State v. Catron

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. DONOVAN COLE CATRON, Appellant. No. 1 CA-CR 25-0569 FILED 10-30-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County No. S0300CR202500321 The Honorable Joshua Steinlage, Judge AFFIRM COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix By Joseph Newberg Counsel for Appellee Coconino County Legal Defender’s Office, Flagstaff By Joseph Adam Carver Counsel for Appellant  STATE v. CATRON Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig joined. F O S T E R, Judge: ¶1 Defendant Donovan Catron appeals his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing insufficient evidence supports it. This Court affirms. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The victim in this case, Frank1, was an inmate of the Coconino County Detention Facility. As he sat in a common area, Catron and another inmate, Anthony Ben, assaulted him. Surveillance video shows that Ben walked into the common area and paced one lap around the room. He then walked up behind Frank and stabbed him in the neck with a pencil. Frank, who had been sitting in a chair watching television, got out of his chair and tried to defend himself while Ben continued stabbing and hitting him. Simultaneously, Catron maneuvered his way past several inmates and chairs to join the assault on Frank. ¶3 During the struggle, Catron struck Frank repeatedly. He first punched Frank in the face and then attempted to put Frank in a headlock. Frank immediately stepped backwards, slipping out of the headlock as Catron and Ben continued to punch Frank. As Frank backed away with his head down, covering the back of his neck with his hands, Catron punched him repeatedly. ¶4 As the struggle continued, Catron and Ben pushed Frank toward a wall next to a locked jail door. Frank fell to the floor against the wall as Catron and Ben continued hitting him. The attack ended when the jail door opened for a guard to enter. Guards detained Catron and Ben and 1 This Court uses the same pseudonym for the victim that both Catron and the State used to protect the identity of victim. See State v. Tapia-Munoz, 261 Ariz. 120 (App. 2025). 2  STATE v. CATRON Decision of the Court sent Frank to the hospital. Frank suffered multiple contusions and lacerations. ¶5 The State charged Catron with aggravated assault under A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(4), claiming Catron assaulted Frank “while his capacity to resist was substantially impaired.” Catron moved for a judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 after the State rested and again after the defense rested. The court denied both motions, and the jury convicted Catron as charged. ¶6 Catron timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12- 120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4033(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶7 Catron argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he assaulted Frank while his “capacity to resist [was] substantially impaired.” A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(4). First, Catron argues the State failed to present substantial evidence that Frank’s capacity to resist was substantially impaired. Second, he claims that the assault did not continue after any inferred impairment. And third, he asserts the State did not provide any evidence that Catron knew Frank was substantially impaired. ¶8 This Court reviews sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction and issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011) (sufficient evidence); State v. Duarte, 246 Ariz. 338, 341, ¶ 5 (App. 2018) (statutory interpretation). Any conflicting evidence or inferences are resolved in the light most favorable to support the verdict. State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279, ¶ 5 (2014). This Court does not reweigh the evidence. In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JV-123196, 172 Ariz. 74, 78 (App. 1992). ¶9 A court must enter a judgment of acquittal when no substantial evidence supports a conviction. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a); State v. Barnett, 173 Ariz. 282, 284–85 (App. 1991). If a reasonable jury could find the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, substantial evidence exists to uphold the conviction. Pena, 235 Ariz. at 279, ¶ 5. Here, the State needed to prove Catron assaulted Frank while Frank’s “capacity to resist [was] substantially impaired.” A.R.S. §§ 13-1203, - 1204(A)(4). 3  STATE v. CATRON Decision of the Court I. Substantial evidence supports the § 13-1204(A)(4) elements. ¶10 Catron argues the court erroneously denied his Rule 20 motion because the State failed to show Frank was substantially impaired while Catron assaulted him. He reasons that because Frank remained standing for most of the assault, and Frank used his hands to protect from incoming blows, Frank maintained the “essential means to defend himself,” and thus the State could not show Frank was substantially impaired. Catron’s argument requires this Court to interpret A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(4). See Duarte, 246 Ariz. at 342, ¶ 7. ¶11 This Court previously interpreted § 13-1204(A)(4)’s phrase “substantially impaired” to mean “the victim’s ability to refuse to submit is considerably weakened.” Duarte, 246 Ariz. at 342, ¶ 9; see also JV-123196, 172 Ariz. at 77. And in Duarte, this Court held that a sleeping victim’s capacity to resist is substantially impaired. 