video evidence showed McCoy driving the white car that entered and exited the apartment complex and that the passenger, Abraham, shot the victim there. Later that night, law enforcement tried to pull over the car, and a high-speed chase ensued, culminating in a crash. McCoy and Abraham were arrested in a field following the crash. The victim’s DNA was found on the vehicle, and shell casings in the vehicle matched the shell casings at the scene. “Relevant factors in determining the connection of an accomplice to a crime are the presence of the accused in proximity of a crime, the opportunity to commit the crime, and an association with a person involved in a manner suggestive of joint participation.” Bradley v. State, 2013 Ark. 58, at 5, 426 S.W.3d 363, 367. All these factors were present here. McCoy was the driver of the car from which Abraham shot the victim. The two had set 2 A more detailed recitation of the evidence is provided in the Facts section. 6 out together from Memphis. And after the crash, they fled together on foot. Contrary to McCoy’s argument, we find that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict was that he was more than an accomplice after the fact. There was substantial evidence to support the verdict. We therefore affirm the convictions. B. Evidentiary Objections In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, McCoy argues that the circuit court erred in admitting certain evidence. We address these arguments together because they all fall under the circuit court’s wide discretion to admit or exclude evidence. The circuit court has broad leeway to control admission of evidence, and we will not overturn its decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Kellensworth, 2021 Ark. 5, at 10, 614 S.W.3d at 810. This standard of review requires that the circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Id. 1. Photographs of alleged gang signs The first argument concerns the court’s admission of a photograph that shows McCoy and Abraham supposedly flashing gang signs with their hands. McCoy claims this photograph, while marginally relevant to show that he knew Abraham, unduly prejudiced him for being a purported gang member. We disagree. The circuit court deftly handled this issue at trial. The court noted that it could not confirm whether the hand gestures were gang signs and allowed admission after the State promised not to reference the gestures. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the photo for the limited purpose of showing that McCoy and Abraham knew one another. 7 2. Handgun found in the Infiniti The second evidentiary issue involves the court’s admission of the handgun discovered in the car. McCoy claims admission of this gun was irrelevant and prejudiced him because it led the jury to believe that he is a “dangerous, armed thug.” We disagree. As discussed above, McCoy claims he was merely present during the murder and just happened to be found with Abraham fleeing from the scene. But the jury could infer from the presence of the gun, found on the driver-side floorboard, that McCoy’s role exceeded simply being in the wrong place at the wrong time. To the extent the gun possession was a prior bad act, Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b) permitted its admission to show “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” And although McCoy argues the gun was “prejudicial” in a colloquial sense, evidence admitted against a criminal defendant will often be “prejudicial.” McDaniels v. State, 2025 Ark. 139, at 12, 720 S.W.3d 82, 90. The issue is whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Ark. R. Evid. 403. This requires that the evidence influence the jury to render a decision “on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” McDaniels, 2025 Ark. 139, at 12, 720 S.W.3d at 90; see also Sasser v. State, 321 Ark. 438, 445, 902 S.W.2d 773, 778 (1995) (“The prejudice referred to in Rule 403, however, denotes the effect of the evidence upon the jury, not the defendant.”). We find nothing overtly emotional or improper about admitting evidence discovered in a car that was involved in a murder and had just crashed following a high- speed chase. And, importantly, balancing probative value against prejudice rests with the 8 court’s sound discretion; therefore, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion here. See id. at 446, 902 S.W.2d at 778. 3. Apartment video footage McCoy next argues the court abused its discretion when it admitted a video of the homicide because it had been improperly authenticated. Detective Williams went to the apartment complex, observed the video, and then downloaded it onto a thumb drive. McCoy argues that, because the detective could not testify about how the apartment’s surveillance system worked or whether the footage accurately depicted what happened, the video should not have been admitted. Authentication of a document is a condition precedent to admissibility. Ark. R. Evid. 901(a). This rule provides that authentication is “satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Evidence is authenticated when the circuit court is satisfied that it is genuine and in reasonable probability has not been tampered with. Keesee v. State, 2022 Ark. 68, at 8, 641 S.W.3d 628, 636. Evidence may be authenticated through the testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be by the evidence’s appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances. Ark. R. Evid. 901(b)(1) & (4). We find no abuse of discretion here. Detective Williams testified he was familiar with the apartment complex and described how he obtained the video. Williams contacted the property manager, who provided access to the complex’s video surveillance. Williams 9 reviewed the footage and then extracted it onto his thumb drive. He testified that, to his knowledge, the footage had not been altered. We find no abuse of discretion on these facts. 