Michael Roland v. State of Arkansas
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 561
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CR-26-37
Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026
MICHAEL ROLAND
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 18CR-23-780]
V.
HONORABLE DAN RITCHEY, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
AFFIRMED
APPELLEE
WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge
Appellant Michael Roland appeals the sentencing order entered by the Crittenden
County Circuit Court convicting him of driving while intoxicated, refusal to submit to a
chemical test, and inattentive driving. He argues that his convictions must be reversed and
dismissed because his right to a speedy trial was violated. We affirm.
Roland was arrested on August 19, 2023. Two months later, on October 26, 2023,
he pled no contest in Crittenden County District Court to four charges: driving while
intoxicated, violation of the motor-vehicle-ignition-interlock-device requirements, refusal to
submit to a chemical test, and violation of Marion Ordinance 602 (inattentive driving). He
was assessed a total of $4,145 in fines and court costs for these convictions. On November
20, 2023, he timely appealed his convictions to the Crittenden County Circuit Court by
filing with the circuit clerk a certified record of the proceedings in the district court. See Ark.
R. Crim. P. 36.1(b)–(c).
A plea and arraignment hearing was held on December 28, 2023, and the circuit
court set the case for trial on July 9, 2024. Roland appeared on July 9 and informed the court
that he wanted additional time to talk to an attorney. The court continued the case in light
of the defense motion for a continuance and scheduled a motion and plea hearing for
September 6, 2024, and a jury trial for the September 9–13, 2024 term of court. Roland
signed the order, which noted that the continuance was granted on his motion.
Roland appeared without an attorney on September 6, 2024, and the circuit court
continued the case to the October 21–25, 2024 term of court.1 Roland appeared on October
21, 2024, and asked that an attorney be appointed. He claimed that he could not afford to
hire an attorney because he had missed a month of work without pay when he had COVID.
The court expressed concern that Roland might not “qualify for a public defender with [his]
pay scale.”2 The following colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: Okay. Well, you were first here in December of [20]23.
Continued to July 9th. July 9th, you were [granted a]
continu[ance] to . . . September 6th to see about an attorney.
September 6th, you were told to come back today.
I don’t know. Seems like you had enough time to do whatever
you need to do, Mr. Roland, to hire an attorney. I don’t think
you qualify for the public defender’s office.
If you want to represent yourself we can give you a trial starting
tomorrow or the next day if you want to do that. Unless Mr.
1
There is no transcript of the September 6 hearing in the record, but a scheduling
order entered the same day notes that Roland “will hire [an attorney] before next court date.”
2
Roland told the court that he worked for FedEx earning $22 an hour.
2
Crain wants to agree to continue the case on your motion to the
next term so you can get back on your feet and hire an attorney.
MR. CRAIN:[3] Your Honor, I don’t mind the Court hearing it December 2nd
through the 6th term. But if he’s gonna hire an attorney he
needs to do it then. I don’t want this hanging around any longer
than that.
(Emphasis added.) Roland agreed that he would find an attorney. The court confirmed: “So
we’ll continue this on your motion to the next term of court.” (Emphasis added.) The court
granted Roland’s motion for continuance; scheduled pretrial hearings for November 7–8,
2024, and a jury trial for the December 2–6, 2024 term of court; and admonished Roland
to hire an attorney before November 7. In its written order of continuance entered the same
day, which Roland signed, the court ordered “that the period of time between the date of
the continuance and the trial date be an excluded period [of] time within the meaning of the
Speedy Trial Rules.”
On October 28, 2024, Roland filed a motion to dismiss the charges on speedy-trial
grounds pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 28.1 and 28.2. The motion was
heard and denied on November 7, and the court entered a written order memorializing its
ruling on December 2. The court found that Roland had filed his appeal from the district
court on November 20, 2023, and that the orders of the court provided that the following
time periods were excluded for speedy-trial purposes pursuant to Rule 28.3(c): July 9 through
3
Christoper Crain was the Marion city attorney.
3
September 6, 2024; and October 21 through December 2, 2024. Accordingly, the court
found that the one-year period for speedy trial had not run.
Roland appeared without counsel on December 2, 2024, and stated that he wanted
a jury trial and intended to represent himself “[f]or right now.” He noted that he had filed a
motion to dismiss on October 28, which was heard on November 7, and the court went over
its rulings denying Roland’s motion to dismiss. Two days later, on December 4, Roland filed
a second motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds.
Later on December 4, the City of Marion filed a motion for continuance due to the
unavailability of a material witness. The circuit court granted the motion and continued the
case until December 12 and ordered the “continuance charged to the City of Marion for
speedy trial purposes.” On December 12, the court again continued the case and scheduled
the trial for the February 3–7, 2025 term of court and charged the time to the City.
