Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 416 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-25-727 Opinion Delivered September 16, 2026 BRANDI BRUMLEY APPEAL FROM THE BRADLEY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT APPELLANT [NO. 06CR-25-1] V. HONORABLE CREWS PURYEAR, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS AFFIRMED APPELLEE KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge Appellant Brandi Brumley appeals after she was convicted by the Bradley County Circuit Court of theft of property valued at $5,000 or less but more than $1,000. She was sentenced to serve a twenty-four-month suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) and pay $2,246 in restitution in addition to court costs and fees. On appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to dismiss. We affirm. I. Relevant Facts Appellant was charged by felony information with theft of property valued at $5,000 or less but more than $1,000, a Class D felony, in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-36-103(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 2023). A bench trial was held on September 10, 2025, and only one witness testified. Dr. William Brent Hall, an optometrist, testified that he hired appellant at the end of June 2024 to work at his satellite office in Warren, Arkansas. He explained that his main office was located in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. Appellant was the only employee working at the Warren office full time, but on certain days, a doctor or other staff could be present on a part-time basis. Appellant’s duties included opening and closing the office, answering the phone, taking payments, and making deposits at the bank. Dr. Hall testified that appellant was required to fax a copy of the deposit slips to the Pine Bluff office before depositing any checks or cash in the bank. Appellant was the only person responsible for taking money and making deposits at the Warren office. Dr. Hall discovered at some point during appellant’s employment that several deposits had never been made when he compared the bank statement to the deposit slips that appellant had faxed to the Pine Bluff office. He stated that although appellant made multiple correct deposits, he found seven missing deposits totaling $2,246.1 Once Dr. Hall discovered the discrepancy, he texted appellant on a Friday to ask her about it. Appellant responded that she was out of town but would get the deposits back to him on Monday; however, on Monday, she messaged him that she had to get a loan to pay the money back. The following day, appellant told Dr. Hall that she drove by the bank and realized she had 1 Although Dr. Hall initially testified that a total of $2,280 in deposits was missing, he later admitted that there was a discrepancy with a $34 deposit from October 22, 2024, appearing later on October 28, 2024. Accordingly, the circuit court excluded that $34 deposit from the total amount missing. 2 placed the deposits in the mailbox instead of the night deposit box. Appellant’s last day was October 28, 2024. Two exhibits were admitted at trial. State’s exhibit 1 was a copy of a bank statement showing money that was successfully deposited and included a handwritten list of missing deposits that Dr. Hall stated were never deposited in the bank. State’s exhibit 1 was admitted without objection. State’s exhibit 2 included copies of the faxed deposit slips that appellant had faxed to the Pine Bluff office but were never actually deposited in the bank account. Appellant objected to the admission of State’s exhibit 2 on the basis of hearsay and lack of authentication because no one from the local bank was there to testify. The State argued that the bank was not the party to authenticate the exhibit because those deposit slips never went through the bank but were instead copies of slips that were faxed but never actually deposited by appellant. When asked, Dr. Hall clarified that the deposit slips in the exhibit were faxed copies that the Pine Bluff office received and that the copies showed the date and time the deposit slips were faxed to the Pine Bluff office. After hearing Dr. Hall’s testimony regarding State’s exhibit 2, the circuit court admitted the copies of the deposit slips into evidence over appellant’s objection. On cross-examination, Dr. Hall explained that he knew appellant had to have made some successful deposits because appellant was the only one in the Warren office on some of the dates the bank statement reflected that deposits were made. State’s exhibit 1 reflected that ten successful deposits were made between June 28 and November 6, 2024. Appellant failed to make seven deposits during the same time frame. Dr. Hall testified that one patient 3 had called after the discrepancy was discovered to inquire why his “check hasn’t gone through [his] bank.” At the conclusion of the evidence, appellant’s counsel made the following motion to dismiss: Your Honor, the only - - the only thing that I would make in the way of a directed verdict is, we don’t have records of the people, for example, who had checks that we could call and say, “Hey, did you have any problems with this?” They’re just not there. We don’t really have a full example of the bank records. We have part of one. There’s nobody - - I guess I would have had to have - - asked - - subpoenaed the people - - the