N.C., by his Mother, Amy Lifson, as Next Friend v. Meaghan Brill

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Record No. 1155-25-4 N.C., BY HIS MOTHER, AMY LIFSON, AS NEXT FRIEND v. MEAGHAN BRILL, ET AL. Present: Judges O’Brien, Causey and Bernhard Opinion Issued November 10, 2026* FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY James E. Plowman, Judge (Debra K. Rose; WhitbeckBeglis, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (Karissa T. Kaseorg; Whitney E. Nelson-Crawford; Nicole S. Cheuk; Sands Anderson PC, on brief), for appellees. Appellees submitting on brief. MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE DORIS HENDERSON CAUSEY N.C., by his mother, Amy Lifson, as next friend, sued Meaghan Brill and Jesse Rivera for gross negligence and willful misconduct arising from N.C.’s suspension from school and extracurricular activities following an incident at Meridian High School. The circuit court sustained appellees’ demurrer to the amended complaint and dismissed it with prejudice. On appeal, N.C. argues that that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged gross negligence and willful misconduct. He further argues the circuit court evaluated the amended complaint under a * This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). due-process and disciplinary-policy framework that was not pled, rather than the tort claims for gross negligence and willful misconduct actually alleged.1 For the reasons that follow, this Court concludes that N.C.’s complaint fails to allege a cognizable legal duty. This holding is sufficient to resolve the appeal. Accordingly, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed. BACKGROUND On May 8, 2023, N.C.,2 a lacrosse player at Kettle Run High School, attended an away lacrosse game at Meridian High School. Players had been instructed by their coach to remain at the field and use the outdoor restroom facilities. N.C. requested permission from a Meridian High School security guard to enter the school building to use an indoor restroom, and the security guard granted him access. The following day, Meridian High School staff discovered racial epithets written on a whiteboard in the staff lounge. Meridian personnel notified Kettle Run administrators and provided photographs from security footage showing three Kettle Run students in the school hallway the evening before. Kettle Run High School’s investigative report further identified the students as having been seen on footage on the same floor as the staff lounge where the epithets were found. Principal Meaghan Brill’s letter to the school district stated that no other occupants were in the building during the relevant time. She emailed Meridian personnel stating that the matter would be addressed and that the students would receive “consequences related to both school and extracurricular activities.” 1 “[T]he parties agree[d] that oral argument [wa]s not necessary,” so we did not hear oral argument in this case. See Code § 17.1-403. Instead, the parties submitted their arguments on brief. 2 This opinion uses initials to protect the privacy of minor appellant. -2-  On May 10, 2023, Brill and Assistant Principal Jesse Rivera interviewed N.C. regarding the incident. According to Kettle Run’s report, “[a]lthough [N.C.] was present when the words were written, he could not indicate which student was responsible.” On May 12, 2023, N.C.’s parents were informed that N.C. would receive a three-day out- of-school suspension and would be suspended from extracurricular activities through the end of the 2023-2024 school year. On May 15, 2023, school officials issued a written notice of suspension, discipline referral, report of facts, and appeal materials. The written notice identified harassment, vandalism, and failure to follow school rules as disciplinary violations. On May 16, 2023, N.C.’s parents met with Brill and Rivera to question the evidentiary basis for the disciplinary charges. The complaint alleges that during the meeting, defendants did not provide evidence that N.C. himself wrote the epithets on the whiteboard. It further alleges that during the meeting, defendants indicated that the “incident is about how it reflects on Kettle Run [High School]” and responded to their questions by asking them what evidence they possessed “that [N.C.] didn’t do it.” N.C.’s parents subsequently pursued an administrative appeal of the disciplinary decision. After review by a higher-level school official, the disciplinary action was upheld. On September 16, 2024, N.C., by his mother and next friend, filed a complaint against the Fauquier County School Board, Brill, and Rivera. The original complaint asserted claims for violations of due process, gross negligence, and willful misconduct arising from the disciplinary proceedings. On February 28, 2025, following a hearing, the circuit court sustained defendants’ demurrer but granted N.C. leave to amend. N.C. thereafter filed an amended complaint naming only Brill and