Full Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two November 17, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II BENNETT MARK THOMAS, No. 61303-4-II Respondent, v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION BRIANA KAYLA BROOKS, Appellant. PRICE, A.C.J. — Briana K. Brooks appeals the domestic violence protection order (DVPO) Bennett Thomas obtained against her. Because Brooks’ assignments of error are not reviewable, we affirm. FACTS In 2024, Brooks and Thomas attended the same high school. They were in a relationship for several months during the summer of 2024. On March 12, 2025, Thomas filed a petition for a DVPO against Brooks. Brooks had previously filed a petition for a DVPO against Thomas that was pending at the same time. The superior court held a hearing on both petitions on April 22, 2025. At the hearing, Thomas referenced several pieces of evidence supporting his arguments: “numerous social media messages, text messages,” and a letter Brooks sent to Thomas. Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 14. Thomas also repeatedly referenced that he denied the allegations. See, e.g., VRP at 15, 17 (“He’s denied each and every allegation.”) (“And he has denied all the allegations.”). No. 61303-4-II In its ruling on the DVPO against Brooks, the superior court relied on the underlying contact Brooks had with Thomas and “multiple witness statements” to find Brooks engaged in harassment: In looking at the totality of the circumstances, regardless of really the underlying contact and perhaps basis for reaching out, where this Court lands is there was a no-contact order contract between the parties. Mr. Thomas has presented multiple witness statements corroborating his view that Ms. Brooks violated that no-contact order through the school. And I do believe that it was ongoing and sufficient enough to constitute a course of conduct that served a purpose to harass Mr. Thomas. VRP at 21. Further, in its ruling granting Brooks’ DVPO against Thomas, the superior court indicated that it had reviewed a statement of Thomas’ version of events. The superior court ultimately granted both petitions. Brooks appealed. To perfect her appeal, Brooks arranged for the verbatim report of proceedings for the April 22 hearing. She also designated some clerk’s papers, specifically, the DVPO petition, an order denying Thomas’ temporary protection order, her own response to Thomas’ petition, three witness statements Thomas submitted in support of his petition, a memorandum of journal entry setting the April 22 hearing, and the DVPO. But there is much missing from our record. There is nothing stating the specific allegations supporting Thomas’ petition for a DVPO: no statements from Thomas; no social media messages, text messages, or letters; no documentation of the school no-contact order or violations; and only limited witness statements.1 1 We recognize that Brooks included in our record a final investigation report from the school and several text messages between her and Thomas as exhibits in support of her declaration. However, the investigation report involved Thomas and another student at school and the text messages were 2 No. 61303-4-II ANALYSIS I. APPEAL NOT REVIEWABLE On appeal, Brooks challenges the DVPO, arguing that there was not sufficient evidence to grant the DVPO, the superior court gave too much weight to some evidence and too little weight to other evidence, and the trial court made a prejudicial comment about anal sex and religion. For the reasons explained below, none of these arguments are reviewable. Accordingly, we affirm. A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Brooks challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the DVPO claiming that the DVPO was “based on questionable evidence.” Br. of Appellant at 2. Because Brooks has failed to provide an adequate record, we cannot review this assignment of error. “The appellant has the burden of perfecting the record so that the court has before it all the evidence relevant to the issue.” In re Marriage of Haugh, 58 Wn. App. 1, 6, 790 P.2d 1266 (1990); RAP 9.2(b). Brooks has failed to meet her burden in this case. It is clear from reviewing the transcript of the April 22 hearing that Thomas presented evidence that was considered by the superior court but was not designated as part of the record on appeal. Without all the evidence, we cannot evaluate whether sufficient evidence supports the superior court’s determination. See Olmsted v. Mulder, 72 Wn. App. 169, 183, 863 P.2d 1355 (1993) (“We cannot reach the merits of [appellant’s] arguments because he has failed to provide us with a sufficient trial record.”), review denied, 123 Wn.2d 1025 (1994). Thus, because Brooks from the summer when Brooks and Thomas were dating. Therefore, this does not appear to be the evidence Thomas and the superior court referred to at the hearing. 