other people that worked there. And then as far as the other checks that could have been brought in and this is what they look like when they make it through. There wasn’t anything like that we got. In other words, I think that we have an incomplete prepared display to just focus in on part of the time period. First of all, the time period here - - there, there’s several that made it in front and several that made it after. And, in other words, this could have been paired down to the time period that all were done that were good and bad. They weren’t. So it’s made to look worse than it was, because there’s a whole lot more at the top and a whole lot more at the bottom that weren’t disturbed at all. And I’m not saying that was done intentionally, it just appears that way. And then the other thing was, we could have had all the deposits like these deposits to compare and see if they were the ones that were the legitimate ones. But they didn’t give us all of them. They just gave us the ones that were “missing.” And that’s all I’ve got as far as that argument. The circuit court denied appellant’s motion. The circuit court found appellant guilty of theft of property valued at $5,000 or less but more than $1,000 and sentenced her to serve a 4 twenty-four-month SIS and to pay $2,246 in restitution in addition to court costs and fees. This appeal followed. II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss at a bench trial, like a motion for directed verdict at a jury trial, is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Jones v. State, 2023 Ark. 189, 678 S.W.3d 778; Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark. 309, 607 S.W.3d 491. We will affirm a judgment of conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Collins v. State, 2021 Ark. 35, 617 S.W.3d 701. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to decide. Id. Further, the credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury, not the court; the trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Armstrong, supra. This court has noted that a criminal defendant’s intent or state of mind is seldom apparent. Benton v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 223, 599 S.W.3d 353. One’s intent or purpose, being a state of mind, can seldom be positively known to others, so it ordinarily cannot be 5 shown by direct evidence but may be inferred from the facts and circumstances. Id. Because intent cannot be proved by direct evidence, the fact-finder is allowed to draw on common knowledge and experience to infer it from the circumstances. Id. Because of the difficulty in ascertaining a defendant’s intent or state of mind, a presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts. Id. A person commits theft of property if he or she knowingly (1) takes or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another person with the purpose of depriving the owner of the property or (2) obtains the property of another person by deception or by threat with the purpose of depriving the owner of the property. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a) (Repl. 2024). A person acts knowingly with respect to his or her conduct when he or she is aware the conduct is of that nature or that the attendant circumstances exist. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(2) (Repl. 2024). A person acts purposely with respect to his or her conduct or a result of his or her conduct when it is the person’s conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause the result. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1). Theft of property is a Class D felony if the value of the property is $5,000 or less but more than $1,000. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(b)(3)(A). Appellant specifically argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence because the deposit slips lacked authentication and were inadmissible hearsay and because there was no evidence that she intended to deprive Dr. Hall of the money. The appellant made neither of these arguments in her motion to dismiss below. The State responds by arguing that 6 appellant has changed her argument on appeal and that her argument is thus not preserved for this court’s review. We agree with the State. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1 provides the following in pertinent part: (b) In a nonjury trial, if a motion for dismissal is to be made, it shall be made at the close of all of the evidence. The motion for dismissal shall state the specific grounds therefor. If the defendant moved for dismissal at the conclusion of the prosecution’s evidence, then the motion must be renewed at the close of all of the evidence. (c) The failure of a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the times and in the manner required in subsections (a) and (b) above will constitute a waiver of any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict or judgment. A motion for directed verdict or for dismissal based on insufficiency of the evidence must specify the respect in which the evidence is deficient. A motion merely stating that the evidence is insufficient does not preserve for appeal issues relating to a specific deficiency such as insufficient proof on the elements of the offense. In her motion to dismiss, which was made at the close of all the evidence, appellant argued only that there was insufficient