Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. KURT AARON COLIN, Appellant. No. 1 CA-CR 25-0208 FILED 11-20-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County No. S1300CR202400389 The Honorable Krista M. Carman, Judge AFFIRMED COUNSEL Law Offices of Trent R. Buckallew, P.C., Phoenix By Trent R. Buckallew Counsel for Appellant Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix By Celeste Kinney Counsel for Appellee STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Angela K. Paton joined. B R O W N, Judge: ¶1 Kurt Colin appeals from his convictions and sentences for seven counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. For the following reasons, we affirm. BACKGROUND ¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Colin. State v. Fierro, 254 Ariz. 35, 38, ¶ 2 (2022). ¶3 BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file sharing network, which allows users to share files with one another. Rather than requiring a single user to download an entire file, BitTorrent allows that user to receive smaller portions of the file from multiple users who are sharing the same file. This process allows users to download files faster than if they were downloading the entire file from a single user. BitTorrent requires users downloading files, such as a movie or video, to also share a portion of their files with other users, or it will remove those users who fail to meet the requirement. In simpler terms, the purpose of the sharing requirement is to allow large files to spread quickly across the network. Each file—and every individual piece of those files—have an associated “hash value.” These hash values appear as a string of alphanumeric characters, and they act as a digital “fingerprint” that BitTorrent uses to identify the file and its pieces that a BitTorrent user seeks. ¶4 Torrential Downpour is a law enforcement tool used to locate and identify users who may be possessing and sharing child sexual assault material (“CSAM”) through BitTorrent. This tool was designed by law enforcement agencies and is not publicly available. Using a catalog of confirmed or suspected CSAM files and their hash values, Torrential Downpour searches for those hashes among other BitTorrent users. When a law enforcement computer running Torrential Downpour identifies a user who is sharing CSAM, the program can download those files from a 2 STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court single user through the BitTorrent network. This ensures law enforcement can confirm that their suspect is the person possessing CSAM. Torrential Downpour does not access any unshared files on a target computer and can only connect with a BitTorrent user if that user is online and sharing content. ¶5 In early 2024, a special agent with Homeland Security Investigations (“Agent”) was running Torrential Downpour on an employer-provided computer. The program alerted the Agent that Torrential Downpour had attempted twice to download a CSAM file from an internet protocol (“IP”) address in Yavapai County. On the second download attempt, Torrential Downpour identified the target computer as having a CSAM file with a hash value matching that of a known CSAM file named “Siberian Mouse jail bate [sic] PTHC.”1 The Agent used the IP address Torrential Downpour identified to learn that Cable One, an internet service provider, owned the associated IP address. The Agent sent Cable One a subpoena requesting records relating to that IP address at the time of the Siberian Mouse download; Cable One responded with its records showing Colin was the account holder at that time, and that Colin’s residential address was in Chino Valley. The Agent then contacted a detective in Chino Valley (“Detective”) with the information about the Siberian Mouse download and Colin’s residential address, and the Detective secured a warrant to search Colin’s home. ¶6 While executing the warrant, police found and seized several devices that were sent to a computer forensic analyst for examination, which revealed that one of the computers, a black Acer laptop, had a single password protected account bearing Colin’s name. Using software that compared hashes of previously identified CSAM files to the files in the laptop, the analyst found 244 confirmed CSAM files. The analyst also reviewed several other seized devices containing CSAM, including: a four- terabyte hard drive (1300 files), a gray Toshiba laptop (64 files), a desktop computer and hard drive with another user account bearing Colin’s name (11 pictures and one video), and a 1.5 terabyte hard drive (645 images and three videos). The analyst examined devices owned by Colin’s wife and children, none of which contained any CSAM files or images. Colin’s devices also contained several items with Colin’s personal information including photographs, resumes, tax returns, a pay stub, and letters. 1 As the Agent testified, “jail bate” [sic] means someone looking at the content is likely to go to jail, and PTHC is an acronym for “preteen hard core” pornography. 