United States v. Cunningham
CourtUnited States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketMisc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
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Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
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UNITED STATES
Appellant
v.
Chevaughn J. CUNNINGHAM
Airman First Class (E-3), U.S. Air Force, Appellee
________________________
Appeal by the United States Pursuant to Article 62, UCMJ
Decided 20 November 2026 1
________________________
Military Judge: Ryan D. Brunson (motions), Tiny L. Bowman (trial).
GCM convened at: Joint Base San Antonio – Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
For Appellant: Major Donnell D. Wright, USAF (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Brian H. Adams, USAF; Major Morgan R. Christie, USAF; Mary
Ellen Payne, Esquire.
For Appellee: Major Olga Stanford, USAF (argued); Megan P. Marinos,
Esquire.
Before KUBLER, JAMES, and KINDNESS, Appellate Military Judges.
Judge JAMES delivered the opinion of the court, in which Judge KU-
BLER and Judge KINDNESS joined.
________________________
This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.3.
________________________
1 The court heard oral argument in this case on 30 September 2026.
United States v. Cunningham, Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
JAMES, Judge:
This case arises out of an interlocutory appeal under Article 62, Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 862,2 in a pending court-martial.
Appellee is charged with two specifications of sexual assault in violation of
Article 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920, six specifications of domestic violence in
violation of Article 128b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 928b, and one specification of bur-
glary in violation of Article 129, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 929. AN is the named vic-
tim in all specifications.
During the Government’s case-in-chief, it called two outcry witnesses, Staff
Sergeant (SSgt) CB and Senior Airman (SrA) JLM, to testify regarding Speci-
fications 1 and 5 of Charge II, two of the six domestic violence allegations
(strangling AN and hitting AN’s face).3 After hearing testimony by SSgt CB,
the military judge granted a defense oral motion to exclude SSgt CB’s testi-
mony entirely as irrelevant. Additionally, during testimony by SrA JLM, the
military judge sustained multiple objections by the trial defense counsel to po-
tential testimony by SrA JLM of excited utterances. The Government filed a
motion to reconsider the military judge’s rulings excluding the testimony of
SSgt CB and to reconsider the objections to SSgt CB and SrA JLM’s testimony
as excited utterances and as a present sense impression. The trial defense
counsel responded to the motion for reconsideration orally. After hearing the
trial defense counsel’s argument and considering the Government’s written fil-
ing for reconsideration, the military judge orally denied the Government’s mo-
tion for reconsideration.
The Government filed a timely notice of appeal asserting jurisdiction under
Article 62(a)(1)(B), UCMJ.4 The Government requested this court find the mil-
itary judge abused her discretion by excluding SSgt CB’s testimony as irrele-
vant, sustaining trial defense counsel’s objections to SSgt CB’s and SrA JLM’s
2 Unless otherwise specified, references to the UCMJ, the Rules for Courts-Martial,
and the Military Rules of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.) are to the Manual for Courts-Mar-
tial, United States (2024 ed.).
3 The Appellee was originally charged with six specifications of domestic violence
against AN, however, the military judge presiding over motions granted a defense mo-
tion for appropriate relief and found Specifications 5 and 6 were multiplicious for find-
ings purposes and subsequently merged those two specifications into a rewritten Spec-
ification 5.
4 After oral argument, Appellee moved to dismiss this Article 62, UCMJ, appeal as
moot because the military judge, the factfinder for Appellee’s court-martial, was no
longer assigned as a military judge in the trial judiciary. Because this court received
an allegation of legal error through Article 62, UCMJ, this purported change in case
posture did not render the appeal moot and the motion was denied on 15 October 2026.
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United States v. Cunningham, Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
testimony as not meeting the requirements for an excited utterance or present
sense impression under Mil. R. Evid. 803(1) and 803(2), and sustaining the
trial defense counsel’s objection to speculation regarding testimony by SrA
JLM that the female he heard sounded “upset” and “distressed.”
I. BACKGROUND
The named victim, AN, testified during the findings portion of Appellee’s
court-martial. During her testimony, AN stated Appellee had assaulted her on
multiple occasions. She was specifically asked about 17 July 2023, and if she
remembered the events of that day. AN said she did not remember 17 July
2023, specifically but did remember an incident that occurred around mid-July.
