State of Alabama v. Michael Bragg Woolf; Michael Bragg Woolf v. State of Alabama

Rel: November 6, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 (334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ CR-2025-0567 _________________________ State of Alabama v. Michael Bragg Woolf ________________________ Michael Bragg Woolf v. State of Alabama Appeals from Mobile Circuit Court (CC-08-4437.60) KELLUM, Judge. The State of Alabama appeals the Mobile Circuit Court's order granting, in part, Michael Bragg Woolf's petition for postconviction relief CR-2025-0567 filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P. The circuit court set aside Woolf's sentence of death after finding that Woolf was intellectually disabled and resentenced Woolf to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Woolf cross-appeals the circuit court's order insofar as it denies his claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in the guilt phase of his trial for failing to investigate and present certain evidence that, he says, was relevant to the issue of his intent. In November 2010, Woolf was convicted of two counts of capital murder for murdering his wife, Angel Marie Woolf, and his two-year-old son, Ayden Woolf, offenses defined as capital because two or more people were killed pursuant to one plan or scheme, § 13A-5-40(a)(10), Ala. Code 1975, and because Ayden was under the age of 14 years old at the time that he was killed, a violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975. In February 2011, the jury, by a vote of 11 to 1, recommended that Woolf be sentenced to death. The circuit court sentenced Woolf to death. On direct appeal in 2014, this Court affirmed, in part, the circuit court's judgment and remanded Woolf's case for the circuit court to clarify its findings regarding the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and to reweigh the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances. See Woolf v. 2 CR-2025-0567 State, 220 So. 3d 338 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014). On return to remand, we affirmed Woolf's convictions and sentence of death. See Woolf v. State, 220 So. 3d at 388 (opinion on return to remand). The Alabama Supreme Court initially granted certiorari review but then quashed the writ of certiorari, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. See Woolf v. Alabama, 581 U.S. 943 (2017). This Court issued the certificate of judgment on October 28, 2016. See Rule 41, Ala. R. App. P. On October 24, 2017, Woolf filed a timely petition for postconviction relief attacking his capital-murder convictions and sentence of death. The State moved that the petition be partially dismissed on procedural grounds. The circuit court denied that motion. The State then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court. By an order dated January 30, 2019, this Court denied the State's mandamus petition. See State v. Woolf (No. CR-2018-0324, January 30, 2019). An amended postconviction petition was filed on June 22, 2023,1 after Woolf obtained new counsel. After an evidentiary hearing in August 1A review of the record shows that the delay in this case was caused by changes in postconviction counsel and scheduling delays necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic. 3 CR-2025-0567 2024, the circuit court granted, in part, Woolf's petition and found that he could not constitutionally be sentenced to death because he is intellectual disabled. The circuit court denied relief on Woolf's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in regard to the guilt phase of his trial. The State appealed, and Woolf cross-appealed. See Rule 32.10(a), Ala. R. Crim. P. On direct appeal, this Court stated the following concerning the facts supporting Woolf's convictions: "On February 15, 2008, Woolf went to Resultz Corp. in Mobile with his wife Angel, their two-year-old son Ayden, and Woolf's mother, Lynn Tullos. Woolf and Angel had what witnesses described as a turbulent relationship, and, because Woolf had begun to doubt that he was Ayden's biological father, Woolf and Angel went to Resultz Corp., 'a biomedical testing laboratory' that performed drug screenings and 'DNA collections and testing,' for a paternity test to determine whether Woolf was Ayden's biological father. Woolf seemed stressed about the results of the test and said 'that other people were saying [Ayden] [might] not be his.' After completing the test, Woolf asked an employee of Resultz Corp. to pray for him. "After he received the results, Woolf returned to Resultz Corp. with Ayden on March 3, 2008. Woolf told a Resultz Corp. employee that he needed to have the results of the test 'explain[ed] to him because he was a little confused about [them].' The employee explained the results to Woolf who said 'he was just worried about' what other people were saying regarding Ayden's paternity. As Woolf left Resultz Corp., he 4 CR-2025-0567 asked the owner whether she believed in God and asked her to pray for him. "Shortly after midnight on the morning of March 5, 2008, Woolf called the Mobile County