3 STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court ¶7 The analyst selected and reviewed seven images from Colin’s black laptop for purposes of supporting criminal charges. A pediatric nurse practitioner reviewed those images. She later testified that all images showed nude or partially nude female children, all of whom the nurse testified appeared to be 13 years old or younger. ¶8 The State charged Colin with seven counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3553(A)(2). After a two- day trial in which the Agent, the Detective, the computer forensic analyst, and the pediatric nurse practitioner testified, a jury convicted Colin as charged. For each charged image, the jury found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that each victim was younger than 15 years old. The trial court sentenced Colin to slightly mitigated 15-year sentences for each count, with all sentences to run consecutively. Colin timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033. DISCUSSION A. Lawfulness of Warrantless Search ¶9 Before trial, Colin moved to suppress all evidence stemming from law enforcement’s use of Torrential Downpour. Relying in part on Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), he argued that using such technology to intercept and log his BitTorrent activity was an unlawful search. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, at which both Colin and the State presented expert testimony about Torrential Downpour. The State’s expert testified in part that Torrential Downpour only connects to users who are actively online and making content available for sharing through BitTorrent; it does not access any unshared files on a target computer. The expert also explained that BitTorrent users share their IP addresses and the type of content that user has downloaded with other, unknown users and that once a user begins downloading a file, their IP address becomes associated with that file’s hash value. ¶10 The court denied Colin’s motion, finding that Colin had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the files available for sharing on the peer-to-peer network. The court therefore determined no search had occurred through law enforcement’s use of Torrential Downpour, and no basis existed for suppressing any evidence on this ground. ¶11 On appeal, Colin argues law enforcement conducted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Arizona Constitution through the use of Torrential Downpour, and thus the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. “We review for abuse of 4 STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court discretion the trial court’s factual findings on the motion to suppress, but review de novo the trial court’s ultimate legal determination that the search complied with the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Jean, 243 Ariz. 331, 334, ¶ 9 (2018) (citation omitted). ¶12 The Fourth Amendment grants individuals the right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. Const. amend. IV, and evidence derived from an unreasonable, warrantless search generally requires suppression, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963). A defendant seeking to invoke the constitutional protection and exclude such evidence must first show there was a “search,” which occurs when the State infringes on a privacy interest that society recognizes as reasonable. See State v. Mixton, 250 Ariz. 282, 286, ¶ 13 (2021); see also State v. Mitcham, 258 Ariz. 432, 437, ¶ 14 (2024) (“When an individual seeks to preserve something as private, and that expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, Fourth Amendment protections will apply.” (citation modified)). ¶13 Relying on Kyllo, Colin argues that law enforcement’s use of Torrential Downpour was a warrantless, unlawful search. In Kyllo, federal agents used a thermal imager to detect the heat emanating from a defendant’s home. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29–30. Noticing that some portions of the home were hotter than others, and believing this showed indoor marijuana cultivation, the agents obtained a warrant relying in part on the information from use of the thermal imager. Id. at 30. Emphasizing that individuals have a reasonable privacy interest in the interior of their homes and expressing concerns about how advancing technology may allow the government to invade that privacy interest, the Supreme Court concluded that use of the thermal imager constituted a search. Id. at 33–35, 40. The Court held that when the government “uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” Id. at 40. ¶14 The record supports Colin’s argument that Torrential Downpour is a piece of technology unavailable to the public. But Kyllo does not hold that the government’s use of such technology alone constitutes an unlawful search. Rather, as Kyllo explained, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless use of such technology to “explore details of the home.” Id. ¶15 Nothing in the record shows the Torrential Downpour tool similarly invaded Colin’s home or any other space where Colin maintained 5 STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court a reasonable expectation of privacy. True, as Colin argues, his computer was located inside his home. But there is no evidence that law enforcement’s use of Torrential Downpour allowed them to learn any details about Colin’s home. Rather, the record shows Torrential Downpour only accessed the files Colin had already made available for sharing and did not access any unshared files or activity.2 Colin could not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information he made available for sharing through his use of BitTorrent. See State v. MacHardy, 254 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 7 (App. 2022) (“[W]arrantless searches into content shared on peer- to-peer networks are constitutionally permissible because ‘by knowingly using a file sharing network,’ users maintain ‘no reasonable expectation of privacy in the files accessible on that network.’