State v. Colin
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket1 CA-CR 25-0208
JudgeMichael J. Brown
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
v.
KURT AARON COLIN, Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CR 25-0208
FILED 11-20-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300CR202400389
The Honorable Krista M. Carman, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Law Offices of Trent R. Buckallew, P.C., Phoenix
By Trent R. Buckallew
Counsel for Appellant
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Celeste Kinney
Counsel for Appellee
STATE v. COLIN
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.
B R O W N, Judge:
¶1 Kurt Colin appeals from his convictions and sentences for
seven counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. For the following reasons,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
jury’s verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Colin. State v.
Fierro, 254 Ariz. 35, 38, ¶ 2 (2022).
¶3 BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file sharing network, which
allows users to share files with one another. Rather than requiring a single
user to download an entire file, BitTorrent allows that user to receive
smaller portions of the file from multiple users who are sharing the same
file. This process allows users to download files faster than if they were
downloading the entire file from a single user. BitTorrent requires users
downloading files, such as a movie or video, to also share a portion of their
files with other users, or it will remove those users who fail to meet the
requirement. In simpler terms, the purpose of the sharing requirement is
to allow large files to spread quickly across the network. Each file—and
every individual piece of those files—have an associated “hash value.”
These hash values appear as a string of alphanumeric characters, and they
act as a digital “fingerprint” that BitTorrent uses to identify the file and its
pieces that a BitTorrent user seeks.
¶4 Torrential Downpour is a law enforcement tool used to locate
and identify users who may be possessing and sharing child sexual assault
material (“CSAM”) through BitTorrent. This tool was designed by law
enforcement agencies and is not publicly available. Using a catalog of
confirmed or suspected CSAM files and their hash values, Torrential
Downpour searches for those hashes among other BitTorrent users. When
a law enforcement computer running Torrential Downpour identifies a
user who is sharing CSAM, the program can download those files from a
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Decision of the Court
single user through the BitTorrent network. This ensures law enforcement
can confirm that their suspect is the person possessing CSAM. Torrential
Downpour does not access any unshared files on a target computer and can
only connect with a BitTorrent user if that user is online and sharing
content.
¶5 In early 2024, a special agent with Homeland Security
Investigations (“Agent”) was running Torrential Downpour on an
employer-provided computer. The program alerted the Agent that
Torrential Downpour had attempted twice to download a CSAM file from
an internet protocol (“IP”) address in Yavapai County. On the second
download attempt, Torrential Downpour identified the target computer as
having a CSAM file with a hash value matching that of a known CSAM file
named “Siberian Mouse jail bate [sic] PTHC.”1 The Agent used the IP
address Torrential Downpour identified to learn that Cable One, an
internet service provider, owned the associated IP address. The Agent sent
Cable One a subpoena requesting records relating to that IP address at the
time of the Siberian Mouse download; Cable One responded with its
records showing Colin was the account holder at that time, and that Colin’s
residential address was in Chino Valley. The Agent then contacted a
detective in Chino Valley (“Detective”) with the information about the
Siberian Mouse download and Colin’s residential address, and the
Detective secured a warrant to search Colin’s home.
¶6 While executing the warrant, police found and seized several
devices that were sent to a computer forensic analyst for examination,
which revealed that one of the computers, a black Acer laptop, had a single
password protected account bearing Colin’s name. Using software that
compared hashes of previously identified CSAM files to the files in the
laptop, the analyst found 244 confirmed CSAM files. The analyst also
reviewed several other seized devices containing CSAM, including: a four-
terabyte hard drive (1300 files), a gray Toshiba laptop (64 files), a desktop
computer and hard drive with another user account bearing Colin’s name
(11 pictures and one video), and a 1.5 terabyte hard drive (645 images and
three videos). The analyst examined devices owned by Colin’s wife and
children, none of which contained any CSAM files or images. Colin’s
devices also contained several items with Colin’s personal information
including photographs, resumes, tax returns, a pay stub, and letters.
1 As the Agent testified, “jail bate” [sic] means someone looking at the
content is likely to go to jail, and PTHC is an acronym for “preteen hard
core” pornography.
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Decision of the Court
¶7 The analyst selected and reviewed seven images from Colin’s
black laptop for purposes of supporting criminal charges. A pediatric nurse
practitioner reviewed those images. She later testified that all images
showed nude or partially nude female children, all of whom the nurse
testified appeared to be 13 years old or younger.