emergency 911 number and reported that he had killed his family and needed to go to jail. Paramedics with the Mobile Fire Department and officers with the Mobile Police Department were dispatched to Woolf's mobile home. ".... "Mobile police officers went to Woolf's mobile home, where they found the bodies of Angel and Ayden; both Angel and Ayden had been shot. The officers also located a 'sock print impression that was in blood' and several bloody shoe impressions. On the living-room floor officers found a .38 caliber revolver that held two spent casings and one cartridge. "Officers transported Woolf to the Mobile Police Department headquarters and placed him in an interview room. Officer [Shannon] Payne checked on Woolf, who was alternating between pacing and lying on the floor. Woolf said, 'I'm a fucking dumb ass.' He also said, 'Shoot me, just shoot me.' (R. 1415.) When Officer Payne asked why he should shoot him, Woolf said, 'because I'm guilty.' (R. 1415.)" Woolf, 220 So. 3d at 345-47 (footnote omitted). Standard of Review The Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition that is the subject of this appeal was filed in the Mobile Circuit Court by Woolf; therefore, according to Rule 32.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., Woolf has the sole burden of pleading and proving his claims. 5 CR-2025-0567 "The petitioner shall have the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The state shall have the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion, but once a ground of preclusion has been pleaded, the petitioner shall have the burden of disproving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." Rule 32.3 (emphasis added). " 'The standard of review on appeal in a postconviction proceeding [after an evidentiary hearing] is whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied the petition.' Elliott v. State, 601 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). '[W]hen the facts are undisputed, and an appellate court is presented with pure questions of law, that court's review in a Rule 32 proceeding is de novo.' Ex parte White, 792 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Ala. 2001). '[W]hen there are disputed facts in a postconviction proceeding and the circuit court resolves those disputed facts, "[t]he standard of review on appeal ... is whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied the petition." ' Boyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 1113, 1122 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003), quoting Elliott, 601 So. 2d at 1119. See also Mashburn v. State, 148 So. 3d 1094, 1104 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013). 'We will reverse a circuit court's findings only if they are "clearly erroneous." ' Barbour v. State, 903 So. 2d 858, 861 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)." State v. Mack, [Ms. CR-2023-0284, Dec. 20, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2024). " ' "[A] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). ...' " 6 CR-2025-0567 Morrison v. State, 551 So. 2d 435, 436-37 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (citation omitted). In this case, a different judge presided over the postconviction proceedings than the judge who presided over Woolf's trial. " 'The Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Gissendanner, 288 So. 3d 1011 (Ala. 2019), recognized that, when a circuit court grants relief on a postconviction petition, we afford the court's findings of fact deference on appeal.' State v. Lewis, 371 So. 3d 863, 890 (Ala. Crim. App. 2022)." State v. Mack, ___ So. 3d at ___. We further noted in Mack that "[w]e would apply even a greater degree of deference if the same judge presided over the trial and the postconviction proceedings." Mack, ___ So. 3d at ___ n.10. When granting relief and finding that Woolf was intellectually disabled, the circuit court stated that its finding was a "question of fact" solely for that court to determine. (C. 1488.) However, in the context of such a claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), this Court must consider the court's application of the applicable law to the facts. "IQ analyses in Atkins [v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002),] claims pose mixed questions of law and fact. A defendant's specific scores are factual issues, whereas the propriety of a 7 CR-2025-0567 court's interpretation of those scores can be an issue of federal [or state] law. See Hall [v. Florida], 572 U.S. [701] at 723 [(2014)] (concluding that the Constitution prohibited Florida's approach to analyzing IQ scores); Moore [v. Texas], 581 U.S. [1] at 13-15 [(2017)] (vacating the Texas court's IQ analysis because it contravened our holding in Hall, not because it constituted clear factual error)." Hamm v. Smith, 608 U.S. 278 n.6 (2026) (Alito, J., dissenting from order dismissing writ of certiorari). With these principles in mind, we first review the State's appeal of the circuit court's order insofar as it finds that Woolf is intellectually disabled. I. State's Appeal The State argues