Amyntas Hinckley v. University of Wyoming

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING 2026 WY 118 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2026 November 3, 2026 AMYNTAS HINCKLEY, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. S-26-0018 UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING, Appellee (Defendant). Appeal from the District Court of Albany County The Honorable Dawnessa A. Snyder, Judge 1 Representing Appellant: Amyntas Hinckley, pro se. Representing Appellee: Erin E. Berry and Jacob L. Vogt, Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Before BOOMGAARDEN, C.J., and GRAY, FENN, and HILL, JJ., and STITH, DJ. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 1 The original district judge, Misha Westby, assigned the case to Judge Snyder. 1 STITH, District Judge. [¶1] Amyntas Hinckley (“Hinckley”) was employed by the University of Wyoming (“University”) as a marketing and communications specialist. According to her amended complaint, she was subjected to discrimination based on sex, was paid a lower salary than a male counterpart for equivalent work, and endured a hostile environment, retaliation, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The University filed a motion to dismiss her complaint, claiming immunity from tort liability under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the University’s motion to dismiss and Hinckley appealed. We affirm. ISSUES [¶2] Appellant Hinckley raises five issues and Appellee University raises six issues in response, which this court rephrases as follows: 1) Whether the technical deficiencies in Appellant’s brief warrant summary affirmance of the district court; 2) Whether the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act bars Hinckley’s claims; and 3) Whether the Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act limits the district court’s jurisdiction to reviewing the outcome of an administrative fair hearing under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-106(k) and the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act; FACTS [¶3] According to her amended complaint, Hinckley was employed by the University as a marketing and communications specialist. She alleged that she was subject to discriminatory treatment during her employment, a male peer was paid a higher salary for equivalent work and given preferential treatment, and her supervisor otherwise fostered an environment of unequal treatment. After she raised concerns concerning unequal treatment, the amended complaint alleges that the University retaliated against her by issuing a warning letter falsely claiming performance deficiencies and denied her the opportunity to disprove the claims. The University terminated Hinckley’s employment. Post-termination, the amended complaint alleges that the University provided false information to the Wyoming Department of Workforce Services, falsely claiming that she had left work early on one day, which delayed her receipt of unemployment compensation benefits. 2 [¶4] On December 11, 2024, Hinckley filed a complaint pro se in district court alleging causes of action for (1) retaliation; (2) sex based discrimination; (3) hostile work environment; (4) fraud; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. She sought monetary damages and injunctive relief for reinstatement and to compel the University to implement workplace changes. The University filed a motion to dismiss and a notice of removal to U.S. District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1441 and 1446 on the basis that Hinckley raised federal questions under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. [¶5] Hinckley filed an amended complaint in U.S. district court. The amended complaint alleged only state law causes of action for (1) wrongful termination in violation of Wyoming’s public policy; (2) discrimination under Wyoming law; (3) hostile work environment; (4) fraud; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. On January 30, 2025, the U.S. District Court remanded the case to district court on the basis that no federal questions were presented in the amended complaint. The University then filed a motion to dismiss Hinckley’s amended complaint. Hinckley’s amended complaint requested monetary damages, reinstatement and an injunction compelling the University to implement certain workplace changes. Hinckley filed a “Motion for Emergency Hearing, Emergency Relief, Injunctive Relief and Preservation of Evidence.” The district court, Misha Westby presiding, set a hearing for March 24, 2025 on the University’s motion to dismiss and Hinckley’s motion regarding presentation of evidence. [¶6] There is no transcript of the March 24, 2025 hearing before Judge Westby. On March 27, 2025, Hinckley filed a “Motion to Recuse Presiding Judge For Cause” and a “Motion for Reconsideration and Emergency Injunctive Relief.” Following the motion to recuse, on April 25, 2025, Judge Westby assigned the case to Judge Snyder. [¶7] On October 15, 2025, the University filed a “Notice of Resubmission of Proposed Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice,” and attached a proposed order. The notice claimed that the proposed order had been previously submitted to the court on April 2, 2025, but that filing was stricken by Judge Westby on April 21, 2025, and no longer appears in the court record. On October 16, 2025, Judge Snyder granted the University’s proposed “Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice.” The district court found that the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act barred Hinckley’s tort claims and, with respect to the claims for discrimination and hostile environment, the Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act required Hinckley to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit in district court. The district court also noted that Plaintiff failed to allege facts that could satisfy the elements of fraud or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted the University’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint without prejudice because Hinckley, who had not exhausted administrative remedies, could still seek a fair hearing and any subsequent judicial review of that proceeding. 