Full Opinion

Opinion filed September 24, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-26-00093-CV __________ IN THE INTEREST OF J.B. AND B.B., CHILDREN On Appeal from the 326th District Court Taylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 11476-CX MEMORANDUM OPINION In this accelerated appeal, the mother of J.B. and B.B.1 challenges the trial court’s order that terminated her rights to the children.2 In two issues, Appellant, the mother, contends that the evidence does not support the trial court’s findings that: (1) termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interest; and (2) the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) made 1 To protect the identities of the children, we use pseudonyms or initials to refer to them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). 2 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the presumed father. He did not appeal. reasonable efforts to return the children to the mother prior to the commencement of the final hearing, but a continuing danger existed in the home that prevented the return of the children to her. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2), (f), (g) (West Supp. 2025). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s order. I. Termination Findings and Standards To terminate one’s parental rights, the Department must “clear[] a high bar.” In re K.N., No. 24-0881, 2026 WL 1614378, at *6 (Tex. June 5, 2026); see also In re H.S., No. 24-0307, 2026 WL 1614496, at *8–9 (Tex. June 5, 2026). To support termination, this heightened standard requires that the Department present clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination is in the best interest of the children. See FAM. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” FAM. § 101.007 (West 2019). As relevant to this appeal, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence established that the mother: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). The mother does not challenge these findings. The trial court further found, among other things, that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest, see id. § 161.001(b)(2), and that the Department made reasonable efforts to 2 return the children to the mother, however, a continuing danger existed in the home that prevented the children’s return to her. See id. § 161.001(f), (g). In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of our deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed facts that do not support the finding.’” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). Because “the factfinder remains ‘the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor’” under this standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Id. (quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding, we weigh the disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all evidence that favors it. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference to the finding, and determine whether, based on the entire record, a factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations asserted against the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). II. Background and the Evidence Presented at Trial Reports were made that the mother and the presumed father had endangered and neglectfully supervised the children. According to the intake that the Department received on May 15, 2024, B.B. had been sexually assaulted, and the 3 parents were not assuring that B.B. took her ADHD medication. The Department reported that there was illegal drug use and unsanitary conditions in the home, the mother had used illegal drugs—heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine—in the children’s presence, and the children had tested positive for amphetamine, cocaine metabolite, and methamphetamine. In addition to the circumstances outlined in the intake, the children were removed from the mother’s care because she reported to the Department that she was “dirty [for drugs].” On June 4, 2024, the Department filed suit to terminate the mother’s and the father’s parental rights, and the Department was granted temporary managing conservatorship of the children the same day. The final hearing commenced on December 1, 2025, and resumed on January 16, 2026, and February 10, 2026. The mother testified and admitted to a history of illegal drug use—methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, and marihuana— but claimed that she was “clean” and had ceased using illegal drugs since she relapsed and overdosed on fentanyl approximately two months before the final hearing commenced. At the time of the final hearing, she was staying at the Noah Project, and she conceded that the children were happy with their foster family placement and that she could not provide the children with a safe and stable home environment. The mother testified that, for many months after the children’s removal, she did not maintain contact with the Department because they refused to allow her to see the children. She testified that she was currently employed as a Lyft and Uber driver, attending weekly visitation with the children, had found a three-bedroom home that she had “a good probability” of securing, and was attending weekly meetings and group therapy at a methadone clinic. 