State v. Alexander

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. LAQUAN LEROY ALEXANDER, Appellant. No. 1 CA-CR 26-0195 FILED 11-04-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2024-121994-001 The Honorable Kristin Culbertson, Judge JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix By Anne Carmack Counsel for Appellee LaQuan Leroy Alexander, Grand Rapids, Michigan Appellant Pro Se  STATE v. ALEXANDER Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined. H O W E, Judge: ¶1 Laquan Alexander appeals the superior court’s denial of his petition to terminate sex offender registration. For the following reasons, we accept special action jurisdiction but deny relief. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 In 1999 Alexander was convicted of a sex offense in Michigan. Consequently, he was required to register as a sex offender, which he did several times over the years in both Michigan and Arizona. His most recent Arizona registration was in 2023. ¶3 In May 2024, Maricopa County charged Alexander with failing to register as a sex offender and tampering with a public record (sex offender registration form), class 4 and 6 felonies respectively. In September 2025, pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. In doing so, he stipulated that he “underst[ood] that by entering a plea of guilty to Failure to Register as a Sex Offender, he w[ould] have a lifetime requirement to register as a sex offender while residing in Arizona.” In October 2025, the court placed Alexander on three years of probation which began in November 2025. Less than a month later, Alexander petitioned to terminate his registration requirement. The superior court denied his petition. Alexander appealed. DISCUSSION I. Jurisdiction ¶4 “[W]e have an independent duty to ensure that we have jurisdiction before addressing the merits of any claim raised on appeal.” State v. Bejarano, 219 Ariz. 518, 519 ¶ 2 (App. 2008). Generally, a defendant “may not appeal from a judgment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea agreement.” A.R.S. § 13-4033(B). Though section 13-4033(B) has an exception for issues that “could not have been raised in connection with the original judgment and sentence,” the requirement to register as a sex 2  STATE v. ALEXANDER Decision of the Court offender was included in Alexander’s plea and was “part of the sentence originally imposed.” Fisher v. Kaufman, 201 Ariz. 500, 501 ¶¶ 5–6 (App. 2001) (cleaned up). Thus, we lack jurisdiction over Alexander’s direct appeal. A.R.S. § 13-4033(B). ¶5 Despite lacking jurisdiction of a direct appeal, this Court has previously accepted special action jurisdiction over appeals from orders denying petitions to terminate sex offender registration. See, e.g., Fisher, 201 Ariz. at 501 ¶¶ 1, 4, 5; State v. Pearson, 2 CA-CR 2019-0047, 2020 WL 3127373, at *2 ¶ 9 (Ariz. App. June 11, 2020) (mem. decision). Because Alexander does not appear to have “an equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal” we accept special action jurisdiction in our discretion. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(a); Fisher, 201 Ariz. at 501 ¶¶ 1, 4, 5. II. Alexander’s Registration Requirement ¶6 Alexander argues that Arizona may not “continue to enforce a registration requirement—and maintain a conviction for failing to abide by that requirement—when the duty has been legally terminated and declared unconstitutional at its source.” We generally review the superior court’s ruling on a petition to terminate sex offender registration for abuse of discretion, see State v. Stubblefield, 261 Ariz. 386, 391–92 ¶¶ 20–21, 24 (App. 2025), but review constitutional issues and the application of statutes de novo, State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 398 ¶ 64 (2015); State v. Nixon, 242 Ariz. 242, 243 ¶ 5 (App. 2017). ¶7 Alexander argues that the superior court erred by not giving full faith and credit to Michigan’s termination of his registration requirement. But his current registration requirement stems from his stipulation to lifetime registration in his 2025 Arizona plea agreement—not from his Michigan offense. In September 2025, Alexander pled guilty and agreed to lifetime registration in Arizona. The court sentenced him in October 2025. By his own acknowledgment, the Michigan order terminating his Michigan registration requirement did not issue until December 2025. At the time of his offense and sentencing in Arizona, Alexander’s Michigan registration requirement was still in place. And “the offender shall be punished under the law in force when the offense was committed.” A.R.S. § 1-246; see also State v. Newton, 200 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 3 (2001) (“A basic principle of criminal law requires that an offender be sentenced under the laws in effect at the time he committed the offense for which he is being sentenced.”). As Alexander concedes in his reply brief, the superior court did not err by convicting him of failing to register. Nor did the court err in requiring continuing registration based on the stipulation to which 3  STATE v. ALEXANDER Decision of the Court he agreed. See A.R.S. § 1-246; Newton, 200 Ariz. at 2 ¶ 3. As the State notes, his “Arizona plea agreement created a new, independent registration requirement” that Alexander stipulated would be for his lifetime. ¶8 Alexander also argues that the court erred by failing to make specific findings to determine whether his Michigan offense was “‘sufficiently similar’ to an Arizona registerable offense.” He reasons that because “the convicting state (Michigan) has determined that the 1999 conviction cannot constitutionally support a registration requirement, then, as a matter of law, that conviction cannot be ‘substantially similar’ to a valid Arizona registerable offense.” Again, the petition from which Alexander appeals arises from the registration requirement of his 2025 plea, not his 1999 Michigan conviction. And a defendant petitioning to terminate sex offender registration is responsible for affirmatively avowing that they met the requirements of A.R.S. § 13-3826(A). Though he cited A.R.S. § 13-3826 generally in his petition, Alexander failed to avow he met any of the factors required for the court to discharge his registration requirement. The court did not err in dismissing his petition. See A.R.S. § 13-3826(C) (“The court shall deny the petition if the court finds that any factor listed in subsection A of this section is not met.”). ¶9 Nor could Alexander meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 13- 3826 at the time he filed his petition. Following his Arizona plea, the court sentenced him to three years of probation in October 2025. That probation began in November 2025. He petitioned to terminate registration less than a month later in December 2025. Section 13-3826(A) requires that a defendant first successfully complete their probation before petitioning to terminate their registration requirement. Alexander had not completed his probation and was thus ineligible to petition for termination. A.R.S. § 13- 3826. The court did not err in dismissing his petition. See A.R.S. § 13- 3826(C). ¶10 As the State notes, Alexander’s opening brief contains several erroneous citations to cases that do not exist and other misstatements of law. Alexander acknowledges and corrects his erroneous citations in his reply brief. Misuse of artificial intelligence or the failure to provide accurate legal authority may result in sanctions. See Matter of Est. of Acciavatti, 1 CA- CV 25-0606 PB, 2026 WL 2041963, at *4 ¶ 18 (Ariz. App. July 15, 2026). In our discretion, we decline to impose sanctions. 4  STATE v. ALEXANDER Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶11 We accept special action jurisdiction but deny relief. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 5