3 [¶8] The same day, October 16, 2025, Hinckley filed a “Plaintiff’s Objection and Motion to Strike Defendant’s ‘Notice of Resubmission of Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice’ For Misrepresentation and Bad-Faith Attempt to Mislead The Court, Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 11(b)” (“Motion to Strike”). On October 20, 2025, the district court denied Hinckley’s Motion to Strike. On October 24, 2025, Hinckley filed a “Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) Motion to Vacate and Reconsider Order of Dismissal and Denial of Motion To Strike.” On November 25, 2025, the district court denied Hinckley’s Rule 59(e) motion by order styled “Order Following Reconsideration Hearing.” [¶9] On December 5, 2025, Hinckley filed a notice of appeal. In her notice of appeal, Hinckley listed the orders being appealed as the November 25, 2025, Order Following Reconsideration Hearing, the October 16, 2025, Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice, “all prior adverse interlocutory orders,” and “the court’s failure to issue findings and rulings.” [¶10] While her state court complaint was proceeding, Hinckley filed a separate Title VII employment discrimination complaint against the University in U.S. District Court, Hinckley v. University of Wyoming, et al., case No. 25-CV-0043 (U.S. Dist., Wyo. 2025) arising out of the same set of transactions and occurrences as alleged in this case. On November 4, 2025, the U.S. District Court denied the University’s motion to dismiss Hinckley’s Title VII federal employment discrimination claims. STANDARD OF REVIEW [¶11] This Court reviews a motion to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) de novo. Gunwerks, LLC v. Forward Cody Wyo., Inc., 2026 WY 16, ¶ 23, 583 P.3d 405, 411 (Wyo. 2026) (citing Sheesley as Tr. Of DCS Tr. Dated May 17, 2005 v. AristaTek, Inc., 2025 WY 89, ¶ 34, 573 P.3d 535, 547 (Wyo. 2025)). “Dismissal is appropriate only if it is certain from the face of the complaint the plaintiff cannot assert any facts entitling him to relief.” Id. (citing Sheesley, ¶ 34, 573 P.3d at 547). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we examine the same materials and apply the same standards as the district court. Sheesley, ¶ 34, 573 P.3d at 547 (quoting Moose Hollow Holdings, LLC v. Teton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2017 WY 74, ¶ 20, 396 P.3d 1027, 1033 (Wyo. 2017)). “[W]e accept the facts alleged in the complaint or petition as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. (quoting Moose Hollow Holdings, LLC, ¶ 20, 396 P.3d at 1033); City of Laramie v. Univ. of Wyoming, 2024 WY 13, ¶ 16, 542 P.3d 607, 614 (Wyo. 2024). “Dismissal is a drastic remedy which should be used cautiously; however, a motion to dismiss ‘is the proper method for testing the legal sufficiency of the allegations and will be sustained when the complaint shows on its face that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.’” Peterson v. Laramie City Council, 2024 WY 23, ¶ 9, 543 P.3d 922, 926 (Wyo. 2024) (quoting Matter of Est. of Britain, 2018 WY 101, ¶ 11, 425 P.3d 978, 981 (Wyo. 2018)). With respect to Hinckley’s Motion for reconsideration under W.R.C.P. 59(e), “Rule 4 59(e) orders are final appealable orders that we review for an abuse of discretion.” Am. Collection Sys., Inc. v. Judkins, 2024 WY 66, ¶ 15, 550 P.3d 549, 556 (Wyo. 2024). DISCUSSION I. The Technical Deficiencies of Appellant’s Notice of Appeal and Brief. [¶12] Appellee University points to several technical deficiencies in Hinckley’s notice of appeal and brief. They include: (1) the notice of appeal identifies two specific orders being appealed but also generically lists “all interlocutory orders;” (2) Hinckley has failed to designate a record on appeal; (3) Hinckley fails to support her brief with cogent argument and relevant authority; (4) Hinckley’s brief fails to comply with W.R.A.P. 7.01 in multiple ways, including failure to have a statement of jurisdiction and an appendix. [¶13] “A pro se litigant is entitled to some leniency from the stringent standards applied to formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. However, there must be a reasonable adherence to the procedural rules and requirements of the court.” Byrnes v. Harper, 2019 WY 20, ¶ 3, 435 P.3d 364, 366 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Hodgins v. State, 1 P.3d 1259, 1262 (Wyo. 2000)). “This Court will impose sanctions including, but not limited to, summary affirmance, pursuant to W.R.A.P. 1.03 on pro se litigants who fail to comply with these rules.” Id. In addition, “It is well established that the appellant bears the responsibility of bringing forth a sufficient record for the Court’s review.” O’Donoghue v. Jim Vito Constr., Inc., 2026 WY 53, ¶ 12, 589 P.3d 342, 346 (Wyo. 2026) (citation omitted). [¶14] Rule 