4 The mother claimed that the Department did not refer her to counseling, she did not submit to a psychological evaluation because the Department’s caseworkers forgot to refer her, and she did not participate in services because none were provided to her. But she did complete two psychological referrals and testified that she was willing to do “anything” to retain her parental rights. The mother and the father each have a prior conviction for possession of marihuana. The father used marihuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine in the past. He admitted that he had several criminal charges pending against him; three charges for possession of methamphetamine and a charge for tampering with physical evidence. He denied any history of violence, even though the 108th District Court of Potter County, in its order that established the father’s parentage of the children, made findings under Section 153.004(d) that: (1) the father had a history or pattern of family violence; (2) awarding the father access to the children would endanger them; and (3) such access would not be in the children’s best interest. See FAM. § 153.004(d). Tammy Allred is a special investigator with the Department, and she is tasked with locating parents and children who are not maintaining communication with an assigned Department investigator, which was the circumstance with the mother. Initial attempts by Department investigators in the Spring of 2024 to locate the mother were unsuccessful. However, Allred eventually located the mother in May 2024; at the time, the mother and the children were living with a “friend.” Despite the Department’s requests, the mother would not provide her friend’s address so the Department could visit with her and the children because her friend did not want her “to allow CPS in the house.” Department investigator Victoria Melissa Mason was assigned the intake for the children’s case. After unsuccessful attempts to contact the mother, Mason 5 notified the Abilene Police Department. During her investigation, Mason spoke with personnel at the children’s school and various friends and family members of the mother, all of whom expressed concern that the mother was using heroin and being untruthful with the Department about her and the children’s circumstances and location. Mason eventually made contact with the mother who admitted using methamphetamine and marihuana. The father answered Mason’s phone call once but never contacted her thereafter. The mother and the father were requested to submit to drug testing throughout the duration of the case, but their hair follicle samples were never clean. In June 2024, the mother’s hair follicle tested positive for amphetamines, cocaine, methamphetamine, marihuana, heroin, codeine, and hydrocodone. At the same time, B.B. tested positive for amphetamine, cocaine metabolite, and methamphetamine; J.B. was positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. The mother’s October 14, 2024, hair follicle test was positive for cocaine and marihuana and her urinalysis (UA) on the same date was positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, alprazolam, and marihuana. Her August 11, 2025, hair follicle test and UA were positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marihuana; her November 2025 hair follicle test was positive for methamphetamine and marihuana, and her UA on the same day was positive for methadone. The father’s May 2025 UA was positive for marihuana, his July 2025 nail bed test was positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine, and for his last test in September, he tested positive for marihuana. Mason testified that the Department had investigated the mother and the father several times since 2015, and, before this case was filed, the children had twice been removed from their care. In both instances, the parents were offered services. As for the efforts that Mason made to avoid the children’s removal this time, she 6 (1) attempted a Parental Child Safety Placement, (2) completed multiple searches to determine if any of the mother’s family members or friends would be suitable for placement, and (3) discussed viable placement options with the mother. Vanessa Gott is the children’s 2INgage permanency case manager. Gott also described the efforts that the Department made to reunify the children and the mother through referrals for services, drug testing, visitation, and assistance with transportation. A service plan was implemented for the mother that was adopted as an order of the trial court. Although the mother completed some services (a drug abuse assessment and a ninety-day rehab stint at GreenTree rehabilitation in October 2024), she admitted to Gott in June 2025 that she was injecting methamphetamine intravenously and had to be readmitted to GreenTree; she eventually left without completing the treatment program. She also went to Serenity House but only stayed until “she was 11 days clean” because “she felt she was at a good point that she did not need to continue treatment.” She advised Gott that she was attending counseling and pursuing medical detox through a methadone clinic. Despite this, Gott said that the mother was not testing when required. Gott attempted to schedule a follow-up psychological evaluation for the mother, but this did not occur because the mother refused to sign a release of information. While the final hearing was ongoing and before it concluded, the mother submitted to another hair follicle test on January 19, 2026, the results of which were positive for methamphetamine at a level that was almost twenty times higher than the results from her November 2025 test. Although the father testified that he knew that the mother used drugs, as did others who were in the house with the children, the mother claimed that her January 2026 hair follicle test was positive because she was “homeless for a minute” and living with people who used methamphetamine “so [she] was exposed to it. [Her] hair was exposed to it.” The 7 mother was referred for another hair follicle test on February 2, but she refused to participate, stating, “[the Department] took my visits away from me, so I said I’m not going to take a drug test because I can’t see my kids.” Gott provided the mother with transportation to the methadone clinic, to obtain clothing, and to Living Care Ministries, and arranged visitation for her with the children. Despite this, the Department had continuing concerns that the mother was under the influence of illegal drugs during a December 21 visitation session. After investigating the backgrounds of the mother’s and the father’s families and friends that they suggested would be appropriate placements for the children, the Department determined that none of them were suitable placement options because they either declined, had histories of illegal drug use, and/or had negative histories with the Department, law enforcement, or both. Gott testified that the children were eleven and twelve and were placed with a foster family who was willing to adopt them if the parents’ rights were terminated. She testified