State v. Leonard
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket1 CA-CR 26-0124 PRPC
JudgeRandall M. Howe
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,
v.
JAYSEN LEMAR LEONARD, Petitioner.
No. 1 CA-CR 26-0124 PRPC
FILED 11-18-2026
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2022-110828-001
The Honorable Bradley Astrowsky, Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
COUNSEL
Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Robert E. Prather
Counsel for Respondent
Jaysen Lemar Leonard
Pro Se
STATE v. LEONARD
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge James B. Morse joined.
H O W E, Judge:
¶1 Jaysen Lemar Leonard seeks review of the superior court’s
dismissal of his post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petition filed under Arizona
Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 32.1. We grant review but deny relief.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 The State charged Leonard with weapons misconduct, a class
four felony. Before trial, Leonard filed notice that he may raise duress and
necessity defenses. After a short trial at which Leonard testified, the
superior court refused to instruct on duress, and the jury rejected the
necessity defense by finding him guilty. The court sentenced Leonard to a
less than the presumptive term of four years’ incarceration.
¶3 Leonard appealed. In his direct appeal, Leonard argued that
he was entitled to present a duress defense, and that the superior court
erred by refusing to instruct the jury on duress. State v. Leonard, 1 CA-CR
23-0247, 2024 WL 4360168, *2 ¶ 11 (Ariz. App. Oct. 1, 2024) (mem. decision).
¶4 This Court relied on Leonard’s own testimony in rejecting his
claim. Id. at *1 ¶¶ 4–6. He testified that he was at a bar when a man
shouldered him aggressively and threatened him. Id. at *1 ¶ 4. He claimed
his friend then offered him a gun which he took because he was afraid, but
that he did not “inten[d]” to have the gun. Id. at *1 ¶ 5. This Court ruled
that “[t]he defense of duress ‘envisions a third person compelling a person
by the threat of immediate physical violence to commit a crime against
another person or the property of another person.’” Id. at *2 ¶ 14 (citation
omitted). The duress defense applies “only when third parties are the
victims.” Id. (citation omitted). Because “[n]o evidence” suggested that
Leonard “ever caused or threatened harm to a third party,” this Court
found that the superior court correctly declined to instruct the jurors on
duress and affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. at *2, *4 ¶¶ 15, 22.
¶5 Leonard filed a timely PCR notice. Appointed counsel filed a
completion notice stating that she could not find issues to present to the
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STATE v. LEONARD
Decision of the Court
court. Leonard then filed a pro se PCR petition claiming (1) his trial counsel
was ineffective, (2) his trial counsel had a conflict of interest, (3) his
appellate counsel was ineffective, (4) a significant change in the law
occurred, (5) his due process rights were violated, and (6) the errors resulted
in cumulative error.
¶6 In a detailed order, the superior court summarily rejected
Leonard’s claims and denied the petition. Leonard petitioned this Court for
review under Rule 32.16, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 13-4239(C).
DISCUSSION
¶7 In his petition, Leonard claims that the court erred by (1)
denying him an evidentiary hearing, (2) rejecting his ineffective assistance
of counsel and bias claims against trial counsel, and (3) dismissing his claim
that N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), significantly
altered the law.
¶8 We review the superior court’s denial of a PCR petition for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Macias, 249 Ariz. 335, 339 ¶ 8 (App. 2020). But
we review the interpretation of the Criminal Rules de novo. State v.
Mendoza, 248 Ariz. 6, 14–15 ¶ 12 (App. 2019). When the superior court
commits an error of law or fails to investigate the facts supporting its
decision adequately, it constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Pandeli,
242 Ariz. 175, 180 ¶ 4 (2017).
¶9 Leonard bears the burden of proving that the superior court
erred. State v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 236, 238 ¶ 6 (App. 2021). He also waives all
claims not raised first to the superior court and all claims raised to the
superior court but not addressed in his review petition to this Court. Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 32.16(c)(4) (“A party’s failure to raise any issue that could be
raised in the petition for review or cross-petition for review constitutes a
waiver of appellate review of that issue.”); State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464,
468 (App. 1980) (finding waiver of “issues first presented in a petition for
review” because the superior court “obviously never” had the chance to
consider the alleged errors meaningfully).
I. Duress
¶10 Leonard contends that the superior court erred by denying an
evidentiary hearing for his duress claim. A defendant is precluded from
relief under Rule 32 based on any ground that was “finally adjudicated on
the merits in an appeal.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). This Court fully
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STATE v. LEONARD
Decision of the Court
adjudicated Leonard’s argument in his first appeal. Leonard, 2024 WL
4360168, at *2–*4 ¶¶ 11–22. Therefore, he is precluded from raising this issue
again. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). The superior court did not err.
II. Actual Conflict of Interest
¶11 Leonard next claims that the court erred by not specifically
addressing his claim that trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest. “We
consider a claim denied when a court fails to rule on it expressly.” State v.
Evans, 252 Ariz. 590, 596 ¶ 15 (App. 2022). So, the issue is whether the
superior court abused its discretion by summarily rejecting the claim.
¶12 In his PCR petition, Leonard claimed that trial counsel would
not raise “certain constitutional and jurisdictional challenges” because he
feared a State Bar complaint and professional retaliation. Leonard did not
list the claims that counsel would not pursue to either the superior court or
this Court.
¶13 Rule 32.7(b) provides that a PCR petition “must include a
memorandum that contains citations to relevant portions of the record and
to relevant legal authorities.” Leonard’s memorandum failed to meet the
rule’s mandatory requirement on his actual conflict claim under Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). Thus, he has waived the issue.
¶14 Regardless, Leonard’s claim fails on the merits. To establish
an actual conflict, a defendant must show two elements: first, that “some
plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued”
that “possessed sufficient substance to be a viable alternative,” and second,
that “the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with the attorney’s
other loyalties or interests.” State v. Jenkins, 148 Ariz. 463, 466 n.1 (1986)
(citation omitted).
¶15 The Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct ER 1.16 frames the
refusal to pursue unethical claims not as a conflict, but as a mandatory
professional duty. Pursuing a claim that would constitute misconduct is
therefore something an attorney is ethically prohibited from doing, and that
prohibition exists independently of any conflict between competing client
loyalties. When an attorney declines to pursue a claim because doing so
would be unethical, the attorney is not choosing one client’s interests over
another’s, nor is the attorney acting out of self-interest. The attorney is
simply complying with mandatory professional obligations under ER 1.16.
Leonard has failed to show that the superior court abused its discretion by
denying his actual conflict claim.
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STATE v. LEONARD
Decision of the Court
III. Change in the Law
¶16 On review, Leonard claims that Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 is a
significant change in the law that applies to his case. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
32.1(g). We understand his argument to be that Arizona’s weapons
misconduct statute prohibiting felons from possessing a firearm until their
rights have been restored is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment
as applied to him.
¶17 To bring a claim under Rule 32.1(g) Leonard must show “a
significant change in the law that, if applicable to [his] case, would probably
overturn [his] judgment or sentence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g). Bruen, 597
U.S. 1, the basis for Leonard’s claim, was published in 2022 before
Leonard’s trial occurred. Thus, Bruen was applied to Leonard’s case and
cannot establish a significant change in the law that, if applied, would
overturn his conviction. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g). We affirm the superior
court’s dismissal of Leonard’s Rule 32.1(g) claim.
CONCLUSION
¶18 We grant review but deny relief.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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