Richard Smith v. State of Arkansas
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 542
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-25-707
RICHARD SMITH Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE YELL COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT, NORTHERN
V. DISTRICT
[NO. 75NCV-23-49]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE HONORABLE JERRY DON RAMEY,
JUDGE
REVERSED AND DISMISSED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Richard Smith appeals the Yell County Circuit Court’s “Amended Order of
Forfeiture of Real Property” filed on September 11, 2025. Smith argues on appeal that the
circuit court erred in granting the forfeiture because (1) there was insufficient evidence
presented at trial, and (2) the forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment because the value
of the property is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Smith’s conviction. We agree with
Smith’s second point and reverse and dismiss.
I. Background
A search was conducted on Smith’s home around April 23, 2023. During the search
of the house, a safe was discovered, and within the safe officers found multiple bags, 3.1626
grams of cocaine, and “multiple pills.” As a result of the search, Smith was arrested for
various drug-related charges by the Yell County Sheriff’s Office. On August 8, 2024, Smith
pleaded guilty to one count of possession of between ten and two hundred grams of cocaine
with intent to deliver, a Class A felony; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia,
a Class A misdemeanor. Smith was sentenced to 120 months of supervised probation, one
day of jail with credit for one day, and a $2500 fine.
Concurrently with the criminal proceedings, the State filed a “Notice of Lis Pendens
and Notice of Forfeiture Lien” on April 20, 2023, as well as a “Warrant of Seizure of
Forfeiture” on April 27 on Smith’s house located at 403 Willow Creek Drive, Dardanelle,
Arkansas. On August 14, 2025, a hearing was held on the forfeiture petition. Officers
testified that before the search there was increased traffic to the home and that some
individuals leaving the home were found to have methamphetamine on them. The State
further introduced a crime-lab report showing that the only controlled substance found in
the home and tested by the state crime lab was cocaine. Officers did not know why the crime
lab did not test the remaining substances.
During the hearing, Smith testified that the drugs were for personal use and that he
“get[s] $37 for 3.5 grams.” Smith conceded he is a heavy drug user. In his closing arguments,
Smith’s counsel argued that the circuit court was required to look at the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines when determining the forfeiture issue. Ruling
from the bench, the circuit court did not mention the Eighth Amendment argument but
instead found that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the home was
used for the sale and delivery of controlled substances. In the written judgment, however,
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the circuit court stated it considered the argument regarding excessive fines and rejected the
argument. Accordingly, the circuit court ordered the house forfeited to the Fifteenth Judicial
District Prosecuting Attorney’s Office. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
Forfeiture is an in rem civil proceeding independent of any pending criminal charge,
to be decided by a preponderance of the evidence. King v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 554, at 3,
447 S.W.3d 126, 128. The circuit court’s decision to grant forfeiture will not be set aside
unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. A decision is clearly erroneous when, although there is
evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. Credibility determinations
are left to the circuit court, and we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Simmons v. State,
2024 Ark. App. 42, at 3–4, 683 S.W.3d 231, 233.
III. Nexus
The first issue before us is whether the property forfeited had sufficient nexus to the
underlying crime. Smith argues that there was insufficient evidence that the property was
used for the sale of controlled substances. Property may be subject to forfeiture if it
“substantially assisted in, facilitated in any manner, or was used or intended for use in the
commission of any act prohibited by this chapter.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-505(a)(8)
(Supp. 2021).
Even if Smith is correct that there is insufficient evidence that the property was used
for the sale of controlled substances, there was sufficient evidence before the circuit court
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that the house was used to possess a controlled substances, Schedule I/II, between ten and
two hundred grams, a Class B felony pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-419(b)(1)(C) (Repl.
2016). Under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-505(a)(8)(B), real property is subject to forfeiture under
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-419 if the offense is a Class B felony or higher. In this instance, even
mere possession is above a Class B felony, which would subject it to forfeiture. Accordingly,
we find a sufficient nexus between the property and the offense.
IV. Eighth Amendment
A. Preservation
The State argues that Smith failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment excessive-fines
argument in his opening brief. Specifically, the State alleges that Smith merely made a strict-
proportionality argument, and any other argument cannot be raised in his reply brief. Smith
concedes on appeal that counsel did not make a sufficiency argument below; but he correctly
notes that the failure to make a sufficiency argument in a civil bench trial does not bar the
issue being raised on appeal. Oates v. Oates, 340 Ark. 431, 435, 10 S.W.3d 861, 864 (2000).
Our supreme court has held that “the purpose of a reply brief has always been to
respond to the arguments raised by the appellee.” Ayala v. State, 365 Ark. 192, 198–99, 226
S.W.3d 766, 771 (2006) (citing 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 560 (2005); 4 C.J.S. Appeal
and Error § 619 (2005)). Smith clearly raises the overarching issue of the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on excessive fines in his opening brief, albeit not as articulately as he could have.