1.03(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure (W.R.A.P.) explicitly provides “[t]he timely filing of a notice of appeal, which complies with Rule 2.07(a), is jurisdictional.” Am. Collection Sys., Inc., ¶ 7, 550 P.3d at 554. To comply with W.R.A.P 2.07(a)(2), a party’s notice of appeal must “identify the judgment or appealable order being appealed.” Id. (citation omitted). “A notice of appeal ‘only perfects an appeal of the order(s) identified in the notice.’” Id. (quoting EOG Res. Inc., v. JJLM Land, LLC, 2022 WY 162, ¶ 41, 522 P.3d 605, 616 (Wyo. 2022)). If an order is not properly identified in the notice of appeal, this Court is “without jurisdiction” to review it. Id. [¶15] Hinckley did identify two specific orders in her Notice of Appeal, the “October 16, 2025 Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice” and the “November 25, 2025 Order Following Reconsideration Hearing.” Hinckley’s Notice of Appeal adequately identifies those two orders. This Court does not have jurisdiction over any other orders in this appeal, which are identified only generically, and we will not consider them. [¶16] Hinckley’s failure to designate a record on appeal would be a sufficient reason for summary affirmance, but the University did designate a record and the materials necessary to review the dismissal order are adequately before the Court. With respect to lack of 5 citation to authority or cogent argument, Hinckley’s brief is not a model of clarity, but the issues she identifies and the gravamen of her argument are ascertainable. [¶17] In summary, although the technical deficiencies of Hinckley’s notice and brief would permit summary affirmance, the Court will not impose sanctions on Hinckley and exercises its discretion to consider her appeal on the merits. II. The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act Bars Hinckley’s Tort Claims for Money Damages But Does Not Bar Her Claims for Injunctive Relief. [¶18] The University argues that the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (“WGCA”) bars all of Hinckley’s tort claims, which are Hinckley’s causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of Wyoming public policy, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As discussed below, the WGCA bars Hinckley’s tort claims for money damages, but does not bar Hinckley’s claim for wrongful termination to the extent that Hinckley seeks injunctive relief. [¶19] The University was created by the Wyoming Constitution and is a governmental entity within the meaning of the Wyoming Governmental Claim Act. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1- 39-101 et seq.; Wyo. Const. art. 7, § 15; City of Laramie, ¶ 28, 542 P.3d at 617. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a) provides: “[a] governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112.” “When it adopted the WGCA, the Wyoming Legislature balanced the equities between the ‘inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur in the strict application of the doctrine of governmental immunity’ and the need to provide governmental services while protecting the public coffers.” Whitham v. Feller, 2018 WY 43, ¶ 24, 415 P.3d 1264, 1269 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-102(a)). [¶20] Fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not exceptions to immunity listed in the WGCA. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-105 to 1-39-112. Hinckley seeks monetary damages only for those claims and the WGCA grants the University immunity barring Hinckley from pursuing those claims. Hinckley’s amended complaint also includes a claim for wrongful termination in violation of Wyoming’s public policy, which would be a tort and for which there is no enumerated exception under the WGCA. To the extent that Hinckley seeks monetary damages for wrongful termination, the WGCA also bars that claim. [¶21] The WGCA does not, however, prevent suits for injunction against a governmental entity. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-116 (“Nothing in this section prohibits any proceedings for mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus, injunction or quo warranto”). With respect to her claim for wrongful termination, Hinckley seeks not just financial compensation, but also 6 to be reinstated to her position and to compel the University to implement certain workplace changes, which are forms of injunctive relief. [¶22] Injunctions are governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-28-101 et seq. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-28-102 provides: When it appears by the petition that the plaintiff is entitled to relief consisting of restraining the commission or continuance of some act the commission or continuance of which during the litigation would produce great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff, or when during the litigation it appears that the defendant is doing, threatens to do, or is procuring to be done some act in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action and tending to render the judgment ineffectual, a temporary order may be granted restraining the act. The order may also be granted in any case where it is specially authorized by statute and by municipal ordinance adopted pursuant to W.S. 15-1-103(a)(xlvi). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-28-102; Degenfelder v. Wyoming Educ. Ass’n, 2026 WY 54, ¶ 19, 589 P.3d 346, 353 (Wyo. 2026) (“An injunction, whether preliminary or permanent, is authorized by statute”). The WGCA does not bar Hinckley’s claim for wrongful termination to the extent that she seeks injunctive relief. As discussed below, however, Hinckley’s request for injunctive relief as a remedy for her claim for wrongful termination in violation of Wyoming public policy is barred for different reasons. III. Hinckley’s Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy Is Not a Cognizable Tort Because There Is an Adequate Statutory Remedy for the Wrong Alleged. [¶23] Hinckley’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy fails because there is an adequate statutory remedy for the wrong alleged. Hinckley’s amended complaint alleges that Hinckley “was subjected to discriminatory treatment during her employment in violation of Wyoming’s anti-discrimination statutes.” The factual allegations focus on discrimination based on sex, including that a male counterpart was paid a higher salary, that she was reprimanded for highlighting a controversial female speaker in social media posts, that her supervisor expressed reluctance to promote women in business, that she was questioned about why the Women in Business Club was featured in a video, that she was instructed not to promote events organized around Women In Business, and that her employer fostered an environment of unequal treatment and retaliated against her for raising concerns about unequal treatment. Hinckley’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy states: “Defendant’s termination of Plaintiff violated Wyoming public policy, including protections against retaliation for raising workplace grievances.” 7 [¶24] “In order to prevail on a claim of wrongful termination against public policy, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements: 1) the termination violated a well-established public policy; and 2) no other remedy is available to protect the interests of the terminated employee or of society.” McLean v. Hyland Enters., Inc., 2001 WY 111, ¶ 24, 34 P.3d 1262, 1268 (Wyo. 2001); McGarvey v. Key Prop. Mgmt. LLC, 2009 WY 84, ¶ 13, 211 P.3d 503, 507 (Wyo. 2009) (same). In the present case, Hinckley cannot satisfy the second element, namely, the lack of other remedy. Allen v. Safeway Stores Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo.1985) (both Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. provide remedies for termination based on sex discrimination). [¶25] The Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act (“WFEPA”) prohibits the same conduct for which Hinckley seeks a remedy in her amended complaint. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-105(a) provides: It is a discriminatory or unfair employment practice: (i) For an employer to refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote, or to discriminate in matters of compensation or the terms, conditions or privileges of employment against, a qualified disabled person or any person otherwise qualified, because of age, sex, race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry or pregnancy. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-105(a). [¶26] The central claim of Hinckley’s complaint is discrimination in compensation, terms and conditions of her employment based on sex and falls squarely within the scope of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-105(a). [¶27] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-106 provides a statutory remedy for a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-105(a) and also provides a process that a complainant must follow to pursue that remedy. The available relief under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-106(n) includes reinstatement and requiring the employer to cease and desist from the discriminatory or unfair practice, similar to the injunctive remedy that Hinckley seeks in her amended complaint. McLean, ¶ 38, 34 P.3d at 1271 (“nothing requires the administrative remedy to be equivalent to a common law claim”). [¶28] The administrative process is set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-106(a). Subsection (a) states that “any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or unfair employment practice may, personally or through his attorney, make, sign and file with the department [of workforce services] within six (6) months of the alleged violation a verified, written complaint . . .” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-106(a). Upon the filing of a complaint, “[t]he department [of workforce services] shall investigate to determine the validity of the charges and issue a determination thereupon.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-106(a). If the 8 employee or employer “is aggrieved by the department’s determination, the aggrieved party may request a fair hearing.