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Hoeffener, 950 F.3d 1037, 1044 (8th Cir. 2020) (noting Torrential Downpour “only searches for information that a user had already made public” and that a defendant “has no legitimate expectation of privacy in files made available to the public through peer-to-peer file-sharing networks”). ¶16 We therefore conclude that under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement’s use of Torrential Downpour did not constitute a “search” requiring a warrant. Several other jurisdictions and federal circuits presented with similar challenges to law enforcement’s use of Torrential Downpour (or using similar tools on other peer-to-peer networks) have also concluded the program does not implicate Fourth Amendment concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Ewing, 140 F.4th 1339, 1349 (11th Cir. 2025); Hoeffener, 950 F.3d at 1044; People v. Slusher, 592 P.3d 192, 202–03, ¶¶ 48–53 (Colo. App. 2026); Youngman v. State, 342 So.3d 770, 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022); see also United States v. Johnson, 180 F.4th 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2026); State v. Roberts, 345 P.3d 1226, 1236, ¶ 28 (Utah 2015). ¶17 Colin separately argues the use of Torrential Downpour violated Article 2, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution—referred to as the 2 In his reply brief, Colin asserts that he retained an expectation of privacy in “those pieces [] that would not have otherwise been voluntarily shared on the peer-to-peer network but for the ability of the police to secure the entire file” from his computer. Because he did not make that argument in his opening brief it is waived. See Jean, 243 Ariz. at 342, ¶ 39. Even so, nothing in the record shows that Colin could control which specific pieces of a file he could choose to share on BitTorrent. Further, his computer revealed to Torrential Downpour the hash value connected to the Siberian Mouse torrent file, not just the hash value for the specific piece Torrential Downpour was able to download. 6 STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court “Private Affairs Clause.” See Mixton, 250 Ariz. at 289–90, ¶ 29. This provision states that “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8. Colin contends that law enforcement’s use of Torrential Downpour violates “the sanctity of the home.” Colin is correct that the Private Affairs Clause provides broader protections for the home than the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 264–65 (1984); State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 466 (1986). But nothing in the record shows law enforcement’s use of Torrential Downpour revealed any information about Colin’s home or activities conducted there that were not publicly shared. Colin has not shown that law enforcement violated his state constitutional rights. B. Lawfulness of Affidavit Supporting Warrant ¶18 In his motion to suppress, Colin also challenged the affidavit supporting the warrant that authorized a search of his home under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). After the Agent subpoenaed Colin’s internet service provider and received records indicating Colin was the account holder for the IP address identified by Torrential Downpour, the Agent contacted the Detective who had worked with the Agent several times before investigating Colin. The Detective obtained a search warrant for Colin’s home, and the supporting affidavit stated the following: On March 14, 2024, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Prescott Valley identified internet protocol (IP) address 67.60.89.189 after receiving files associated with child sexual abuse material (CSAM). The download occurred on February 2, 2024, between 1505 and 1538 hours. A subpoena to the internet provider, Cable One, was executed and Cable One returned records identifying Kurt COLIN as the internet subscriber. The records were provided by [a] Cable One employee . . . . The file name 5f4cd489bd1c7702385aaeca524c8cb334l3l430, which is a known image of child pornography was downloaded onto an electronic device using IP address 67.60.89.189 on February 2, 2024 10:05:45 UTC. The results of the subpoena showed the owner of that IP address during the search time range was Kurt Colin with an authorized user of [Colin’s wife]. ¶19 Colin argued these statements were recklessly misleading and omitted several critical facts necessary to establish probable cause. He 7 STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court specifically mentioned that Torrential Downpour only downloaded one piece of the CSAM file from the IP address Torrential Downpour connected to, and that law enforcement could not view the file to confirm it was in fact CSAM. Colin also argued the affidavit failed to include critical information about the hash values Torrential Downpour relied on and the program’s reliance on an obsolete hash algorithm that could lead to “hash collisions.” 