In re J.A.C...

This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter 2026 UT 27 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of J.A.C. and A.E.C., persons under eighteen years of age C.T.M., Appellant, v. STATE OF UTAH, Appellee. No. 20231128 Heard September 5, 2025 Filed July 30, 2026 On Certification from the Court of Appeals Fourth District Juvenile Court, Utah County The Honorable F. Richards Smith Nos. 1121825 and 1121829 Attorneys: Alexandra Mareschal, Kirstin Norman, Jason B. Richards, Debra M. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for appellant Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Deborah A. Wood, John M. Peterson, Asst. Att’ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee __________________________________________________________  As of January 31, 2026, “The Supreme Court consists of seven justices.” UTAH CODE § 78A-3-101(1). Pursuant to Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 18, this court sat and rendered judgment in this matter as a division of five justices.  Additional attorneys: Emily Adams, Bountiful, Tara Urs, Seattle, Wash., Amy Mulzer, Brooklyn, N.Y., for amici curiae Adopted People and Allied Organizations, in support of appellant.  In re J.A.C. Opinion of the Court Martha Pierce, Alisha Giles, Heath Haacke, Salt Lake City, Guardian ad Litem. ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE POHLMAN authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE PETERSEN, JUSTICE NIELSEN, and JUDGE NEIDER joined. JUSTICE NIELSEN authored a concurring opinion. Due to his retirement, JUSTICE PEARCE did not participate herein; DISTRICT COURT JUDGE CAMILLE L. NEIDER sat. JUSTICE HAGEN stepped down from the court before this case was decided. JUSTICE NIELSEN, having reviewed the briefs and listened to a recording of the oral argument, substituted for JUSTICE HAGEN and participated fully in this decision. JUSTICE JORGENSEN and JUSTICE DENT became members of the Court after oral argument in this matter and did not participate. ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE POHLMAN, opinion of the Court: INTRODUCTION ¶1 This child welfare case has spent too many years in our courts. The two children at the center of this case were first removed from the parents’ custody in 2015 and then again in 2019. For the past seven years, the children, their foster parents, and C.T.M. (Mother) have awaited resolution through two trials and two appeals, with the second appeal making its way to us via certification by the court of appeals. ¶2 To provide everyone involved the resolution they seek, we must first answer an important jurisdictional question. The answer to that question dictates whether we can hear this second appeal and, if so, whether we can reach every issue Mother raises. We ultimately conclude that we have jurisdiction over this appeal generally and over the alleged errors that arose during the second trial, which occurred after the juvenile court’s first termination decision was reversed by the court of appeals. We don’t have jurisdiction, however, over alleged errors that occurred as early as 2019 and that predate Mother’s first appeal. ¶3 Accordingly, our review is limited to Mother’s challenges to the juvenile court’s post-remand decision in which it determined that due to Mother’s neglect, her parental unfitness, and the 2  Cite as: 2026 UT 27 Opinion of the Court significant needs of the children, the termination of her parental rights is strictly necessary to promote their best interest. Mother contends, among other things, that the court’s termination decision is against the clear weight of the evidence. But for the reasons we explain, we affirm the court’s decision, rejecting her claim that it lacks sufficient evidentiary support. BACKGROUND1 ¶4 Mother and father have two children together: fourteen- year-old J.A.C. and eleven-year-old A.E.C.2 This family has a history with the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) and the juvenile court dating back to 2015. The 2015 Child Welfare Petition ¶5 The State first became involved with the family in 2015, after J.A.C., who was then just three, was found wandering alone outside an apartment complex wearing only a dirty diaper and an oversized t-shirt. When responding officers later questioned father about this incident, he told them he had been sleeping all day, so he didn’t notice that J.A.C. had gone missing. He also informed the officers that he and Mother have, at times, locked the children in their bedroom by tying an electrical cord around the handle to prevent them from getting out. Officers observed that the children’s bedroom was littered with dirty diapers and feces on the walls and floor, and J.A.C. appeared to be developmentally delayed. ¶6 The State removed the children from their home after DCFS made findings of non-supervision, physical neglect, environmental neglect, and general neglect. And the juvenile court later adjudicated the children neglected and abused by their parents. The parents, however, participated in services and made improvements. In 2016, the parents regained custody and the children returned home. __________________________________________________________ 1 “We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision.” In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, n.3, 472 P.3d 827. 