¶8 The State charged Colin with seven counts of sexual
exploitation of a minor, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3553(A)(2). After a two-
day trial in which the Agent, the Detective, the computer forensic analyst,
and the pediatric nurse practitioner testified, a jury convicted Colin as
charged. For each charged image, the jury found the State proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that each victim was younger than 15 years old. The
trial court sentenced Colin to slightly mitigated 15-year sentences for each
count, with all sentences to run consecutively. Colin timely appealed, and
we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033.
DISCUSSION
A. Lawfulness of Warrantless Search
¶9 Before trial, Colin moved to suppress all evidence stemming
from law enforcement’s use of Torrential Downpour. Relying in part on
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), he argued that using such
technology to intercept and log his BitTorrent activity was an unlawful
search. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, at which both Colin and
the State presented expert testimony about Torrential Downpour. The
State’s expert testified in part that Torrential Downpour only connects to
users who are actively online and making content available for sharing
through BitTorrent; it does not access any unshared files on a target
computer. The expert also explained that BitTorrent users share their IP
addresses and the type of content that user has downloaded with other,
unknown users and that once a user begins downloading a file, their IP
address becomes associated with that file’s hash value.
¶10 The court denied Colin’s motion, finding that Colin had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the files available for sharing on the
peer-to-peer network. The court therefore determined no search had
occurred through law enforcement’s use of Torrential Downpour, and no
basis existed for suppressing any evidence on this ground.
¶11 On appeal, Colin argues law enforcement conducted a
warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Arizona
Constitution through the use of Torrential Downpour, and thus the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress. “We review for abuse of
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Decision of the Court
discretion the trial court’s factual findings on the motion to suppress, but
review de novo the trial court’s ultimate legal determination that the search
complied with the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Jean, 243 Ariz. 331, 334,
¶ 9 (2018) (citation omitted).
¶12 The Fourth Amendment grants individuals the right to be
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. Const. amend.
IV, and evidence derived from an unreasonable, warrantless search
generally requires suppression, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
487–88 (1963). A defendant seeking to invoke the constitutional protection
and exclude such evidence must first show there was a “search,” which
occurs when the State infringes on a privacy interest that society recognizes
as reasonable. See State v. Mixton, 250 Ariz. 282, 286, ¶ 13 (2021); see also
State v. Mitcham, 258 Ariz. 432, 437, ¶ 14 (2024) (“When an individual seeks
to preserve something as private, and that expectation of privacy is one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, Fourth Amendment
protections will apply.” (citation modified)).
¶13 Relying on Kyllo, Colin argues that law enforcement’s use of
Torrential Downpour was a warrantless, unlawful search. In Kyllo, federal
agents used a thermal imager to detect the heat emanating from a
defendant’s home. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29–30. Noticing that some portions of
the home were hotter than others, and believing this showed indoor
marijuana cultivation, the agents obtained a warrant relying in part on the
information from use of the thermal imager. Id. at 30. Emphasizing that
individuals have a reasonable privacy interest in the interior of their homes
and expressing concerns about how advancing technology may allow the
government to invade that privacy interest, the Supreme Court concluded
that use of the thermal imager constituted a search. Id. at 33–35, 40. The
Court held that when the government “uses a device that is not in general
public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” Id. at 40.
¶14 The record supports Colin’s argument that Torrential
Downpour is a piece of technology unavailable to the public. But Kyllo does
not hold that the government’s use of such technology alone constitutes an
unlawful search. Rather, as Kyllo explained, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits warrantless use of such technology to “explore details of the
home.” Id.
¶15 Nothing in the record shows the Torrential Downpour tool
similarly invaded Colin’s home or any other space where Colin maintained
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Decision of the Court
a reasonable expectation of privacy. True, as Colin argues, his computer
was located inside his home. But there is no evidence that law
enforcement’s use of Torrential Downpour allowed them to learn any
details about Colin’s home. Rather, the record shows Torrential Downpour
only accessed the files Colin had already made available for sharing and
did not access any unshared files or activity.2 Colin could not maintain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information he made available for
sharing through his use of BitTorrent. See State v. MacHardy, 254 Ariz. 231,
235, ¶ 7 (App. 2022) (“[W]arrantless searches into content shared on peer-
to-peer networks are constitutionally permissible because ‘by knowingly
using a file sharing network,’ users maintain ‘no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the files accessible on that network.’” (citation omitted)); United
States v. Hoeffener, 950 F.3d 1037, 1044 (8th Cir. 2020) (noting Torrential
Downpour “only searches for information that a user had already made
public” and that a defendant “has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
files made available to the public through peer-to-peer file-sharing
networks”).