AN testified that she and Appellee were in his dorm room on base and started
yelling at each other. The yelling progressed to them pushing each other. Ap-
pellee then allegedly put his hands on AN’s throat, hit her in the face, slammed
her head against the wall, and poured a bottle of juice on her head. AN testified
her airway was constricted from Appellee placing his hands on her neck and
she could speak “a little bit.” AN clarified she could not speak in the same
manner as she was speaking in the courtroom during her testimony. She stated
her airway was constricted for a little while after the Appellee allegedly put
his hands on her neck. AN testified that after Appellee poured juice on her
head she went and showered.
SrA JLM lived in the same dorm room as Appellee. The dorms were set as
a quadplex, meaning four dorms shared a common area, but each dorm had its
own bedroom. On 17 July 2023, SrA JLM was in his dorm room with his then-
girlfriend, now wife, SSgt CB, watching a movie. SrA JLM and SSgt CB heard
noises coming from Appellee’s dorm room. In the Government’s motion to re-
consider, the Government attached SSgt CB’s and SrA JLM’s written state-
ments to law enforcement from 17 July 2023. In SSgt CB’s written statement,
she explained they heard a girl screaming in an adjacent room in the quad-
raplex. SSgt CB said she heard, “[Y]ou hit me first, you were choking me, you
hit me [sic] head so hard I was seeing stars . . . I told you to stop abusing me”
and “stop touching me.” SSgt CB also said she heard “loud thumping sounds.”
She heard both of “them . . . yelling at each other” and “[the female] was crying
a lot.”
In SrA JLM’s written statement dated 17 July 2023, he said he heard “what
sounded like a young female . . . crying,” and saying, “[Y]ou always abuse me
when I take care of you [,] how am I supposed to go to work like this, you hit
my head against the wall [,] I was seeing stars [, and] you are choking me [ ].”
He said he heard “a very audible thud,” but it is unclear when the sound oc-
curred.
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United States v. Cunningham, Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
Because of what SrA JLM and SSgt CB heard, SrA JLM called Security
Forces. Security Forces arrived while AN was in the shower. When she came
out, Security Forces separated her and Appellee and spoke with AN about what
had allegedly occurred. AN told Security Forces she and Appellee got into an
argument, pushed each other around, and he poured juice on her. She did not
tell them Appellee hit her or placed his hands on her neck.
As part of the Government’s case-in-chief, the Government called SSgt CB
as a witness to testify. SSgt CB disclosed that on 17 July 2023, she heard “a lot
of screaming, yelling, crying, and it sounded like there was a disturbance going
on in one of the rooms within the quad.” SSgt CB clarified what she heard came
from Appellee’s dorm room. SSgt CB testified she heard a female voice that
sounded “distressed” who was “crying, screaming. Kind of shaky, at times.”
SSgt CB further indicated she also heard some “banging,” but did not know
what the sound was. During SSgt CB’s direct testimony, she testified this went
on for “about 30 minutes:”
[Special Trial Counsel (STC):] Okay, and you mentioned her cry-
ing, and screaming, how did the crying sound to you?
[SSgt CB:] It -- I don't know how to describe it. It was like a
painful, screaming, crying, like she was definitely in distress.
[Senior Defense Counsel (SDC)]: Objection, Your Honor.
[Military Judge (MJ):] The objection is sustained.
STC: And when you heard this, what did she say --
SDC: Objection, Your Honor. Hearsay.
STC: Your Honor, the [G]overnment -- the [G]overnment offers
this as [Mil. R. Evid.] 802 [sic] evidence excited utterance, as
well as [Mil. R. Evid.] 803(1), present sense impression.
MJ: The objection is overruled -- [I] mean, it’s sustained. Sorry.
The special trial counsel continued to try to ask SSgt CB what she heard
the female voice say on 17 July 2025. The military judge continued to grant
trial defense counsel’s objections to hearsay. The following colloquy occurred:
[STC:] So, you testified that she made statements while she was
screaming. What did she say next?
