State of Alabama v. Quinard Melton

Rel: September 25, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________ CR-2025-0235 _________________________ State of Alabama v. Quinard Melton Appeal from Lee Circuit Court (CC-24-626) PER CURIAM. Quinard Melton was indicted for trafficking oxycodone, hydrocodone, cannabis, and cocaine, violations of §§ 13A-12-231(3), 13A- 12-231(3), 13A-12-231(1), and 13A-12-231(2), Ala. Code 1975, respectively. Melton was also indicted for the unlawful possession of CR-2025-0235 drug paraphernalia, a violation of § 13A-12-260(c), Ala. Code 1975. Melton pleaded not guilty on August 20, 2024. (C. 22.) He subsequently moved to suppress the evidence that was seized pursuant to a search warrant. The Lee Circuit Court granted Melton's motion. The State now appeals the trial court's order pursuant to Rule 15.7, Ala. R. Crim. P., certifying that the pretrial appeal was not brought for the purpose of delay and that the trial court's ruling would be fatal to the prosecution if not reversed. Facts and Procedural History On April 5, 2022, Detective Levi Donnelly (the case agent supervising the "ongoing" narcotics investigation of Melton and the property at issue), along with other members of the Auburn Police Department Narcotics Division and the Lee County SWAT team, conducted a search of 1173 Eagle Circle in Auburn, pursuant to a search warrant that was issued on April 1, 2022. (R. 17, 51.) During that search, officers seized "[m]ultiple plastic bags containing a white powdery substance," "[m]ultiple plastic bags containing marijuana," "THC edibles," a bottle of hydrocodone pills, a bottle of oxycodone pills, two 2 CR-2025-0235 cellular telephones, digital scales, a Glock magazine, boxes of ammunition, and $3,381.00 in cash. (C. 68.) On August 2, 2024, Melton was indicted by a Lee County grand jury for trafficking oxycodone, hydrocodone, cannabis, and cocaine, as well as for the unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. (C. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.) On October 9, 2024, Melton moved to suppress all items seized during the search because, he argued, the affidavit on which the search warrant was issued failed to establish probable cause. (C. 25-28.) Specifically, Melton argued in his motion and at the suppression hearing held on January 7, 2025, that the reliability of the confidential informant referred to in the affidavit had not been established and that the search warrant was based on "stale" information. (C. 26; R. 7.) Detective Joshua Gooden's affidavit in support of the application for the search warrant was admitted as an exhibit at the suppression hearing by stipulation of the parties. (R. 13.) That affidavit, sworn on April 1, 2022, states, in pertinent part: "The Auburn Police Division Narcotics Unit received information concerning the sale of illegal narcotics, to include Cocaine, by Quinard Demon Melton, at 1173 Eagle Circle Auburn, Lee County, Alabama. During the course of this ongoing investigation, purchases of Cocaine have been made 3 CR-2025-0235 from Quinard Demon Melton in Auburn, Lee County, Alabama. "During the month of March, members of the Auburn Police Department Narcotics Unit have met with a confidential informant, hereinafter referred to as CI. During this meeting, the CI and CI's vehicle were searched and the CI was fitted with an electronic transmitting device and provided with U.S. currency, with pre-recorded serial numbers to purchase Cocaine. Detectives then followed the CI to 1173 Eagle Circle in Auburn, Lee County, Alabama. Detectives monitored the transaction by audio and visual surveillance. The CI then purchased a quantity of Cocaine from Quinard Melton, alias. The CI then met with Detective Donnelly and turned the Cocaine over to detectives' control. Detectives have utilized CI to make buys of Cocaine from Quinard Melton, alias, at 1173 Eagle Circle, Auburn, Lee County, Alabama in the past months also. "This residence, 1173 Eagle Circle Auburn, Lee County, Alabama, is a one-story brick/stone dwelling. The dwelling faces North, and the mailbox has the numeric of 1173, which is also clearly marked with the numeric of 1173 on the left side of the house. Melton utilizes a white 1968 Chevrolet Impala, bearing Alabama license plate 3993BH4." (C. 64.) In the affidavit, Det. Gooden also detailed his "training, experience, and participation, in other [drug-trafficking] investigations" and stated that, based on "this training and experience, [he] reasonably believe[d] that such items and/or evidence could be stored and/or contained within the premises/vehicles to be searched." (C. 65.) Det. Gooden further stated his belief that the facts and information provided 4 CR-2025-0235 constituted "probable cause to believe that Quinard Demon Melton is involved in distribution of controlled substances" and that the accoutrements of Melton's drug-trafficking operation (including unlawful controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, firearms, and proceeds) were "concealed