¶16 We therefore conclude that under the Fourth Amendment,
law enforcement’s use of Torrential Downpour did not constitute a
“search” requiring a warrant. Several other jurisdictions and federal
circuits presented with similar challenges to law enforcement’s use of
Torrential Downpour (or using similar tools on other peer-to-peer
networks) have also concluded the program does not implicate Fourth
Amendment concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Ewing, 140 F.4th 1339, 1349
(11th Cir. 2025); Hoeffener, 950 F.3d at 1044; People v. Slusher, 592 P.3d 192,
202–03, ¶¶ 48–53 (Colo. App. 2026); Youngman v. State, 342 So.3d 770, 776
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022); see also United States v. Johnson, 180 F.4th 42, 51 (1st
Cir. 2026); State v. Roberts, 345 P.3d 1226, 1236, ¶ 28 (Utah 2015).
¶17 Colin separately argues the use of Torrential Downpour
violated Article 2, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution—referred to as the
2 In his reply brief, Colin asserts that he retained an expectation of
privacy in “those pieces [] that would not have otherwise been voluntarily
shared on the peer-to-peer network but for the ability of the police to secure
the entire file” from his computer. Because he did not make that argument
in his opening brief it is waived. See Jean, 243 Ariz. at 342, ¶ 39. Even so,
nothing in the record shows that Colin could control which specific pieces
of a file he could choose to share on BitTorrent. Further, his computer
revealed to Torrential Downpour the hash value connected to the Siberian
Mouse torrent file, not just the hash value for the specific piece Torrential
Downpour was able to download.
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Decision of the Court
“Private Affairs Clause.” See Mixton, 250 Ariz. at 289–90, ¶ 29. This
provision states that “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs,
or his home invaded, without authority of law.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8.
Colin contends that law enforcement’s use of Torrential Downpour violates
“the sanctity of the home.” Colin is correct that the Private Affairs Clause
provides broader protections for the home than the Fourth Amendment.
See State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 264–65 (1984); State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 466
(1986). But nothing in the record shows law enforcement’s use of Torrential
Downpour revealed any information about Colin’s home or activities
conducted there that were not publicly shared. Colin has not shown that
law enforcement violated his state constitutional rights.
B. Lawfulness of Affidavit Supporting Warrant
¶18 In his motion to suppress, Colin also challenged the affidavit
supporting the warrant that authorized a search of his home under Franks
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). After the Agent subpoenaed Colin’s
internet service provider and received records indicating Colin was the
account holder for the IP address identified by Torrential Downpour, the
Agent contacted the Detective who had worked with the Agent several
times before investigating Colin. The Detective obtained a search warrant
for Colin’s home, and the supporting affidavit stated the following:
On March 14, 2024, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)
Prescott Valley identified internet protocol (IP) address
67.60.89.189 after receiving files associated with child sexual
abuse material (CSAM). The download occurred on February
2, 2024, between 1505 and 1538 hours. A subpoena to the
internet provider, Cable One, was executed and Cable One
returned records identifying Kurt COLIN as the internet
subscriber. The records were provided by [a] Cable One
employee . . . .
The file name 5f4cd489bd1c7702385aaeca524c8cb334l3l430,
which is a known image of child pornography was
downloaded onto an electronic device using IP address
67.60.89.189 on February 2, 2024 10:05:45 UTC.
The results of the subpoena showed the owner of that IP
address during the search time range was Kurt Colin with an
authorized user of [Colin’s wife].