SDC: Objection, Your Honor. Hearsay.
STC: Your Honor --
MJ: Yes, [special trial counsel]. You can respond.
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United States v. Cunningham, Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
STC: The [G]overnment -- the [G]overnment’s position is at the
-- an excited event or -- excuse me, an event occurred. The wit-
ness --
MJ: The witness [does not] even know who the person is. At this
point, the court is actually at the point of disregarding this whole
testimony as being irrelevant because we don’t even know if the
person that was in his room was him or her.
STC: Can I lay more -- foundation, Your Honor?
MJ: Yeah.
The special trial counsel continued to ask SSgt CB questions, most of which
were objected to by the trial defense counsel and sustained by the military
judge. The following colloquy occurred:
STC: Thank you. And after the screaming, what happened?
[SSgt CB:] I called my First Sergeant. I told --
SDC: Objection, Your Honor. Relevance.
MJ: What is the relevance of her calling her First Sergeant of
about -- of something that she heard in [Appellee]’s dorm room?
STC: Establishing that we already have testimony from other
witnesses that Security Forces was called, and that it corrobo-
rates what was already testified to before about the event that
occurred that day.
MJ: Okay. Then, get -- what, what, what you need to do is ask
the questions in what you’re trying to get out.
STC: Okay.
MJ: But last time I checked, her First Sergeant was not Security
Forces. The objection is sustained.
....
STC: Okay. Where was the screaming coming from?
[SSgt CB:] [Appellee]’s dorm.
STC: Okay, and what was said when the screaming was going
on --
SDC: Objection, Your Honor --
MJ: The objection is sustained. [Special trial counsel], you have
asked that question two or three different times in different
ways and I have sustained the objection.
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United States v. Cunningham, Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
The special trial counsel did not ask any further questions. After, the mili-
tary judge asked if the senior defense counsel intended to cross-examine the
witness, and the following colloquy occurred:
SDC: Your Honor, no, and also based on the fact that, at this
point, there’s no evidence before the court of who, if anyone, was
in the room with [Appellee], I request the court disregard this
witness’s testimony.
MJ: The court will do so. Is this witness subject to recall?
The military judge did not explain why she was granting trial defense coun-
sel’s request to exclude the entire testimony of SSgt CB.
Next, the Government called SrA JLM. When asked about the night of 17
July 2023, SrA JLM explained his dorm room was on the opposite side of the
Appellee’s dorm room in the quad, approximately 20 paces apart. SrA JLM
testified that he called Security Forces that evening because he heard “the
shouting of someone, like, in distress, kind of,” during a quiet part of the movie
he was watching with SSgt CB. Trial defense counsel objected to the testimony
as speculation. The military judge sustained the objection as to speculation,
but considered the shouting. SrA JLM was then asked if he heard “the female
voice” make any statements. The following colloquy occurred:
[Assistant Trial Counsel (ATC):] Okay. And during the shouting,
did you hear the female voice make any statements without go-
ing into what the person may or may not have said?
[SrA JLM:] I heard a statement, but I couldn’t -- I can’t recall it
off the top of my head what she said exactly, sir.
[ATC:] Okay, would anything help you remember?
[SrA JLM:] My statement that I wrote that night, sir.
[ATC:] Your Honor, permission to approach the witness?
MJ: Well, let me ask you -- let me ask you a question. Did the
witness not just answer your question that he heard a state-
ment, he just doesn’t remember what it is. And your question
was, did you hear a statement being made without telling me
what it is? So, what are you doing right now.
[ATC:] Your Honor, the -- the [G]overnment is wanting -- I am
trying to lay foundation for an excited utterance. One of the
foundational steps is to establish that there’s a statement made
about an event going on, and I’m unable to do that unless the
witness recalls the statement in question.
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United States v. Cunningham, Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
MJ: Okay. Also, what -- what else is -- when you look at it -- with
excited utterance, right? It had to be when?
ATC: During, Your Honor.
MJ: During what?
ATC: An event, Your Honor.
MJ: While the declarant was under the stress of excitement that
it caused.
ATC: Yes, Your Honor.