in or upon 1173 Eagle Circle Way," on Melton's person, and on or in "any other persons and/or vehicles located on the property that are immediately associated with 1173 Eagle Circle, Auburn, Lee County, Alabama." (C. 65.) Based on Det. Gooden's affidavit, the magistrate issued a search warrant on the afternoon of April 1, 2022. At the suppression hearing, the case agent, Det. Donnelly, testified that he had supervised the investigation of Melton, that the investigation had been "ongoing" for "[s]everal months," that he had supervised Det. Gooden in seeking the search warrant, and that he had participated in the execution of that warrant. (R. 17-21, 24.) Det. Donnelly testified that there had been multiple purchases from Melton at the residence for which the search warrant was sought. (R. 24, 53-54.) Det. Donnelly also testified that the residence had been under surveillance and that the drug activity had been independently verified by law-enforcement officers. (R. 26, 53-54.) Det. Donnelly further testified that the most 5 CR-2025-0235 recent controlled buy that was specifically detailed in the affidavit took place within 10 days of when the affidavit was sworn. (R. 39.) Det. Donnelly then testified that he knew the exact date of that "buy" but that the specific date could not be provided without compromising the safety of the confidential informant. (R. 40, 46.) However, Det. Donnelly testified that he did not know whether Det. Gooden shared any additional information outside the affidavit with the issuing magistrate. Standard of Review "Because the evidence presented at [Melton's] suppression hearing was undisputed, we review the trial court's [ruling on Melton's] motion to suppress de novo." Reynolds v. State, 334 So. 3d 262, 268 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020). " ' "Where the evidence before the trial court was undisputed the ore tenus rule is inapplicable, and the [appellate] Court will sit in judgment on the evidence de novo, indulging no presumption in favor of the trial court's application of the law to those facts." ' State v. Hill, 690 So. 2d 1201, 1203 (Ala. 1996), quoting Stiles v. Brown, 380 So. 2d 792, 794 (Ala. 1980). ' " '[W]hen the trial court improperly applies the law to the facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court's judgment.' " ' Ex parte Jackson, 886 So. 2d 155, 159 (Ala. 2004), quoting Hill, 690 So. 2d at 1203, quoting in turn Ex parte Agee, 669 So. 2d 102, 104 (Ala. 1995). A trial court's ultimate legal conclusion on a motion to suppress based on a given set of facts is a question of law that is reviewed de novo 6 CR-2025-0235 on appeal. See State v. Smith, 785 So. 2d 1169 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000)." State v. Hargett, 935 So. 2d 1200, 1203-04 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). Analysis On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred when it granted Melton's motion to suppress because the affidavit supported a finding of probable cause. We agree with the State that there was sufficient information in Det. Gooden's affidavit to support the magistrate's finding of probable cause to issue the search warrant. Contrary to Melton's arguments below, the confidential informant's reliability was established in the affidavit, and the information provided therein was not "stale." I. Probable Cause In considering the sufficiency of the affidavit on which the search warrant was based, we are guided by the following well-established principles. " 'The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation." Thus, "[a] search warrant may only be issued upon a showing of probable cause 7 CR-2025-0235 that evidence or instrumentalities of a crime or contraband will be found in the place to be searched." United States v. Gettel, 474 F.3d 1081, 1086 (8th Cir. 2007).' " Callen v. State, 284 So. 3d 177, 209 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Ex parte Green, 15 So. 3d 489, 492 (Ala. 2008)). " 'Probable cause must be determined by an analysis of "the totality of the circumstances." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). In determining whether to issue a search warrant, the issuing magistrate is to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of the person supplying the information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates; Hyde v. State, 534 So. 2d 1132 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988). Our duty as a reviewing court is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates; McCray v. State, 501 So. 2d 532 (Ala. Cr. App. 1986); Hyde v. State.' "Marks v. State, 575 So. 2d 611, 614-15 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)." Callen, 284 So. 3d at 208 (emphasis added). " ' "Probable cause to search a residence exists when 'there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.' Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. [213], 103 S. Ct. [2317] at 2332[, 76 L. Ed.2d 527 (1983)]." United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075, 1080 8 CR-2025-0235 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 901, 111 S. Ct. 259 [112 L. Ed. 2d 216] (1990).... [T]here is no requirement of a "showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A 'practical, nontechnical' probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. [730] at 742, 103 S. Ct. [1535] at 1543 [75 L. Ed.2d 502] [(1983)]. Additionally, "[w]here a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical rather than a common sense manner, and should resolve doubtful or marginal cases according to the preference to be accorded to warrants." Maddox v. State, 502 So. 2d 779, 785 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), affirmed in part, remanded on other grounds, 502 So. 2d 786 (Ala.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 932 [107 S. Ct. 404, 93 L. Ed. 2d 357] (1986).' "Poole v. State, 596 So. 2d 632, 641 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)." Callen, 284 So. 3d at 209-10 (emphasis added). Likewise, "[a] 'neutral and detached magistrate' is permitted to 'draw such reasonable inferences as he will from the material supplied to him by applicants for a warrant.' " Reynolds v. State, 334 So. 3d 262, 268 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (1983)) (emphasis added). In addition, "[w]hether the circumstances recited in an affidavit offered in support of an application for a search warrant are such that the probable cause that might once have been demonstrated by them has grown 'stale' is a matter that 'must be 9 CR-2025-0235 determined by the circumstances of each case.' " Vinson v. State, 843 So. 2d 229, 233 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (quoting Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932)). Finally, " '[w]here the affidavit recites a mere isolated violation it would not be unreasonable to imply that probable cause dwindles rather quickly with the passage of time. However, where the affidavit properly recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature, a course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less significant.' " Vinson, 843 So. 2d at 233 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972)) (emphasis added). Here, given the "totality of the circumstances" and allowing for "reasonable inferences," as well as a "practical, common-sense" determination, we hold that the affidavit presented a "fair probability" that controlled substances would be found at the Eagle Circle residence. See Callen, supra. In short, the issuing magistrate could have reasonably concluded from Det. Gooden's affidavit that there was a "fair probability" that cocaine and other evidence of drug trafficking were located at the residence to be searched. First, the affidavit clearly stated that law-enforcement officers began a narcotics investigation into Melton and the residence after 10 CR-2025-0235 "receiv[ing] information concerning the sale of illegal narcotics, to include Cocaine, by Quinard Melton, at 1173 Eagle Circle Auburn, Lee County, Alabama." (C. 64.) Second, the affidavit made clear that there was an "ongoing investigation" based on that information and that multiple "purchases of Cocaine have been made from … Melton." (C. 64 (emphasis added).) Third, the affidavit specifically stated that "[d]etectives have utilized [the confidential informant] to make buys of Cocaine from Quinard Melton, alias, at 1173 Eagle Circle … in the past months" as part of this "ongoing" investigation. (C. 64.) Fourth, the affidavit stated that at least one of the multiple controlled buys from Melton at the specific residence to be searched took place within the 31 days preceding the swearing of the affidavit, specifically, "[d]uring the month of March." Fifth, Det. Gooden further stated that -- in light of his training and experience and based on the "ongoing" investigation of Melton and the residence at issue, which included multiple cocaine purchases the confidential informant had made from Melton at that residence during the "past months," including the specific transaction in March 2022 -- he believed that Melton was running a drug-trafficking operation at the residence and that evidence of that operation would be found there. 11 CR-2025-0235 To be sure, the affidavit's only specific reference to a clearly defined time was to the preceding month of March, which included a time span of up to 31 days. However, that reference must be considered in the context of the entire affidavit and the totality of the circumstances presented therein. The March 2022 purchase was not a "single, isolated" event. See Cochran v. State, 111 So. 3d 148, 162 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012). The affidavit stated that, "[d]uring the course of this ongoing investigation," "[d]etectives have utilized [the confidential informant] to make buys of cocaine from Quinard Melton … at 1173 Eagle Circle, Auburn, Lee County, Alabama in the past months," including a specific transaction that was recorded by detectives "[d]uring the month of March" before