¶19 Colin argued these statements were recklessly misleading
and omitted several critical facts necessary to establish probable cause. He
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STATE v. COLIN
Decision of the Court
specifically mentioned that Torrential Downpour only downloaded one
piece of the CSAM file from the IP address Torrential Downpour connected
to, and that law enforcement could not view the file to confirm it was in fact
CSAM. Colin also argued the affidavit failed to include critical information
about the hash values Torrential Downpour relied on and the program’s
reliance on an obsolete hash algorithm that could lead to “hash collisions.” 3
¶20 At the evidentiary hearing on his motion, Colin’s expert
testified about her review of various records relating to Torrential
Downpour’s download of the Siberian Mouse file. She noted the piece of
information Torrential Downpour downloaded was a “mangled code” that
“would be unreadable by any human person,” and that from the
information available to her, there “would not be a way for any human
person to confirm its legality.” She also testified that Torrential Downpour
relies on an outdated hashing algorithm, SHA-1. She explained that newer
versions of BitTorrent have moved to a new algorithm, SHA-256, and SHA-
1 hashes should not be used on their own to verify the contents of a file.
Colin’s expert further noted it is possible for more than one file to share the
same SHA-1 hash value, and that she had seen hash collisions occur, but
she did not say how likely that would be. The State’s expert, conversely,
testified that such collisions are incredibly rare among actual BitTorrent
users and most users still use SHA-1 hashes.
¶21 The Detective also testified, stating that before drafting the
affidavit he received an email from the Agent, and they discussed the
investigation. The Detective explained that he had worked with the Agent
a few times before this investigation, and that he copied and pasted
information from the Agent’s email into the affidavit.
¶22 The trial court rejected Colin’s Franks claim, finding that the
Detective relied on information he received from the Agent, and no
evidence presented at the hearing showed the Detective “intentionally,
knowingly, or with any recklessness” made a false or misleading statement
in the affidavit. The court also found that the affidavit, if redrafted to reflect
that “a piece of a known file with a hash identified by Homeland Security
to be CSAM had been downloaded” by Colin’s IP address, would still
support a finding of probable cause.
¶23 The Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant be
issued only upon probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under Franks v.
3 A “hash collision” occurs when two different files have the same
hash value.
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Decision of the Court
Delaware, a defendant may attack a search warrant and seek exclusion of
evidence obtained from a search arising from that warrant, if the finding of
probable cause was “based on intentional or reckless falsehood.” State v.
Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 279 (1982); see State v. Carter, 145 Ariz. 101, 108 (1985).
Such a challenge may also succeed if the defendant shows the warrant
affidavit “contains deliberate or reckless omissions of facts that tend to
mislead,” as an affiant “is not permitted to tell less than the total story.”
Frimmel v. Sanders, 236 Ariz. 232, 239, ¶ 27 (App. 2014) (citation modified).
¶24 In assessing a claim that a warrant fails under Franks, courts
first examine whether the affiant knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, included a false statement or omitted material
information from the affidavit. State v. Buccini, 167 Ariz. 550, 554 (1991).
This is a factual determination we uphold unless it is clearly erroneous. Id.
Next, if the court finds such material omissions or false statements, it must
remove any false statements or add any materially omitted information to
the affidavit and assess whether the newly drafted affidavit establishes
probable cause. Frimmel, 236 Ariz. at 241, ¶ 38. In this stage of the analysis,
whether the redrafted affidavit establishes probable cause is reviewed de
novo. Buccini, 167 Ariz. at 555.
¶25 According to Colin, the warrant affidavit here (1) falsely
stated that a known CSAM image was downloaded from Colin’s IP
address, and (2) failed to inform the magistrate that Torrential Downpour
received only one unreadable piece of the file. He likewise contends the
affidavit failed to explain the flaws in the SHA-1 hashing system Torrential
Downpour relied on. To secure relief under Franks, Colin must show the
affiant (here, the Detective) “knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth” included false statements or omitted material facts.
Frimmel, 236 Ariz. at 239, ¶ 27.
¶26 Colin asserts the Detective’s copying and pasting information
from the Agent’s email “without any independent verification at all
constitutes a reckless disregard for the accuracy of the information” offered
in the affidavit. We disagree. To show an affiant acted with a reckless
disregard for the truth, a defendant challenging a warrant under Franks
must show “proof that the affiant entertained serious doubts about the
truth of the affidavit.” Carter, 145 Ariz. at 109. The record contains no such
proof here. The Detective testified that he had worked with the Agent
previously and had no reason to doubt or question the information the
Agent provided based on their previous interactions. Moreover, nothing in
Franks prohibited the Detective from relying on information provided by
another law enforcement officer in drafting the affidavit. Cf. United States
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STATE v. COLIN
Decision of the Court
v. Kirk, 781 F.2d 1498, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Observations of fellow officers
of the Government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable
basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number.” (citation omitted)).
