Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 540 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CR-26-145 Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026 DEREK SIMMONS APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE BRADLEY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 06CR-23-39] STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE QUINCEY ROSS, APPELLEE JUDGE AFFIRMED N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Chief Judge Following a jury trial in the Bradley County Circuit Court, Derek Simmons was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine, simultaneous possession of drugs and a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. We affirm. Two law enforcement officers, Stephanie Harris and James Slaughter, testified at trial about a search of appellant’s residence. Appellant was not home at the time of the search, but a woman, Mackenzie Nichols, was present. The officers first searched the master bedroom, which contained many items of men’s clothing and items that had appellant’s name on them. Harris testified that the master bedroom was obviously a male’s room. After moving some things around in the room’s closet, she discovered a loaded shotgun. The officers also found drug paraphernalia and marijuana in the bedroom. In the living room, the officers discovered a glass tray under the coffee table with a white crystal substance on it believed to be methamphetamine. In a gun cabinet in the living room, the officers discovered paraphernalia for smoking methamphetamine and marijuana and ammunition that matched the ammunition removed from the shotgun. Behind a gaming console, they found a prescription bottle that had been turned into a device used to smoke methamphetamine and a bag of suspected methamphetamine. When Slaughter interviewed appellant later that day, appellant stated that the shotgun may belong to a friend and that his daughter had been hunting with the shotgun. Appellant told Slaughter that he had lived in the house for at least a year. Testimony from a forensic chemist established that the suspected methamphetamine had tested positive for methamphetamine. Mackenzie Nichols testified in appellant’s defense that she had been staying at the home on and off for a few months and that she slept in the master bedroom with appellant. She testified that she and appellant used methamphetamine in the house. She denied knowing about the shotgun in the house. Appellant was ultimately convicted of all three offenses and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. On appeal, appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence of constructive possession to support any of the three convictions. We first note that we agree with the State that appellant’s argument is not preserved as to the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon. The parties and the court agreed before trial that in order to avoid prejudicing appellant by identifying him as a felon in the guilt phase, a bifurcated trial would take place 2 whereby the charge of felon in possession would not be introduced until after the jury returned verdicts on possession of methamphetamine and simultaneous possession of drugs and a firearm. After guilty verdicts were returned on those two charges, the jury was informed of the felon-in-possession charge and instructed that appellant had previously been convicted of at least two felonies. The State and defense then gave closing arguments as to this charge, but appellant never moved for a directed verdict on the felon-in-possession charge. Accordingly, appellant’s argument as to this offense is not preserved. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c) (stating that the failure of a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the times and in the manner required in the Rule will constitute a waiver of any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict or judgment). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court determines whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Martin v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 19, 567 S.W.3d 558. Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. Id. The State need not prove actual possession of contraband to prove possession; it may be proved by constructive possession, which is the control or the right to control the contraband. Mudd v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 628, 565 S.W.3d 154. Constructive possession can be inferred when the contraband is found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the defendant and subject to his control. Id. Constructive possession can also 3 be inferred when the contraband is in the joint control of the accused and another. Id. However, joint occupancy alone is not sufficient to establish possession or joint possession; there must be some additional factor linking the accused to the contraband. Id. In such cases, the State must prove that the accused exercised care, control, and management over the contraband and that the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband. Id. Control over the contraband can be inferred from the circumstances, such as the proximity of the contraband to the accused, the fact that it is in plain view, and the ownership of the property where the contraband is found. Id. Appellant argues that the home was jointly occupied by him and Nichols and that the State failed to offer additional evidence linking him to the contraband. He argues that Nichols stayed at the home and slept in the master bedroom; thus, she had access to all the areas where the contraband was recovered. Appellant acknowledges his connection to the premises but argues that there was insufficient evidence linking him to the contraband as in Ravellette v. State, 264 Ark. 344, 571 S.W.2d 433 (1978), and Embry v. State, 302 Ark. 608, 792 S.W.2d 318 (1990). We find these cases distinguishable. In Ravellette, the appellant and a codefendant jointly occupied a rent home. Contraband was found only in common areas and the codefendant’s bedroom, and the codefendant admitted the contraband was his. Notably, the court said that the codefendant “exonerated the appellant of any knowledge of the presence or control of the contraband.” Ravellette, 264 Ark. at 346, 571 S.W.2d at 434. In Embry, the drugs were found in a search of the home of appellant’s off-and-on girlfriend. 4 Although he frequently stayed there, Embry was not present during the search and had no ownership interest in the house or superior or equal right to control the house. Here, the parties stipulated at trial that appellant lived at the house at the time of the search, and appellant told Slaughter that he had lived there for at least a year. While Nichols had stayed at the house on and off for a few months, it was appellant who had a superior right to control the house. The master bedroom was identified as a male’s room containing male clothing and items with appellant’s name on them. The shotgun was found inside the closet along with male clothing, and appellant told Slaughter that his daughter had used the gun. The methamphetamine was found in the living room; nevertheless, we have held that the presence of drugs in common areas of a residence is a factor linking the accused to the contraband. Mudd, supra (citing Sweat v. State, 25 Ark. App. 60, 752 S.W.2d 49 (1988) (noting all occupants would be presumed to use common areas of the house)). Rather than providing evidence that would exonerate appellant of any knowledge of the methamphetamine’s presence, Nichols testified that she and appellant had used methamphetamine inside the house. Appellant cannot disclaim possession of the contraband simply because he was not present when the search was executed. Knauls v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 48, 593 S.W.3d 58. We hold that there was sufficient evidence linking appellant to both the drugs and firearm to support his convictions. Affirmed. ABRAMSON and HARRISON, JJ., agree. Mothershed Law, PLLC, by: La’Donnia M. Mothershed, for appellant. 5 Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 6