MJ: Right? So, how does this witness be able to -- how do you lay
a foundation with this particular witness to even say that the
statement has anything to do with an event that was caused be-
cause he wasn’t even in there.
[ATC:] Your Honor, the content of the statement is indicative of
whether there was a[n] event and a startling event going on.
MJ: Yeah, but how does he know what the event and the star-
tling event is, and he was not there?
[ATC:] Your Honor, based on the statement -- a statement can
have an indicia of reliability regarding a[n] event and startling
event going on.
MJ: At the time?
ATC: At the time, Your Honor.
MJ: But how does he know that that event occurred at the time?
Because a person can be in a room and scream anything about
something that happened 4 days ago. How does he know that
what the person was screaming about occurred at that time?
[ATC:] The grammar and verbiage of the statement, Your Honor.
MJ: The court is not going to allow that. Anything else?
[ATC:] Your Honor, can you please clarify what you mean by al-
low that? What will you not be allowing?
MJ: The entrance [sic] of whatever statement is that you plan on
trying to refresh his recollection on to be admitted under excited
utterance?
(Emphasis added).
Further during SrA JLM’s testimony he was asked the following:
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United States v. Cunningham, Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
[ATC:] Okay. And going back a little bit, without discussing
what you thought might be going on, how did the things you
heard make you feel?
SDC: Objection, Your Honor. Relevance.
MJ: The objection is overruled. You may answer the question.
[SrA JLM:] Concerned.
SrA JLM was asked further questions regarding the call to Security Forces.
These questions prompted a recess and Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 802
session. The assistant trial counsel finished up his questioning soon thereafter.
Before the senior defense counsel started cross-examination, she stated:
SDC: Your Honor, before cross-examination, given the fact that
this witness has not stated who, if anyone, was in the room with
[Appellee], we would make the similar request that the court
disregard this testimony as irrelevant.
MJ: The court is going to deny that request.
During cross-examination of SrA JLM, the defense counsel elicited that
SrA JLM heard a female voice yelling in an angry manner but that “it didn’t
sound like that voice was crying out for help.” On redirect examination, the
assistant trial counsel tried to impeach SrA JLM with his pre-trial statement
he gave to Security Forces by asking him if he had previously stated, “that [he]
heard the female voice state, ‘[Y]ou always abuse me when I take care of you.
How am I supposed to go to work like this? You hit my head against the wall.
I was seeing stars --[.]’” The senior defense counsel objected to this approach
as improper impeachment, and the military judge sustained the objection. The
assistant trial counsel attempted again to impeach his own witness, and the
military judge sustained the defense counsel’s objections to the statements.
The assistant trial counsel had no further questions.
AN was recalled to testify after SrA JLM. The special trial counsel at-
tempted to lay the foundation for video clips from AN’s Air Force Office of Spe-
cial Investigations (OSI) pre-trial interview, as prior consistent statements.
The military judge denied three different offered exhibits, eventually allowing
the Government to splice out one part of one exhibit and admitted it over the
defense counsel’s objection. The special trial counsel then asked AN if she re-
called “not wanting to tell people what happened to [her] face after the 17 July
2023 incident.” AN stated she did. When asked why, AN stated, “I did not want
this to escalate legally, and have to deal with all of the things that come after
that.” The special trial counsel never asked AN if she made any statements on
17 July 2023, after Appellee allegedly assaulted her.
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United States v. Cunningham, Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
The trial recessed, and the parties and the military judge had another
R.C.M. 802 session, where the Government requested the evening to decide
how they would move forward on their case. The following morning, the mili-
tary judge stated the Government had filed a motion for reconsideration of two
of her rulings from the day prior. While discussing the motion for reconsidera-
tion with the trial counsel, the military judge asked if the trial counsel had
anything else to add. The trial counsel stated he “would like to go through each
and every element” of the applicable hearsay exceptions. The military judge
replied that “[she was] not going to let [the trial counsel] go through each and
every element.”
