Full Opinion

2026 WL 3548632 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION NOTICE This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a). Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d). Court of Appeals of Alaska. WAYLON W. WEAVER, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee. Court of Appeals No. A-14407 November 18, 2026 Trial Court No. 3PA-22-01068 CR Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, Jonathan A. Woodman, Judge. Attorneys and Law Firms Appearances: Justin Gillette, Assistant Public Defender, Fairbanks, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Haines, Judges. SUMMARY DISPOSITION Waylon W. Weaver was convicted, following a jury trial, of felony driving under the influence, felony refusal to submit to a chemical test, and fourth-degree misconduct involving weapons. 1 Weaver now appeals, arguing that the superior court erred by denying his motion to suppress all evidence collected after his arrest because the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for driving under the influence. At an evidentiary hearing on Weaver's motion, the arresting officer testified about his interaction with Weaver as follows. In late June 2022, at roughly midnight, the officer was sitting in a parked patrol vehicle waiting for a tow truck to arrive to impound a vehicle in an unrelated investigation. The patrol vehicle was marked as a police vehicle, and the officer had activated his emergency lights to alert passing drivers to be careful because his patrol vehicle was partially obstructing the road. As the officer sat in his parked patrol vehicle, Weaver drove by the officer at a rate of roughly three to five miles per hour (well below the posted speed limit, which the officer believed was around twenty-five miles per hour), turned around, and then approached the officer's vehicle from the opposite direction at that same slow speed. The officer characterized Weaver as initially driving “extremely close” to the patrol vehicle, despite there being ample room to pass. Uncertain of why Weaver had turned around and was coming back toward him, the officer exited his vehicle and moved around to the passenger side of his car. Weaver then pulled up next to the empty patrol vehicle and paused, looking into it from the driver's side of his truck. The officer approached Weaver and asked him why he was stopped next to the patrol vehicle. Weaver and the officer engaged in a conversation about why the officer was there that the officer characterized as antagonistic. According to the officer, Weaver also had slurred speech, bloodshot watery eyes, and a “thousand-yard stare” consistent with alcohol intoxication, and Weaver exhibited poor manual dexterity, including taking “considerable effort” to focus on removing his keys from the ignition. Suspecting Weaver was intoxicated, the officer asked him if he had consumed any alcohol, and Weaver responded that he had “never” had alcohol. When asked to rate his intoxication on a scale of one to ten, Weaver responded “silly.” Throughout the conversation, Weaver gave answers that (in the officer's view) were unresponsive, noncompliant, and made clear that he did not wish to speak with the officer or answer his questions. The officer then instructed Weaver to exit his truck. The officer testified that Weaver “stumbled a little bit” as he exited the truck and seemed to have an issue maintaining balance. The officer arrested Weaver on suspicion of driving under the influence. 2 Based on the officer's testimony, the superior court ruled that the officer had probable cause to arrest Weaver for driving under the influence. On appeal, Weaver challenges this ruling. Relying primarily on our decision in Saucier v. State , Weaver argues that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him because the officer did not observe any unsafe or erratic driving, did not notice an “odor of alcohol” prior to the arrest, and did not administer field sobriety tests. 3 But probable cause is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. 4 Here, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the superior court's findings, 5 Weaver engaged in behavior consistent with driving under the influence. Weaver drove “extremely close” to the patrol vehicle without a discernable reason and at a rate of three to five miles per hour on a street where the speed limit was around twenty-five miles per hour. There were numerous combined indicia of Weaver's intoxication, including his erratic driving, his slurred speech, his watery, glassy eyes, his poor manual dexterity, and his response intimating that he was “silly” drunk. Applying our independent judgment, we agree with the superior court that the totality of the circumstances supported a reasonable belief that Weaver was driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. 6 The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED. Footnotes 1 AS 28.35.030(n), AS 28.35.032(p), and AS 11.61.210(a)(1), respectively. 2 The officer testified that he did not ask Weaver to perform any field sobriety tests at least in part due to Weaver's uncooperativeness, including Weaver's refusal to answer many of the officer's questions. 3 See Saucier v. State , 869 P.2d 483, 484-86 (Alaska App. 1994) (holding that there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving while intoxicated where the defendant had “minor driving errors” and admitted to drinking two beers, the officer “candidly admitted that many of the common indicia of intoxication were absent,” and the officer smelled a normal but not strong odor of alcohol because “the law prohibits driving while intoxicated, not driving after having had a drink”). 4 Simpson v. State , 489 P.3d 1181, 1185 (Alaska App. 2021) (“Probable cause to arrest exists if the totality of the circumstances known to the officer would support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”). 5 State v. Joubert , 20 P.3d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 2001) (requiring appellate courts to “review a denial of a motion to suppress in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling”). 6 See id. at 1118-19 (defining “probable cause” and stating that a trial court's probable cause determination is reviewed de novo ). End of Document