In Re Delinquency of G.M.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket1 CA-JV 26-0094
JudgeCynthia J. Bailey
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
Arizona Court of Appeals
Division One
IN RE DELINQUENCY OF G.M.
No. 1 CA-JV 26-0094
1 CA-JV 26-0116
(Consolidated)
FILED 11-19-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JV608762
The Honorable Harriet M. Bernick, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Mesa
By Andrea R. Anderson
Counsel for Appellant
Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix
By Jordan Anthony Smith
Counsel for Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
B A I L E Y, Judge:
G.M. appeals her delinquency adjudications and order to pay restitution. We reject G.M.'s arguments that the delinquency adjudications were not based on sufficient evidence, and that restitution was precluded by an additional causative factor. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that G.M. committed assault and disorderly conduct. The case proceeded to an adjudication hearing at which the State presented evidence of the following facts.
On the morning of April 13, 2025, G.M. was staying at the house of her father ("Father") and his live-in girlfriend ("Victim"). G.M. went into the garage to search for a charger for her electric scooter, which she planned to ride with friends. G.M. periodically came back into the house, sounding increasingly frustrated that she could not find a charger. Victim agreed to help G.M. look for the charger later, to which G.M. "huffed and puffed, rolled her eyes, use[d] inappropriate language, and then went to the garage and slammed the door." Victim then began to hear loud crashing noises in the garage.
Father went into the garage to investigate while Victim remained in the house, constructing a bookshelf. When the loud crashing noises continued, Victim joined Father in the garage and saw that her air fryer had fallen from a shelf and was dented. Victim told G.M. to stop damaging her belongings and attempted to help G.M. get the charger. G.M. responded with profanity and a loud, aggressive tone. Father told Victim that "he's got it under control" and instructed her to go back into the house, which she did.
A few minutes later, Victim saw a car parked outside the house and thought it might be G.M.'s friends. Victim walked outside through the front door to investigate, holding a small Allen wrench she had been using on the bookshelf. G.M. approached Victim through the open garage, and Victim told G.M. that her friends were not allowed to come over. G.M. responded disrespectfully, and Victim told G.M. to hand over her cell phone. G.M. refused. Victim then transferred the Allen wrench to her mouth to avoid scratching G.M. and tried to take the phone from her by wrapping her in a "bear hug." G.M. closed her fist and hit Victim three times: once in the face, once in the chest, and once near the shoulder. G.M.'s punches "cracked and damaged six of [Victim's] teeth" and left red, tender marks on her chest and shoulders. Victim released G.M. and G.M. ran up the street.
Two police officers were in the area on a different call when they overheard the altercation. They saw Victim point at G.M. and yell that "she hit me in my mouth, and my tooth might be broken." One of the officers contacted G.M. up the street and noted that G.M. had a split lip and bloody nose. The second officer interviewed Victim, and a third officer arrived on the scene and interviewed Father. At the conclusion of the interviews, the officers determined G.M. was the "primary aggressor" and arrested her.
The superior court adjudicated G.M. delinquent of both disorderly conduct and assault, placed her on probation, and required her to write an essay. Later, the court held a restitution hearing for the medical bills Victim incurred by having her teeth examined at an urgent care and by a dentist. The court also ordered supplemental briefing on the restitution issues. After considering the evidence and briefing, the court ordered G.M. to pay Victim $542 in restitution.
G.M. timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
The State presented sufficient evidence to support G.M.'s delinquency adjudication for assault.
G.M. argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support her delinquency adjudication for assault. We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to upholding the adjudications, examining "whether the evidence before the court `existed in sufficient quantity so that any rational trier of fact' could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile had committed the offense[s]." In re Jessi W., 214 Ariz. 334, 336, ¶ 11 (App. 2007) (citation omitted). Reversal is appropriate only if there is a "complete absence of probative facts to support a judgment or when a judgment is clearly contrary to any substantial evidence." In re Kyle M., 200 Ariz. 447, 448 - 49, ¶ 6 (App. 2001). We will not alter the superior court's credibility determinations. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JV-132905, 186 Ariz. 607, 609 (App. 1996).
The State presented sufficient evidence to support the superior court's adjudication that G.M. committed assault by "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly" causing injury to Victim. See A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(1). The court found that G.M. committed assault by responding to Victim's physical contact "aggressively with excessive force that was not justified[, by] . . . . punch[ing] the victim in the face hitting her mouth and teeth, punch[ing] her in the chest and punch[ing] her in the arm," causing her to "suffer[] injuries due to the juvenile's unreasonable conduct." In making this determination, the court noted that "the issues of criminal intent and physical injury were uncontested by the juvenile." Even so, the superior court considered photographs of Victim's injuries and testimony from Father about G.M.'s purposeful intent. Moreover, the superior court discredited G.M.'s testimony that Victim punched her first, instead relying on Father's and Victim's testimony about the sequence of events. The evidence was sufficient to support the delinquency adjudication.
Further, contrary to G.M.'s contention, the court did not err by rejecting G.M.'s self-defense theory. Under A.R.S. § 13-404(A), "a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force." (Emphasis added.) Once a defendant presents evidence of self-defense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act with justification. A.R.S. § 13-205(A); State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 89, ¶ 6 (2010).