The military judge then invited the senior defense counsel to argue her ob-
jections to the motion for reconsideration. The following colloquy occurred:
SDC: Both the [G]overnment and Defense went through in -- in
great detail with [AN], the events of that night, and at no point
did she make any -- any testimony. There was no testimony that
she made any statements that night, Your Honor. Certainly no
testimony that -- when she would have made the statements
that don’t exist, according to her testimony that she was under
excitement at that time --
MJ: Does -- let me ask you this.
SDC: Yes, Your Honor.
MJ: Does this contradictory evidence in and of itself make the
authority for this court to exclude the evidence in which they are
seeking admission of?
SDC: Not --
MJ: Or does it go to weight?
SDC: Your Honor, for excited utterance, contradictory evidence
does not. For present sense impression, that does require corrob-
oration as a piece of it. Which is also in the [G]overnment’s filing
is present sense impression. So, we would argue that it -- it does
go to admissibility for that piece.
Later, the senior defense counsel stated, “[F]or excited utterance, Your
Honor, it goes exactly to the exciting event. If we don’t even know who is mak-
ing these statements --[.]”
The military judge replied, “A declarant does not need to be known for an
excited utterance to be admitted.”
The senior defense counsel continued her argument. After the senior de-
fense counsel was done, the military judge stated, “Based on the
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United States v. Cunningham, Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
[G]overnment’s pleadings, the [D]efense’s argument, the court maintains its
rulings from yesterday for the same reasons that it placed on the record yes-
terday.” The Government then filed its notice of intent to file this Article 62,
UCMJ, appeal.
We granted oral argument on the following specified issues, which we
heard on 30 September 2026:
I. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE’S EXCLUSION OF
TESTIMONY AMOUNTS TO A “SUBSTANTIAL PROOF OF
FACT MATERIAL IN THE PROCEEDING,” TO ESTABLISH
THIS COURT’S JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE
62(a)(1)(B), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1)(B), TO HEAR THIS
APPEAL.
II. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HER DIS-
CRETION WHEN SHE EXCLUDED THE ENTIRE TESTI-
MONY OF [SSGT] CB AS NON-RELEVANT.
III. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HER DIS-
CRETION WHEN SHE EXCLUDED STATEMENTS OF-
FERED BY [SSGT] CB AND [SRA] JLM AS INADMISSIBLE
UNDER THE HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS OF EXCITED UTTER-
ANCE AND PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
1. Article 62, UCMJ, Appeal
When the Government appeals a ruling under Article 62, UCMJ, “this court
reviews the military judge’s decision directly and reviews the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party which prevailed at trial.” United States v.
Lewis, 78 M.J. 447, 453 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (quoting United States v. Pugh, 77 M.J.
1, 3 (C.A.A.F. 2017)). Because this issue is before us pursuant to a government
appeal, we “may act only with respect to matters of law.” Article 62(a), UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 862(a). We are limited to determining whether the military judge's
factual findings are “unsupported by the record or clearly erroneous.” United
States v. Gore, 60 M.J. 178, 185 (C.A.A.F. 2004). When a military judge’s “find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law are incomplete and ambiguous . . . the case
must be remanded to the military judge for further proceedings.” United States
v. Kosek, 41 M.J. 60, 62 (C.A.A.F. 1994).
“A military judge’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Roberson, 65 M.J. 43, 45–46
(C.A.A.F. 2007) (citations omitted). “The abuse of discretion standard is a strict
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United States v. Cunningham, Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
one, calling for more than a mere difference of opinion. The challenged action
must be arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable, or clearly erroneous.” United
States v. Holmes, 84 M.J. 704, 709 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2024) (quoting United
States v. Solomon, 72 M.J. 176, 179 (C.A.A.F. 2013)). “The military judge’s find-
ings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard and conclusions
of law, de novo.” United States v. White, 69 M.J. 236, 239 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citing
United States v. Ayala, 43 M.J. 296, 298 (C.A.A.F. 1995)).
2. Jurisdiction
The parties disagree as to whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the
Government’s appeal. Appellant asserts that this court has jurisdiction to hear
this appeal under Article 62(a)(1)(B), UCMJ, because
the military judge’s rulings excluded “evidence that is substan-
tial proof of a fact material in the proceeding”—specifically, cor-
roborating evidence that Appellee struck AN in the face, stran-
gled her, and caused her head to hit a wall, and generally abused
her on 17 July 2023—the misconduct charged in Charge II, Spec-
ifications 1 and 5.