2 Father is not a party to this appeal because he voluntarily relinquished his rights to the children in 2021. Because this appeal concerns only Mother’s parental rights, we mention father only to provide context. 3  In re J.A.C. Opinion of the Court The 2019 Child Welfare Petition ¶7 Approximately three years later, the State filed a second petition against Mother and father based on new findings of non- supervision and physical neglect. The allegations in this new petition “mirrored, in many respects, the allegations contained in the 2015 petition.” The children once again were found by officers playing in a busy street, unsupervised, and dressed in only their underwear. When the children were taken home, officers watched them crawl through an open window to get inside. And when the State walked through the family’s home, it observed trash and “what appeared to be feces” throughout. ¶8 The officers also observed that J.A.C. and A.E.C. appeared developmentally delayed, with A.E.C. (at five years old) being nonverbal. When speaking to school personnel, officers discovered that J.A.C. (at seven years old) was not potty trained and often went to school unbathed and dirty. School personnel reported that they would send J.A.C. home with his soiled clothes after an accident, and those clothes would remain in his backpack for several days. ¶9 At an initial pretrial hearing before the juvenile court, Mother appeared and explained that the children were in father’s custody because “in a few days she would be leaving the country and traveling to Turkey to pursue a romantic relationship.” She said that she did not know how long she would be gone, but estimated it could be longer than a year, and that she didn’t intend to return to the United States until after her fiancé was able to obtain a green card. The court excused Mother from the case and proceeded without her while she was out of the country. ¶10 As the case progressed, the court authorized the State to remove the children from father’s custody because of his failure to address conditions in the home and to properly care for the children. The children were eventually placed with a foster family in Tennessee that was willing and wanting to adopt them. When Mother was notified by the State of the children’s removal from father’s home, she “appeared unconcerned and stated she had no intentions of returning to the U.S. anytime soon.” ¶11 The juvenile court later adjudicated the State’s petition for custody against the parents, finding that the children were neglected as to both Mother and father. In the court’s findings, it established non-supervision of the children, a chronically unsafe and unsanitary home condition, a failure to meet the children’s hygienic needs, and other issues of neglect. 4  Cite as: 2026 UT 27 Opinion of the Court ¶12 With the adjudication complete, the court held a disposition hearing and set “return home” as the permanency goal for the children along with an order for the State to provide reunification services to the parents. As father was the only parent in the country at the time, the reunification goal was focused on him. In October 2020, approximately one year after she left the country, Mother returned to the U.S. ¶13 After attempting reunification, the juvenile court held a hearing in February 2021 to reassess the children’s permanency goal. After hearing from the parties, it terminated reunification services as to father and changed the primary permanency goal to adoption. Shortly thereafter, in March 2021, the State filed a termination petition for the parental rights of Mother and father as to both children. Only then, in April 2021, did Mother begin accessing services. The First Trial & August 3 Termination Order ¶14 The first trial on the State’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights was held in the summer of 2021. As to grounds for termination, the court determined that Mother neglected the children and was unfit or incompetent. In support of its determination, the court found, among other things, that Mother demonstrated a disregard for the welfare of her children; she had an unwillingness or inability to ensure the children’s most basic needs were met; she did not have basic insight into her children’s needs and did not take responsibility for her role as a parent to ensure their wellbeing; and her “commitment to and interest in the children is not what would be expected of a normal parent.” The court also determined that it was in the “children’s best interest that the mother’s parental rights be terminated, and termination is strictly necessary to promote the children’s welfare and best interest.” Finally, the court found that J.A.C. and A.E.C. had suffered severe chronic neglect that has detrimentally impacted their development, and it found that further exposure to such neglect while waiting for the possibility that Mother would develop sufficient skills to adequately parent them would be harmful. ¶15 The juvenile court ordered Mother’s parental rights permanently terminated on August 3, 2021 (August 3 order). Although the court stated that it had considered alternatives to the termination of Mother’s rights and had determined that termination was strictly necessary to promote the welfare and best 5  In re J.A.C. Opinion of the Court interest of the children, the court did not describe what alternatives it had considered or why it found