that the circuit court erred in finding that Woolf met the definition of intellectually disabled adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453 (Ala. 2002), pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Atkins. Specifically, the State argues that, over the course of his life, Woolf had nine IQ tests and that, in none of those tests, did Woolf score less than a full-scale IQ score of 74. The State asserts that the circuit court "cherry-picked Woolf's childhood IQ scores, removing the four highest from consideration to try 8 CR-2025-0567 to create the facts necessary for intellectual disability." (State's brief at 40.) It further asserts that the court also abused its discretion in considering neuropsychological tests when evaluating the first prong of the Perkins's inquiry. The circuit court requested imaging of Woolf's brain, it argues, but those tests were "never mentioned or admitted into evidence." (State's brief at 41.) The United States Supreme Court, in Atkins, first held that it was a violation of the United States Constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment to execute an individual who is mentally retarded. The Court left it to each state to determine the definition of mental retardation. The Alabama Supreme Court, in Perkins, adopted the most liberal definition of mental retardation utilized by the states that have addressed this issue and held that, to prove mental retardation, now referred to as an intellectual disability, a defendant must show the following: "(1) significant subaverage intellectual functioning (i.e., an IQ of 70 or below); (2) significant or substantial deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) the manifestation of these problems during the defendant's developmental period (i.e., before the defendant reached age 18)." 9 CR-2025-0567 Perkins, 851 So. 2d at 456. A few years later, in Smith v. State, 213 So. 3d 239 (Ala. 2007), the Alabama Supreme Court expanded its holding in Perkins and explained: "All three factors must be met in order for a person to be classified as mentally retarded for purposes of an Atkins [v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002),] claim. Implicit in the definition is that the subaverage intellectual functioning and the deficits in adaptive behavior must be present at the time the crime was committed as well as having manifested themselves before age 18. This conclusion finds support in examining the facts we found relevant in Ex parte Perkins and Ex parte Smith[, 213 So. 3d 214 (Ala. 2003),] and finds further support in the Atkins decision itself, in which the United States Supreme Court noted: 'The American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines mental retardation as follows: "Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning." ' 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (second emphasis added). Therefore, in order for an offender to be considered mentally retarded in the Atkins context, the offender must currently exhibit subaverage intellectual functioning, currently exhibit deficits in adaptive behavior, and these problems must have manifested themselves before the age of 18." 213 So. 3d at 248 (some emphasis added). Since Perkins and Smith, the United States Supreme Court has declined to use the term "mental retardation" but, instead, has used the term "intellectual disability" to be consistent with experts who have modified their terminology. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014). 10 CR-2025-0567 In Hall v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court revisited Atkins and rejected Florida's strict adherence to a score of 70 as an absolute cutoff for defining intellectual disability under Atkins. The United States Supreme Court further stated: "By failing to take into account the SEM [Standard Error of Measurement] and setting a strict cutoff at 70, Florida 'goes against the unanimous professional consensus.' APA [American Psychological Association] Brief 15. Neither Florida nor its amici point to a single medical professional who supports this cutoff. The DSM-5 [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fifth Edition] repudiates it: 'IQ test scores are approximations of conceptual functioning but may be insufficient to assess reasoning in real-life situations and mastery of practical tasks.' DSM-5, at 37. This statement well captures the Court's independent assessment that an individual with an IQ test score 'between 70 and 75 or lower,' Atkins [v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304] at 309, n.5 [(2002),] may show intellectual disability by presenting additional evidence regarding difficulties in adaptive functioning. "The flaws in Florida's law are the result of the inherent error in IQ tests themselves. An IQ score is an approximation, not a final and infallible assessment of intellectual functioning. See APA Brief 24 ('[I]t is standard psychometric practice to report the "estimates of relevant reliabilities and standard errors of measurement" when reporting a test score'); ibid. (the margin of error is 