In their response to Appellant’s appeal, Appellee argues “the Government
has not established the identity of the declarant, or the specific charged event
to which the statements pertain, or whether the statements reference miscon-
duct as opposed to something that happened during rough consensual sex.” In
addition, during oral argument, Appellee argues the exclusion of SSgt CB’s
testimony alone was not substantial proof of a material fact.5 Jurisdiction is
discussed more thoroughly below.
We review the question of whether we have jurisdiction de novo. United
States v. Jacobsen, 77 M.J. 81, 84 (C.A.A.F. 2017). As the Government is the
moving party, it has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. See United States
v. LaBella, 75 M.J. 52, 53 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (citation omitted). In order to do so,
they must meet two requirements. First, the military judge’s ruling must ex-
clude evidence, and second, the evidence must be “substantial proof of a fact
material in the proceeding.” Jacobsen, 77 M.J. at 85 (quoting Article
62(a)(1)(B), UCMJ). When determining if the Government has met its burden,
Article 62(e), UCMJ, states “[t]he provisions of this [A]rticle shall be liberally
construed to effect its purposes.”
5 Cunningham Oral Argument (Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06), at 31:52,
https://afcca.law.af.mil/content/afcca_audio/cp/us_v__cunningham_3022061.mp3.
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Neither party argues the first requirement—exclusion of evidence—is not
met. We agree. Appellee argues that while evidence was excluded, it was nei-
ther substantial nor material.
In Jacobsen, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF) dealt with jurisdiction at an Article 62, UCMJ, appeal and found the
Government had not met the second requirement. Id. at 87. However, Article
62, UCMJ at that time did not include the current liberal construction clause
to effect its purpose. Id. at n.5.
Our sister service courts have dealt with similar issues in this regard. Re-
cently, in United States v. Rodriguez, the United States Coast Guard Court of
Criminal Appeals (CGCCA) found testimony from an outcry witness close in
time to the alleged assault was “substantial” proof of a material fact. No. 25-
012(62), 2025 CCA LEXIS 391, at *8–9 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 18 Aug. 2025)
(unpub. op). Regarding the determination that the proof was substantial, the
CGCCA stated, “We need not here attempt to draw precise contours of when
proof is ‘substantial’ enough to meet this jurisdictional requirement other than
to note that, reading the term broadly, it is a relatively low bar.” Id. We concur.
The standard for “substantial” is low. Here, like Rodriguez, we have state-
ments from outcry witnesses who could provide material evidence related to a
specific charged offense, i.e., the alleged assaults by Appellee against AN on 17
July 2023. Whether the offense occurred was a central matter in dispute at
trial and the evidence tended to corroborate that some form of altercation oc-
curred in the dorm room. Although other corroborating evidence was admitted
during trial, like reporting a disturbance to Security Forces on 17 July 2023
and another witness seeing AN with a bruise on her face sometime in July,
SSgt CB and SrA JLM offered direct and circumstantial evidence of a potential
domestic violence incident occurring between AN and Appellee. Therefore, the
excluded evidence constituted substantial proof of a material fact in the pro-
ceeding. The Government has met its burden to establish jurisdiction under
Article 62, UCMJ, and we answer Issue I, supra, in the affirmative. Next, we
turn to Issues II and III.
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B. Exclusion of Evidence
1. Judicial Deference
“Military judges are presumed to know the law and to follow it absent clear
evidence to the contrary.” United States v. Erickson, 65 M.J. 221, 225 (C.A.A.F.
2007) (citing United States v. Mason, 45 M.J. 483, 484 (C.A.A.F. 1997)).
“[W]here the military judge places on the record [her] analysis and application
of the law to the facts, deference is clearly warranted. On the contrary, [i]f a
military judge fails to place [her] findings and analysis on the record, less def-
erence will be accorded.” United States v. Smith, 83 M.J. 350, 355 (C.A.A.F.