4. Admission of “pattern of life” map McCoy also claims the circuit court erred by admitting “pattern of life” evidence that showed cell-site-location data for McCoy and Abraham in the month leading up to the murder. The map showed that the only time either cell phone had been in Arkansas in the month prior was in the hours surrounding the murder. McCoy claims this was irrelevant evidence and an improper attempt to show when and how the murder took place. But we defer to the circuit court, who noted that the evidence reflected “locations of the phones. It’s not the people.” In other words, at trial, the map was admitted for a much more limited purpose than McCoy claims on appeal. 5. Admission of the “BOLO” flyer McCoy contends the court should not have admitted a “BOLO” flyer that circulated after the murder. The flyer showed a picture of the white Infiniti and noted that the occupants were armed and dangerous and should be approached with caution. McCoy claims the flyer was prejudicial and that the jury may have been unduly influenced by McCoy’s supposed dangerousness as stated on the flyer. We affirm the court’s admission of this flyer as it was admitted immediately after the jury had been shown a video of the same vehicle driving into an apartment complex and the passenger shooting someone. Again, as discussed above, unduly prejudicial evidence under Rule 403 is evidence that would cause the jury to make an emotional decision instead of one based on the plain facts of the case. This flyer merely described what the jury had 10 just seen in much more graphic detail on a video recording. Cumulative evidence like this is not unfairly prejudicial. Smith v. State, 2024 Ark. 161, at 9, 699 S.W.3d 92, 99. 6. Evidence of flight Next, McCoy argues the court should have excluded evidence of the high-speed chase because there was no proof that the flight was from the crime of murder rather than flight from some other crime, like a traffic offense or a stolen car. But our cases have not required this level of precision. Evidence of flight is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, even if the flight was not immediately after the alleged commission of the crime. Dorsey v. State, 2020 Ark. 316, at 8, 607 S.W.3d 485, 490. What conclusion to draw from flight—whether flight from the murder or flight from some other crime—is an issue for the jury to resolve. E.g., Killcrease v. State, 310 Ark. 392, 396, 836 S.W.2d 380, 382 (1992) (“It was up to the jury to determine whether [the defendant] fled Arkansas to avoid arrest.”). In allowing this evidence, the court noted that the fleeing took place within one hour of the homicide. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the high-speed chase and McCoy’s subsequent apprehension. 7. Identification evidence For the first time on appeal, McCoy argues that the court should have prohibited Detective Williams from identifying McCoy as the driver of the car involved in the shooting. We decline to address this argument. McCoy failed to raise a contemporaneous objection to this testimony at trial, so the argument is not preserved for appellate review. See, e.g., Romick v. State, 2025 Ark. 57, at 5, 709 S.W.3d 816, 820. C. Failure to Instruct the Jury on AMI Crim. 2d 405 11 McCoy asked the court to instruct the jury using AMI Crim. 2d 405, which concerns liability of a criminal defendant when there are two or more criminal defendants charged. Citing the notes to this model instruction, the court refused to give the instruction because McCoy had been charged alone. A party is generally entitled to an instruction on a defense if there is sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact or if there is any supporting evidence for the instruction. Cage v. State, 2017 Ark. 277, at 7, 528 S.W.3d 825, 829. The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Id. at 8, 528 S.W.3d at 829. The model instruction McCoy asked for reads, in relevant part: “When two or more persons are criminally responsible for an offense, each person is liable only for the degree of the offense that is consistent with the person’s own [culpable mental state] [or] [accountability for an aggravating fact or circumstance].” AMI Crim. 2d 405. But “[t]his instruction is limited to instances where two or more defendants are being tried together or where the criminal liability of the other codefendants has previously been decided.” AMI Crim. 2d 405 note on use (emphasis added). We affirm the court’s decision to follow the guidance given for the instruction. The court followed the note on use in denying the instruction: “I’m reading that this is and should be limited to that, where both two or more codefendants are being tried before the same jury or if there’s been a previous finding