Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-26-00385-CV IN THE INTEREST OF J.O.S. JR. and A.M., Children From the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025-PA-00534 Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Delivered and Filed: October 30, 2026 AFFIRMED Appellant S.R. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her children, J.O.S. Jr. (born 2020) and A.M. (born 2024). 1 Mother argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s termination findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (Q) and its finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. She also argues the trial court abused its discretion by appointing the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the “Department”) as A.M.’s managing conservator. We affirm the termination order. 1 To protect the privacy of the minor children, we use initials or pseudonyms to refer to the children, their biological parents, and A.M.’s foster parent. TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). 04-26-00385-CV BACKGROUND In December of 2024, shortly after A.M.’s birth, the Department opened a family-based case because it received a report that Mother and A.M. tested positive for methamphetamines. Mother had prior history with the Department involving drug usage, and the Department’s records showed J.O.S. Jr. had also been exposed to drugs prior to his birth. The Department’s family-based safety plan required Mother’s contact with the children to be supervised by either J.O.S. Jr.’s father, J.O.S. Sr., or by Brian Monreal, the then-boyfriend of Mother’s adult daughter, Monserat Martinez. At that time, A.M. lived with Brian and Monserat. J.O.S. Jr. lived with J.O.S. Sr., but he stayed with Brian and Monserat while J.O.S. Sr. was at work. Mother testified that she frequently visited the children at Brian and Monserat’s home but did not live with them. On March 25, 2025, the Department removed the children from Brian and Monserat’s home because “the safety plan was broken under [their] care” and the Department believed the home was unsafe. Mother was present during the removal, and a Department supervisor testified that she “was getting very aggressive,” appeared to be under the influence, and refused a drug test. The Department obtained temporary managing conservatorship over the children, placed them in foster care, and filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother, J.O.S. Sr., and A.M.’s father, L.M. A.M., who was three months old at the time of removal and sixteen months old at the time of trial, remained in the same foster care placement throughout this case. Four-year- old J.O.S. Jr. was initially placed in the same foster home, but he “became physical and dangerous around [the foster family’s] other children” and was eventually admitted to Clarity, “a mental health institute for adolescents.” After being released from Clarity, J.O.S. Jr. moved to a treatment home, then to a second foster home, and finally back into J.O.S. Sr.’s home, where he remained at the time of trial. -2- 04-26-00385-CV By the time of trial, the Department sought to permanently reunify J.O.S. Jr. and J.O.S. Sr. and to terminate Mother’s and L.M.’s parental rights. On March 6, 2026, March 30, 2026, and April 20, 2026, the trial court held a bench trial at which Mother appeared. The trial court heard testimony from nine witnesses: (1) a Department family-based caseworker, Ernesto Hernandez; (2) a Department family-based supervisor, Angela Orta; (3) Mother; (4) San Antonio Police Department Detective Robert Ramos, Jr.; (5) Department investigator Natasha Mata; (6) Mother’s former therapist, Delilah Martinez; (7) foster parent K.D.G.; (8) conservatorship caseworker Rebecca Quiroga; and (9) Mother’s 20-year-old daughter, Monserat Martinez. During the trial, L.M. executed an affidavit voluntarily relinquishing his parental rights to A.M., and the trial court terminated his parental rights on that basis. 2 After hearing the evidence, the trial court signed an order finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was justified by Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (Q) and was in the best interest of the children. The trial court appointed J.O.S. Sr. as managing conservator for J.O.S. Jr. and the Department as managing conservator for A.M. Mother timely filed this appeal. ANALYSIS Applicable Law and Standard of Review The involuntary termination of a natural parent’s rights implicates fundamental constitutional rights and “divests the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except for the child’s right to inherit from the parent.” In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (internal quotation marks omitted). “As a result, appellate courts must strictly scrutinize involuntary termination 2 L.M. is not a party to this appeal. -3- 04-26-00385-CV proceedings in favor of the parent.” Id. The Department had the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, both that a statutory ground existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. Id.; TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.206. “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court’s order of termination, we apply well-established standards of review. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263– 64 (Tex. 2002). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings, we look “at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009) (citation omitted). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider disputed or conflicting evidence. Id. at 345. A factual sufficiency review requires us to consider the entire record to determine whether the evidence that is contrary to a finding would prevent a reasonable factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. See id. The factfinder is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Id. at 346. Statutory Termination Grounds Applicable Law In her first issue on appeal, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s predicate findings under subsections (D), (E), and (Q). TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (Q). In general, assuming a best interest finding, only one predicate ground under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination. -4- 04-26-00385-CV In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). However, because termination under subsections (D) or (E) may have implications for a parent’s rights to other children, appellate courts must address a parent’s challenges to a trial court’s findings under those subsections. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 236–37 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). “Because the evidence pertaining to subsections 161.001[(b)](1)(D) and (E) [is] interrelated, we conduct a consolidated review.” In re T.N.S., 230 S.W.3d 434, 439 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.). “Endangerment means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize.” In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Subsection (D) allows a trial court to terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Under subsection (D), the trial court examines “evidence related to the environment of the children to determine if the environment was the source of endangerment to the children’s physical or emotional well-being.” In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. “‘Environment’ refers to the acceptability of living conditions, as well as a parent’s conduct in the home.” In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). “A child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger that the parent is aware of but consciously disregards.” Id. A parent does not need to know for certain that the child is in an endangering environment. In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 109 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). Awareness of a potential for danger is sufficient. Id. In a subsection (D) analysis, the relevant period for review is before the Department removes the child. In re J.R., 171 S.W.3d 558, 569 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). -5- 04-26-00385-CV Subsection (E) allows a trial court to terminate a parent’s rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Under subsection (E), the trial court determines whether there is evidence that a parent’s acts, omissions, or failures to act endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being. See In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. “It is not necessary that the parent’s conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually be injured; rather, a child is endangered when the environment or the parent’s course of conduct creates a potential for danger which the parent is aware of but disregards.” In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 110 (internal quotation marks omitted). In a subsection (E) analysis, the relevant period for review is broader than that involved in subsection (D). A trial court conducting a subsection (E) analysis may consider actions that occurred before the child’s birth, and in some cases may consider actions that occurred while the child was not in the parent’s presence and while the child was in the Department’s custody. In re M.H., No. 02-24-00426-CV, 2024 WL 5083193, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 12, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. “Such actions are relevant because they may create an inference that similar conduct could recur and further jeopardize a child’s well- being.” In re M.H., 2024 WL 5083193, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The specific danger to the child’s well-being need not be established as an independent proposition, but may be inferred from parental misconduct.” In re E.J.M., 673 S.W.3d 310, 331 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (internal quotation marks omitted). -6- 04-26-00385-CV Application Under subsection (D), “a single pre-removal act, omission, or incident can support termination.” In re A.O., No. 02-21-00376-CV, 2022 WL 1257384, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Here, it was undisputed that Mother used methamphetamines while she was pregnant with A.M., and both she and A.M. tested positive for methamphetamines when A.M. was born. 3 The trial court also heard evidence that J.O.S. Jr. was exposed to drugs before he was born, although the drug in question was not identified. A mother’s drug use during pregnancy can constitute endangerment of the fetus. See, e.g., In re M.K.V., 648 S.W.3d 478, 486 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.); In re A.B.R., No. 04-19-00631-CV, 2020 WL 1159043, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 11, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re T.N.S., 230 S.W.3d at 438–39. The trial court could have rationally concluded that the children’s pre-birth drug exposure supported a subsection (D) finding. Unlike subsection (D), subsection (E) requires evidence of a voluntary and deliberate endangering course of conduct rather than a single act or omission. See, e.g., In re F.S.F., No. 04- 24-00125-CV, 2024 WL 3800662, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). “Subsection (E) is not limited to actions directed towards the