evidence because there were no records of the people who had problems with checks, there was not a full example of the bank records, there was no evidence of what a completed check or deposit looked like, and the time period was made to look worse than it was. These are clearly not the sufficiency arguments now being raised on appeal. To the extent appellant is arguing that we cannot consider State’s exhibit 2 because it was improperly admitted, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court considers all the evidence, whether admitted properly or erroneously. Echelbarger v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 38, 682 S.W.3d 383. Moreover, our case law is well settled that a party cannot change the grounds for an objection on appeal but is bound by the scope and nature 7 of the arguments presented at trial.2 Cockrell v. State, 2010 Ark. 258, 370 S.W.3d 197. Thus, because appellant is bound by her arguments made at trial, her sufficiency arguments made for the first time on appeal are not preserved. Accordingly, we must affirm on this point. III. Evidentiary Objection To the extent appellant is also raising a separate evidentiary claim, we find no merit. We review a circuit court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion and will reverse only upon a showing of prejudice. Keesee v. State, 2022 Ark. 68, 641 S.W.3d 628. Appellant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting State’s exhibit 2 because an employee of the First State Bank of Warren failed to authenticate the deposit slips, and the deposit slips contained hearsay because they were “not an admission by a party opponent or a regularly kept business record by anyone other than the First State Bank of Warren.” She argues that the “whole purpose for the deposit slips w[as] to show the amounts that were or were not deposited” and alleges that she was prejudiced because “she is required to pay restitution based on amounts erroneously admitted.” The State responds that appellant’s arguments lack merit because “[r]egardless of whether the deposit slips were properly admitted, [appellant] cannot show prejudice from 2 We acknowledge that appellant did object to the admission of State’s exhibit 2 at trial; however, her objection is irrelevant as it pertains to her sufficiency challenge raised on appeal because she did not raise the evidentiary arguments in her motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Badger v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 490, at 3, 588 S.W.3d 779, 782 (holding that an argument raised in an evidentiary objection but not in a directed-verdict motion was not preserved for review in a sufficiency challenge). 8 their admission because State’s Exhibit 1, which was admitted without objection, also showed the missing deposits, dates, and amounts.” We agree. Even when a circuit court errs in admitting evidence, we will affirm the conviction and deem the error harmless if there is overwhelming evidence of guilt and the error is slight. Rodriguez v. State, 372 Ark. 335, 276 S.W.3d 208 (2008). To determine if the error is slight, we look at whether the defendant was prejudiced by the erroneously admitted evidence. Id. Prejudice is not presumed, and this court will not reverse a conviction absent a showing of prejudice by the defendant. Id. When the erroneously admitted evidence is merely cumulative, there is no prejudice, and a conviction will not be reversed for harmless error in the admission of evidence. Id.; Eastin v. State, 370 Ark. 10, 22, 257 S.W.3d 58, 67 (2007); Caldwell v. State, 319 Ark. 243, 891 S.W.2d 42 (1995); Burns v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 329, 690 S.W.3d 133; Sanchez-Gonzales v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 570, 682 S.W.3d 340. Here, the State presented overwhelming evidence of guilt. Dr. Hall testified that appellant was the only person responsible for taking money and making deposits at the Warren office. She was required to fax a copy of the deposit slips to the Pine Bluff office before depositing any checks or cash in the bank. Dr. Hall testified that although appellant correctly made multiple deposits, he discovered appellant failed to make seven missing deposits totaling $2,246 when he compared the bank statement to the deposit slips that appellant had faxed to the Pine Bluff office. Once Dr. Hall discovered the discrepancy, he texted appellant on a Friday to ask her about it. Appellant responded that she was out of town but would get the deposits back to him on Monday; however, on Monday, she messaged 9 him that she had to get a loan to pay the money back. The following day, appellant told Dr. Hall that she drove by the bank and realized that she had placed the deposits in the mailbox instead of the night deposit box. State’s exhibit 1, a copy of a bank statement listing successful deposits and a handwritten list of missing deposits, including the dates and amounts, was admitted without objection. Therefore, even if State’s exhibit 2 was erroneously admitted, its content was properly admitted through another source, State’s exhibit 1, and Dr. Hall’s testimony. Thus, there can be no reversible error, and we must affirm. Affirmed. TUCKER and WOOD, JJ., agree. Dusti Standridge, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christopher R. Warthen, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 10