Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. MICAIAH PAUL GRAY, Petitioner. No. 1 CA-CR 26-0157 PRPC FILED 11-17-2026 Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Mohave County No. CR2012-0330 The Honorable Derek Carlisle, Judge REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED COUNSEL Mohave County Attorney’s Office, Kingman By Matthew J. Smith Counsel for Respondent Miciah Gray, Buckeye Pro Se STATE v. GRAY Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined. G A O N A, Judge: ¶1 Miciah Gray seeks review of the superior court’s dismissal of his second post-conviction relief (“PCR”) proceeding filed under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 33.1. We grant review but deny relief. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 In 2014, Gray pled no contest to second-degree murder. The superior court sentenced him to 20 calendar years in prison, followed by a term of community supervision. ¶3 In 2024, Gray filed a PCR notice alleging claims under Rule 33.1(a), (c), (e), and (f). He acknowledged his notice was untimely but said he “did not know there was a problem until a paralegal told [him].” The superior court appointed counsel, who later filed a completion notice stating she identified no colorable claims. ¶4 Gray then filed two PCR petitions. Among other things, Gray claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) because trial counsel failed to request a new mental-health evaluation to determine his competency to enter the no-contest plea. The superior court summarily dismissed Gray’s petition. It found Gray’s Rule 33.1(a) claims untimely because he filed his notice more than 10 years after sentencing and didn’t explain why the late filing wasn’t his fault. The superior court noted that even if it excused the delay, Gray presented no evidence suggesting he was incompetent to enter a no-contest plea. The superior court summarily dismissed Gray’s petition. ¶5 Gray petitioned this court to review the decision. State v. Gray, 1 CA-CR 25-0497, 2026 WL 1257342 (App. May 7, 2026) (mem. decision). We granted review but denied relief. Id. at *2 ¶ 11. We agreed that Gray’s claims were untimely and, even if timely, the IAC claim was meritless because “counsel had no viable basis to raise [the claim].” Id. ¶¶ 9–10. Gray then 2 STATE v. GRAY Decision of the Court petitioned for review, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied his petition last month. ¶6 Gray filed his second PCR notice and petition while we considered the summary dismissal of his first. In that petition, Gray claimed he had newly discovered material facts (Rule 33.1(e)) that may have changed the outcome. Gray claimed that he “recently obtained mental health records [showing] that [he] was borderline insane after the incident as noted by a police officer.” Gray requested a current mental health examination to determine if he had the ability to plead no contest. He also questioned if he was “competent at the time of the incident.” ¶7 The court summarily dismissed Gray’s PCR proceeding. Gray petitioned this court for review under Rule 33.16, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 13-4239(C). DISCUSSION ¶8 Gray’s petition before us now raises three issues, which we reproduce below verbatim: 1. “Did defendant produce new evidence?” 2. “Did defendant present a colorable claim?” 3. “Is a notice just to let a court know defendant had new information that would be fully briefed in the petition?” ¶9 We will not disturb the superior court’s ruling on a PCR petition absent an abuse of discretion or error of law. State v. Evans, 252 Ariz. 590, 594 ¶ 7 (App. 2022). We review the court’s legal conclusions de novo. State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 180 ¶ 4 (2017). A defendant must strictly comply with the rules to be eligible for PCR. Canion v. Cole, 210 Ariz. 598, 600 ¶ 11 (2005). And it is a petitioner’s burden to show the superior court abused its discretion by denying the PCR petition. State v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 236, 238 ¶ 6 (App. 2021). I. The Superior Court Wasn’t Required to Appoint Counsel. ¶10 Gray claims that the court erred by not appointing him counsel and dismissing his petition without first appointing that counsel. ¶11 Under Rule 33.5(a), for non-capital cases, the court must appoint counsel for an indigent defendant upon the filing of a timely first notice under Rule 33.4 if requested. Likewise, the court must appoint 3 STATE v. GRAY Decision of the Court counsel for an indigent defendant if he or she files a timely notice after the first PCR proceeding stating he or she wants to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel from the first action. State v. Mendoza, 249 Ariz. 180, 185 ¶ 14 (App. 2020) (A court has no discretion to deny a defendant’s request for counsel in his second proceeding in which he sought to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of Rule 33 counsel); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.5(a). But for the filing of all other Rule 33 notices—i.e., successive notices—the court “may” appoint counsel for an indigent defendant. The use of “may” rather than “must” makes clear that appointment of counsel in successive Rule 33 non-capital PCR proceedings is discretionary, not mandatory unless the defendant is claiming IAC in the first PCR proceedings, which Gray did not assert in his notice or petition. The court has discretion because defendants generally have no constitutional right to counsel in PCR proceedings. State v. Escareno-Meraz, 232 Ariz. 586, 587 ¶ 4 (App. 2013). Except for mandatory appointment, the superior court does not abuse its discretion by declining to appoint counsel if the PCR notice is “facially non- meritorious.” State v. Harden, 228 Ariz. 131, 134 ¶ 11 (App. 2011). ¶12 Gray filed a PCR petition with attachments that he labeled as a “supplement” to his notice. Gray had no right to file repetitive petitions. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appointment of counsel or ruling on the petition. II. Gray Has No Colorable Claim of Newly Discovered Evidence. ¶13 To be entitled to PCR on the ground of newly discovered evidence under Rule 33.1(e), a defendant must establish the evidence: (1) was discovered after the conviction although it existed before; (2) could not have been discovered and produced through reasonable diligence; (3) is neither cumulative nor impeaching; (4) is material; and (5) probably would have changed the outcome. State v. Mauro, 159 Ariz. 186, 207 (1988). Evidence is not newly discovered unless it was unknown to the trial court, the defendant, or counsel at the time of conviction, and neither the defendant nor counsel could have known about its existence through due diligence. State v. Saenz, 197 Ariz. 487, 490 ¶ 13 (App. 2000) (citing State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404 (1983)). “A claim of newly discovered evidence requires discovery of ‘material facts,’ not assertion of new legal arguments.” State v. Herrera, No. 1 CA-CR 26-0012 PRPC, 2026 WL 2018668, at *2 (App. July 13, 2026) (mem. decision) (emphasis in original). ¶14 Gray litigated his mental competency before he pled no contest. Trial counsel moved for a Rule 11 examination, and the court granted it. In the motion, counsel said: 4 STATE v. GRAY Decision of the Court On a previous civil case Mr. Gray was seen by the Social Services Interagency Council out of Lake Havasu City. The program director noted that “it became evident that he has great difficulty maintaining any coherent line of communication.” The director recommended a “higher level of care that is appropriate to address his mental condition.” Following that Mr. Gray was evaluated by Dr. Mark Harvancik on Dec. 28th of 2011. Dr. Harvancik had to prematurely terminate the evaluation due to Mr. Gray’s disjointed speech, disorientation, and “atypical presentation.” Dr. Harvancik noted a concern that Mr. Gray was not even competent to participate in the evaluation process. Dr. Harvancik noted that the responses to the standard MCMI-III test were “very atypical” due to attention and concentration problems, paranoia, obsession, anxiety, and disorganized thought process, which the [doctor] felt was indicative of some sort of psychosis or mood disorder with psychotic features. Dr. Harvancik concluded his attempt at an evaluation with a recommendation for a psychiatric “crisis state” evaluation and possible hospitalization before a full evaluation could be attempted. Two Rule 11 experts examined Gray. While the experts disagreed over Gray’s competency to stand trial, they both had the police reports and Dr. Harvancik’s earlier evaluation. In addition, Dr. Laura Pieri’s previous psychological report was available for review. Given the experts’ disagreement, the court conducted a Rule 11 competency hearing. At the end of the hearing, the court found Gray incompetent but restorable. ¶15 Gray was then in the Pima County Restoration to Competency Program for about five months. Before beginning the program, the treating doctor reviewed the reports from Doctors Harvancik and Pieri, the two Rule 11 doctors, and the jail mental health progress notes. After months of observation, therapy, and education, the program doctor concluded: The treating psychiatrist and psychologist believe the defendant is psychologically stable. As a result, Mr. Gray’s mental health needs would appear to continue their stable presentation under the demands of a trial. Ongoing medication compliance is required to maintain stability. In conclusion, Mr. Gray’s current level of functioning as 5 STATE v. GRAY Decision of the Court demonstrated by observation across the past five months, investigation, and evaluation, indicates that he is COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL at this time. Once restored to competency, Gray pled no contest to the charge. ¶16 Gray’s petition claims he recently obtained mental health records that would show that he “was borderline insane after the incident as noted by a police officer.” But the attached exhibits to support his claim were not mental health records. Assuming the exhibits were part of police reports, the Rule 11 doctors reviewed those reports, and the restoration doctor ultimately determined Gray was competent to stand trial. And even the Rule 11 doctor who believed Gray was incompetent to stand trial determined that he was not insane at the time of the offense. ¶17 The evidence Gray provided to the court as newly discovered was not properly characterized as such. The evidence was available to counsel and used by the Rule 11 doctors in reaching their conclusions. “Facts cannot be newly discovered if already presented and considered.” State v. King, 250 Ariz. 433, 441 ¶ 32 (App. 2021). The court did not abuse its discretion by summarily dismissing the claim. III. Gray’s Third Issue Assigns No Legal Error. ¶18 Finally, we identify no reviewable legal issue arising out of Gray’s third issue, which his petition states as follows: “Is a notice just to let a court know defendant had new information that would be fully briefed in the petition?” CONCLUSION ¶19 We grant review but deny relief. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 6