State v. Mendoza

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. JOSE ESTEBAN MENDOZA, Petitioner. No. 1 CA-CR 26-0107 PRPC FILED 11-10-2026 Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2022-111702-001 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED COUNSEL Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix By Benjamin A. Armstrong Counsel for Respondent Rosenstein Law Group, PLLC, Scottsdale By Vicki A. R. Lopez Counsel for Petitioner  STATE v. MENDOZA Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined. F U R U Y A, Judge: ¶1 Jose Esteban Mendoza petitions for review of the superior court’s dismissal of his first petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) filed under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 33.1. We grant review but deny relief. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 In 2022, Mendoza was driving home from a trip to Mexico with four other people. During that trip, a disagreement occurred, resulting in Mendoza strangling one person (“KD”) and punching another (“BG”), before the driver (“ZD”) stopped the car. Mendoza then got out of the car with BG and the two fought beside the road before finally reentering the car and resuming their return trip. ¶3 After the group arrived at Mendoza’s residence, ZD heard a single gunshot and an exclamation from BG. ZD then saw Mendoza, a prohibited possessor, pointing a gun at BG, who was lying on the floor. Mendoza aimed the gun at ZD, ordered him to leave the residence and not report what happened. Mendoza fled but was eventually captured and charged. After lingering for ten days—intubated as a quadriplegic in a hospital’s care—BG eventually died from his wounds. ¶4 Mendoza entered a plea agreement with the State, by which he pled guilty to Count I, second-degree murder, a Class 1 dangerous felony; Count II, aggravated assault, a Class 3 dangerous felony; Count III, aggravated assault, a Class 4 felony and domestic violence offense; and Count IV, misconduct involving weapons, a Class 4 felony. The parties stipulated that for Count I, Mendoza would be sentenced to no less than 16 calendar years and no more than 25 calendar years. ¶5 After a full mitigation and aggravation hearing, the superior court sentenced Mendoza to a maximum term of 25 calendar years’ imprisonment for Count I, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13-710(A), a presumptive term of 7.5 years’ imprisonment for Count II, see A.R.S. § 13- 704(A), a maximum term of three years’ imprisonment for Count III, see 2  STATE v. MENDOZA Decision of the Court A.R.S. § 13-702(D), and a presumptive term of 2.5 years’ imprisonment for Count IV, see A.R.S. § 13-702(D), all to be served concurrently. ¶6 Mendoza timely sought post-conviction relief in the superior court. Challenging only his sentence for the second-degree murder conviction, he argued he should be resentenced on Count I because the superior court misapplied aggravating factors, which resulted in a maximum sentence. See Rule 33.1(c). Mendoza also alleged the court did not find the statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt. Mendoza further argued he should be resentenced on Count I because the court inadequately considered the mitigating factors, resulting in an improper sentence. See id. After the parties fully briefed the issues, the superior court dismissed the petition, finding Mendoza failed to raise a colorable claim. ¶7 Mendoza timely petitioned for review. Rule 33.16. We grant review. See A.R.S. § 13-4239. DISCUSSION ¶8 We review the superior court’s ruling on a petition for post- conviction relief for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 576–77 ¶ 19 (2012). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the PCR court makes an error of law or fails to adequately investigate the facts necessary to support its decision.” State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 180 ¶ 4 (2017) (citing cases). ¶9 In his petition for review, Mendoza argues that, regarding Count I, the superior court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to a maximum term of 25 calendar years for second-degree murder because it applied improper aggravating factors pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-701(C). The court found two aggravating circumstances: (1) the victim suffered physical and emotional harm; and (2) the victim’s family suffered emotional and financial harm. See A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(9). The remaining aggravating circumstances the court found fell under the “catch-all” provision of A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(27). ¶10 Because the court found at least one enumerated statutory aggravating circumstance, it could—and did—impose the maximum sentence. See A.R.S. §§ 13-701(C), -710(A). Further, the sentence complies with Mendoza’s plea agreement. Mendoza stipulated in the plea agreement that the sentencing range encompassed the maximum sentence of 25 calendar years, and he stated during the change of plea hearing that he understood the plea agreement and the possible sentences he could serve. 3  STATE v. MENDOZA Decision of the Court ¶11 Mendoza also argues the court failed to find at least one aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt under A.R.S. § 13-701(C). He is correct that the superior court did not expressly state on the record that it found the aggravating circumstances “beyond a reasonable doubt.” But the failure to do so does not necessarily entitle Mendoza to post-conviction relief because courts are presumed to know and properly apply the law when making decisions. See State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 608, 616 (1997). ¶12 Here, the victim’s family had informed the court the victim “suffer[ed] unimaginable pain in his final days” and “knew he was going to die.” The court found that the victim “suffered excruciating pain, physically. The emotional toll had to be devastating because I’m sure he was aware of his circumstances. That factor alone would support an aggravated sentence.” The record shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim suffered physical and emotional harm. Moreover, the record also fully supports finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim’s family suffered emotional and financial harm. And once the court found either of these statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances, it was free to impose the maximum sentence for second-degree murder in accordance with A.R.S. §§ 13-701(C) and 13-710(A). ¶13 Mendoza further argues the court inadequately considered the mitigating circumstances he presented. But the “court ha[d] the discretion to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors.” State v. Harvey, 193 Ariz. 472, 477 ¶ 24 (App. 1998). And it expressly considered Mendoza’s sentencing recommendation and attachments and his argument at sentencing, in which he presented mitigating circumstances, and it found the mitigating factors presented were sufficient to call for his sentences to run concurrently. The determination of what mitigations were established for sentencing purposes, as well as the weight to assign those mitigating circumstances, was properly left to the court’s discretion. See id. CONCLUSION ¶14 We grant review but deny relief. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 4