the affidavit was sworn on April 1, 2022. (C. 64 (emphasis added).) "Ongoing" is defined as "being actually in process." Merriam- Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1111 (12th ed. 2026) (emphasis added). Thus, the magistrate, relying on his "practical, common-sense," could "reasonably infer" from the description of an "ongoing" investigation that the multiple buys made in the "past months" referred to the "past months" most recently preceding the specific March 2022 reference. In addition, the affidavit stated that law-enforcement officers had "utilized 12 CR-2025-0235 CI to make buys … from Quinard Melton … at 1173 Eagle Circle" in Auburn, Alabama. (C. 64 (emphasis added).) Thus, the recent, multiple cocaine "buys" were clearly supervised by law-enforcement officers, which established the reliability of the confidential informant and the information provided. The buys were all made from Melton and at the address to be searched, which established a pattern of drug trafficking by Melton at that location. In other words, the affidavit indicated " 'protracted and continuous' " drug-activity for which " 'the passage of time becomes less significant.' " Vinson, 843 So. 2d at 233 (emphasis added; citation omitted). See also Cochran, 111 So. 3d at 162 (noting that "[t]he allegations in the affidavit concerned criminal activity that was continuing in nature over an extended period, not a single, isolated event" (emphasis added)). Because of the pattern of confirmed drug-trafficking activity, the passage of time, at most 31 days,1 did not render the reliable information provided in Det. Gooden's affidavit "stale." 1Although Det. Donnelly testified that the March 2022 buy occurred within 10 days of the swearing of Det. Gooden's affidavit, Det. Donnelly did not know if this fact (or any facts to which he testified at the suppression hearing) was presented by Det. Gooden to the magistrate. Thus, we consider only the information presented in Det. Gooden's affidavit in determining whether probable cause existed. See, e.g., Ex parte Green, 15 So. 3d 489, 495 (Ala. 2008) (recognizing that an affidavit's 13 CR-2025-0235 In sum, because multiple, reliable and verified "buys" took place from Melton at the residence to be searched during an "ongoing" investigation in the months recently preceding the swearing of the affidavit, including but not limited to the previous 31 days, it was reasonable for the magistrate to conclude that there was a "fair probability" that evidence of drug trafficking, including illegal drugs, would be found at the residence at the time the search warrant issued on April 1, 2022. Cf. Ex parte Parker, 858 So. 2d 941, 945-47 (2003) (holding that, because "the only statement" in the affidavit "that could support a finding of probable cause" was "false without dispute," the affidavit failed to establish reliability or provide "any dates to establish recency" and did not establish "a pattern of cocaine sales" to "support the conclusion that the cocaine … was still there"); and Nelms v. State, 568 So. 2d 384, 388 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (holding that the affidavit was " 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable' " because "there was no reference at all in the "deficiency may be cured by information an affiant supplied to the issuing authority in addition to the assertions in the affidavit," but not when the affiant could not recall providing those additional facts to the magistrate). 14 CR-2025-0235 affidavit as to when the informant saw the narcotics at the appellant's residence" (emphasis added; citation omitted)). Our conclusion that the affidavit here was supported by probable cause is further bolstered by the well-settled principle that this Court will " ' "resolve doubtful or marginal cases according to the preference to be accorded to warrants." ' " Callen, 284 So. 3d at 209-10 (citations omitted). Accordingly, we hold that the magistrate properly issued the search warrant based on probable cause and that the trial court exceeded its discretion by granting Melton's motion to suppress the evidence seized during the execution of that warrant. II. Good Faith In the alternative, the State also argues, as it did below, that, even if there were deficiencies in the affidavit, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would preclude suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. We agree with the State that, had there been deficiencies in Det. Gooden's affidavit, the good-faith exception would nonetheless prevent the exclusion of evidence seized during the search in this case. 15 CR-2025-0235 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly "expressed a strong preference for warrants and declared that 'in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall.' " United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (citation omitted). As the Leon Court explained, "[r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according 'great deference' to a magistrate's