3 ¶20 At the evidentiary hearing on his motion, Colin’s expert testified about her review of various records relating to Torrential Downpour’s download of the Siberian Mouse file. She noted the piece of information Torrential Downpour downloaded was a “mangled code” that “would be unreadable by any human person,” and that from the information available to her, there “would not be a way for any human person to confirm its legality.” She also testified that Torrential Downpour relies on an outdated hashing algorithm, SHA-1. She explained that newer versions of BitTorrent have moved to a new algorithm, SHA-256, and SHA- 1 hashes should not be used on their own to verify the contents of a file. Colin’s expert further noted it is possible for more than one file to share the same SHA-1 hash value, and that she had seen hash collisions occur, but she did not say how likely that would be. The State’s expert, conversely, testified that such collisions are incredibly rare among actual BitTorrent users and most users still use SHA-1 hashes. ¶21 The Detective also testified, stating that before drafting the affidavit he received an email from the Agent, and they discussed the investigation. The Detective explained that he had worked with the Agent a few times before this investigation, and that he copied and pasted information from the Agent’s email into the affidavit. ¶22 The trial court rejected Colin’s Franks claim, finding that the Detective relied on information he received from the Agent, and no evidence presented at the hearing showed the Detective “intentionally, knowingly, or with any recklessness” made a false or misleading statement in the affidavit. The court also found that the affidavit, if redrafted to reflect that “a piece of a known file with a hash identified by Homeland Security to be CSAM had been downloaded” by Colin’s IP address, would still support a finding of probable cause. ¶23 The Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant be issued only upon probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under Franks v. 3 A “hash collision” occurs when two different files have the same hash value. 8 STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court Delaware, a defendant may attack a search warrant and seek exclusion of evidence obtained from a search arising from that warrant, if the finding of probable cause was “based on intentional or reckless falsehood.” State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 279 (1982); see State v. Carter, 145 Ariz. 101, 108 (1985). Such a challenge may also succeed if the defendant shows the warrant affidavit “contains deliberate or reckless omissions of facts that tend to mislead,” as an affiant “is not permitted to tell less than the total story.” Frimmel v. Sanders, 236 Ariz. 232, 239, ¶ 27 (App. 2014) (citation modified). ¶24 In assessing a claim that a warrant fails under Franks, courts first examine whether the affiant knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, included a false statement or omitted material information from the affidavit. State v. Buccini, 167 Ariz. 550, 554 (1991). This is a factual determination we uphold unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. Next, if the court finds such material omissions or false statements, it must remove any false statements or add any materially omitted information to the affidavit and assess whether the newly drafted affidavit establishes probable cause. Frimmel, 236 Ariz. at 241, ¶ 38. In this stage of the analysis, whether the redrafted affidavit establishes probable cause is reviewed de novo. Buccini, 167 Ariz. at 555. ¶25 According to Colin, the warrant affidavit here (1) falsely stated that a known CSAM image was downloaded from Colin’s IP address, and (2) failed to inform the magistrate that Torrential Downpour received only one unreadable piece of the file. He likewise contends the affidavit failed to explain the flaws in the SHA-1 hashing system Torrential Downpour relied on. To secure relief under Franks, Colin must show the affiant (here, the Detective) “knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth” included false statements or omitted material facts. Frimmel, 236 Ariz. at 239, ¶ 27. ¶26 Colin asserts the Detective’s copying and pasting information from the Agent’s email “without any independent verification at all constitutes a reckless disregard for the accuracy of the information” offered in the affidavit. We disagree. To show an affiant acted with a reckless disregard for the truth, a defendant challenging a warrant under Franks must show “proof that the affiant entertained serious doubts about the truth of the affidavit.” Carter, 145 Ariz. at 109. The record contains no such proof here. The Detective testified that he had worked with the Agent previously and had no reason to doubt or question the information the Agent provided based on their previous interactions. Moreover, nothing in Franks prohibited the Detective from relying on information provided by another law enforcement officer in drafting