'inherent to the accuracy of IQ scores'); Furr [& Bacharach], Psychometrics, at 119 [(2d ed. 2014)] ('[T]he standard error of measurement is an important psychometric value with implications for applied measurement'). SEM is not a concept peculiar to the psychiatric profession and IQ tests. It is a measure that is recognized and relied upon by those who create and devise 11 CR-2025-0567 tests of all sorts. Id., at 118 (identifying the SEM as 'one of the most important concepts in measurement theory'). "This awareness of the IQ test's limits is of particular importance when conducting the conjunctive assessment necessary to assess an individual's intellectual ability. See American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 40 (11th ed. 2010) ('It must be stressed that the diagnosis of [intellectual disability] is intended to reflect a clinical judgment rather than an actuarial determination'). "Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number. See DSM-5, at 37. Courts must recognize, as does the medical community, that the IQ test is imprecise. This is not to say that an IQ test score is unhelpful. It is of considerable significance, as the medical community recognizes. But in using these scores to assess a defendant's eligibility for the death penalty, a State must afford these test scores the same studied skepticism that those who design and use the tests do and understand that an IQ test score represents a range rather than a fixed number. A State that ignores the inherent imprecision of these tests risks executing a person who suffers from intellectual disability. See APA Brief 17 ('Under the universally accepted clinical standards for diagnosing intellectual disability, the court's determination that Mr. Hall is not intellectually disabled cannot be considered valid'). "This Court agrees with the medical experts that when a defendant's IQ test score falls within the test's acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits." 572 U.S. at 722-23. 12 CR-2025-0567 Alabama has applied the Hall v. Florida holding. See Carroll v. State, 300 So. 3d 59 (Ala. 2019); Lane v. State, 286 So. 3d 61 (Ala. 2018); Reeves v. State, 226 So. 3d 711 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016). As we have stated: "The Court held that, consistent with the 'medical community's diagnostic framework,' courts tasked with determining whether a defendant exhibits intellectual- functioning deficits must consider the 'standard error or measurement.' Moore [v. Texas,] 581 U.S. [1] at [13], 137 S.Ct. [1039] at 1049 [(2017)]. To that end, the Court, " 'instructs that, where an IQ score is close to, but above, 70, courts must account for the test's "standard error of measurement." See [Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701] at 713, 724[, 134 S.Ct. at 1995, 2001 (2014)]. See also Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 315[, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2278, 192 L.Ed. 2d 356] (2015) (relying on Hall to find unreasonable a state court's conclusion that a score of 75 precluded an intellectual-disability finding). As we explained in Hall, the standard error of measurement is "a statistical fact, a reflection of the inherent imprecision of the test itself." 572 U.S., at 713[, 134 S.Ct. at 1995]. "For purposes of most IQ tests," this imprecision in the testing instrument "means that an individual's score is best understood as a range of scores on either side of the recorded score ... within which one may say an individual's true IQ score lies." Id., at 713[, 134 S.Ct. at 1995]. A test's standard error of measurement "reflects the reality that an individual's intellectual functioning cannot be reduced to a single numerical score." Ibid. See also id., at 713[, 134 S.Ct. at 1995]; DSM-5, at 37; 13 CR-2025-0567 AAIDD, User's Guide: Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 22-23 (11th ed. 2012) (hereinafter AAIDD-11 User's Guide).' "Moore, 581 U.S. at 13-14, 137 S.Ct. at 1049. Thus, with a standard error of measurement of 5, an IQ 'score of 74, adjusted for the standard error of measurement, yields a range of 69 to 79.' Moore, 581 U.S. at 14, 137 S.Ct. at 1049. 'Because the lower end of [the] score range falls at or below 70, [courts must] move on to consider ... adaptive functioning.' Id." Carroll v. State, 300 So. 3d at 54. Nonetheless, Alabama has not specifically addressed the situation where a defendant alleging intellectual disability under Atkins has taken multiple IQ tests and how those prior test scores should be used in assessing an Atkins claim. The United States Supreme Court in Hall did state: "Even when a person has taken multiple tests, each separate score must be assessed using the SEM, and the analysis of multiple IQ scores jointly is a complicated endeavor. See Schneider, Principles of Assessment of Aptitude and Achievement, in The Oxford Handbook of Child Psychological Assessment 286, 289-291, 318 (D. Saklofske, C. Reynolds, V. Schwean, ed. 2013). In addition, because the test itself may be flawed, or administered in a consistently flawed manner, multiple examinations may result in repeated similar scores, so that even a consistent score is not conclusive evidence of intellectual functioning." 