determination." Id. Guided by those principles, the United States Supreme Court established the "good-faith" exception, which prevents the exclusion of "reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate." Id. at 913. This Court has explained: " ' "The good faith exception provides that when officers acting in good faith, that is, in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral, detached magistrate, conduct a search and the warrant is found to be invalid, the evidence need not be excluded." Rivers v. State, 695 So. 2d 260, 262 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). " 'In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), … the United States Supreme Court recognized four circumstances in which the good faith 16 CR-2025-0235 exception was inapplicable: (1) when the magistrate or judge relies on information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) when the magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role and fails to act in a neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking an indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) when the warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officer cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.' " Callen, 284 So. 3d at 208 (quoting Bailey v. State, 67 So. 3d 145, 149-50 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)). The search warrant here was executed by law-enforcement officers in good faith and in objective reasonable reliance on that warrant. First, regardless of whether Det. Donnelly should be considered in the affiant's stead because he assisted Det. Gooden in preparing the affidavit (as Melton asserted below (R. 15)), the good-faith exception is not rendered inapplicable based on the affiant's providing "deficient" information. Rather, the good-faith exception is rendered inapplicable based on the affiant's submission of "false" information that the affiant either " 'knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth.' " Callen, 284 So. 3d at 208 (emphasis added; citation omitted). Here, there has never been any allegation that Det. Gooden's affidavit was based on "false" information or information based on a 17 CR-2025-0235 "reckless disregard of the truth." Id. Second, there has never been any allegation that the " 'magistrate wholly abandon[ed] his judicial role and fail[ed] to act in a neutral and detached manner.' " Id. (citation omitted). Third, for the reasons already stated in Part I of this opinion, we do not believe that the " 'affidavit [was] so lacking an indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.' " Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, probable cause was provided in Det. Gooden's affidavit. However, to the extent that "[r]easonable … minds may differ," Leon, 484 U.S. at 914, there was, at a minimum, a "colorable showing of probable cause" on which law-enforcement officers could have reasonably relied. Nelms v. State, 568 So. 2d 384, 389 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (quoting United States v. Hove, 848 F. 2d 137, 140 (9th Cir. 1988)) (" '[O]fficers who present a colorable showing of probable cause to a judicial officer ought to be able to rely on that officer's ruling in executing the warrant.' "). As we recognized in Berry v. State, 299 So. 3d 336, 350 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (plurality opinion), " ' [i]t is well settled that "[s]uppression of evidence … has always been our last resort, not our first impulse," and the exclusionary rule is only applicable "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." ' " (Quoting United 18 CR-2025-0235 States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir. 2006), quoting in turn Hudson v. Michigan, 546 U.S. 586 (2006).) Fourth, " 'the warrant is [not] so facially deficient that the executing officer cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.' " Callen, 284 So. 2d at 208 (citation omitted). In sum, "[t]here is no indication in the record that any of the four cited circumstances that would invalidate the application of the good- faith exception was present in this case." Id. Accordingly, "in light of the foregoing, even if there were deficiencies in [Det. Gooden's] affidavit, we cannot say that the evidence seized as a result of the warrant should have been suppressed." Bolden v. State, 205 So. 3d 739, 744 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). Every indication here is that law-enforcement officers reasonably relied in "good faith" on the search warrant. And, "when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope … there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter." Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21. Conclusion For these reasons, the trial court's order suppressing the evidence against Melton is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 19 CR-2025-0235 REVERSED AND REMANDED. Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Minor, and Anderson, JJ., concur. Cole, J., concurs in the result. 20