Colin likewise cites no authority requiring an officer to personally verify
the facts received from another officer before including those same facts in
a search warrant affidavit.
¶27 Colin also asserts “the government cannot insulate a
deliberately false or recklessly false statement by transmitting it through an
innocent affiant officer,” citing United States v. DeLeon, 979 F.2d 761, 764 (9th
Cir. 1992) (“A deliberate or reckless omission by a government official who
is not the affiant can be the basis for a Franks suppression.”) Setting aside
the fact that Colin first made this assertion in his reply brief, it is not
persuasive. Colin could have attacked the veracity of the warrant by
presenting evidence showing the Agent knew or entertained some serious
doubts on whether the statements provided to the Detective were
misleading or untrue. But Colin did not have the Agent testify at the
hearing, and no evidence in the record shows the Agent knew of any false
information or material omissions. Because Colin had the burden of
proving the Agent made recklessly false statements or material omissions,
he has not shown the trial court abused its discretion. See Buccini, 167 Ariz.
at 554 (noting the defendant must establish the first prong of a Franks
analysis).
C. Admissibility of Rule 404(b) Evidence
¶28 Colin challenges the admission of other, uncharged CSAM
images found on his devices under Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”)
404(b). We review a trial court’s admission of evidence of other acts for
abuse of discretion. State v. Villalobos, 225 Ariz. 74, 80, ¶ 18 (2010).
¶29 Before trial, the State moved to admit evidence of other,
uncharged CSAM files found on Colin’s devices. The State argued such
evidence would be used to prove Colin “knowingly possessed the
exploitative materials located on his computers, rather than coming upon
them by accident or mistake,” and that without such evidence the State may
be unable to meet its burden of proof. The State asserted that testimony
about these files would be “brief and general in nature,” such as the number
of images, their general content, and where the images had been found in
the various electronic devices. Colin responded, asking the court to
“severely restrict what the State is permitted to show the jury and what the
State’s witnesses are permitted to describe.” Colin further argued such
evidence should be admitted only if he testified at trial, and that otherwise
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STATE v. COLIN
Decision of the Court
the uncharged CSAM evidence would constitute improper propensity
evidence.
¶30 Acknowledging the State’s burden to prove Colin’s
knowledge of the CSAM files, the court granted the State’s motion. The
court cautioned the State it should not elicit testimony about any images
that could not be confirmed as CSAM files, and to not include any
descriptions of the files, to which the State agreed. At trial, the forensic
analyst testified about the number of CSAM images found on Colin’s
various devices. Though the State did not present any of the uncharged
images directly to the jury or have the expert describe the contents of any
particular images or other files, the analyst testified about the file names
associated with some of the uncharged images. The expert also testified
about some terms associated with other files found on one of Colin’s
devices. Examples of the file names and terms in the testimony were: rape,
anal, lolita, pedo, child porn, and “PTHC.” Colin did not object to any of
this testimony at trial.
¶31 Generally, evidence of a person’s “other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith.” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). A purpose of this
rule is “to prevent introduction of evidence solely to prove a defendant’s
propensity for crime or to show [the] defendant is a bad person.” State v.
Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 391 (1986). Though such evidence is not admissible
if offered only to show propensity, other acts evidence may be admissible
for other purposes, including “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Ariz. R. Evid.
404(b)(2). Before admitting evidence under Rule 404(b)(2), a court must
first determine there is clear and convincing evidence that the acts occurred.
State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 582–83 (1997). Then the court must find: (1)
the evidence of the other acts is offered for a proper, non-propensity
purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) the proffered evidence is relevant to prove
that purpose; and (3) the probative value of such evidence is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Allen,
253 Ariz. 306, 333, ¶ 58 (2022).
¶32 Colin argues the expert’s testimony regarding the uncharged
CSAM did not support a valid, non-propensity purpose. Despite the State’s
claim that such evidence was relevant to show knowledge, Colin claims this
was “not such a sufficiently disputed issue that would allow the amount of
other-acts evidence” admitted because he did not present any “case-in-
chief.” But the State was required to demonstrate Colin knew about the
charged CSAM files. See A.R.S. § 13-3553(A)(2) (“A person commits sexual
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exploitation of a minor by knowingly . . . possessing . . . any visual depiction
in which a minor is engaged in exploitive exhibition or other sexual
conduct.”). And though Colin did not testify and presented no evidence at
trial, he did specifically raise the issue of knowledge in his arguments to the
jury, putting the issue in dispute. Contrary to Colin’s contentions, such
evidence was relevant to establishing his knowledge. See Antoniello v. State,
542 S.W.3d 878, 880–81 (Ark. App. 2018) (noting testimony that defendant
possessed over 3,000 CSAM files was “probative of his intent, lack of
mistake, and knowledge”).
