Robert Asbell v. State of Arkansas
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 566
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CR-25-723
ROBERT ASBELL Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 17CR-24-437]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE MARC MCCUNE,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED; REMANDED TO
CORRECT SENTENCING ORDER
MIKE MURPHY, Judge
A Crawford County jury convicted appellant Robert Asbell of committing a terroristic
act. It also found that he employed a firearm as a means of committing the offense. He was
sentenced to thirty-five years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Asbell contends that the circuit
court erred by denying his motion for directed verdict because the State failed to prove that
he acted with the purpose to cause injury to another person or damage to property. We
affirm but remand for the circuit court to correct a clerical error in the sentencing order.
The State charged Asbell with committing a terroristic act, attempted first-degree
battery, and a firearm enhancement under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-120
(Supp. 2023??). The charges arose after shots had been fired into the Van Buren home of his
former girlfriend, Valerina Tompkins, in the early-morning hours of August 17, 2024.
A jury trial was held in September 2025. Kathy Billy, Tompkins’s neighbor, testified
she heard five to six gunshots and saw Asbell standing outside in front of Tompkins’s front
door, holding a handgun. Billy called the police as she watched Asbell walk away toward his
nearby home.
Tompkins testified that she and Asbell had dated for about a year before the
relationship ended in July 2024. In the weeks that followed, Asbell sent her a series of text
messages, which were introduced at trial. In them, Asbell called her vulgar names. He told
her, “Call the popo on me, I’ll put you in a hole, bitch,” “Coming to see yeah bitch,” and
“Ready or not here I come.” He also wrote, “I cannot believe you tried to have me arrested.
I knew you were a nark.” On the night of the shooting, she stayed at her daughter’s home in
Fort Smith because she feared for her safety and felt that something was going to happen.
Billy called her between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. that morning to tell her that her home “had
been shot up.”
Tompkins testified that she saw bullet holes in the couch pillow where she usually
slept, in the television and its cabinet, and in a kitchen cabinet. Asbell knew Tompkins had
slept on that couch for the past several months and that she was routinely asleep between
10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. Tompkins estimated the damage to her property inside her home
to be about $2,000.
Officer Elaina Adams testified that she responded to the call early that morning and
talked with Billy and determined that the shooter was Asbell, who lived less than a block
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away. She explained the weather was stormy and that there was flooding and mud in the area
that night.
Detective Erik Jensen testified that law enforcement found eight bullet holes in the
window screen beside Tompkins’s front door. Inside, the bullets had struck the couch, the
television, the television stand, and the kitchen cabinets.
Lieutenant Wesley Marsh testified that Asbell refused to come out of his home for
several hours. In a recorded telephone call with Marsh, Asbell said he had been drinking.
He complained that “them girls” had cost him $600 in bond and denied that any shots had
been fired.
When officers executed a search warrant, they found Asbell alone inside. They
recovered eight spent .22-magnum casings. They also found an eight-shot .22-magnum
revolver hidden under a blanket, loaded with one spent casing and seven live rounds, and a
fifty-round box of ammunition missing seven rounds. The revolver’s holster was wet and
muddy. A firearm examiner from the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory testified that the
projectiles recovered from Tompkins’s home had been fired from the recovered revolver.
At the close of the State’s case, Asbell moved for a directed verdict on the terroristic-
act charge. He argued that although the State proved shots had been fired into the home, it
did not prove “a purpose to . . . cause injury or damage.” The circuit court denied the motion.
Asbell elected not to testify, and the defense rested without presenting evidence. He renewed
his motion, arguing that the State failed to prove he “acted purposely.” The court again
denied it.
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The jury found Asbell guilty of committing a terroristic act and that he employed a
firearm in doing so. It could not reach a verdict on attempted first-degree battery, and the
State nolle prossed that charge. The jury fixed Asbell’s sentence at twenty years’
imprisonment for the terroristic act and fifteen years’ imprisonment on the firearm
enhancement, to run consecutively. This appeal followed.
We treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Young v. State, 374 Ark. 350, 354, 288 S.W.3d 221, 224 (2008). The test for determining the
sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct
or circumstantial. Id. Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel
reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Id. On
appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only that
evidence that supports the verdict. Id.
Furthermore, circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction,
but it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other
reasonable conclusion. Smith v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 216, at 5. Whether the evidence
excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to decide. Id. The credibility of witnesses is
an issue for the jury and not the court. Id. Upon review, this court must determine whether
the jury resorted to speculation and conjecture in reaching its verdict. Id.
As charged and instructed here, a person commits a terroristic act if, while not in the
commission of a lawful act, the person “[s]hoots at an occupiable structure with the purpose
to cause injury to a person or damage to property.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-310(a)(2) (Repl.
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2024). A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result of his conduct when
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause the result. Ark. Code
Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 2024). Asbell does not dispute that he shot at an occupiable
structure.
A person’s state of mind at the time of a crime is seldom apparent and ordinarily
cannot be proved by direct evidence. Noble v. State, 2017 Ark. 142, at 3, 516 S.W.3d 727,
730. Jurors may therefore draw upon their common knowledge and experience to infer it
from the circumstances. Id. And because intent is difficult to prove, a person is presumed to
intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts. Id. In Noble, the defendant fired
four or five shots at a car and claimed he meant only to scare its occupants. Our supreme
court held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer a purpose to damage property.
Id. at 3–4, 516 S.W.3d at 729–30.
The evidence is stronger here. Billy saw Asbell standing at Tompkins’s door with a
handgun pointed toward the door and window. Eight bullets passed through the window
and lodged in Tompkins’s couch, television, television stand, and kitchen cabinets. Eight is
the full capacity of the revolver found hidden in Asbell’s home, and eight spent casings were
recovered there. The natural and probable consequence of firing every round in a revolver
through the window of a furnished home is damage to the property inside. The jury could
reasonably infer that this was Asbell’s conscious object.
The circumstances surrounding the shooting reinforce that inference. In the
preceding weeks, Asbell had sent Tompkins hostile and threatening messages. He was angry
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that she had “tried to have [him] arrested.” The shooting followed. Afterward, he hid the
reloaded revolver, refused for hours to come out to speak with police, and denied that any
shots had been fired. A jury could view this evidence of motive and of consciousness of guilt
as further proof that the shooting was deliberate rather than accidental or aimless.
Asbell does not identify any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.
Because substantial evidence supports a finding that Asbell shot at Tompkins’s home with
the purpose to damage property, we need not decide whether the evidence was also sufficient
to prove a purpose to cause injury to a person. The circuit court did not err in denying
Asbell’s motion for directed verdict.
The sentencing order identifies the offense of conviction as section “5-13-310(a)(1)-
Terroristic Act.” Subdivision (a)(1) concerns shooting at a conveyance that is being operated
or is occupied by another person. Asbell was charged with, instructed on, and convicted of
shooting at an occupiable structure, which is the offense described in subdivision (a)(2). The
reference to subdivision (a)(1) is a clerical error. We therefore remand for the circuit court
to enter a corrected sentencing order reflecting that Asbell was convicted under Arkansas
Code Annotated section 5-13-310(a)(2).
Affirmed; remanded to correct sentencing order.
GLADWIN and THYER, JJ., agree.
LaPorte-Jenner Law, PLLC, by: Kelli LaPorte-Jenner and Frank LaPorte-Jenner, for
appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Laura K. Shue, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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