the affidavit. Cf. United States 9 STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court v. Kirk, 781 F.2d 1498, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Observations of fellow officers of the Government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number.” (citation omitted)). Colin likewise cites no authority requiring an officer to personally verify the facts received from another officer before including those same facts in a search warrant affidavit. ¶27 Colin also asserts “the government cannot insulate a deliberately false or recklessly false statement by transmitting it through an innocent affiant officer,” citing United States v. DeLeon, 979 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A deliberate or reckless omission by a government official who is not the affiant can be the basis for a Franks suppression.”) Setting aside the fact that Colin first made this assertion in his reply brief, it is not persuasive. Colin could have attacked the veracity of the warrant by presenting evidence showing the Agent knew or entertained some serious doubts on whether the statements provided to the Detective were misleading or untrue. But Colin did not have the Agent testify at the hearing, and no evidence in the record shows the Agent knew of any false information or material omissions. Because Colin had the burden of proving the Agent made recklessly false statements or material omissions, he has not shown the trial court abused its discretion. See Buccini, 167 Ariz. at 554 (noting the defendant must establish the first prong of a Franks analysis). C. Admissibility of Rule 404(b) Evidence ¶28 Colin challenges the admission of other, uncharged CSAM images found on his devices under Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 404(b). We review a trial court’s admission of evidence of other acts for abuse of discretion. State v. Villalobos, 225 Ariz. 74, 80, ¶ 18 (2010). ¶29 Before trial, the State moved to admit evidence of other, uncharged CSAM files found on Colin’s devices. The State argued such evidence would be used to prove Colin “knowingly possessed the exploitative materials located on his computers, rather than coming upon them by accident or mistake,” and that without such evidence the State may be unable to meet its burden of proof. The State asserted that testimony about these files would be “brief and general in nature,” such as the number of images, their general content, and where the images had been found in the various electronic devices. Colin responded, asking the court to “severely restrict what the State is permitted to show the jury and what the State’s witnesses are permitted to describe.” Colin further argued such evidence should be admitted only if he testified at trial, and that otherwise 10 STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court the uncharged CSAM evidence would constitute improper propensity evidence. ¶30 Acknowledging the State’s burden to prove Colin’s knowledge of the CSAM files, the court granted the State’s motion. The court cautioned the State it should not elicit testimony about any images that could not be confirmed as CSAM files, and to not include any descriptions of the files, to which the State agreed. At trial, the forensic analyst testified about the number of CSAM images found on Colin’s various devices. Though the State did not present any of the uncharged images directly to the jury or have the expert describe the contents of any particular images or other files, the analyst testified about the file names associated with some of the uncharged images. The expert also testified about some terms associated with other files found on one of Colin’s devices. Examples of the file names and terms in the testimony were: rape, anal, lolita, pedo, child porn, and “PTHC.” Colin did not object to any of this testimony at trial. ¶31 Generally, evidence of a person’s “other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). A purpose of this rule is “to prevent introduction of evidence solely to prove a defendant’s propensity for crime or to show [the] defendant is a bad person.” State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 391 (1986). Though such evidence is not admissible if offered only to show propensity, other acts evidence may be admissible for other purposes, including “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Before admitting evidence under Rule 404(b)(2), a court must first determine there is clear and convincing evidence that the acts occurred. State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 582–83 (1997). Then the court must find: (1) the evidence of the other acts is offered for a proper, non-propensity purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) the proffered evidence is relevant to prove that purpose; and (3) the probative value of such evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, 333, ¶ 58 (2022). ¶32 Colin argues the expert’s testimony regarding the uncharged CSAM did not support a valid, non-propensity purpose. Despite the State’s claim that such evidence was relevant to show knowledge, Colin claims this was “not such a sufficiently disputed issue that would allow the amount of other-acts evidence” admitted because he did not present any “case-in- chief.” But