572 U.S. at 714 (emphasis added). 14 CR-2025-0567 Since Hall, little has been written on the issue of assessing multiple IQ scores in light of Atkins. The Ohio Court of Appeals has stated: "Even if Mr. Wesson achieved a higher score on certain tests, that fact would not allow the trial court to ignore lower scores on different tests. [State v.] Ford[, 158 Ohio St. 3d 139, 154-55, 140 N.E.3d 616, 652-53 (2019)]. When a defendant has taken multiple IQ tests, 'each score must be assessed using the SEM ....' Hall, 572 U.S. at 714, 134 S.Ct. 1986. Because Mr. Wesson took multiple IQ tests, the trial court was required to consider each of his scores, apply the SEM to each of his scores, and determine whether any of them evidenced an intellectual-functioning deficit. As noted, an intellectual functioning deficit is indicated by an IQ score of 'roughly 70 or lower when adjusted for the [SEM].' … Ford[, 158 Ohio St. 3d at 157, 140 N.E.3d at 655-66]. See also Hall [, 572 U.S.] at 722, 134 S.Ct. 1986 ('An IQ score is an approximation, not a final and infallible assessment of intellectual functioning.'). There is no dispute that Mr. Wesson received a full-scale IQ score of 76 on three separate IQ tests: the WAIS-3, the WAIS-4, and the RIAS. Those scores did not account for the SEM. The trial court acknowledged the SEM but did not explicitly apply it to each of Mr. Wesson's scores to produce a specific confidence interval range for each score. There was testimony that, for at least two of Mr. Wesson's tests, the SEM would result in a confidence interval range as low as 72; just two points shy of 70. That adjusted score also did not account for the Flynn Effect. Because Mr. Wesson presented evidence on the Flynn Effect, the trial court was required to consider and discuss that evidence before deciding whether to adjust his scores due to that phenomenon. See Ford[, 158 Ohio St. 3d at 155, 140 N.E.3d at 653-54]." State v. Wesson, 281 N.E.3d 818, 840 (Ohio Ct. App. 2026). The Supreme Court of South Carolina stated: 15 CR-2025-0567 "Aleksey also challenges the reliability of Tests #1-3, citing incomplete documentation regarding their administration. The PCR [postconviction relief] court nevertheless credited Dr. [Alicia] Hall's testimony that these were standard assessments administered by trained professionals. Further, Dr. Hall did not rely on those scores in isolation. Instead, she considered them alongside Aleksey's school records, diagnoses, and developmental history." Aleksey v. State, 448 S.C. 62, 76, 930 S.E.2d 304, 311 (2026). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated: "According to the State, the district court first erred in considering Jackson's childhood IQ test scores, which the State contends are unreliable or invalid. But as we explained in Jackson III [Jackson v. Kelley, 898 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2018)], the district court in 2016 'did not find that any of the IQ tests administered to Jackson before he was 18 were invalid.' See 898 F.3d at 864. The State did not request rehearing in this Court to challenge the validity or use of the childhood IQ scores, nor did it make any such arguments to the district court on remand. The State now points to the testimony of its expert, Dr. [Gilbert] Macvaugh, in which he opined that the record was not 'real specific' about which version of a test was given and that he was uncertain whether the tests were administered by a licensed psychologist trained to administer IQ tests. … And Dr. Macvaugh also testified: '[W]hen you have lots of scores that all fall in the same approximate area or range, then there is probably less error associated with each of those scores because we have evidence of consistency across multiple administrations.' " 16 CR-2025-0567 Jackson v. Payne, 9 F.4th 646, 654 (8th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added).2 Here, the record shows that Woolf had been given nine IQ tests before the postconviction proceedings and that no doctor before Dr. Robert Ouaou had concluded that Woolf was intellectually disabled. (C. 1450-1658.) (2nd Supp. Corr. R. 4622-4719.) Seven of the IQ tests were administered by psychologists. A summary of the IQ tests given to Woolf follows: --(1) On March 13, 1987, when Woolf was eight years old, he was given the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children -- Revised ("WISC-R") test. Woolf was determined to have a full- scale IQ of 87. (C. 1540; 2nd Supp. Corr. R. 3047.) This test is merely referenced in a 1990 report. No other information concerning this test is contained in the record. --(2) On March 26, 1990, when Woolf was 11 years old, he was given the WISC-R. He was determined to have a full- 2The State has notified this Court of a recent decision released by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Bush v. Lovelace, (No. 2:12-CV-345-RAH, September 30, 2026) (M.D. Ala. 2026) (not published in Federal Supplement), in which the court addressed multiple IQ scores in relation to an Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), claim. In Bush, the inmate's six IQ scores ranged from 63 to 81, and the court denied habeas relief, finding that Bush did not meet the definition of intellectually disabled adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court pursuant to Atkins. The Bush court also declined to apply the Flynn Effect and noted: "[I]t does not appear that the application of the Flynn Effect here produces greater certainty about what is [Bush's] true level of intellectual functioning." The holding in Bush is not inconsistent with our holding today. 