2023) (first and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Finch,
79 M.J. 389, 397 (C.A.A.F. 2020)).
2. Hearsay
As a general rule, out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter
are not permitted unless an exemption or exception applies. Mil. R. Evid. 802.
a. Excited Utterance
In United States v. Henry, 81 M.J. 91, 96 (C.A.A.F. 2021), CAAF confirmed,
‘“[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the de-
clarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition,’ is
admissible as an exception to the general prohibition on hearsay.” Id. (first cit-
ing Mil. R. Evid. 803(2); and then citing the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (2016 ed.), App. 22, at A22–63 (2016 ed.) (“[Mil. R. Evid.] 803(2) is taken
from the Federal Rule [803(2)] verbatim.”)).
“The implicit premise [of the exception] is that a person who reacts ‘to a
startling event or condition’ while ‘under the stress of excitement caused’
thereby will speak truthfully because of a lack of opportunity to fabri-
cate.” Henry, 81 M.J. at 96 (citing United States v. Jones, 30 M.J. 127, 129
(C.M.A. 1990)); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357 (1992) (“[A] state-
ment that qualifies for admission under a ‘firmly rooted’ hearsay exception is
so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to its reli-
ability.”) (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820–21 (1990)).
For a statement to qualify as an excited utterance: (1) the statement must
be “spontaneous, excited or impulsive rather than the product of reflection and
deliberation”; (2) the event prompting the utterance must be “startling”; and
(3) the declarant must be “under the stress of excitement caused by the
event.” United States v. Arnold, 25 M.J. 129, 132 (C.M.A. 1987) (internal quo-
tation marks and citations omitted).
Excited utterances do not require corroboration—the declarant’s statement
is sufficient to prove the existence of the startling event. 2016 MCM, App. 22,
at A22-63.
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United States v. Cunningham, Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
In order to meet the burden to show the statement or statements were an
excited utterance, “[t]he proponent of the excited utterance has the burden to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that each element is met.” Henry, 81
M.J. at 96 (citations omitted).
b. Present Sense Impression
“A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while or
immediately after the declarant perceived it.” Mil. R. Evid. 803(1). Corrobora-
tion of the statement is required. See Henry, 81 M.J. at 97 (“[W]e emphasize
that [Mil. R. Evid.] 803(2), in contrast with [Mil. R. Evid.] 803(1), present sense
impression, does not contain a corroboration requirement.”).
3. Relevant Evidence
“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of conse-
quence in determining the action.” Mil. R. Evid. 401. “Irrelevant evidence is
not admissible.” Mil. R. Evid. 402(b). The standard for relevance is low. United
States v. Roberts, 69 M.J. 23, 27 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
C. Analysis
1. Exclusion of SSgt CB’s Testimony as Irrelevant
The military judge stated during the objection to SSgt CB’s testimony that
she was considering disregarding the “whole testimony as being irrelevant be-
cause we don’t even know if the person that was in [Appellee’s] room was him
or her.” However, during the charged timeframe for Specifications 1 and 5 of
Charge II, SSgt CB testified she heard “a lot of screaming, yelling, crying, and
[what] sounded like a disturbance going on in one of the rooms in the quad.”
SSgt CB clarified what she heard came from Appellee’s dorm room. SSgt CB
testified she heard a female voice that sounded “distressed” who was “crying,
screaming[,]” and “kind of shaky, at times.” SSgt CB testified she also heard
some “banging,” but did not know what the sound was. SSgt CB testified this
went on for “about 30 minutes.”
Trial defense counsel requested the military judge exclude SSgt CB’s testi-
mony as irrelevant. The military judge granted the defense request, without
providing the analysis behind her decision.
When deciding to exclude the entirety of SSgt CB’s testimony as irrelevant,
the military judge applied an erroneous view of the law. The military judge sua
sponte stated she was considering excluding SSgt CB’s statement as irrelevant
because SSgt CB did not know who the female was in the room with Appellee.