G.M. contends that because Father "expressly withdrew any delegated [parental] authority before the physical encounter began," Victim was exercising unlawful force when she tried to take G.M.'s phone and bear-hugged her. To be sure, evidence showed that Father told Victim at one point during the incident to return to the house because he had it "under control," and that he made no effort to take away G.M.'s phone. But both Father and Victim testified that Victim had authority to discipline G.M., including by taking away her phone. The superior court had discretion to find this testimony credible.
Further, the court reasonably found that "the juvenile responded aggressively with excessive force that was not justified" and "the force used by the juvenile in punching the victim three times was clearly outside the scope of self-defense." Whether a defendant's use of force was reasonable is an objective question to be decided by the fact-finder. See Cespedes v. Lee, 243 Ariz. 46, 49, ¶ 12 (2017) (holding the prosecutor correctly "instructed the jurors that they would `have to decide' whether a defendant's use of force was reasonable"); King, 225 Ariz. at 90, ¶ 11 ("Section 13-404(A) . . . adopts a purely objective standard . . . ."). We will not alter that determination unless there is a complete lack of sufficient evidence to support the conclusion. See Kyle M., 200 Ariz. at 448 - 49, ¶ 6. Here, the unreasonableness of G.M.'s conduct is supported by sufficient evidence, specifically Victim's and Father's testimony describing the sequence of events, Victim's methods for attempting to take the phone away from G.M., and the force, intent, and harm caused by G.M.'s response.
The superior court properly adjudicated G.M. delinquent on the assault charge.
The State presented sufficient evidence to support G.M.'s delinquency adjudication for disorderly conduct.
Victim also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for her disorderly conduct adjudication.
Under A.R.S. § 13-2904(A)(1), a person commits disorderly conduct if she intentionally or knowingly acts to disturb the peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family, or person by "[e]ngag[ing] in fighting, violent or seriously disruptive behavior." Here, sufficient evidence supported G.M.'s delinquency adjudication because both Victim and Father testified that G.M. disturbed their peace, and Father and one of the police officers testified about the loud and chaotic nature of the altercation outside the house.
G.M. contends that her accidental knocking-over of household items, yelling, and use of profanity did not rise to the level of "fighting, violent or seriously disruptive behavior." G.M. points to In re Julio L., where the court concluded that a juvenile who directed profanity toward a school official and kicked over a plastic chair was not engaged in "seriously disruptive behavior." 197 Ariz. 1, 2, 4, ¶¶ 3, 11 (2000). G.M. also points to In re Louise C., where the court concluded that a juvenile's use of profanity toward school officials and slamming a door did not constitute disorderly conduct. 197 Ariz. 84, 85, 87, ¶¶ 2, 11 (App. 1999).
We reject G.M.'s argument. To be sure, her conduct was like the conduct at issue in Julio L. and Louise C. But the superior court also found that, unlike in those cases, G.M.'s disorderly conduct continued "during the assault." The court therefore reasonably concluded that G.M.'s behavior met the elements of disorderly conduct.
The superior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding restitution.
Finally, G.M. challenges the restitution awarded to Victim for her medical bills. We review the order for an abuse of discretion. State v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 328, 331, ¶ 13 (2022).
To award restitution, the superior court must find that: (1) the loss is economic, (2) the loss is one that the victim would not have incurred but for the defendant's criminal offense, and (3) the criminal conduct directly caused the economic loss. State v. Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. 27, 29, ¶ 7 (2002). Damages must "flow directly from the defendant's conduct, without the intervention of additional causative factors." Id. G.M. argues that the presence of the Allen wrench in Victim's mouth constitutes an "additional causative factor," precluding restitution.
In awarding restitution, the superior court primarily relied on In re Stephanie B., 204 Ariz. 466 (App. 2003). There, the superior court ordered the juvenile to pay restitution for the victim's chipped and broken teeth following an assault. Id. at 468, ¶ 7. On appeal, we held that though at least one of the victim's teeth had been damaged before the assault, the dental repair was still a "direct result" of the juvenile's criminal conduct. Id. at 469, ¶¶ 11, 13. Thus, we upheld the restitution award for "certain . . . chipped and broken teeth." Id.
"Arizona courts use a `foreseeability' or `natural consequence' test to evaluate whether an economic loss was directly caused by the criminal offense." G.F. v. Nielson, 258 Ariz. 279, 283, ¶ 22 (App. 2024). Courts should consider "the nature and character of [the] defendant's criminal actions" when making this determination. State v. Morris, 173 Ariz. 14, 18 (App. 1992). As Stephanie B. demonstrates, dental repairs are a foreseeable or natural consequence from a closed-fist punch to a victim's face. Further, G.M. should have reasonably foreseen that punching Victim while she had an Allen wrench in her mouth would cause serious injury.
Finally, victim fault is not at issue when determining restitution. For example, in State v. Clinton, a victim provided the defendant alcoholic beverages before the defendant caused a car accident that left the victim a paraplegic. 181 Ariz. 299, 300 (App. 1995). We reversed the denial of restitution to the victim, holding that "victim fault is not an issue in the restitution phase of a criminal case." Id. Victim's decision to hold an Allen wrench in her mouth did not preclude the restitution award. The court acted within its discretion in ordering restitution.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the delinquency adjudications and the restitution award.