17 CR-2025-0567 scale IQ of 78+3. This report is signed by both Cassie G. Fishbein, Ed.S., Associate School Psychologist, and signed as approved by the School Psychologist, Doyle James, Ed.D. (C. 1540-41; 2nd Supp. Corr. R. 3047-3049.) --(3) On November 11, 1992,3 Woolf was given the WISC- R by Dr. Robert G. Cook, a clinical psychologist, when he was 14 years old. An extensive report was completed by Dr. Cook. Woolf was found to have a full-scale IQ of 85. (C. 1545-49.) --(4) On May 3, 1993, at the age of "14.7," Woolf was given the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children -- Third Edition ("WISC-III") by the University of Alabama psychological program. The testing and findings were supervised by Dr. Elise Labbe, a clinical psychologist. At Woolf's trial, Dr. Labbe testified at the penalty phase that "[Woolf] and his father came in because they wanted to have him tested. And so my student and I interviewed [Woolf] and the family and then we did some testing, a pretty good battery of testing." (Direct Appeal, R. 2289.) Dr. Labbe found that Woolf's full-scale IQ was 83+7. (C. 1550-55; 2nd Supp. Corr. R. 6202-07.) --(5) On April 4, 1994, Woolf was given an IQ test by a psychometrist, Debra S. Laughlin, while Woolf was incarcerated at Strickland Youth Center in Mobile. Woolf had a full-scale IQ of 91. (R. 1556.) It is unclear exactly what IQ test was given to Woolf at this time. The report states "Wechsler Intelligence Scale." (2nd Supp. Corr. R. 3079.) However, a more detailed copy in the second supplemental 3This is the date that the report by Dr. Robert G. Cook was completed; it is not the date that the test was administered. However, the report states that Woolf had recently celebrated his 14th birthday. Given that Woolf's birthday is October 21, we know that this test was administered between October 21 and November 11. (C. 1545.) For clarity, we use the date of the report. 18 CR-2025-0567 record states that Woolf was given the WISC-R IQ test. (2nd Supp. Corr. R. 5008.) --(6) On September 18, 2009, and January 29, 2010, immediately before Woolf was tried for capital murder, he was evaluated by an expert that he had retained to testify at his trial, Dr. Thomas S. Bennett, a clinical psychologist. Woolf was given the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -- Fourth Edition ("WAIS-IV"). Dr. Bennett evaluated Woolf on three different dates: July 31, 2009, September 18, 2009, and January 29, 2010. Dr. Bennett determined that Woolf's full- scale IQ was 74 and that Woolf was in the borderline range for intellectual functioning. (C. 1578-81.)4 --(7) On May 9, 2019, Woolf was evaluated by Dr. Glen King, a clinical psychologist, as a result of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Atkins. Woolf was given the WAIS-IV test and various other tests. Dr. King stated that Woolf's full-scale IQ was 78. (C. 1611-21.) The original report was dated May 28, 2019, and a supplemental report was filed on June 23, 2024. (2nd Supp. Corr. R. 4959-61.) --(8) On May 9, 2019, Dr. King also administered the Stanford Binet Intelligence Test, Fifth Edition ("SB-5"). Woolf received a full-scale score of 84 on this test.5 4On June 12, 2009, Woolf was also evaluated by Dr. Doug McKeown before trial to determine his competency at the time of the murders and his competency to stand trial. (C. 1571-77.) This report does not indicate that Dr. McKeown administered an IQ test. The report does show that Woolf was competent. 5"It is … often suggested that the Stanford-Binet is more challenging than Wechsler tests. AAMR [American Association on Mental Retardation] 58 (10th ed. 2002)." Simpson v. Quarterman, 593 F. Supp. 2d 922, 942 n.21 (E.D. Texas 2009). 19 CR-2025-0567 --(9) On May 20, 2022, Woolf was examined by Dr. Robert Ouaou, a neuropsychologist. Woolf was given the WAIS-IV and numerous other tests. Dr. Ouaou found that Woolf had a full-scale IQ of 78 but that, after adjusting for the Flynn Effect his IQ was actually 74. The circuit court, when finding that Woolf is intellectually disabled, made the following findings: "Alabama law defines intellectual disability as including three criteria: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (generally considered to be an IQ of 70 or below), (2) significant or substantial deficits in adaptive behavior, and (3) the onset of these elements during the developmental period, which Alabama courts have identified as 18 years old.