the State was required to demonstrate Colin knew about the charged CSAM files. See A.R.S. § 13-3553(A)(2) (“A person commits sexual 11 STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court exploitation of a minor by knowingly . . . possessing . . . any visual depiction in which a minor is engaged in exploitive exhibition or other sexual conduct.”). And though Colin did not testify and presented no evidence at trial, he did specifically raise the issue of knowledge in his arguments to the jury, putting the issue in dispute. Contrary to Colin’s contentions, such evidence was relevant to establishing his knowledge. See Antoniello v. State, 542 S.W.3d 878, 880–81 (Ark. App. 2018) (noting testimony that defendant possessed over 3,000 CSAM files was “probative of his intent, lack of mistake, and knowledge”). ¶33 The additional CSAM images were found among Colin’s various devices that also included items with his personal information. The volume of the uncharged CSAM images, interspersed across multiple devices with indicia of Colin’s ownership, rebuts any suggestion that he did not know about the images or that another person may have acquired CSAM on his devices. Cf. State v. Schneider, 483 S.W.3d 495, 505–06 (Mo. App. 2016) (admitting other acts evidence of several thousand images and videos “tended to show that [the defendant] ‘knowingly’ possess[ed] the images and videos actually charged as crimes”); United States v. Schene, 543 F.3d 627, 643 (10th Cir. 2008) (concluding admission of other, non-charged CSAM images to show defendant knowingly possessed CSAM was not an abuse of discretion). ¶34 Colin also argues the other acts evidence was unfairly prejudicial. Noting the expert’s testimony of the file names associated with some of the uncharged files, Colin argues this evidence would “tend to inflame and upset” the jury and invite them “to infer that the defendant was predisposed to seek or possess illegal material.” Even proper Rule 404(b) evidence, like all relevant evidence, may be excluded if its probative value is “substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 52 (1993); Ariz. R. Evid. 403. ¶35 Admission of uncharged CSAM images or videos can be unduly prejudicial. In State v. Rix, 256 Ariz. 125 (App. 2023), we concluded the trial court erred by allowing the State to present several “disturbing images” of children engaged in sexual conduct under Rule 404(c). Id. at 134, ¶¶ 26–27. These images were far more graphic and substantially dissimilar to the images the defendant had been charged with possessing, and thus in that case we held that the images were “extremely prejudicial, and far less probative.” Id. at ¶ 27. Even so, we explained that had “the evidence been limited to the State to describing the nature and amount of [the defendant’s] sexually exploitative material, . . . the other-act evidence would certainly have been acceptably probative.” Id. at 134–35, ¶ 28. 12 STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court ¶36 Here, the trial court restricted such testimony even further, preventing the State from describing the content of any uncharged images found on Colin’s devices. Though the State did read some file names and terms associated with these images, that testimony was brief and the State did not “luxuriate in inflammatory detail” beyond reading those names. See State v. Salazar, 181 Ariz. 87, 92 (App. 1994). Given the restrictions put in place by the trial court to minimize the prejudicial effect of this evidence, we cannot say it abused its discretion. D. Admissibility of Cable One Records ¶37 Colin argues the court erroneously admitted documents from his internet service provider under the business records hearsay exception. See Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6). “We review admissions of evidence under exceptions to the rule against hearsay for abuse of discretion.” State v. Tucker, 205 Ariz. 157, 165, ¶ 41 (2003). ¶38 On examination of the Agent during trial, the State admitted into evidence records from Cable One, Colin’s internet service provider, showing subscriber data, billing information, along with residential and IP addresses. The records Cable One sent in response came with a cover letter, in which a Cable One employee acknowledged receipt of the subpoena, and further stated, “[p]ursuant to that request, our researchers reviewed our customer/billing databases and have compiled a report responsive to the Summons.” ¶39 At trial, Colin objected to introduction of this evidence on both hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds. In response, the State explained to the court that the records were “kept in the regular course of business” and that “[a] custodian of records is not required” to admit such evidence. The court overruled Colin’s objection and admitted the records. The Agent then testified that Colin’s IP address in the Cable One records matched the IP address Torrential Downpour identified. ¶40 “Generally, an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted is hearsay and not admissible as evidence.” State v. Alston, 261 Ariz. 82, 87, ¶ 10 (App. 2025); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c), 802. An exception to this rule exists for business records of a regularly conducted activity. Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6). To admit records under this exception, Rule 803(6) requires “that the record be made at or near the time of the entry by or from information transmitted by someone with knowledge, be kept in the ordinary course of business, [and] be made as a regular practice.” State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391, 401, ¶ 28 (2013). These 13 STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court conditions must be shown by either (1) the testimony of the custodian of the records or another qualified witness, or (2) certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12). Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6)(D); see Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Trout, 145 Ariz. 355, 360 (App. 1985). Such evidence may be admitted only if “the opponent does not show that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6)(E). ¶41 The State did not call a Cable One custodian of records or another qualified witness of such records to testify at trial as to the requirements listed in Rule 803(6)(A)–(C). Instead, the State argues the cover letter serves as sufficient certification that the records meet the requirements of Rule 803(6). Proper certification under that rule requires compliance with Rule 902(11), which provides that “[t]he original or a copy of a domestic record that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)–(C), as shown by a certification of the custodian or another qualified person that complies with a statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court” is self- authenticating evidence. Ariz. R. Evid. 902(11). ¶42 We are not persuaded by the State’s argument. As to the way Cable One created or stored those records, the cover letter states only that “researchers reviewed [the] customer/billing databases and have compiled a report.” Nothing in this statement makes clear, or even suggests, who entered information into that database and when, or whether making or entering such information into this database was a regular practice of Cable One. See Ariz. R. Evid. 803(6)(A)–(C). Moreover, the certification under Rule 902(11) must be made by “a custodian or another qualified person.” ¶43 The record here contains no information about whether the Cable One employee who authored the cover letter is a custodian or otherwise “qualified person” properly familiar with Cable One’s record keeping practices. See Premier Consulting & Mgmt. Sols., LLC v. Peace Releaf Ctr. I, 257 Ariz. 80, 90, ¶ 42 (App. 2024) (“The requisite foundation [for a business record] must, however, be established by someone who has personal knowledge or is otherwise familiar with how the record was prepared or with the practice of the business concerning the preparation of records of that type.” (citation omitted)). Because there was not sufficient foundation to meet the business records exception, the court erred in admitting the Cable One records. See State v. Walker, 181 Ariz. 475, 482 (App. 1995) (concluding a prosecutor’s avowal that a document was a business record of the police without requisite foundation could not support its admission into evidence). 14 STATE v. COLIN Decision of the Court ¶44 Although the letter did not qualify as a business record, we will not reverse if the error is harmless. State v. Leteve, 237 Ariz. 516, 524, ¶ 25 (2015). To show harmless error, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 (1993). Our analysis does not turn on whether the jury would have returned a guilty verdict absent this error, but “whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶45 On this record, we conclude any error in admitting the Cable One records was harmless. Significantly, Colin never disputed that the information in the records was accurate. See State v. Williams, 133 Ariz. 220, 226 (1982) (“In addition, and perhaps more important to our finding of harmless error, is the fact that the contents of the hearsay evidence were not really in dispute.”). Moreover, the Cable One information listing Colin’s IP address was cumulative to other properly admitted testimony. Without objection, the forensic analyst later testified about the same IP address as listed in the Cable One records. State v. Bass, 198 Ariz. 571, 581, ¶ 40 (2000) (“Evidence is cumulative, and therefore error is cured only where the tainted evidence supports a fact otherwise established by existing evidence.”). ¶46 Though Colin claims the Cable One records were necessary to link him to that IP address, the forensic analyst’s testimony also linked Colin to that information. The analyst testified that the black Acer laptop, on which the charged images were found and which had a single user account with Colin’s name, had used that same IP address. Moreover, the reliability or credibility of the Cable One records was not a key to the State’s case or any evidence presented about Colin’s knowing possession of the charged images. Cf. State v. Copeland, 253 Ariz. 104, 116–17, ¶ 31 (App. 2022) (declining to find erroneously admitted hearsay harmless when the State acknowledged to the jury that “this case is very much about credibility,” and those hearsay statements were used to bolster the victim’s allegations). On this record, the State has shown that any error