child . . . nor is it limited to the parent’s pre-removal actions.” In re A.O., 2022 WL 1257384, at *9 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). Here, on the day before the termination trial began, 3 When the Department asked Mother how frequently she used drugs during her pregnancy, she invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The trial court was permitted to make a negative inference based on that invocation. See In re I.R.Z., No. 14-22-00431-CV, 2022 WL 17491941, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 8, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). -7- 04-26-00385-CV Mother was indicted on multiple counts of child endangerment. Detective Ramos, who investigated the criminal case, testified that the charges were based on “multiple instances where the children were exposed to methamphetamines,” including the evidence about the children’s drug exposure before birth. Both children also tested positive for methamphetamines ten days after they were removed. Additionally, A.M. tested positive for benzodiazepines during this case after a parent-child visit with Mother. See In re N.T., No. 02-24-00067-CV, 2024 WL 2066375, at *5 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth May 9, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering similar evidence in subsection (E) review). A.M. was drug-tested at that time because her daycare reported that she showed symptoms of shaking, lethargy, and fever. J.O.S. Jr. showed similar symptoms after the same parent-child visit, but his drug test was negative. Mother argues on appeal that she did not test positive for benzodiazepines, that there is no evidence to connect her to A.M.’s exposure to benzodiazepines, and that the Department’s “investigation for this incident was inconclusive with a finding of ‘unable to determine.’” However, A.M.’s foster mother, K.D.G., testified that as far as she could tell, that exposure happened during a visit with Mother because A.M. “left perfectly fine and returned very different.” Moreover, when Mother was asked, “So the only drug exposure of these children would have been from you, correct?” she responded, “I think so.” Finally, the record shows that Mother did not submit to a drug test until two months after A.M.’s benzodiazepine exposure. The Department presented evidence that when it removed the children, they were dirty and in “[b]ad” condition. K.D.G. testified that when A.M. arrived in their home, the child “wasn’t really there. Like, she wasn’t making eye contact, she wouldn’t track you, she wouldn’t cry, she just layed [sic] there. And she was dirty as well. They [A.M. and J.O.S. Jr.] both smelled stale, like -8- 04-26-00385-CV sweat.” J.O.S. Jr. “wasn’t potty trained, he didn’t know how to use silverware, he didn’t know his name[.] . . . He was very detached from everything. He would just scream and cry and throw things and want to break things.” K.D.G. testified that doctors who evaluated J.O.S. Jr. believed “his behaviors were due to most likely drug exposure and extreme neglect.” Department supervisor Orta testified that based on her review of Mother’s history with the Department, it was fair to say Mother had had issues with drug use and instability for at least the last five to ten years. Mother admitted that before the children were removed, she sometimes visited them while she was high. See, e.g., In re J.C.P.L., No. 01-24-00723-CV, 2025 WL 757159, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 11, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). (“Evidence of a parent’s illegal drug use may support termination under Subsection (E).”). She also testified that she continued using methamphetamines after the implementation of the family-based case. We note that Mother testified that she never used drugs around the children, and she told the trial court that she believed the children tested positive because she had methamphetamine residue on her hands or clothes. However, she told the Department during this case that “[s]he believed that the children’s hair follicle tests were fake.” See In re L.M., 572 S.W.3d 823, 835 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (considering parent’s minimization of drug-related concerns in subsection (E) analysis). The trial court also heard evidence that Mother allowed L.M. to move into her home during this case after he was released from jail. Mother’s therapist testified that she found this concerning because Mother “had reported to [her] before that [L.M.] was the person who would have, in the past, suppl[ied] her with” illegal drugs. See In re S.V., No. 02-23-00188-CV, 2023 WL 5967890, at *8–9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting during a subsection (E) analysis that drug arrest of parent’s live-in girlfriend was evidence that “both drugs and drug -9- 04-26-00385-CV users were finding their way into the children’s home”). The therapist also testified that Mother “was very reluctant to ask [L.M.] to leave the home and that was very concerning.” Caseworker Quiroga testified that based on what she had observed, she believed Mother and L.M. remained together even after Mother said they had split up. Quiroga also testified that Mother did not exclude L.M. from the residence after he tested positive for methamphetamines, adding that Mother declared those test results were “false” and tried to find excuses for L.M.’s positive test result. See In re K.K.D.B., No. 14-17-00302-CV, 2017 WL 4440546, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 5, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“A parent endangers her child by accepting endangering conduct of other people.”). Mother presented evidence that she had been sober for several months by the time of trial. Furthermore, both she and Monserat testified that L.M. moved out of Mother’s home between the second and third days of trial. But the Texas Supreme Court has recognized that “evidence of improved conduct, especially of short-duration, does not conclusively negate the probative value of a long history of drug use and irresponsible choices.