Understanding that the abuse of discretion standard is high, the bar for rele-
vance is low. Simply put, the evidence must make a fact of consequence more
or less likely than it would be without the evidence. Without getting into the
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United States v. Cunningham, Misc. Dkt. No. 2026-06
question of whether hearsay statements may have been admissible through
SSgt CB, her testimony as a bystander of what she heard on 17 July 2023,
including screaming and crying coming mostly from a female who appeared to
be in distress and banging noises, made it more likely that a disputed fact of
consequence occurred. As will be discussed further below, SSgt CB’s knowledge
of the identity of who was in the room was not necessary and certainly did not
transform relevant evidence into inadmissible evidence. Appellee elected to be
tried by military judge alone; therefore, the military judge was also the fact-
finder. As such, she was free to give the evidence the weight she believed it
deserved, but she was not free to preclude its consideration entirely.
SSgt CB’s testimony was probative of whether Appellee committed the
charged offenses and the military judge abused her discretion when she ex-
cluded the entirety of SSgt CB’s testimony as irrelevant. The Government has
met its burden and we answer Issue II in the affirmative.
2. Exclusion of Evidence as Hearsay - Excited Utterance and Pre-
sent Sense Impression
This court starts with what deference to give a military judge where the
military judge did not provide a justification for a ruling, either orally or in
writing, for this court to consider when determining if she abused her discre-
tion. The Government asserts this court should give no deference to the mili-
tary judge for any rulings she made regarding excited utterances, present
sense impression, or the exclusion of evidence under a relevance standard. Ap-
pellee countered the military judge should be afforded deference because ear-
lier in the proceedings the military judge admitted hearsay statements in ac-
cordance with Henry and Arnold, which demonstrated the military judge’s
knowledge and application of the law to resolve this dispute.
The court concurs the military judge did review both Henry and Arnold
earlier on the record. Military judges are presumed to know the law. However,
to receive full deference for rulings made on the record, a military judge should
state the essential findings of fact and conclusions of law relied upon when
issuing a ruling. In the present case, the military judge failed to specify find-
ings of fact and offered scant legal analysis for her decision to exclude the evi-
dence at issue; therefore, we give the military judge’s ruling little deference.
See Finch, 79 M.J. at 397 (finding the military judge’s decision warranted “lit-
tle deference” by failing to put “any findings of fact or particularized conclu-
sions of law on the record with respect to a hearsay objection”); see also United
States v. Soloshenko, No. ACM 40581, 2025 CCA LEXIS 358, at *39 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 31 Jul. 2025) (unpub. op.) (citation omitted) (finding deference to
the military judge was not clearly warranted because “he did not place his
analysis and application of the law to the facts” on the record).
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Although it is difficult for this court to discern how the military judge ap-
plied the applicable law to the facts, she offered two distinct legal conclusions
on the record regarding excited utterances, both of which this court reviews to
determine whether the exclusion of evidence was erroneous.
First, the military judge stated that since SSgt CB and SrA JLM did not
know the identity of the declarant in Appellee’s dorm room at the time state-
ments were made, they could not properly lay the foundation for an excited
utterance. Second, the military judge stated SrA JLM could not lay the foun-
dation for an excited utterance because he was not in the room at the time the
statements were made.
Turning to the issue raised, the military judge denied the Government the
ability to question SSgt CB regarding the statements she heard on 17 July
2024 when she was in the quad area of the dorms shared by Appellee and SrA
JLM. In SSgt CB’s written statement to law enforcement, she stated she heard
a female make statements such as “you hit me first, you were choking me, you
hit me [sic] head so hard I was seeing stars . . . I told you to stop abusing me”
and “stop touching me.” SSgt CB also said she heard “loud thumping sounds,”
she heard both of “them . . . yelling at each other, and “[the female] was crying
a lot.”
In addition, the military judge denied the Government the ability to ques-
tion SrA JLM regarding the statements he heard on 17 July 2023 and docu-
mented in a written statement to law enforcement the same evening. SrA JLM
reported hearing “what sounded like a young female . . . crying” and saying,
“you always abuse me when I take care of you, how am I supposed to go to work
like this, you hit my head against the wall, I was seeing stars, you are choking
me.” He also reported a “very audible thud,” but it is unclear when the sound
occurred.
Although much of the military judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law were unclear, this court can clearly assess the legal correctness of two of
the foundational requirements imposed by the military ju