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-106(k). [¶29] The Wyoming Department of Workforce Services, acting through its Labor Standards Division, has promulgated rules governing such a fair hearing. See Labor Standards, ch. 3, Fair Employment Rules (hereinafter “Rules”). Under the Rules, “[i]f Labor Standards determines that probable cause does exist to conclude that discrimination has occurred, Labor Standards shall endeavor to make whole the complainant through its conciliation process.” Rules, § 4(h). If no settlement is reached within forty-five days after both parties receive the probable cause determination, Labor Standards shall make a determination that the conciliation process has failed and, upon request of either party, refer the complaint to an independent hearing officer for a fair hearing. Id. Fair hearings are conducted by an independent hearing officer. Rules, § 5(a). [¶30] Judicial review of a hearing officer’s decision is provided by the Rules as follows: “Pursuant to W.S. § 16-3-114, any complainant or respondent aggrieved or adversely affected by the hearing officer’s decision may file a petition for judicial review. Petitions for judicial review of the hearing officer’s decision shall be made pursuant to Rule 12 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Rules, § 6(a). [¶31] W.R.A.P. 12.01 provides: To the extent judicial review of administrative action by a district court is available, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency in a contested case, or who is aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by any other agency action or inaction . . . may obtain such review as provided in this rule. W.R.A.P. 12.01. [¶32] W.R.A.P. 12.03 provides: The proceedings for judicial review under Rule 12 shall be instituted by filing a petition for review in the district court[.] W.R.A.P. 12.03 [¶33] The public-policy exception exists to vindicate important social policies that would otherwise go unremedied when an employee is discharged. Where a statutory or other remedy already addresses the policy violation that led to the discharge, a separate common- law tort claim is unnecessary. Allen, 699 P.2d at 284. Hinckley has failed to show that there is no other remedy and her claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy fails. 9  IV. Hinckley’s Causes of Action for “Discrimination under Wyoming Law” and “Hostile Work Environment” Fail Because They Were Not Filed As a Petition for Review of Any Agency Action. [¶34] To the extent that Hinckley’s causes of action for “Discrimination under Wyoming Law” and “Hostile Work Environment” are based upon WFEPA, those claims also fail. The amended complaint does not disclose whether Hinckley filed a complaint with the department of workforce services, whether an investigation was conducted or whether a fair hearing was requested or held. What is clear from the record, however, is that the amended complaint is not a “petition for judicial review” of agency action. [¶35] “Generally, where an agency prescribes an administrative process for resolving disputes, the parties must exhaust those administrative remedies before seeking court intervention.” Sorensen v. Halling, 2025 WY 8, ¶ 10, 561 P.3d 1241, 1245 (Wyo. 2025). “A district court is vested with the discretion to decline jurisdiction over a matter because a party failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.” Thomas Gilcrease Found. for Gilcrease Hoback One Charitable Tr. v. Cavallaro, 2017 WY 67, ¶ 10, 397 P.3d 166, 169 (Wyo. 2017). Under WFEPA, judicial review of a fair-hearing decision is obtained by filing a petition for review in the district court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.03 and the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114; W.R.A.P. 12.01, 12.03. Hinckley did not file a petition for review. She commenced the action by filing a complaint under W.R.C.P. 3, which is the ordinary pleading used to initiate an original civil action. Because the amended complaint was not a petition for review of any agency action, the district court properly exercised its discretion to decline jurisdiction over the WFEPA claims. 2 V. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Hinckley’s Rule 59(e) Motion. [¶36] The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hinckley’s motion for reconsideration under W.R.C.P. 59(e). A motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) may be granted only on limited grounds an intervening change in controlling law, newly available evidence, or the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. Am. Collection Sys., Inc., ¶ 17, 550 P.3d at 556 (quoting Brown v. Jerding, 2020 2 Hinckley’s second cause of action stated that “Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff based on her sex, resulting in unequal pay . . .” In district court, the University treated this as a claim under Wyoming’s equal pay statute, W.S. §§ 27-4-301 et seq. and moved to dismiss it. On appeal, Hinckley did not address the dismissal of her equal pay claim under W.S. §§ 27-4-301 et seq. A “litigant's failure to raise an issue on appeal . . . gives rise to the preclusive effect of the lower court's ruling[.]” Mantle v. N. Star Energy & Constr., LLC, 2020 WY 125, ¶ 19, 473 P.3d 279, 284 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 1993)). As a result, the Court will not address the district court’s dismissal of Hinckley’s unequal pay claim under state law. 10 WY 123, ¶ 12, 472 P.3d 1038, 1042 (Wyo. 2020)). Hinckley’s motion did not address or satisfy any of those grounds and she makes no cogent argument on appeal. CONCLUSION [¶37] The WGCA bars Hinckley’s tort claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, for which she seeks only monetary damages. The WGCA also bars her claim for wrongful termination in violation of Wyoming public policy to the extent that she seeks monetary damages. Hinckley’s claim for wrongful termination, to the extent that it seeks injunctive relief, and her claims for discrimination under Wyoming law and hostile environment, fail because they are all based on alleged sex discrimination for which there is an adequate statutory remedy under WFEPA that requires any district court action to be brought as a petition for review under W.R.A.P. 12.03 rather than as a complaint under W.R.C.P. 3. [¶38] Affirmed. 11