Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 545 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CR-26-99 Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026 DANIEL BELL APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT SMITH DISTRICT [NO. 66FCR-25-903] V. HONORABLE R. GUNNER DELAY, STATE OF ARKANSAS JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED BART F. VIRDEN, Judge Appellant Daniel Bell appeals from the Sebastian County Circuit Court’s order finding him in criminal contempt and sentencing him to 130 days in jail. Bell argues that (1) his appeal is properly before this court for review because he did not plead guilty to contempt, and alternatively, it was a conditional guilty plea for which an exception applies; (2) his conduct did not fall within the purview of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-10-108 (Repl. 2010); (3) he received an illegal sentence; and (4) he should not have received any jail time because he expressed remorse. We affirm. I. Show-Cause Hearing At a show-cause hearing, counsel told the trial court that Bell agreed that his behavior at a revocation hearing held roughly a month earlier was contemptuous. Bell was then sworn in, examined by counsel, and said the following: Your Honor, I feel very remorseful for losing my control, you know, when they were putting their hands on me, you know. I do have PTSD and, you know, schizophrenia, so when people touch me, I tend to, you know -- and I do apologize. I should -- in your courtroom, I should better behave myself, and I do feel very remorseful for the incident that took place on 12/11/2025. The trial court noted that Bell was not contesting the finding of guilt, so it moved on to the sentencing phase. Four witnesses testified: Deputy John Hancock; Aaron Beshears, a public-defender investigator; Paula Barden, the court reporter; and Amber Sunday, the trial court administrator. Their testimony revealed that Bell’s probation-revocation hearing was concluding when Bell became “very agitated” and “belligerent” because he learned that he was receiving a sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment after having rejected an offer of two years’ imprisonment. A couple of the witnesses heard Bell mumbling under his breath as the trial court announced his sentence and had to be told by the judge to be quiet. The witnesses testified that they heard Bell cursing at and threatening the judge, the officers, and counsel. They saw Bell flip over a “very heavy” counsel table, and a witness said that it splintered and “wood flew.” Hancock, Beshears, and another bailiff took Bell to the ground. Witnesses heard Bell say that he was in a “kangaroo court” and that the judge was “not a real judge,” although the witnesses believed that the judge had already left the bench soon after pronouncing the sentence. One witness described damage—not only to the counsel table— but to the courtroom’s podium and a microphone and said that their system was “down” for a week and a half before necessary repairs were made. In its ruling, the trial court pointed out that what had taken place was “way, way outside the norm” and noted the chaos, turmoil, danger, and fear that people in close 2 proximity to Bell must have felt. The trial court also referred to the disruption of the proceedings. The trial court said that, considering the egregious nature of Bell’s conduct, but taking into account the improvement in his demeanor and his expression of remorse, Bell would be sentenced to 130 days in jail. The written order states the following: The Court does find upon completion of testimony at the Criminal Contempt Hearing held Monday, January 5, 2026, that Mr. Bell is guilty of Criminal Contempt and does hereby sentence the Defendant to a term of One hundred and thirty (130) days. II. Discussion A. Jurisdiction The State asserts that Bell pleaded guilty and that his appeal is barred by Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 1(a). Bell argues that he did not enter a guilty plea, which should be clear because he did not receive advice by the court pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.4, which provides that the trial court will address the defendant personally to inform him of and determine that he understands, for example, the nature of the charge, the mandatory minimum sentence, and the maximum sentence available. Bell further argues that the stipulation to contempt did not, as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.6, contain a factual basis. We agree with Bell that he did not enter a guilty plea. At the show-cause hearing, Bell was sworn in for testimony and simply admitted that he lost control and misbehaved when the bailiffs put their hands on him. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order finding Bell guilty of criminal contempt—there is no mention of a guilty plea having been entered. Also, as asserted by appellate counsel, there was no advice by the court and no 3 inquiry about the factual basis of any supposed plea. Because we agree that Bell did not enter a guilty plea, we need not address his alternative argument that an exception applies to the general rule that there shall be no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. B. Conduct Outside Purview of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-10-108 Criminal contempt preserves the power of the court, vindicates its dignity, and punishes those who disobey its orders. Zihala v. Staley, 2024 Ark. App. 269, 689 S.W.3d 82. Our standard of review for criminal contempt is whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision. Id. Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-10-108(a) provides that every court of record shall have power to punish, as for criminal contempt, persons guilty of the following acts and no others: (1) Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior committed during the court’s sitting, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority; (2) Any breach of the peace, noise, or disturbance directly tending to interrupt its proceedings; (3) Willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued or made by it; (4) Resistance willfully offered by any person to the lawful order or process of the court; and (5) The contumacious and unlawful refusal of any person to be sworn as a witness and when so sworn a similar refusal to answer any legal and proper interrogatory. Section 16-10-108(c) provides that contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of the court may be punished summarily but that, in other cases, the party charged 4 shall be notified of the accusation and shall have a reasonable time to make a defense. See, e.g., Allison v. DuFresne, 340 Ark. 583, 12 S.W.3d 216 (2000). Bell argues that his statements and actions did not take place “during the court’s sitting, in the immediate view and presence” because the judge had already left the bench. Moreover, the proceedings had concluded. According to Bell, he committed neither direct nor indirect criminal contempt because all he did was become agitated and mumble under his breath. Bell essentially challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his criminal- contempt conviction; however, the argument is not preserved for our review. In order to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, an appellant must move to dismiss at trial in the manner prescribed by Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1. In a nonjury trial, if a motion for dismissal is to be made, it shall be made at the close of all of the evidence and shall state the specific grounds therefor. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(b). The failure to make a timely motion waives any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c). Here, Bell did not move to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence. He admitted that his behavior was contemptuous, and the matter proceeded straight to his punishment. See, e.g., Bonee v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 520, 678 S.W.3d 864 (holding that Bonee’s sufficiency challenge was not preserved for review because he wholly failed to move for dismissal at his contempt hearing). C. Illegal Sentence The parties disagree as to whether Bell’s conduct constituted direct or indirect contempt. Bell apparently concedes that, if his behavior was in fact within the purview of 5 section 16-10-108(a), it was indirect contempt, while the State insists that it was direct contempt. Direct contempt is a contemptuous act committed within the immediate presence of the court, while indirect contempt is contemptuous behavior committed outside the presence of the judge. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Dowdy, 2018 Ark. 307, 558 S.W.3d 847. An obvious example of direct contempt, apart from open misconduct in the courtroom, is when a party comes to court drunk. Id. It is well settled that summary punishment for contempt committed in the presence of the court is an inherent power reserved to the judiciary and cannot be abridged by legislation. Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 295 Ark. 211, 748 S.W.2d 123 (1988). Indeed, our supreme court has held that a court has the inherent power to punish contemptuous behavior committed in its presence without regard to the restrictions imposed by section 16-10-108(a). Id. What is appropriate under the circumstances will necessarily vary and is dependent on the specific facts of each case. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Clark, 305 Ark. 561, 810 S.W.2d 331 (1991). Bell argues that, because this was indirect criminal contempt, the trial court was limited to its statutory authority on punishment. Punishment for contempt is a Class C misdemeanor. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-10-108(b)(1). For a Class C misdemeanor, the sentence shall not exceed thirty days. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(b)(3) (Repl. 2024). A defendant convicted of a Class C misdemeanor may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $500. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-201(b)(3) (Repl. 2024). Bell argues that his sentence of 130 days was illegal. An illegal sentence is one that the trial court lacked the authority to impose. Thompson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 158, 516 S.W.3d 297. 6 In asserting that this was direct criminal contempt, the State relies on Weldon v. State, 150 Ark. 407, 234 S.W. 466 (1921). Weldon was held in contempt for assaulting a judge in an attempt to intimidate him in connection with an upcoming trial and was sentenced to three months in jail and ordered to pay a $500 fine. In affirming, the supreme court followed the rule of the common law and held that Weldon’s conduct was calculated to impede or obstruct the court in the administration of justice and that the act should be considered as having been done in the presence of the court, although it was during the court’s recess and about eight miles from the courthouse. The supreme court said that Weldon was in the “constructive presence of the court.” Id. at 416, 234 S.W. at 468. Here, the trial court did not punish Bell summarily; it ordered him to show cause; and it informed Bell’s counsel before the show-cause hearing that his punishment would not exceed six months. The trial court took evidence during the guilt phase only to determine whether Bell expressed any remorse for his behavior at the probation-revocation hearing. The witnesses called during the sentencing phase said that Bell’s misbehavior began while the trial court was pronouncing his sentence and increased in severity from Bell’s cursing at the judge and referencing a “kangaroo court” to his flipping over a heavy counsel table until he was eventually taken to the floor by two bailiffs and an investigator who was present. Although the judge may not have been present for the entire melee, he was present when the tension began to escalate, and he must have heard Bell winding up because a witness testified that the judge told Bell to stop talking as his mumblings gradually got louder and more disruptive to the proceedings. It is not entirely clear at what precise point the trial court 7 left the bench; nevertheless, Bell’s behavior could be considered open misconduct in the courtroom. As such, we cannot say that the trial court lacked authority through its inherent power—not limited by statute—to impose a sentence of 130 days in jail for Bell’s acts of direct criminal contempt. Yarbrough, supra. D. Incarceration Unwarranted Bell argues that he should not have been given any incarceration time because he expressed remorse for his behavior. Bell, however, raised no objection to the trial court’s sentence of 130 days when it was imposed. Our supreme court has held that “[a] defendant who makes no objection at the time sentence is imposed has no standing to complain of it.” Scroggins v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 346, at 5, 582 S.W.3d 853, 856 (citing Ladwig v. State, 328 Ark. 241, 246, 943 S.W.2d 571, 574 (1997)); see also Pfeifer v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 556, at 4 (holding that an argument pertaining to a sentence following revocation of probation was not preserved because appellant failed to object to the sentence when it was imposed); Cline v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 315, at 3 (refusing to consider an argument that a sentencing decision following revocation of suspended imposition of sentence was unduly harsh because appellant failed to object to the sentences at the time they were imposed). Because Bell failed to object when the trial court imposed jail time despite his pleas of remorse, his argument is not preserved for appeal. In any event, the trial court expressly stated that it took into consideration Bell’s testimony, but it also factored in the egregious nature of his conduct and the fear he caused everyone in close proximity when he exploded with rage. Affirmed. 8 GLADWIN and TUCKER, JJ., agree. Dusti Standridge, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: James Hill, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 9