Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 418 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CR-24-17 Opinion Delivered September 16, 2026 BRYANT GOODMAN APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SEVENTH DIVISION V. [NO. 60CR-19-4256] STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE KAREN D. WHATLEY, APPELLEE JUDGE AFFIRMED MIKE MURPHY, Judge Bryant Goodman appeals his conviction by a Pulaski County Circuit Court of the first-degree murder of his father, Derrick Goodman. On appeal, Goodman argues that he was justified in using the force that resulted in his father’s death, and the circuit court therefore erred in denying his motion for directed verdict. 1 We affirm. Bryant testified that he lived in a trailer on his father and stepmother’s property. On the morning that Bryant killed Derrick, Bryant had borrowed Derrick’s car to apply for a job. Bryant said he had texted his father that he was borrowing the car, but the text may not have gone through. According to Bryant, while he was out, Derrick called him and sounded 1 Motions to dismiss in bench trials are occasionally mislabeled as motions for directed verdict. Both are challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, and the same standard of evaluation is applied at both the circuit court and appellate levels. Ark. R. Civ. P. 50(a). angry. Bryant went home. When Bryant got home, Derrick began lecturing Bryant. Bryant laughed at something Derrick said, and Derrick allegedly reached toward his belt buckle. In the belt buckle was a .22 derringer pistol. Bryant said that he punched Derrick and restrained him. When Derrick asked Bryant to stop, Bryant released him, but then Derrick allegedly punched Bryant, knocking him out. When Bryant came to, Derrick had him in a chokehold. Bryant fought his way out but does not recall how he did so; in this process he killed his father. Bryant called 911, and the call was played to the court. Bryant can be heard telling the dispatcher that he and his father had argued, his father “went for his gun,” and Bryant “had to defend [himself].” When asked if Derrick was still breathing, Bryant said, “I’m not going over there by him.” When police arrived, Bryant had only superficial injuries. He was sitting on a bench using wet wipes to clean his hands. His father was lying face down on the ground in a pool of blood. His head appeared “caved in.” The belt with the gun in the buckle was next to where Bryant was sitting; Bryant said he had “secured the weapon.” Derrick’s keys were next to his left hand. His wallet, cell phone, eyeglasses, and a lens from his glasses were found at different locations nearby. Next to Derrick’s head was a large rock. Derrick’s wife testified that there was a rock border around her garden bed, and five rocks were missing from the border. Police collected three rocks with blood on them. Two were near Derrick, including the one inches from his head and another that was near the separated glasses lens. The three rocks with blood on them collected by police weighed approximately 12.2, 37.6, and 53.8 pounds. The 53.8 pound rock was the one closest to 2 Derrick’s head. The forensic pathologist who performed Derrick’s autopsy testified. She observed cuts and bruises all over Derrick’s head, a skull fracture on the back of his head, fractures of his left facial bones and around his left eye, and fractures along the right side and base of his skull. He had bleeding in his brain because fragments of his skull had penetrated his brain. She explained that the injuries could not have been caused by fists alone. When asked if the injuries could have been caused by one blow, she said no, explaining that the injuries appeared on multiple surfaces and planes, including the back, left side, and right side of Derrick’s head and the center and both sides of his face. The fractures would have required significant force, and any one of the fractures could have rendered Derrick unconscious. There was gravel on Derrick’s back and on his front. At the close of the evidence, Bryant moved to dismiss the first-degree-murder charge, arguing that the State had failed to negate his justification defense. The circuit court denied the motion. After considering the evidence, the court found Bryant guilty of first-degree murder, finding that the State disproved Bryant’s justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Bryant appealed. On appeal he argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the State failed to negate his justification defense. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-2-607(a)(2)–(3) (Repl. 2024) provides that a person is justified in using deadly physical force against another person if he reasonably believes that the other person is using or about to use unlawful deadly force or is imminently 3 endangering his life. Brown v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 609, at 8, 728 S.W.3d 783, 788. Once justification is asserted, the State bears the burden to negate the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(5)(C) (Repl. 2024); Brown, supra. Whether circumstances negate a defendant’s excuse or justification is an element of the offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(5)(C). A motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Freeman v. State, 331 Ark. 130, 131, 959 S.W.2d 400, 401 (1998). In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only evidence supporting the verdict. Severance v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 87, 684 S.W.3d 610. A conviction is affirmed if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Id. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is for the fact-finder to decide. Id. Likewise, credibility determinations are for the fact-finder, which is free to believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony and to resolve conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence. Id. Here, the circuit court served as the fact-finder, and these principles apply in the same manner. Substantial evidence supports the circuit court’s finding that the State negated justification. The only evidence that Derrick was armed and reached for the gun, knocked 4 Bryant unconscious, or placed Bryant in a chokehold came from Bryant’s testimony. While a belt with a small gun in the buckle belonging to Derrick was recovered at the scene, the altercation occurred in front of Derrick’s home, Derrick was not wearing the belt, and the gun remained fastened in the buckle. Bryant also could not explain how Derrick sustained multiple fractures to his head or recall the immediate circumstances surrounding his use of deadly force. The circuit court, as factfinder, was not required to accept Bryant’s account. See Severance, 2024 Ark. App. 87, at 10–11, 684 S.W.3d at 618; Smith v. State, 2025 Ark. 83, at 6–7, 711 S.W.3d 297, 302. The physical and medical evidence further supported the circuit court’s conclusion that Bryant’s use of deadly force was not justified. Five rocks were missing from the garden border, and police collected three rocks with blood on them, including one weighing over fifty-three pounds that was inches from Derrick’s head. The forensic pathologist testified that Derrick suffered cuts and bruises across his head, a skull fracture on the back of his head, fractures of his left facial bones and around his left eye, fractures along the right side and base of his skull, and bleeding in the brain caused by skull fragments penetrating the brain. She explained that the injuries could not have been caused by fists alone and could not have been caused by a single blow because they appeared on multiple surfaces and planes, including the back, left side, and right side of Derrick’s head and the center and both sides of his face. She further testified that the fractures required significant force and that any one of the fractures could have rendered Derrick unconscious. From this evidence, the circuit court could reasonably infer that Derrick sustained repeated, forceful blows to his head and 5 that this conduct was not consistent with the use of deadly force that was reasonably necessary in self-defense. Moreover, justification for deadly force ends when the threat of endangerment is no longer imminent. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-607(a)(3); Brown, 2025 Ark. App. 609, at 9, 728 S.W.3d at 789. In Brown, the appellant continued to shoot the victim after the victim had fallen to the ground. We explained that, even if the initial use of deadly force was reasonable, the additional shots fired after the victim had fallen could not be. Id. Here, given the evidence of multiple severe fractures across different planes of Derrick’s head and face, any one of which could have rendered him unconscious, it was reasonable for the circuit court to conclude that the force used exceeded what was necessary and continued beyond any imminent threat. Finally, to the extent Bryant’s justification claim depended on his own description of Derrick’s actions and the immediacy of the threat, the circuit court was entitled to reject that testimony. In Smith, 2025 Ark. 83, 711 S.W.3d 297, Smith shot a driver and a passenger in a moving vehicle. Smith raised the defense of justification, claiming that the victims intended to drive into a crowd. The jury was instructed on Smith’s justification defense, which allowed them to decide whether to credit it. They did not, and our supreme court reiterated that the fact-finder is permitted to decide whether to credit a defendant’s justification account, and it is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony. 2025 Ark. 83, at 6–7, 711 S.W.3d at 302; see also Airsman v. State, 2014 Ark. 500, at 11, 451 S.W.3d 565, 572 (“Clearly, the jury disbelieved Airsman’s defense of justification, which it was free to do.”). The circuit 6 court was not obligated to accept Bryant’s self-serving testimony. Substantial evidence supports the circuit court’s finding that the State negated Bryant’s justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm. Affirmed. KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and HARRISON, J., agree. Brian G. Brooks, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christopher R. Warthen, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 7