The circuit court heard Roland’s second motion to dismiss on January 16, 2025. The
court denied the motion and entered a written order memorializing its rulings on February
3. Referencing the same time periods cited in its previous order denying Roland’s first
motion to dismiss, the circuit court found “that the one-year period for speedy trial has not
run pursuant to ARCP 28.1, 28.2 and 28.3 because 101 days are excluded for speedy trial
purposes.”
A jury trial was held on February 6. The circuit court granted Roland a directed
verdict and dismissed the charge for violation of the motor-vehicle-ignition-interlock-device
requirements. The jury found Roland guilty of the remaining charges. He was sentenced to
4
one year in county jail and a $1,000 fine for driving while intoxicated, a $100 fine for refusal
to submit to a chemical test, and a $100 fine for inattentive driving. A sentencing order was
entered on February 6, and an amended sentencing order was filed on February 18. 4
Roland filed an untimely notice of appeal on September 2, 2025. On January 16,
2026, he tendered the record to the clerk of this court and filed a motion and amended
motion for a belated appeal.5 We granted his request for a belated appeal on February 11.
On appeal, he contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the
charges.
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.1(c) provides that a criminal defendant shall
be entitled to have the charges against him dismissed with an absolute bar to prosecution if
the case is not brought to trial within twelve months from the time provided in Rule 28.2,
excluding periods as authorized under Rule 28.3. Under Rule 28.2, the time within which a
defendant must be brought to trial upon appeal of a misdemeanor conviction to circuit court
begins to run on the day that the appeal is perfected. McClung v. State, 53 Ark. App. 196,
198, 920 S.W.2d 867, 868 (1996). The time for speedy trial is tolled when the defendant
files his motion to dismiss. Eagle v. State, 2012 Ark. 371, at 4.
4
The sentencing order was amended to reflect that a directed verdict was granted as
to the charge for violation of the motor-vehicle-ignition-interlock-device requirements.
5
Roland claimed that he was denied access to the courts to file a timely notice of
appeal while he was incarcerated in the Crittenden County Detention Facility from
February–September 2025, serving his sentence relating to the subject convictions.
5
Once it has been shown that a trial is to be held after the speedy-trial period has
expired, the State has the burden of showing that any delay was the result of the defendant’s
conduct or that it was otherwise legally justified. McClung, 53 Ark. App. at 198, 920 S.W.2d
at 868. On appeal, we conduct a de novo review to determine whether specific periods of
time are excludable under our speedy-trial rules. Perkins v. State, 2019 Ark. 247, at 2, 582
S.W.3d 1, 2.
Here, the time for speedy trial started when Roland perfected his appeal from district
court on November 20, 2023. The latest date on which the time for speedy trial stopped was
on December 4, 2024, when Roland filed his second motion to dismiss. Because 380 days
had passed between November 20, 2023, and December 4, 2024, Roland established a prima
facie case of a speedy-trial violation. Thus, the burden was on the City of Marion to show
that the delay was the result of Roland’s conduct or was otherwise justified.
The periods from July 9 through September 6, 2024, and October 21 through
December 2, 2024, were properly excluded from the speedy-trial time as a result of Roland’s
motions for continuance. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(c) (providing that the period of delay
resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the defendant or his counsel shall be
excluded). Those periods total 101 days, and when excluded, the speedy-trial-time calculation
is at 279 days—well within the 365-day limit.6
6
We note that although the time for speedy trial was tolled once Roland filed his
second motion to dismiss, even counting the 64 days that passed between the filing of the
second motion on December 4, 2024, and the trial on February 6, 2025, the speedy-trial-
6
Roland contends on appeal that the continuances were initiated by the City, not him
and that those periods were therefore improperly excluded from the speedy-trial time.
However, Roland waived any argument challenging the exclusion of these periods on appeal
because he did not object to the continuances being charged to him when they were entered.
See DeAsis v. State, 360 Ark. 286, 292–93, 200 S.W.3d 911, 914–15 (2005) (preservation of
speedy-trial objection for appeal requires contemporaneous objection at hearing where the
time is excluded); Clements v. State, 312 Ark. 528, 535–36, 851 S.W.2d 422, 426 (1993) (if a
defendant discovers a docket error that affects his speedy-trial rights or takes exception to
the wording of an order charging a continuance to him, he must immediately bring the issue
to the circuit court’s attention). In any event, even if Roland had preserved the argument, it
would still be meritless. The record is clear that Roland requested additional time to obtain
counsel at the time of each continuance. Accordingly, the delay was the result of his conduct,
and the circuit court correctly charged him with the relevant time periods.
Affirmed.
VIRDEN and BARRETT, JJ., agree.
Michael Roland, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
time calculation was only at 343 days when the case was tried—within the one-year period for
speedy trial.
7