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346. As Quiroga explained: [T]he Department acknowledges her six months of compliance, partial compliance, and acknowledges her negative drug tests. We do acknowledge that. However, we don’t just look at one time, we look at the entire picture. The safety of these children is what trumps everything. So we look at not just accountability, but the environment that she’s able to provide for these children. Is it safe? Can she provide for the needs? That is what she lacks. Mother’s former therapist similarly testified that based on her observations, she believed Mother had displayed poor decision making, that a child left in her care would be in danger, and that she did not believe Mother was capable of putting the children’s needs above her own at that point in time. - 10 - 04-26-00385-CV When considered under the applicable standard of review, the evidence described above would permit a reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and that she engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). That evidence is therefore legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E). See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Because we have concluded the evidence supports the subsection (D) and (E) findings, we need not consider Mother’s challenge to the subsection (Q) finding. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; In re D.J.H., 381 S.W.3d 606, 611–12 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.). We overrule Mother’s first issue. Best Interest Applicable Law Mother also challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. There is a strong presumption that a child’s best interest is served by maintaining the relationship between a child and the natural parent, and the Department has the burden to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 97. To determine whether the Department satisfied this burden, the Texas Legislature has provided several factors 4 for courts to consider regarding a 4 These factors include, inter alia: “(1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department; (5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child’s home; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate - 11 - 04-26-00385-CV parent’s willingness and ability to provide a child with a safe environment, and the Texas Supreme Court has used a similar list of factors 5 to determine a child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). A best interest finding, however, does not require proof of any particular factors. See In re G.C.D., No. 04-14-00769-CV, 2015 WL 1938435, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Neither the statutory factors nor the Holley factors are exhaustive, and “[e]vidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest[.]” In re J.B.-F., No. 04-18-00181-CV, 2018 WL 3551208, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 25, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Additionally, evidence that proves a statutory ground for termination may be probative on the issue of best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). Furthermore, in determining whether termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of a child, a factfinder may judge a parent’s future conduct by her past conduct. In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). Finally, we presume that prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a). Much of the evidence detailed above in our discussion of subsections (D) and (E) is also relevant to the trial court’s best interest finding. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. Specifically, Mother’s history of drug use, the evidence that the children tested positive for controlled an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills [. . .]; and (13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b). 5 Those factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371– 72 (Tex. 1976). - 12 - 04-26-00385-CV substances multiple times, the pending child endangerment charges against Mother, and Mother’s willingness to invite L.M. into her home all went directly to both statutory and Holley best-interest factors. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(4) (trial court can consider whether child has been victim of repeated harm after Department intervention); id. § 263.307(b)(8) (trial court can consider parent’s history of substance abuse); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. A trial court can also consider a parent’s late start of service plan requirements in its best interest analysis. See In re A.M.B., No. 04-24-00410-CV, 2024 WL 4547065, at *4 (Tex. App.