them inadequate. The First Appeal ¶16 Mother’s counsel filed a notice of appeal from the termination order on August 17, but counsel filed the notice in the court of appeals instead of filing it in the juvenile court. Because counsel filed the notice in the wrong court, he re-filed the notice in the juvenile court on August 23, twenty days after the juvenile court’s termination order was entered, which was beyond the fifteen days allowed by rule. See UTAH R. APP. P. 52(a). ¶17 Because the notice of appeal was untimely, the court of appeals noticed the appeal for summary disposition on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. The State and the guardian ad litem (GAL) agreed that the court lacked jurisdiction; Mother’s counsel argued that his mistake should not deprive Mother of her constitutional right to appeal. The court of appeals rejected counsel’s plea and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ¶18 Undeterred, Mother filed a motion in the juvenile court seeking to set aside and re-enter the August 3 order under rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, so that her time to appeal would be reset. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1) (“On motion and upon just terms, the court may relieve a party . . . from a judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake . . . or excusable neglect . . . .”). Over the State’s objection, the court granted Mother’s motion. It set aside its August 3 order and deemed it “re-entered,” effective December 3, 2021 (December 3 order). Mother then filed a notice of appeal in the juvenile court identifying the December 3 order as the subject of her appeal. ¶19 Along with her notice of appeal, Mother filed a petition on appeal as required by rule 55(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In her petition, Mother identified two issues for appeal: (1) whether the juvenile court erred in discrediting a mental health assessment and Mother’s therapist’s testimony in considering her fitness to parent; and (2) whether the juvenile court erred in determining it was strictly necessary to terminate parental rights where (according to Mother) termination was not warranted, Mother’s parenting was improving, Mother had substantially complied with DCFS’s requests, and the children were not in an adoptive placement. 6  Cite as: 2026 UT 27 Opinion of the Court ¶20 In response, the State argued that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over Mother’s appeal of the August 3 order because the notice was filed too late. Citing court of appeals’ authority, the State argued that because the juvenile court did not substantively change its August 3 order, the court’s December 3 re- entry of that order did not reset the time for filing an appeal. (Citing Foster v. Montgomery, 2003 UT App 405, ¶ 18, 82 P.3d 191.) ¶21 The court of appeals subsequently issued an order notifying the parties that the case was being considered for summary dismissal due to a lack of jurisdiction for the reasons stated in the State’s response to Mother’s petition. In responding to the court’s order, Mother argued that because her constitutional rights were implicated, equities weighed in favor of “honoring” the juvenile court’s decision to set aside and reinstate its August 3 order so that she could timely file her appeal. Mother also argued that the court should adopt a method for appellants to reinstate their rights to appeal in parental termination proceedings. ¶22 The court of appeals withdrew its notice of summary disposition and ordered the parties to proceed to full briefing, instructing that “[i]n addition to the issues raised on appeal, the parties shall specifically address whether Utah Appellate Courts should adopt some method for parents to reinstate their right to appeal or whether Manning should be extended to termination of parental rights proceedings.” (Citing Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628, superseded by rule as stated in State v. Brown, 2021 UT 11, ¶ 15, 489 P.3d 152.) ¶23 Although the case was originally set to be briefed within three months, a host of motions delayed the proceeding for more than a year. Then, before Mother’s principal brief was filed, the parties filed a stipulated motion asking the court of appeals to refer the appeal to mediation. Mother represented that mediation would “assist in the resolution of this case without an appeal and lead to a permanent solution for all parties more expeditiously.” ¶24 The court of appeals granted the parties’ request and the parties returned to the court several weeks later with a “stipulated motion to reverse and remand.” Invoking rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,3 the parties asserted that the juvenile court __________________________________________________________ 3 Rule 10 allows for a summary reversal “in cases of manifest error.” UTAH R. APP. P. 10(a)(2). The parties did not allege manifest (continued . . .) 