Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 535 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. CR-25-828 JAMIEN THOMPSON Opinion Delivered: November 4, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, V. WESTERN DISTRICT [NO. 16JCR-24-1050] STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE CHRIS THYER, JUDGE AFFIRMED STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge Appellant, Jamien Thompson (“Thompson”), was convicted by a Craighead County jury of trafficking fentanyl, possession of cocaine with purpose to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Thompson was sentenced to an aggregate term of twenty-five years in the Arkansas Division of Correction. On appeal, he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Rather, Thompson asserts that (1) the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence found in his residence; and (2) the search warrant improperly authorized a no-knock entry without sufficient particularized facts. Finding no basis for reversal, we affirm. On August 6, 2024, the Jonesboro Police Department Drug Task Force executed an affidavit for a search warrant requesting that a warrant be issued to search Thompson’s residence. The affidavit in support of the warrant application states as follows: On 8/6/2024, Agents with the 2nd Judicial Drug Task Force and Investigators with Jonesboro Police Department Street Crimes unit were conducting surveillance at 703 Gladiolus apartment G-8. Officers were watching the residence due to information received that Jamien Thompson was selling blue M30 Fentanyl pills. During this surveillance, Agents observed a white male enter apartment 8 and stay for a short time and exited the residence. On or about 8/6/2024 Agents with the drug task force contacted a confidential source who stated that he barters items for Fentanyl from “J” Jamien Thompson. Confidential source met Thompson inside of his residence where Thompson gave confidential source Fentanyl. Confidential source exited the residence and surrendered Fentanyl over to Inv Huff. Based on the above listed facts and circumstances, the affiant is requesting a search warrant be issued for the above-described residence. Officers are requesting a No Knock Warrant on the residence due to Jamien Thompson being identified as a violent offender and threat to law enforcement officers. Due to the deadly risk of exposure to Fentanyl in the likely hood, offender attempts to expose officers in attempt to elude arrest/ apprehension. The district court subsequently issued the search warrant upon finding reasonable cause. Although the affidavit requested a no-knock warrant, the warrant itself did not authorize a no-knock entry or otherwise address the knock-and-announce requirement. During the execution of the search warrant, the officers found a digital scale and a hairbrush with a concealed compartment. The concealed compartment contained 7.8 grams of fentanyl and 5.1 grams of cocaine. On September 19, 2024, Thompson was charged by criminal information with trafficking a controlled substance in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-64-440 (Repl. 2024), possession of cocaine with purpose to deliver in violation of Arkansas Code 2 Annotated section 5-64-420 (Repl. 2024), and possession of drug paraphernalia to manufacture in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-64-443 (Repl. 2024).1 On February 25, 2025, Thompson moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his residence, arguing that the affidavit for search warrant failed to establish probable cause. Specifically, he asserted that the affidavit relied on officers’ surveillance of a single white male briefly entering and leaving the residence and the statements from a confidential source whose reliability was not established. The circuit court held a hearing on Thompson’s motion to suppress on March 3, 2025. Drug Task Force Agent Chris Jefferson (“Agent Jefferson”) testified that he was involved in an investigation involving Thompson. He stated that officers conducted surveillance at Thompson’s residence. During the surveillance, officers came into contact with a confidential source who had been seen leaving Thompson’s apartment. During a traffic stop, the source told officers that he planned to return to Thompson’s residence to barter items for fentanyl. Officers sent the source back to Thompson’s residence, where the source obtained approximately 0.4 grams of powdered fentanyl in exchange for cigarettes. Agent Jefferson testified that the investigation identified Thompson as the resident of the apartment, which his father rented for him. Thompson was also the only person associated with the apartment who regularly frequented it during the surveillance. He further testified that the confidential source identified Thompson as the person who bartered with 1 The information was amended on February 25, 2025, to reflect count one, trafficking a controlled substance, as an unclassified felony. 3 him in exchange for fentanyl and that the officers maintained surveillance during the transaction. Agent Jefferson thereafter prepared the search-warrant affidavit stating the likelihood that officers would find fentanyl on the basis of the source who obtained it from Thompson at the apartment. Agent Jefferson acknowledged that he had no prior experience with the confidential source, and the transaction was not recorded. Jefferson spoke with the source for no more than approximately five minutes during which the source told him that he had previously bartered drugs with Thompson. He testified, however, that the source and his vehicle were searched before the source returned to Thompson’s residence and that the source possessed no illegal contraband. After leaving the residence, the source met with Investigator Huff and surrendered fentanyl, which field-tested positive. Agent Jefferson also testified that he omitted certain details from the affidavit to protect the confidential source’s identity. Agent Jefferson testified that, considering the circumstances, he believed the confidential source was reliable. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court denied Thompson’s motion to suppress. That same day, the circuit court entered an order denying Thompson’s motion to suppress, finding that the affidavit was based on law enforcement’s personal observations rather than uncorroborated hearsay and was sufficient to establish probable cause. Alternatively, the circuit court found that even if the warrant was defective or lacked probable cause, the officers relied on the warrant in good faith. 4 The case proceeded to a jury trial on March 4, 2025. Thompson renewed his suppression motion at the close of the State’s case and again at the close of all the evidence. The circuit court denied the motion both times. The jury subsequently convicted Thompson of trafficking a controlled substance, possession of cocaine with purpose to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia to manufacture. Thompson was sentenced to an aggregate term of twenty-five years’ imprisonment. For his first point on appeal, Thompson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrant at Apartment G-8. He raises several challenges to the sufficiency of the affidavit supporting the warrant. Specifically, he argues that (1) the affidavit failed to establish the reliability of the confidential source, (2) the alleged barter transaction did not independently establish probable cause, (3) the circuit court improperly inferred that the alleged transaction occurred at Apartment G-8, and (4) the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. In reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we conduct a de novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical fact for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, giving due weight to inferences drawn by the circuit court and proper deference to the circuit court’s findings. Harding v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 560, at 5, 700 S.W.3d 521, 524 (citing Johnson v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 567, 444 S.W.3d 880). Arkansas appellate courts defer to the superior position of the circuit court to evaluate the credibility of witnesses at a 5 suppression hearing. Id. We will reverse the denial of a motion to suppress only if the ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. Rule 13.1(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part: The application for a search warrant shall describe with particularity the persons or places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized, and shall be supported by one (1) or more affidavits or recorded testimony under oath before a judicial officer particularly setting forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that such persons or things are in the places, or the things are in possession of the person, to be searched. If an affidavit or testimony is based in whole or in part on hearsay, the affiant or witness shall set forth particular facts bearing on the informant's reliability and shall disclose, as far as practicable, the means by which the information was obtained. An affidavit or testimony is sufficient if it describes circumstances establishing reasonable cause to believe that things subject to seizure will be found in a particular place. Failure of the affidavit or testimony to establish the veracity and bases of knowledge of persons providing information to the affiant shall not require that the application be denied, if the affidavit or testimony viewed as a whole, provides a substantial basis for a finding of reasonable cause to believe that things subject to seizure will be found in a particular place. Thompson first argues that the affidavit failed to establish the reliability of the confidential source as required by Rule 13.1(b). When an affidavit for a search warrant is based, in whole or in part, on hearsay, the affiant must set forth particular facts bearing on the informant’s reliability. See Stanton v. State, 344 Ark. 589, 594, 42 S.W.3d 474, 477 (2001). There is no fixed formula in determining an informant’s reliability. Id. (citing James v. State, 280 Ark. 359, 658 S.W.2d 382 (1983)). Relevant considerations include whether the informant’s statements are incriminating on the basis of personal observations of recent criminal activity and whether 6 they are corroborated by other information. Id. (citing Owens v. State, 325 Ark. 110, 926 S.W.2d 650 (1996)). Here, the affidavit contained facts bearing on the source’s reliability. The confidential source stated that he bartered items for fentanyl from Thompson, thereby admitting his participation in an illegal drug transaction. The source’s information was based on his personal participation in recent criminal activity. The affidavit stated that the source met Thompson inside the residence, Thompson gave him fentanyl, and the source thereafter provided the fentanyl to Investigator Huff. Thus, unlike an affidavit merely resting on an uncorroborated tip from an unknown informant, the affidavit described a drug transaction in which the source personally participated and immediately handed over the drugs bartered for to law enforcement. Thompson relies on Haley v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 18, at 4, 509 S.W.3d 692, 694– 95, and emphasizes that the affidavit did not state that the source has previously provided reliable information or detail certain safeguards surrounding the transaction. But an informant’s prior history is only one consideration in assessing reliability, not a requirement. Id. Nor does Haley establish that each procedural safeguard identified by Thompson must appear in every affidavit. Instead, reliability is determined from the particular facts set forth in the affidavit and the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, the affidavit contained sufficient facts bearing on the confidential source’s reliability. Thompson next argues that the barter transaction did not independently establish probable cause to search Thompson’s residence. Before a search warrant may be issued, an 7 affidavit or recorded testimony is required “particularly setting forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that . . . things are in the places . . . to be searched.” Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.1(b). The affidavit must provide facts by direct or circumstantial evidence that there is reasonable cause to believe the specific things sought are located on the property to which entry is sought. Ingle v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 410, at 9, 379 S.W.3d 32, 38–39 (quoting Yancey v. State, 345 Ark. 103, 116, 44 S.W.3d 315, 323 (2001)). Rule 13.1(b) further provides that the failure to establish the veracity and bases of knowledge of persons providing information does not require denial of the warrant if the affidavit, viewed as a whole, provides a substantial basis for a finding of reasonable cause to believe that things subject to seizure will be found in a particular place. In Ingle, this court held that any failure to establish the confidential source’s reliability or basis of knowledge was not fatal because the affidavit established probable cause by recounting the affiant’s monitoring of the confidential source’s controlled buy of methamphetamine at the premises. 2010 Ark. App. 410, at 9, 379 S.W.3d at 39. Similarly, the affidavit here stated that officers were conducting surveillance at Apartment G-8 when they contacted a confidential source who stated that he had bartered items with Thompson in exchange for fentanyl. The affidavit further stated that the source met Thompson inside his residence, Thompson gave the source fentanyl, and the source exited the residence and provided the fentanyl to Investigator Huff. Thus, the affidavit did not rely solely on the source’s assertion that Thompson possessed or sold fentanyl; it 8 described a transaction with Thompson that resulted in the source’s surrendering fentanyl to law enforcement. Thompson attempts to distinguish Ingle and similar controlled-buy cases because the affidavit did not recite procedural safeguards employed in those cases. Id. But Rule 13.1(b) does not require any particular investigative process; rather the affidavit must provide a substantial basis for finding reasonable cause. Here, the affidavit described the source’s personal participation in a recent drug transaction and his subsequent surrender of fentanyl to law enforcement. Viewed as a whole, the affidavit provided a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Thompson next argues that the affidavit failed to establish that the alleged transaction occurred at Apartment G-8. He contends that although the affidavit stated that the confidential source met Thompson “inside of his residence,” it did not expressly identify that residence as Apartment G-8. According to Thompson, the location of the transaction cannot be inferred from the affidavit. In deciding whether to issue the warrant, the magistrate should make a practical, commonsense determination based on the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit. Owens, 325 Ark. at 120, 926 S.W.2d at 655 (citing Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350 (1983)). Furthermore, information not expressly stated in an affidavit may, in appropriate circumstances, be inferred from the information contained in the affidavit itself. See, e.g., Abshure v. State, 79 Ark. App. 317, 324, 87 S.W.3d 822, 827 (2002) (holding 9 that a required time reference could be sufficiently inferred from information contained in the affidavit). Here, the affidavit stated that the officers were conducting surveillance at Apartment G-8 because they had information that Thompson was selling fentanyl. The affidavit subsequently stated that the confidential source met Thompson “inside his residence,” where Thompson gave the source fentanyl. Considering these statements together, the issuing judge could make a practical, commonsense determination that the residence referred to in the affidavit was Apartment G-8. Nor was the affidavit required to establish that officers personally observed Thompson enter or leave the apartment. “The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that specific things to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.” Ingle, 2010 Ark. App. 410, at 9, 379 S.W.3d at 38 (quoting Yancey, 345 Ark. at 116, 44 S.W.3d at 323). Accordingly, we reject Thompson’s argument that the affidavit failed to establish that the transaction occurred at Apartment G-8. Because we conclude that the affidavit established probable cause, we need not address Thompson’s argument concerning the good-faith exception. We therefore affirm the circuit court’s denial of Thompson’s motion to suppress. For his second point on appeal, Thompson contends that the search warrant improperly authorized a no-knock warrant. Specifically, he contends that the no-knock authorization was unsupported by particularized facts. 10 Thompson did not preserve this argument for appellate review. Although Thompson challenged the validity of the search warrant below, he did not specifically challenge the officers’ manner of executing the warrant or argue that the failure to knock and announce warranted suppression. This court has repeatedly held that it will not address arguments, even constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal. See Foster v. State, 66 Ark. App. 183, at 185, 991 S.W.2d 135, 136 (1999). Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed. ABRAMSON and MURPHY, JJ., agree. Matthew Lunde, Craighead County Public Defender’s Office, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 11