Rivera as defendants. The amended complaint omitted the due process claim and asserted only claims for gross negligence and willful misconduct. On April 11, 2025, Brill and Rivera filed a demurrer, -3- arguing that the amended complaint failed to allege a cognizable legal duty and failed to state legally sufficient claims for gross negligence or willful misconduct. Following a hearing on June 13, 2025, the circuit court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. In doing so, the court stated that the amended complaint contained “insufficient facts . . . to allege gross negligence on either part of the two defendants,” and observed that although N.C. characterized the disciplinary process as “a sham,” “the process was followed nonetheless.” N.C. filed a motion to reconsider, and this appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews a circuit court’s decision sustaining a demurrer de novo. Highlander v. Va. Dep’t of Wildlife Res., 84 Va. App. 404, 422 (2025). In reviewing a demurrer, the Court accepts as true all properly pleaded material facts and interprets those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences fairly arising from those facts. Coward v. Wellmont Health Sys., 295 Va. 351, 358-59 (2018). However, courts do not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Id. at 359 (quoting AGCS Marine Ins. v. Arlington Cnty., 293 Va. 469, 473 (2017)). The question presented for this Court is whether the facts alleged are legally sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. Pendleton v. Newsome, 290 Va. 162, 171 (2015). ANALYSIS I. No Cognizable Legal Duty Was Alleged In his amended complaint, N.C. asserts that the school officials possessed, and breached, the following tort duties: (1) a “duty to comply with the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the Fauquier County Public School policies authorizing [suspension] for sufficient cause” and (2) “a duty to provide the [p]laintiff with fair and unbiased due process.” In support of these duties, N.C. cites Code § 22.1-277(A) and Fauquier County Public School Policy 7-3.2 (1.1), -4- which permit student suspension only for “sufficient cause.” He further cites Code § 22.1-293(B), directing school principals to play roles related to leadership, administration, and supervision of schools “in accordance with the rules and regulations of the school board,” as well as Fauquier County Public School Policy 7-3.4 (3.1.3), which sets the burden of proof in the case of expulsions (though N.C. was suspended, not expelled). Finally, N.C. cites the Due Process Clause of the Virginia Constitution. In the school context, we have recognized that “school officials” have a tort duty to “supervise and ensure that ‘students could . . . have an education in an atmosphere conducive to learning, free of disruption, and threat to person.’” Burns v. Gagnon, 283 Va. 657, 671 (2012) (alteration in original). However, N.C. does not ground his tort claims in this duty. Instead, we must assess whether there exists a basis for the specific tort duties that N.C. alleges the school officials deprived him of by acting with gross negligence or willful misconduct in failing to “comply with” the above laws setting forth the “sufficient cause” suspension standard, and by failing to provide him with “fair and unbiased due process.” “The issue whether a legal duty in tort exists is a pure question of law.” Id. at 668 (quoting Kellermann v. McDonough, 278 Va. 478, 487 (2009)). “The law of torts provides redress only for the violation of certain common law and statutory duties.” MCR Fed., LLC v. JB&A, Inc., 294 Va. 446, 457 (2017) (quoting Filak v. George, 267 Va. 612, 618 (2004)). In assessing whether a legal duty exists, “[t]he absence of an underlying common-law duty renders the presence of a statutory standard of care irrelevant.” Parker v. Carilion Clinic, 296 Va. 319, 345 (2018). Even assuming Code § 22.1-277(A) establishes a standard of care governing student discipline, “a statute setting the standard of care does not create the duty of care.” Steward v. Holland Fam. Props., LLC, 284 Va. 282, 286 (2012). Nor is FCPS Policy 7-3.2 (1.1), an internal -5- school board policy carrying much less legal force than a statute, any more capable of independently providing the missing duty. Cf. Murphy v. Coman, No. 1248-24-4, slip op. at 6, 2025 Va. App. LEXIS 491, at *8 (Sep. 2, 2025) (holding that a statute alone does not create a private tort duty absent an underlying common-law duty). N.C. identifies no common-law duty requiring school officials to discipline students only for sufficient cause, nor does N.C. identify a common-law tort duty directing officials to exercise due care in following laws. The statute and school policies, therefore, standing alone, do not create a private tort duty. We are further unpersuaded that Virginia law recognizes the other tort duty N.C. relies upon: a duty of school administrators to provide “fair and unbiased due process.” First, N.C. provides