7  In re J.A.C. Opinion of the Court had “committed reversible error by failing to adequately discuss how it considered, and why it ultimately rejected, alternatives to termination.” And they asked the court of appeals to reverse the juvenile court’s August 3 order “with respect to its best interest analysis and enter a limited remand for further analysis of best interest.” Noting that significant time had passed since that order was entered, they also asked that the juvenile court be instructed to conduct its inquiry based on the children’s current situation and needs. Finally, although the parties acknowledged that “questions about appellate jurisdiction [had been] raised” on appeal, they did not discuss those questions further. ¶25 The court of appeals granted the parties’ request and ordered “that the juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights is reversed.” In its “Order of Reversal and Remand,” the court agreed with the parties’ assessment that the “findings below were insufficient given recent case law.” And it ordered the juvenile court “to explain in greater detail why termination of Mother’s parental rights is, or is not, in the children’s best interests at this time and what, if any, viable alternatives to termination exist.” The court of appeals did not mention the jurisdictional question raised at the outset of the appeal. ¶26 Several weeks later, the court of appeals remitted the case to the juvenile court. See UTAH R. APP. P. 36(a)(2) (“The Court of Appeals will issue a remittitur immediately after the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari expires.”). The Second Trial & December 17 Termination Order ¶27 On remand, the juvenile court held a second trial to take evidence as to the then-current best interest of J.A.C. (at eleven years old) and A.E.C. (at nine years old). The court heard testimony from Mother, J.A.C. and A.E.C., the children’s foster mother, a DCFS caseworker, the children’s case manager from the state of Tennessee, a therapist that had sessions with Mother, and Mother’s now-husband. ¶28 Trial ended on November 3, and on December 17, 2023, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, explaining in greater detail why termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest, including why termination was strictly __________________________________________________________ error, but we assume they believed this provision provided a procedural basis for their joint request for reversal. 8  Cite as: 2026 UT 27 Opinion of the Court necessary (December 17 order). Based on the evidence presented, the court found that the children had “made important progress” in the two years with their foster family, but that they still had significant medical, developmental, and educational needs. For example, J.A.C. continued to require incontinence briefs and was on an individualized education program in school to accommodate his special needs. And although he still struggled at school, he had progressed from “hardly read[ing] at all” before his placement to reading at a third-grade level. As for A.E.C., the court found that he had ADHD and required constant adult supervision to complete homework. A.E.C. also continued to face challenges with everyday tasks, such as tying his shoes, holding a toothbrush, and writing. ¶29 The court further found that both children required care from numerous healthcare providers to address their medical and developmental needs, and that the foster parents used their own income to pay for some of their services. The needs of the children were so great that the foster mother left her job “so that she can devote the necessary time to provide the care they need.” However, despite these challenges, the court found that the children were fully integrated into and connected at an emotional level with the foster family, and that the foster parents were “hands-on,” “very patient and calm,” knew the children’s needs, and were “proactive in addressing them.” Finally, the court found that the foster family was committed to adopting the children should that option become available. ¶30 With regard to Mother, the juvenile court found that she was largely “oblivious” to the challenges J.A.C. and A.E.C. continue to face and their associated needs. It found Mother was “uninterested” in their progress and wellbeing, as she never really asked about them and instead focused her interactions with the children on “having fun and giving gifts.” And the court detailed Mother’s poor judgment about child safety, should the children return home to live with her, as demonstrated by Mother’s lack of concern over her plans to share her home with a person who has been convicted of a sex crime against a minor. ¶31 The court also made findings about Mother’s lack of parenting skills and her failure to make a genuine effort to improve herself and to address the issues that led to the children’s removal. The court found that Mother only briefly engaged in therapy, and that she “chooses to be uninformed about [her children’s] development, physical and emotional wellbeing, and special 9  In re J.A.C. Opinion of the Court needs.” And the court found that she “is either unwilling or incapable of making necessary changes,” and that it would be detrimental to the children to return to her custody. The court also found that with Mother, the children’s “special needs would not be addressed,” “their basic needs would be neglected,” and “[t]hey would regress in the progress they have made since their removal.” ¶32 The juvenile court also made findings about the children’s own desires after hearing the testimony they wanted to share with the court. A.E.C. expressed his view that he wanted to live in his home in Tennessee with the foster family and that he didn’t want to live in Utah