— San Antonio Oct. 23, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Here, the evidence presented at trial showed that while the children were removed in March of 2025, Mother did not begin engaging in services until September of 2025. Mother agreed that she “wasn’t being real honest” and “didn’t take it as serious as [she] was supposed to” for the first several months after the children’s removal because she “wasn’t thinking about my kids or anyone, just myself and my addiction.” Quiroga testified that Mother had never acknowledged how her prior behavior endangered the children and that Mother “always has an excuse to why something happened.” See In re N.T., 2024 WL 2066375, at *9 (considering evidence that “Mother made excuses for her actions rather than taking responsibility” in best interest analysis). Similarly, Mother’s former therapist testified that she unsuccessfully discharged Mother because she “wasn’t understanding the importance of . . . No. 1, waiting so long to engage in services. And No. 2, continuing to have the father of her youngest child living with her knowing that he was—had just come out of jail.” She added, “I don’t really feel like at this point in time, the length of time that she’s had to make the changes and the fact that the case has moved so far and the children have been in care for so long, especially her daughter, I don’t—I don’t think that there’s going to be much change for her.” See TEX. FAM. - 13 - 04-26-00385-CV CODE § 263.307(b)(11) (trial court can consider parent’s willingness and ability to effective positive changes within reasonable period of time). When A.M. came into K.D.G.’s care, the child was in poor physical condition. She also showed signs of emotional neglect and “would just cry for hours. There was no soothing her.” See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(1) (trial court can consider child’s age and physical/mental vulnerabilities). K.D.G. testified that A.M. has been diagnosed with “[g]lobal developmental delay and they said that it’s due to drug exposure.” See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(6) (trial court can consider results of development evaluations of the child). At the time of trial, A.M. was receiving “between four to six hours of therapy by different therapists” each week and had “doctors’ appointments nearly every week to every other week.” K.D.G. testified that A.M. was making improvement, that she was bonded with K.D.G. and her wife, and that they planned to adopt her if her biological parents’ rights were terminated. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a). As noted above, J.O.S. Jr. had behavioral issues when he came into care that medical professionals attributed to drug exposure and neglect. K.D.G. testified that she maintained contact with J.O.S. Jr. after he left her home and that he was “[s]lowly but surely” making progress in his father’s care. She told the trial court, “It’s hard for him to listen and obey rules and listen to his dad, but his dad does a great job. . . . He redirects him and shows him love and patience.” See id. It is clear from the record that Mother loves her children, and the trial court recognized that at trial. There were “no concerns” with her drug test results for the five to six months before trial. She completed parenting classes and drug treatment, provided the Department with evidence that she leased an apartment, and was employed at the time of trial. She also testified that she was no longer in a relationship with L.M. and was not communicating with him because “[t]he love for - 14 - 04-26-00385-CV my children is much bigger than that.” She added, “It’s not good. It’s not good for me, for my kids, especially for my kids. I don’t need that in my life. . . . [A]ll the trouble, the drugs, charges. I just don’t need that type of person surrounding me or my kids.” When viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow the trial court to form a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Furthermore, the evidence contrary to the trial court’s finding was not so overwhelming as to prevent a reasonable factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. The evidence is therefore legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. Conservatorship In her final issue, Mother asks us to review the portion of the trial court’s order appointing the Department as A.M.’s managing conservator. She does not challenge the appointment of J.O.S. Sr. as managing conservator of J.O.S. Jr. We review a trial court’s conservatorship rulings for abuse of discretion. See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007). In making a conservatorship decision, a trial court has broad discretion in determining a child’s best interest. In re J.J.R.S., 607 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2020), aff’d, 627 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2021). We may not reverse a trial court’s conservatorship ruling unless it was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. The Texas Family Code requires a child’s parent to be appointed managing conservator “unless the court finds that appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the best interest of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.131(a). “It is a rebuttable presumption that the - 15 - 04-26-00385-CV appointment of the parents of a child as joint managing conservators is in the best interest of the child.” Id. § 153.131(b). Here, however, we have already concluded the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Because the standard of review “is more stringent for termination decisions than for those regarding conservatorship,” we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to appoint Mother as a managing or possessory conservator. See In re A.S., No. 04-14-00505-CV, 2014 WL 5839256, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 12, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (internal quotation marks omitted). We overrule Mother’s third issue. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s order of termination. Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice - 16 -