no argument that such a tort duty would arise from the Due Process Clause itself, and therefore we will not recognize such a duty in this case. Second, N.C. has not persuaded us that such a tort duty arises from a special relationship between school official and student. Virginia recognizes a special relationship giving rise to a tort duty only in limited, defined categories. “Examples of special relationships we have recognized between a defendant and a plaintiff include common carrier-passenger, business proprietor-invitee, innkeeper-guest, and employer- employee.” Burns, 283 Va. at 669 (quoting Kellermann, 278 Va. at 492). While “this list of relationships that give rise to a special relationship is not exhaustive,” Virginia courts “have exercised caution in expanding it to include new relationships.” Id. (quoting Kellermann, 278 Va. at 492). The relationship between a school administrator and student is not among them, and our Supreme Court has declined to add it. Id. at 670-71 (“We decline [party’s] invitation to expand our special-relationship jurisprudence to include the principal-student relationship. . . . -6- The principal-student relationship . . . has no history—deep-rooted or otherwise—in the common law.”).3 Courts have reached the same conclusion in the closely analogous university-student context. See Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., 439 F. Supp. 3d 784, 797 (W.D. Va. 2020) (rejecting a student’s claim that a university owed a duty to “conduct the disciplinary process with due care”); Doe v. Marymount Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d 573, 589-90 (E.D. Va. 2018) (rejecting a student’s claim that a university owed a duty “to be fair” in conducting his disciplinary process). Although neither decision is binding on this Court, both support the conclusion (grounded in Burns) that the duties N.C. asserts are not cognizable under Virginia tort law. In sum, N.C. identifies no Virginia authority recognizing that there is a tort duty—as opposed to a statutory or constitutional mandate—for school administrators to provide a fair disciplinary proceeding or discipline students only upon sufficient cause. Accordingly, the amended complaint fails to allege a cognizable legal duty, and the circuit court did not err in sustaining the demurrer on that basis. Because N.C. has not alleged a cognizable legal duty, this Court need not reach whether the amended complaint’s allegations would otherwise be sufficient to state a claim for gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct. See Highlander, 84 Va. App. at 424 (noting the doctrine of judicial restraint requires deciding cases “on the best and narrowest grounds available” (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017))). II. Affirmance Is Proper Regardless of the Framework the Circuit Court Applied N.C. contends that the circuit court evaluated the amended complaint through a due- process or disciplinary-policy framework rather than analyzing the tort claims for gross 3 We do not express any opinion on whether the claims asserted by N.C. could give rise to a cognizable tort claim if grounded in duties already recognized in the school context, such as those discussed in Burns, 283 Va. at 671. We solely decline to extend our tort law jurisprudence to recognize the specific tort duties asserted by N.C. in this case. -7- negligence and willful misconduct actually alleged. He points to the circuit court’s discussion regarding whether he received notice, an opportunity to be heard, and administrative review, and contends that the court improperly focused on whether a disciplinary process existed rather than whether Brill and Rivera knowingly disciplined him without evidence. Even assuming the circuit court relied upon an incorrect analytical framework, affirmance remains appropriate under the right-result-different-reason doctrine. See Highlander, 84 Va. App. at 424-25 (“[T]his Court will ‘not hesitate, in a proper case, where the correct conclusion has been reached but the wrong [or a different] reason given, to sustain the result and assign the right ground.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Taylor v. Northam, 300 Va. 230, 251 (2021))). Here, appellees Brill and Rivera argued in their demurrer that the amended complaint failed to allege a cognizable legal duty. Because those grounds were expressly raised below, they may serve as alternative bases for affirmance. See Theologis v. Weiler, 76 Va. App. 596, 604 (2023) (“Code § 8.01-273 prevents us from applying [the right-result-different-reason] doctrine to permit an appellee to benefit from an argument that he did not include in his . . . demurrer.”). Accordingly, any error in the circuit court’s reasoning does not require reversal because the judgment may be affirmed on the basis that the plaintiff did not allege a cognizable duty in tort law. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirms the judgment of the circuit court. Affirmed. -8-