¶33 The additional CSAM images were found among Colin’s
various devices that also included items with his personal information. The
volume of the uncharged CSAM images, interspersed across multiple
devices with indicia of Colin’s ownership, rebuts any suggestion that he did
not know about the images or that another person may have acquired
CSAM on his devices. Cf. State v. Schneider, 483 S.W.3d 495, 505–06 (Mo.
App. 2016) (admitting other acts evidence of several thousand images and
videos “tended to show that [the defendant] ‘knowingly’ possess[ed] the
images and videos actually charged as crimes”); United States v. Schene, 543
F.3d 627, 643 (10th Cir. 2008) (concluding admission of other, non-charged
CSAM images to show defendant knowingly possessed CSAM was not an
abuse of discretion).
¶34 Colin also argues the other acts evidence was unfairly
prejudicial. Noting the expert’s testimony of the file names associated with
some of the uncharged files, Colin argues this evidence would “tend to
inflame and upset” the jury and invite them “to infer that the defendant
was predisposed to seek or possess illegal material.” Even proper Rule
404(b) evidence, like all relevant evidence, may be excluded if its probative
value is “substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice. State
v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 52 (1993); Ariz. R. Evid. 403.
¶35 Admission of uncharged CSAM images or videos can be
unduly prejudicial. In State v. Rix, 256 Ariz. 125 (App. 2023), we concluded
the trial court erred by allowing the State to present several “disturbing
images” of children engaged in sexual conduct under Rule 404(c). Id. at 134,
¶¶ 26–27. These images were far more graphic and substantially dissimilar
to the images the defendant had been charged with possessing, and thus in
that case we held that the images were “extremely prejudicial, and far less
probative.” Id. at ¶ 27. Even so, we explained that had “the evidence been
limited to the State to describing the nature and amount of [the defendant’s]
sexually exploitative material, . . . the other-act evidence would certainly
have been acceptably probative.” Id. at 134–35, ¶ 28.
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¶36 Here, the trial court restricted such testimony even further,
preventing the State from describing the content of any uncharged images
found on Colin’s devices. Though the State did read some file names and
terms associated with these images, that testimony was brief and the State
did not “luxuriate in inflammatory detail” beyond reading those names.
See State v. Salazar, 181 Ariz. 87, 92 (App. 1994). Given the restrictions put
in place by the trial court to minimize the prejudicial effect of this evidence,
we cannot say it abused its discretion.
D. Admissibility of Cable One Records
¶37 Colin argues the court erroneously admitted documents from
his internet service provider under the business records hearsay exception.
See Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6). “We review admissions of evidence under
exceptions to the rule against hearsay for abuse of discretion.” State v.
Tucker, 205 Ariz. 157, 165, ¶ 41 (2003).
¶38 On examination of the Agent during trial, the State admitted
into evidence records from Cable One, Colin’s internet service provider,
showing subscriber data, billing information, along with residential and IP
addresses. The records Cable One sent in response came with a cover letter,
in which a Cable One employee acknowledged receipt of the subpoena, and
further stated, “[p]ursuant to that request, our researchers reviewed our
customer/billing databases and have compiled a report responsive to the
Summons.”
¶39 At trial, Colin objected to introduction of this evidence on
both hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds. In response, the State
explained to the court that the records were “kept in the regular course of
business” and that “[a] custodian of records is not required” to admit such
evidence. The court overruled Colin’s objection and admitted the records.
The Agent then testified that Colin’s IP address in the Cable One records
matched the IP address Torrential Downpour identified.
¶40 “Generally, an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of
the matter asserted is hearsay and not admissible as evidence.” State v.
Alston, 261 Ariz. 82, 87, ¶ 10 (App. 2025); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c), 802.