246 Ariz. at 343. ¶12 This Court also considered § 13-1204(A)(4) in a juvenile delinquency case where a victim was pepper sprayed while riding his bicycle. JV-123196, 172 Ariz. at 75. JV-123196 examined whether a victim’s ability to flee weighed against a finding that the victim was substantially impaired. Id. at 77–78. It concluded “that the legislature did not intend to raise a simple assault to an aggravated assault whenever one combatant gained the upper hand.” Id. at 77. Applying the plain meaning of the words in the statute, this Court concluded the superior court did not abuse its discretion in determining “substantial impairment” and held “that the ability to flee from a situation is included in the concept of capacity to resist.” Id. However, “[t]he fact that [the victim] did escape may bear on the degree of impairment, but it is not determinative.” Id. And in Barnett, this Court held that a victim hit with a stun gun was “physically restrained” even though he fought back. 173 Ariz. at 284–85. ¶13 The evidence supports a finding that Frank was substantially impaired. The State showed the jury the video of the assault. That video showed Frank being stabbed in the neck before Catron began his assault. Though the State did not provide any expert testimony to show that the stab alone caused substantial impairment, testimony from the guard provided sufficient evidence to establish substantial impairment. ¶14 The guard testified that as he entered the common area to break up the altercation, Frank “was towards the left down on the ground while [Catron and Ben] were still taking swings at him.” This evidence spoke to Frank’s capacity to resist because he could not flee. See JV-123196, 4  STATE v. CATRON Decision of the Court 172 Ariz. at 78 (ability to flee “may bear on the degree of impairment”). This evidence—the video and the guard’s testimony—presented a factual issue for the jury to resolve: whether the evidence equated to substantial impairment. Duarte, 246 Ariz. at 344, ¶ 17. Because jurors could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Frank was substantially impaired after he was stabbed and while he lay on the ground absorbing continued blows, the superior court did not err in denying Catron’s initial Rule 20 motion. Id.; Barnett, 173 Ariz. at 284–85. ¶15 Catron also argues that because Frank was able to defend himself, he was not substantially impaired. Catron reasons that “substantially impaired” should be read to “mean[ ] impairment on par with binding or similar physical restraint.” In JV-123196, this Court held that when an action substantially impairs the victim to the point it is the “functional equivalent[ ]” to “bonds or restraints,” any following assaultive conduct is elevated to aggravated assault. 172 Ariz. at 78 (emphasis added). Restraint by itself meets the element of § 13-1204(A)(4) (“otherwise physically restrained”) and substantially impairs a person from resisting. See Barnett, 173 Ariz. at 285 (defining “restraint” as “confinement, abridgment, limitation, or prohibition of action”). The evidence meets that standard. ¶16 Catron himself testified that he kept pushing Frank to get him against the jail door. He said: I’m mostly just trying to push him against the wall, trying to keep him against the wall. Trying to - - like, not restraining him, but I’m, like, my hands are there, like, to make sure he doesn’t do any sudden movements . . . He was already basically stopped. I was just trying to make sure that he would stay, like, in that position that he was. When asked if at any point Frank ever stopped struggling or fighting back, Catron answered, “[j]ust when we got to the door.” And when asked whether Frank “pretty much was subdued” at that point, Catron answered, “[y]es, I guess.” Along with the guard’s testimony, these admissions allowed the jury to find that Frank’s capacity to resist was substantially impaired. Weighing the admissions against Catron’s claim that Frank “still stayed defending himself” was for the jury. The superior court did not err in denying Catron’s second Rule 20 motion and sending the issue to the jury. 5  STATE v. CATRON Decision of the Court II. Substantial evidence shows the assault continued after Frank was substantially impaired. ¶17 Catron next argues the superior court did not expressly find the precise moment Frank first became substantially impaired. He reasons that without a definitive moment identifying Frank as substantially impaired, there is no evidence Catron assaulted Frank while he was substantially impaired. As discussed above, Catron’s own statements permitted the jury to find that Frank was pinned against the wall, unable to flee and substantially impaired from resisting during the attack, meeting the elements of § 13-1204(A)(4). But, as Catron asserts, the State also had to show that the assault continued after Frank became substantially impaired. ¶18 Again, the guard saw both men still swinging at Frank while he was on the ground. See supra ¶ 15. Though Catron offered contradictory testimony suggesting that he was helping Ben because Frank instigated the altercation, no other evidence, including the video evidence, supported his testimony. Any conflicts in this testimony and evidence are within the purview of the jury. JV-123196, 172 Ariz. at 78 (this Court does not reweigh evidence); State v. Manzanedo, 210 Ariz. 292, 293, ¶ 3 (App. 2005) (jury is responsible for deciding conflicts in evidence). III. Substantial evidence shows Catron knew Frank was impaired. ¶19 Catron argues the State failed to prove Catron knew of Frank’s substantial impairment during the assault. Catron alleges § 13- 202(A) requires the State to prove Catron knew Frank was substantially impaired. A.R.S. § 13-202(A). Catron also alleges the plain language of A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(4) required the State to prove Catron continued to assault Frank after Frank was substantially impaired. ¶20 Even assuming the State had to prove Catron knew of Frank’s impairment, Catron’s own testimony supplied that proof. He testified that Frank “was already basically stopped” while Catron pushed him against the wall, and he agreed Frank was subdued once they reached the door. From that testimony, a reasonable jury could find that Catron knew Frank’s capacity to resist was substantially impaired. 6  STATE v. CATRON Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶21 Affirmed. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 7