3 No. 61303-4-II failed to designate all the evidence before the superior court, her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the DVPO is not reviewable. B. WEIGHT GIVEN TO EVIDENCE Brooks also assigns error to the weight the superior court did or did not give to certain pieces of evidence: The trial court gave too much weight on Kasey Eck’s testimony and assigned no weight on Brooks’ Temporary Protective Order violation, no weight on Destiny Probst testimony, no weight on Thomas’ dad as arms and weapons dealer in Washington, and no weight on Thomas’ incident with another student in Steilacoom High School. Br. of Appellant at 2. In reviewing a superior court’s decision to grant or deny a protection order, we defer to the superior court on the persuasiveness of the evidence. Nelson v. Duvall, 197 Wn. App. 441, 451, 387 P.3d 1158 (2017). We do not review credibility determinations or reweigh evidence. In re Marriage of Rostrom, 184 Wn. App. 744, 750, 339 P.3d 185 (2014). Because Brooks’ assignment of error is limited to reviewing the superior court’s determination regarding the persuasiveness of certain pieces of evidence (some of which is not included in the record on appeal), it is not reviewable. C. SUPERIOR COURT’S COMMENT Finally, Brooks argues that the superior court made a prejudicial comment about anal sex and religion. Because this issue is not properly before us, we do not review it. In support of her petition against Thomas, Brooks alleged that Thomas anally raped her on three occasions. At the hearing, Brooks’ counsel argued that a defense of consent must fail “because no one willingly consents to anal as their first way of breaking—or of becoming sexually 4 No. 61303-4-II active.” VRP at 7. In its oral ruling, the superior court expressed disagreement with counsel’s assertion: I also will indicate that I disagree with counsel for Ms. Brooks regarding one’s— no one agrees to a first sexual act as anal. At least in this Court’s life and engaging with particular—particularly conservative religious community members, at least this Court’s experience [is] that that is often viewed as a loophole around maintaining one’s virginity. So I can imagine a scenario where someone would consent to those as their first sexual acts. VRP at 22. Generally, we will review only the decision or parts of a decision designated in the notice of appeal. RAP 2.4(a). However, we will review an order or ruling that is not designated in the notice if it prejudicially affected the decision designated in the notice. RAP 2.4(b). Here, the superior court’s comment was made with respect to Brooks’ petition against Thomas. Brooks did not designate the order granting Brooks’ petition against Thomas. And Brooks provides no clear explanation of why the superior court’s comment about the likelihood of a particular type of activity being a person’s first sexual experience was prejudicial to the decision that is being reviewed—the order granting Thomas’ petition against Brooks. Thus, the superior court’s statement in regard to Brooks’ petition is outside the scope of this appeal. Accordingly, we decline to review the superior court’s comment further. II. THOMAS’ REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL Finally, Thomas requests attorney fees on appeal under RAP 18.1, RCW 7.105.310(1)(j), and RAP 18.9. We deny Thomas’ request for attorney fees. RAP 18.1 allows us to award attorney fees “[i]f applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable attorney fees . . . .” 5 No. 61303-4-II Chapter 7.105 RCW, pertaining to civil protection orders, provides for the recovery of attorney fees. RCW 7.105.310(1) states that “the court shall have broad discretion to grant such relief as the court deems proper,” including requiring the respondent to pay costs, including reasonable attorney fees. RCW 7.105.310(1)(j). If attorney fees are recoverable at the superior court, the prevailing party may recover attorney fees on appeal. Aiken v. Aiken, 187 Wn.2d 491, 506, 387 P.3d 680 (2017). Thomas cites to RCW 7.105.310 in his brief. But other than this citation, he provides no argument supporting why we should award attorney fees on appeal, especially considering that the superior court declined to order payment of fees and costs below. Thus, we decline to award attorney fees under RCW 7.105.310(1)(j). RAP 18.9 also allows the award of attorney fees as sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal. “An appeal is frivolous when the appeal presents no debatable issues on which reasonable minds could differ and is so lacking in merit that there is no possibility of reversal.” Stiles v. Kearney, 168 Wn. App. 250, 267, 277 P.3d 9, review denied, 175 Wn.2d 1016 (2012). Thomas provides no argument as to why this appeal should be considered frivolous. And although Brooks does not prevail on her appeal, imposition of sanctions is not appropriate in this case. Accordingly, we deny Thomas’ request for an award of attorney fees. CONCLUSION Brooks’ three assignments of error are not reviewable. We affirm the superior court and deny Thomas’ request for attorney fees on appeal. 6 No. 61303-4-II A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. PRICE, A.C.J. We concur: MAXA, J. CRUSER, J. 7