An exception to this rule exists for business records of a regularly
conducted activity. Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6). To admit records under this
exception, Rule 803(6) requires “that the record be made at or near the time
of the entry by or from information transmitted by someone with
knowledge, be kept in the ordinary course of business, [and] be made as a
regular practice.” State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391, 401, ¶ 28 (2013). These
13
STATE v. COLIN
Decision of the Court
conditions must be shown by either (1) the testimony of the custodian of
the records or another qualified witness, or (2) certification that complies
with Rule 902(11) or (12). Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6)(D); see Transamerica Ins. Co.
v. Trout, 145 Ariz. 355, 360 (App. 1985). Such evidence may be admitted
only if “the opponent does not show that the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”
Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6)(E).
¶41 The State did not call a Cable One custodian of records or
another qualified witness of such records to testify at trial as to the
requirements listed in Rule 803(6)(A)–(C). Instead, the State argues the
cover letter serves as sufficient certification that the records meet the
requirements of Rule 803(6). Proper certification under that rule requires
compliance with Rule 902(11), which provides that “[t]he original or a copy
of a domestic record that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)–(C), as
shown by a certification of the custodian or another qualified person that
complies with a statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court” is self-
authenticating evidence. Ariz. R. Evid. 902(11).
¶42 We are not persuaded by the State’s argument. As to the way
Cable One created or stored those records, the cover letter states only that
“researchers reviewed [the] customer/billing databases and have compiled
a report.” Nothing in this statement makes clear, or even suggests, who
entered information into that database and when, or whether making or
entering such information into this database was a regular practice of Cable
One. See Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6)(A)–(C). Moreover, the certification under
Rule 902(11) must be made by “a custodian or another qualified person.”
¶43 The record here contains no information about whether the
Cable One employee who authored the cover letter is a custodian or
otherwise “qualified person” properly familiar with Cable One’s record
keeping practices. See Premier Consulting & Mgmt. Sols., LLC v. Peace Releaf
Ctr. I, 257 Ariz. 80, 90, ¶ 42 (App. 2024) (“The requisite foundation [for a
business record] must, however, be established by someone who has
personal knowledge or is otherwise familiar with how the record was
prepared or with the practice of the business concerning the preparation of
records of that type.” (citation omitted)). Because there was not sufficient
foundation to meet the business records exception, the court erred in
admitting the Cable One records. See State v. Walker, 181 Ariz. 475, 482
(App. 1995) (concluding a prosecutor’s avowal that a document was a
business record of the police without requisite foundation could not
support its admission into evidence).
14
STATE v. COLIN
Decision of the Court
¶44 Although the letter did not qualify as a business record, we
will not reverse if the error is harmless. State v. Leteve, 237 Ariz. 516, 524,
¶ 25 (2015). To show harmless error, the State bears the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to or affect the
verdict. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 (1993). Our analysis does not turn
on whether the jury would have returned a guilty verdict absent this error,
but “whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely
unattributable to the error.” Id. (citation omitted).
¶45 On this record, we conclude any error in admitting the Cable
One records was harmless. Significantly, Colin never disputed that the
information in the records was accurate. See State v. Williams, 133 Ariz. 220,
226 (1982) (“In addition, and perhaps more important to our finding of
harmless error, is the fact that the contents of the hearsay evidence were not
really in dispute.”). Moreover, the Cable One information listing Colin’s IP
address was cumulative to other properly admitted testimony. Without
objection, the forensic analyst later testified about the same IP address as
listed in the Cable One records. State v. Bass, 198 Ariz. 571, 581, ¶ 40 (2000)
(“Evidence is cumulative, and therefore error is cured only where the
tainted evidence supports a fact otherwise established by existing
evidence.”).
¶46 Though Colin claims the Cable One records were necessary to
link him to that IP address, the forensic analyst’s testimony also linked
Colin to that information. The analyst testified that the black Acer laptop,
on which the charged images were found and which had a single user
account with Colin’s name, had used that same IP address. Moreover, the
reliability or credibility of the Cable One records was not a key to the State’s
case or any evidence presented about Colin’s knowing possession of the
charged images. Cf. State v. Copeland, 253 Ariz. 104, 116–17, ¶ 31 (App. 2022)
(declining to find erroneously admitted hearsay harmless when the State
acknowledged to the jury that “this case is very much about credibility,”
and those hearsay statements were used to bolster the victim’s allegations).
On this record, the State has shown that any error