While he couches his argument in a strict-proportionality framework, he presents a sufficient
basis for the State to understand his argument and rebut it. This is evidenced by the State’s
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response in which it first rebuts the strict-proportionality argument and then advances an
additional argument that the forfeiture is prope––even under a nonstrict-proportionality
standard. Accordingly, Smith’s Eighth Amendment argument was presented sufficiently in
his opening brief for us to reach.
B. Proportionality
Property subject to forfeiture is subject to the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against excessive fines if the forfeiture is punitive. See, e.g., Pung v. Isabella Cnty., Michigan,
609 U.S. 30, 31 (2026); Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 154 (2019); Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993). The parties both concede that the forfeiture in the instant case is
at least partially punitive. Accordingly, we next turn to whether the forfeiture was excessive.
When determining whether a fine is excessive, the question is whether the fine is
proportional to the offense. In United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998), the
Supreme Court held:
The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines
Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must
bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to
punish. . . . We now hold that a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines
Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense.
The Supreme Court went on to hold that courts “must compare the amount of the forfeiture
to the gravity of the defendant’s offense. If the amount of the forfeiture is grossly
disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's offense, it is unconstitutional.” Id. at 336–
37. In order to make this determination, the Bajakajian Court provided four optional factors
for courts to consider: (1) the severity and extent of the underlying offense; (2) whether the
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underlying offense related to other illegal activities; (3) whether other penalties may be
imposed for the offense; and (4) the extent of the harm caused by the offense. Id. Because
the forfeiture statute is penal in nature and because forfeitures are not favored under the
law, the forfeiture statute is to be narrowly interpreted. 1993 Ford Pick-Up (VIN No.
1FTDF15Y4PNA28918) v. State, 88 Ark. App. 172, 174, 196 S.W.3d 493, 495 (2004).
In the instant case, there was evidence before the circuit court that 3.1626 grams of
cocaine were in a removable safe found within Smith’s house. There was further evidence
that people who were stopped after leaving the house had methamphetamine on them.
Finally, Smith conceded that the drugs were found in the home and that he pleaded guilty
to possessing between ten and two hundred grams of a Schedule I/II substance with intent
to deliver.
While simultaneously rejecting Smith’s strict-proportionality argument, the State asks
us to declare that a Class A felony is always a severe crime. We acknowledge that a Class A
felony is a severe offense; however, it is an offense that our legislature has determined
warrants a maximum fine of $25,000. Ark. Code. Ann. § 5-4-201(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). In
Eighth Amendment cases, we must remain mindful “that judgments about the appropriate
punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature.” Bajakajian, 524
U.S. at 336.
Therefore, the State’s argument regarding the extreme severity of Smith’s offense is
belied by the fact that the State was given the opportunity to punish Smith and determined
that the severity of his offense warranted probation and a $2500 fine. The evidence before
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the circuit court was that Smith purchased the property for $127,967.82 on July 12, 2019.
Even if the property’s value had not appreciated in the six years between Smith’s purchase
and the circuit court’s final order, a forfeiture of the property would result in over fifty-one
times the fine levied against Smith and over five times the maximum fine allowed by statute.
This is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense. Moreover, the offense in
question allowed up to forty years of incarceration in the Arkansas Division of Correction,
and the State determined that the severity of Smith’s crime warranted only supervised
probation for ten years.
Additionally, the evidence before the circuit court was that the only portion of the
property that held any controlled substances and/or paraphernalia was the removable safe.
There was no evidence of firearms anywhere in the house; nor was there evidence of
paraphernalia such as scales or other controlled substances outside of the removable safe. As
to the individuals found with methamphetamine on their person, there was also no evidence
before the court that Smith was found with methamphetamine—the only substance tested by
the state crime lab was cocaine. Accordingly, the extent of the underlying offense was not
significant, and there was no evidence of direct harm caused by Smith’s crime.
Finally, the State’s argument that Smith was not living in the house is without merit.
Smith testified he was not currently staying at his home because he was his mother’s caretaker
and needed to stay with her after she suffered a stroke. There was no evidence presented that
this was anything more than a temporary situation. Beyond the material worth, the State is
asking to take Smith’s home. The Arkansas State Constitution establishes that “[t]he right
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of property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction.” Ark. Const. art. 2, § 22.
We do not venture to say where the line exists between grossly disproportional and just. On
the facts before us, however, the forfeiture of Smith’s house is grossly disproportional to the
offense alleged. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss.
Reversed and dismissed.
KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and HARRISON, J., agree.
Toney B. Brasuell, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: A. Evangeline Bacon, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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