for a codefendant.” We cannot find that the court acted thoughtlessly, improvidently, or without due consideration. D. Failure to Instruct the Jury on First-Degree Murder McCoy raises another jury-instruction issue on appeal. At trial, McCoy discussed having the court issue a lesser-included instruction for first-degree murder. But after 12 consideration, the circuit court concluded that the proposed instruction would confuse the jury. McCoy’s defense counsel agreed that the proposed instruction did not make sense:: COURT: If you have the capital down to murder one, the way it’s styled too, I think it does add additional elements. I think it would also be seen as being very confusing to a jury as well. COUNSEL: I do agree. Obviously, if it’s confusing to us, it would definitely be confusing to the jury. Counsel thereafter agreed with the circuit court’s assessment and decision. We therefore decline to address this argument on appeal. To preserve a jury-instruction challenge, one must object and proffer the proposed instruction. Harris v. State, 2023 Ark. 64, at 19, 663 S.W.3d 355, 367. It appears counsel ultimately agreed that the proposed lesser-included instruction for first-degree murder would confuse the jury and did not press the matter further or proffer it. E. Prosecutor’s Statement During Closing McCoy again raises an argument for the first time on appeal—that the prosecutor misstated the standard for accomplice liability in closing arguments. McCoy’s defense counsel never objected to this statement at trial. To preserve an argument regarding a prosecutor’s comments made during the State’s closing, defense counsel must contemporaneously object. De la Garza v. State, 2025 Ark. 10, at 11, 704 S.W.3d 627, 635. Otherwise, the defense waives its argument on such issues on appeal. Id. We therefore decline to address this argument. F. Confrontation Clause Finally, we address McCoy’s argument on the confrontation clause. This issue emerged during testimony from the crime-lab blood analyst. The analyst conducted testing 13 based on blood samples she received from the medical examiner and concluded that the blood found on the passenger-side door was consistent with the victim’s blood. But because the parties stipulated to the cause of death, the medical examiner did not testify at trial. Citing Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), McCoy argued that the medical examiner should have been made available for cross-examination. The circuit court rejected this argument, and we agree. McCoy misreads Smith. There, the court identified a potential confrontation-clause violation when the analyst who conducted scientific testing was replaced by a different analyst at trial. Id. at 800. This analyst merely repeated the absent analyst’s findings to the jury. Id. But as the court pointed out, the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements. Id. at 784. And McCoy fails to identify which testimonial statement is at issue. Certainly, the confrontation clause applies to forensic findings and lab-analyst reports. Id. at 785–86. But the person who conducted the test on the victim’s blood appeared at trial and testified. McCoy’s counsel conducted cross-examination. The confrontation clause was not implicated, and we therefore affirm. Affirmed. Special Justice CORY COX joins. BAKER, C.J., and HUDSON and WOMACK, JJ., concur. WEBB, J., not participating. COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Justice, concurring. I agree with the majority’s affirmance of appellant Ferrad McCoy’s convictions. I write separately, however, because I would hold that McCoy’s Confrontation Clause argument is not preserved for our review. 14 During the State’s direct examination of Lindsey Heflin, the forensic DNA supervisor at the Arkansas Crime Laboratory, Heflin testified that a swab taken from the passenger door of the Infiniti sedan contained a partial DNA profile consistent with a known DNA sample from the victim. On cross-examination, McCoy asked Heflin where she had obtained a sample of the victim’s DNA. She stated that she received it from the medical examiner, who did not testify at trial because the parties had stipulated to the cause of death. McCoy then objected, arguing that all of Heflin’s testimony about the DNA sample should be excluded because it violated his right to confront the absent medical examiner. The circuit court overruled the objection, noting that McCoy had failed to object when Heflin discussed the victim’s DNA profile on direct examination. The State asserts that McCoy’s Confrontation Clause argument is not preserved because he failed to contemporaneously object when the DNA sample was first mentioned. I agree. A party who does not object to the introduction of evidence at the first opportunity waives any argument based on the admission of that evidence on appeal. E.g., Duck v. State, 2018 Ark. 267, 555 S.W.3d 872. While McCoy did file a motion in limine raising potential confrontation issues involving the absent medical examiner, it was not ruled on at that time. Thus, it was necessary for McCoy to object when the evidence was admitted. Because he did not do so at the first opportunity, I would decline to address the merits of his argument. I therefore respectfully concur. WOMACK, J., joins. Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 15