[6] "…. 6We note that in the circuit court's order, the court quotes the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fifth Edition, definition of intellectual disability and not the definition that the Alabama Supreme Court adopted in Perkins and further refined in Smith. Specifically, the three factors to consider are: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (i.e., an IQ of 70 or below); (2) significant or substantial deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) the manifestation of these problems during the defendant's developmental period (i.e., before the defendant reached age 18). However, in Smith, the court added that, in "order for an offender to be considered mentally retarded in the Atkins context, the offender must currently exhibit subaverage intellectual functioning, currently exhibit deficits in adaptive behavior, and these problems must have manifested themselves before the age of 18." Smith, 213 So. 3d at 248 (emphasis added). The circuit court does cite Perkins and Smith, but it does not quote the relevant Smith holding. (C. 1490.) 20 CR-2025-0567 "In considering these three elements, courts have recognized that 'the question of whether a person has a significantly subaverage intellectual functioning often overlaps with whether that person also has significant or substantial deficits in adaptive behavior.' Smith VII [Smith v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, (No. 21-14519, Nov. 14, 2014) (M.D. Ala. 2014) (not reported in Federal Reporter)]. As a result, when determining intellectual disability, 'it is not sound to view a single factor as dispositive of a conjunctive and interrelated assessment.' Hall [v. Florida, 572 U.S. [701] at 723 [(2014)]. Accordingly, this Court adopts a 'holistic' approach that 'considers the relevant evidence, including as appropriate any relevant expert testimony' and ensures that Mr. Woolf has the opportunity to present evidence of his intellectual disability over the course of his lifetime. Smith [VII], … (citing Hamm v. Smith, 604 U.S. 1 … (U.S. 2024)); see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 713, 724. "…. "Woolf and the State disagree as to whether he meets his burden of proving significantly subaverage intellectual function, which is generally considered to require at or below 70. Prior to trial, Woolf's expert tested his IQ at 74 -- a score that, taking into account the standard error of measurement, brings him within this range. Complicating matters, however, is the fact that Woolf has multiple other test scores, including testing done for his Rule 32 hearing and from his childhood. "…. "Whereas here, a defendant has had his IQ tested on multiple occasions, the question of how to weigh the various scores also 'complicate[s] matters.' Smith [VII], … (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 714). While 'consistent scores across multiple tests may help identify a test-taker's true IQ score' such that 'we'd expect consistent results to reflect a person's 21 CR-2025-0567 intellectual ability as opposed to random chance,' it is equally the case that repeated tests may all suffer from the same error. … 'Because the test itself may be flawed, or administered in a consistently flawed manner, multiple examinations may result in repeated similar scores, so that even a consistent score is not conclusive evidence of intellectual functioning.' Hall, 572 U.S. at 714. "The AAIDD [American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities] guidance to clinicians making retrospective diagnosis (diagnosis after the individual has left the developmental period) encourages practitioners to use clinical judgment in deciding how much weight to accord previously administered intellectual functioning assessments. … "The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a 'holistic approach' to weighing a petitioner's multiple IQ tests. Smith [VII], …. Accordingly, rather than finding the results of a single test dispositive, a court should consider whether IQ tests 'taken together and in context of expert testimony, foreclose the conclusion that [the defendant has] significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.' Smith [VII], …. If they do, 'additional evidence must be considered, including testimony on [a petitioner's] adaptive deficits.' Smith [v. Commissioner, Alabama Dep't of Corr.] 67 F.4th [1335] at 1346 [11th Cir. 2023)]; Hall, 572 U.S. at 723; Moore [v. Texas], 581 U.S. [1] at 14 [(2017)] (in considering IQ test scores of 78 and 74, and 'because the lower end of Moore's [lower] score range falls at or below 70, the [Texas Court of Criminal Appeals] had to move on to consider Moore's adaptive functioning.') … "…. "Woolf's first known childhood test occurred when he was eight years old. (1990 Mobile Public Schools Testing Rep.). There is no record of this test beyond a brief, one-line mention in a 1990 'Child Guidance Center Report of Testing' 22 CR-2025-0567 where, under the category 'previous psychological test results,' it lists a WISC-R test reflecting a [full-scale] IQ score of 87 and the