again. And while J.A.C. had previously expressed the desire to stay in Tennessee with the foster family, the night before trial, he told the GAL that he wanted to give Mother “one more chance.” He thought Mother’s new husband, whom he didn’t know very well, would help Mother make better choices than she had in the past. And although J.A.C. said he wanted to live with Mother, he wanted to do so if he could also have daily contact with his foster family. He also said that Mother wasn’t allowed to buy him presents that cost more than $30, that she lets him have “a lot more screen time,” and that he wasn’t “super thrilled” with the foster parents’ screen time rules. ¶33 Based on these testimonies, the court found that the children had the capacity to relate their experiences with Mother and the foster family, as well as their feelings resulting from those experiences. But the court gave “minimal weight” to J.A.C.’s change of heart about adoption, finding it was likely that he was at least partially motivated by a desire for more screen time and his perception that Mother is “all about fun and gifts.” In making its findings, the court determined that given the children’s ages and development, they lacked sufficient capacity to express “meaningful opinions” about their case’s “ultimate outcome.” ¶34 Finally, the court considered alternatives to terminating Mother’s parental rights. It considered awarding permanent custody and guardianship to the foster parents but concluded such an arrangement wouldn’t “equally protect[] and benefit[]” the children. It found that the foster parents and Mother had a strained relationship that would likely get worse under permanent custody and guardianship because Mother was unable to adhere to the foster parents’ rules or boundaries. The court also found that permanent custody and guardianship would likely confuse the children because they lacked the capacity to distinguish between 10  Cite as: 2026 UT 27 Opinion of the Court guardian and parent. And this confusion would only be exacerbated by Mother’s intrusion on boundaries and her lack of respect for the family’s rules. Last, it found that the foster parents had demonstrated a willingness to work with Mother, but that it was “imperative that they have full authority to set and enforce appropriate limits.” The court found those limits “cannot be satisfactorily achieved through permanent custody and guardianship, and such an arrangement would prove detrimental to the children.” ¶35 Based on these findings, the court concluded that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was strictly necessary to promote the children’s welfare and best interest. Thus, the court granted the State’s petition and permanently terminated Mother’s parental rights. The Second Appeal ¶36 On December 22, Mother filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s termination order. In her notice, she didn’t correctly identify the December 17 order by name, but she states that she is appealing the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the juvenile court after its order of November 3. ¶37 Despite the limitation in her notice of appeal, in her subsequently filed petition on appeal, Mother purports to appeal the court’s pre-remand August 3 order, as well as its post-remand December 17 order. And in addition to the juvenile court’s December 17 best interest determination, Mother purports to appeal alleged errors relating to DCFS’s reunification efforts and alleged errors that she identifies as having occurred as early as 2019. ¶38 The GAL contests Mother’s challenges to the juvenile court’s best interest determination, but the GAL also identifies several potential barriers to review generally. First, the GAL revisits the jurisdictional deficiency tied to the original, untimely notice of appeal, and it argues that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. The GAL also contends that even if we can hear Mother’s challenge to the December 17 order, we either cannot or should not consider Mother’s other challenges because we lack jurisdiction to hear them or because they are unpreserved. ¶39 The State similarly raises the issue of jurisdiction, arguing that the initial appeal from the August 3 order was untimely and 11  In re J.A.C. Opinion of the Court the juvenile court improperly used rule 60(b) to extend the time to file an appeal. Unlike the GAL, however, the State invites the court to craft a Manning-like remedy exclusively for this case to excuse its jurisdictional defect. The State also defends the juvenile court’s best interest determination, and it argues that whatever procedural errors may have occurred early in this case were harmless. ¶40 Finally, in reply, Mother addresses jurisdiction, arguing that the challenge to jurisdiction was implicitly resolved by the court of appeals when it reversed the juvenile court and remanded the appeal for a new trial. And relatedly, Mother argues that any challenge to jurisdiction should have been raised in “the prior appeal” and is now waived. Mother further argues that the juvenile court entered a new order terminating Mother’s rights, and that the August 3 order “does not spring back to life after reversal . . . simply because the juvenile court later came to the same conclusion.”4 Mother also rejects the State’s suggestion that a Manning-type remedy is necessary, and she insists that she should be allowed to raise errors that occurred as far back as 2019, and prior to adjudication, because they are “structural.” Last, Mother asserts that raising these errors in the juvenile court after remand “would have violated” the court of appeals’ “mandate on remand, which was limited to additional findings for best interests.” ¶41 After Mother’s appeal was fully briefed, the court of appeals certified the case to us. See UTAH CODE § 78A-4-103(5). In its certification order, the court of appeals identified several issues that it believed this court should settle, including “whether an untimely notice of appeal that went unaddressed prior to remand in an initial appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction in a timely subsequent appeal in the same matter.” ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶42 We must first resolve the question of whether we have appellate jurisdiction over Mother’s appeal. See State v. Brown, 2021 UT 11, ¶ 10, 489 P.3d 152 (“We have an independent obligation to ensure that we have [jurisdiction] over all matters before us.” __________________________________________________________ 4 Although Mother included the August 3 order in her petition on appeal, she now contends that the “2021 Termination Order has no bearing on jurisdiction over this appeal at this point. To hold otherwise would be procedurally unsound and a colossal waste of judicial resources and precious time for these children and their family.” 12  Cite as: 2026 UT 27 Opinion of the Court (cleaned up)). “Whether this court has jurisdiction over an appeal is a question of law that can be raised for the first time on appeal.” In re Adoption of A.B., 2010 UT 55, ¶ 21, 245 P.3d 711. ¶43 We ultimately determine that we have jurisdiction to hear Mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s termination decision in its December 17 order. “Whether a parent’s rights should be terminated presents a mixed question of law and fact.” In re E.R., 2021 UT 36, ¶ 7, 496 P.3d 58 (cleaned up). We will not overturn a parental termination decision unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence. In re D.S., 2025 UT 11, ¶ 34, 568 P.3d 1060. ANALYSIS ¶44 The GAL and the State both raise jurisdictional concerns stemming from Mother’s untimely appeal of the juvenile court’s August 3 order. We ultimately conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction to hear Mother’s challenge to the December 17 order, but that our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing alleged errors that occurred after remand from the first appeal. Thus, we reach Mother’s contention that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because doing so was not in the best interest of the children nor strictly necessary to promote their best interest. ¶45 As we explain below, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the children because she has not shown error in the court’s decision or that the decision “is against the clear weight of the evidence.” In re D.S., 2025 UT 11, ¶ 46, 568 P.3d 1060 (cleaned up). I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION ¶46 We must first address the jurisdictional uncertainty that clouds this appeal. After all, even when an appeal raises important questions that deserve our attention, “we cannot turn a blind eye to [a] defect in our appellate jurisdiction.” State v. Brown, 2021 UT 11, ¶ 9, 489 P.3d 152; see also State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶ 21, 342 P.3d 789 (“Appellate courts do not enjoy unlimited power to review the actions of trial courts and cannot conjure jurisdiction.” (cleaned up)). ¶47 The State and the GAL argue that Mother’s appeal lacks solid jurisdictional footing in this court, because Mother did not 13  In re J.A.C. Opinion of the Court timely file her notice of appeal in the juvenile court.5 And although the State and the GAL once invoked the court of appeals’ jurisdiction to reverse the juvenile court’s August 3 order, they now claim that the jurisdictional defect tied to the untimely notice still taints these proceedings and proscribes our review.6 ¶48 For her part, Mother argues that our jurisdiction is secure. She doesn’t claim the notice of appeal was timely or that the time to appeal was extended by the juvenile court’s reentry of its August 3 order in December 2021. Instead, she contends that any outstanding challenge to the court of appeals’ jurisdiction was waived when the court of appeals, without challenge from the parties, implicitly resolved the issue by exercising its jurisdiction to reverse the juvenile court. ¶49 To resolve this jurisdictional dilemma, we begin by examining the origins of this appeal and the circumstances surrounding the court of appeals’ reversal of the juvenile court’s August 3 order. As we explain, we ultimately conclude that under our precedent, Mother has the better of the two arguments. We then address how that conclusion affects the scope of this appeal. And although we decide that we have jurisdiction to review Mother’s __________________________________________________________ 5 The parties’ briefs were filed in the court of appeals and thus their challenges to appellate jurisdiction were originally directed at that court. But because the court of appeals certified this case to our court “for original appellate review and determination,” the question of appellate jurisdiction remains. UTAH CODE § 78A-4- 103(5). The court of appeals can certify only those matters over which it has “original appellate jurisdiction.” Id. Thus, if the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over Mother’s appeal, it lacked the authority to certify her case to us and the case must be dismissed. See State v. Sun Sur. Ins., 2004 UT 74, ¶ 9, 99 P.3d 818 (“Where an appeal is not properly taken, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss.” (cleaned up)). 