Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. JAYSEN LEMAR LEONARD, Petitioner. No. 1 CA-CR 26-0124 PRPC FILED 11-18-2026 Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2022-110828-001 The Honorable Bradley Astrowsky, Judge REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED COUNSEL Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix By Robert E. Prather Counsel for Respondent Jaysen Lemar Leonard Pro Se STATE v. LEONARD Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge James B. Morse joined. H O W E, Judge: ¶1 Jaysen Lemar Leonard seeks review of the superior court’s dismissal of his post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petition filed under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 32.1. We grant review but deny relief. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 The State charged Leonard with weapons misconduct, a class four felony. Before trial, Leonard filed notice that he may raise duress and necessity defenses. After a short trial at which Leonard testified, the superior court refused to instruct on duress, and the jury rejected the necessity defense by finding him guilty. The court sentenced Leonard to a less than the presumptive term of four years’ incarceration. ¶3 Leonard appealed. In his direct appeal, Leonard argued that he was entitled to present a duress defense, and that the superior court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on duress. State v. Leonard, 1 CA-CR 23-0247, 2024 WL 4360168, *2 ¶ 11 (Ariz. App. Oct. 1, 2024) (mem. decision). ¶4 This Court relied on Leonard’s own testimony in rejecting his claim. Id. at *1 ¶¶ 4–6. He testified that he was at a bar when a man shouldered him aggressively and threatened him. Id. at *1 ¶ 4. He claimed his friend then offered him a gun which he took because he was afraid, but that he did not “inten[d]” to have the gun. Id. at *1 ¶ 5. This Court ruled that “[t]he defense of duress ‘envisions a third person compelling a person by the threat of immediate physical violence to commit a crime against another person or the property of another person.’” Id. at *2 ¶ 14 (citation omitted). The duress defense applies “only when third parties are the victims.” Id. (citation omitted). Because “[n]o evidence” suggested that Leonard “ever caused or threatened harm to a third party,” this Court found that the superior court correctly declined to instruct the jurors on duress and affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. at *2, *4 ¶¶ 15, 22. ¶5 Leonard filed a timely PCR notice. Appointed counsel filed a completion notice stating that she could not find issues to present to the 2 STATE v. LEONARD Decision of the Court court. Leonard then filed a pro se PCR petition claiming (1) his trial counsel was ineffective, (2) his trial counsel had a conflict of interest, (3) his appellate counsel was ineffective, (4) a significant change in the law occurred, (5) his due process rights were violated, and (6) the errors resulted in cumulative error. ¶6 In a detailed order, the superior court summarily rejected Leonard’s claims and denied the petition. Leonard petitioned this Court for review under Rule 32.16, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 13-4239(C). DISCUSSION ¶7 In his petition, Leonard claims that the court erred by (1) denying him an evidentiary hearing, (2) rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel and bias claims against trial counsel, and (3) dismissing his claim that N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), significantly altered the law. ¶8 We review the superior court’s denial of a PCR petition for an abuse of discretion. State v. Macias, 249 Ariz. 335, 339 ¶ 8 (App. 2020). But we review the interpretation of the Criminal Rules de novo. State v. Mendoza, 248 Ariz. 6, 14–15 ¶ 12 (App. 2019). When the superior court commits an error of law or fails to investigate the facts supporting its decision adequately, it constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 180 ¶ 4 (2017). ¶9 Leonard bears the burden of proving that the superior court erred. State v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 236, 238 ¶ 6 (App. 2021). He also waives all claims not raised first to the superior court and all claims raised to the superior court but not addressed in his review petition to this Court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.16(c)(4) (“A party’s failure to raise any issue that could be raised in the petition for review or cross-petition for review constitutes a waiver of appellate review of that issue.”); State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468 (App. 1980) (finding waiver of “issues first presented in a petition for review” because the superior court “obviously never” had the chance to consider the alleged errors meaningfully). I. Duress ¶10 Leonard contends that the superior court erred by denying an evidentiary hearing for his duress claim. A defendant is precluded from relief under Rule 32 based on any ground that was “finally adjudicated on the merits in an appeal.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). This Court fully 3 STATE v. LEONARD Decision of the Court adjudicated Leonard’s argument in his first appeal. Leonard, 2024 WL 4360168, at *2–*4 ¶¶ 11–22. Therefore, he is precluded from raising this issue again. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). The superior court did not err. II. Actual Conflict of Interest ¶11 Leonard next claims that the court erred by not specifically addressing his claim that trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest. “We consider a claim denied when a court fails to rule on it expressly.” State v. Evans, 252 Ariz. 590, 596 ¶ 15 (App. 2022). So, the issue is whether the superior court abused its discretion by summarily rejecting the claim. ¶12 In his PCR petition, Leonard claimed that trial counsel would not raise “certain constitutional and jurisdictional challenges” because he feared a State Bar complaint and professional retaliation. Leonard did not list the claims that counsel would not pursue to either the superior court or this Court. ¶13 Rule 32.7(b) provides that a PCR petition “must include a memorandum that contains citations to relevant portions of the record and to relevant legal authorities.” Leonard’s memorandum failed to meet the rule’s mandatory requirement on his actual conflict claim under Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). Thus, he has waived the issue. ¶14 Regardless, Leonard’s claim fails on the merits. To establish an actual conflict, a defendant must show two elements: first, that “some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued” that “possessed sufficient substance to be a viable alternative,” and second, that “the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with the attorney’s other loyalties or interests.” State v. Jenkins, 148 Ariz. 463, 466 n.1 (1986) (citation omitted). ¶15 The Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct ER 1.16 frames the refusal to pursue unethical claims not as a conflict, but as a mandatory professional duty. Pursuing a claim that would constitute misconduct is therefore something an attorney is ethically prohibited from doing, and that prohibition exists independently of any conflict between competing client loyalties. When an attorney declines to pursue a claim because doing so would be unethical, the attorney is not choosing one client’s interests over another’s, nor is the attorney acting out of self-interest. The attorney is simply complying with mandatory professional obligations under ER 1.16. Leonard has failed to show that the superior court abused its discretion by denying his actual conflict claim. 4 STATE v. LEONARD Decision of the Court III. Change in the Law ¶16 On review, Leonard claims that Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 is a significant change in the law that applies to his case. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g). We understand his argument to be that Arizona’s weapons misconduct statute prohibiting felons from possessing a firearm until their rights have been restored is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to him. ¶17 To bring a claim under Rule 32.1(g) Leonard must show “a significant change in the law that, if applicable to [his] case, would probably overturn [his] judgment or sentence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g). Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, the basis for Leonard’s claim, was published in 2022 before Leonard’s trial occurred. Thus, Bruen was applied to Leonard’s case and cannot establish a significant change in the law that, if applied, would overturn his conviction. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g). We affirm the superior court’s dismissal of Leonard’s Rule 32.1(g) claim. CONCLUSION ¶18 We grant review but deny relief. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 5