6 The State suggests that we could exercise jurisdiction to hear this appeal, but only if we grant Mother an exception to the jurisdictional bar by fashioning “an ad hoc Manning-like remedy.” (Citing Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628, superseded by rule as stated in State v. Brown, 2021 UT 11, ¶ 15, 489 P.3d 152.) It otherwise asserts that this court “wholly lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the initial notice of appeal . . . was untimely.” 14  Cite as: 2026 UT 27 Opinion of the Court challenges to the juvenile court’s December 17 order, we conclude that her remaining challenges are beyond our reach. A. Mother Filed an Untimely Appeal; But, with the Parties’ Stipulation, the Court of Appeals Exercised Its Jurisdiction to Reverse the Juvenile Court ¶50 Our jurisdictional inquiry begins with an untimely notice of appeal. No one disputes that Mother’s appeal of the juvenile court’s August 3 order, which wasn’t filed in the juvenile court until August 23, was filed too late. See UTAH R. APP. P. 52(a) (requiring an appeal from an order terminating parental rights to be filed within fifteen days of the entry of the order); id. R. 53(a) (“A notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 52(a) must be filed with the clerk of the juvenile court where the order was entered.”). As a result, Mother failed to timely invoke the court of appeals’ jurisdiction, and her appeal was properly dismissed. See Trapnell & Assocs., LLC v. Legacy Resorts, LLC, 2020 UT 44, ¶ 35, 469 P.3d 989 (stating that the filing of a timely notice of appeal in the trial court is a “procedural prerequisite to invoking appellate court jurisdiction” (cleaned up)); see also id. (“An appellate court simply has no power to hear the case if a notice of appeal is untimely.” (cleaned up)). ¶51 Mother, however, did not relent. She returned to the juvenile court and asked it to grant her relief under rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for her counsel’s “mistake” or “excusable neglect.” The State objected, but the court granted her relief. Citing rule 60(b), the court set aside and then re-entered the August 3 order “effective as of December 3, 2021.” Mother then filed a second notice of appeal, this time identifying the December 3 order as the operative order. ¶52 Now back in the court of appeals, the State raised a jurisdictional alarm. It explained that the court had already correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on an untimely notice of appeal. The State then cited Foster v. Montgomery, 2003 UT App 405, 82 P.3d 191, and argued that because the juvenile court did not substantively change its August 3 order, its re-entry of that order could not reset Mother’s time to file her appeal. Id. ¶ 18 (“Where a judgment is reentered, and the subsequent judgment does not alter the substantive rights affected by the first judgment, the time for appeal runs from the first judgment.” (cleaned up)). 15  In re J.A.C. Opinion of the Court ¶53 The court of appeals saw at least some initial merit in the State’s position, and it notified the parties that it was considering dismissing the case on the basis that the court “appears to lack jurisdiction” for the reasons the State argued. In response, Mother argued that the juvenile court had the authority to set aside and re- enter its August 3 order, and that the equities favored “honoring” the juvenile court’s decision so that she could file a timely notice of appeal. She also argued that the court should “adopt” a “method” to allow for the reinstatement of the time to appeal from termination proceedings or “expand the rule in Manning.” ¶54 Shortly after Mother filed her response, the court of appeals withdrew its notice of summary disposition. Without expressing its view on the jurisdictional question, it asked the parties to address, as part of their merits briefing, the suggestion made by Mother that a rule be created, or Manning be extended, to allow for the reinstatement of the time to file an appeal in parental rights proceedings. ¶55 The parties, however, never fully briefed the appeal. They instead mediated their dispute and eventually filed a stipulated motion in which they agreed that the juvenile court had “committed reversible error by failing to adequately discuss how it considered, and why it ultimately rejected, alternatives to termination.” Based on their agreement, the parties asked the court of appeals to reverse the August 3 order and “enter a limited remand for further analysis of best interest” based on the children’s current situation and needs. The parties noted that a question about the court of appeals’ jurisdiction had been previously raised, but they did not suggest that the court lacked the authority to reverse the juvenile court. ¶56 The court of appeals granted the parties’ request and reversed the juvenile cour