that the children were doing well and enjoyed being with their foster family. On occasion, J.B. would be aggressive with B.B. and there was an incident at Walmart where the children were accused of not scanning certain items during checkout. However, Gott testified that the children had bonded with their foster family, they desired to remain with them, and the home environment there was safe and stable. The foster family made efforts to arrange therapy for J.B. to address his behavioral issues. And B.B. was excelling in school and J.B. was receiving tutoring. Gott recommended that the mother’s rights be terminated because: (1) the children had been in foster care three times and they were very happy and had bonded with their current foster family; (2) the children were exposed to domestic violence, sexual abuse, and illegal drug use while in the mother’s and the father’s care; (3) the children tested positive for illegal drugs; and (4) the children were in a 8 safe and stable environment with their foster family and had some “normalcy” for the first time in their lives. Brooke Schubert, the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) for the children, recommended the children’s removal because: (1) during the twenty-one months that this case was pending, neither the mother nor the father were willing or demonstrated that they could provide a safe and stable environment for the children; (2) the children were extremely happy with and were cared for by their foster family and were receiving the educational, psychological, mental support, and services they needed; and (3) the children would probably “be relieved” if the mother’s parental rights were terminated because they can see her when they are “older than 18.” Schubert asked the children: “[O]n a scale of one to ten how safe do you feel, how happy do you feel, and they both [said] a 10 on both scales.” According to Schubert, the foster family connected the children with their extended family, and the children have friends and neighbors. After the final hearing concluded, the trial court announced that it intended to take this matter under advisement. However, before the proceedings adjourned, it stated: “And I will . . . note for the record that the Court finds the testimony of [the mother and the father] throughout the duration of this trial to be mostly not credible.” We note that the trial court, as the factfinder here, may disregard portions of the parents’ testimony that it found not to be credible. See In re M.A., No. 11-26- 00054-CV, 2026 WL 2339171, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 13, 2026, no pet. h.) (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006)). The trial court subsequently terminated the mother’s parental rights and found (1) termination to be in the children’s best interest, and (2) that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children to the mother, however, a continuing danger existed in the 9 home that prevented the children’s return to her. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2), (f), (g). This appeal followed. III. The Best Interest of the Children In her second issue, the mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interest. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)). Because the trial court, as the factfinder in this case, was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, we will not disturb its determinations so long as they are not unreasonable. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). With respect to the best interest of the children, no unique set of factors need be proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). In fact, evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support a best interest finding. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27–28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547–48; In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Nevertheless, courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the children; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the children; (6) the plans for the children by these individuals or 10 by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. Because the best interest of the children is always the paramount consideration, the best interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the children, not the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)). To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of only one factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative evidence illustrating that termination is in the children’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547–48; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266; see also H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *9 (Although the heightened standard of appellate review applies to both the grounds for termination and the best interest analysis, evidence that supports a finding under subsection (b)(1) “may also be, and indeed often is, relevant to best interest under [s]ubsection (b)(2).”). Thus, the absence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the children’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates that the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and well-being of the children. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or her past conduct in determining whether termination of a parent’s parental rights is 11 in the children’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the children may recur in the future if the children are returned to the possession of the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Moreover, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the children’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness to meet the children’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118. A parent’s pattern of substance abuse “implicates most of the Holley factors,” In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied), and can support a best interest finding because of the “attendant risks to employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the children.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279–81 (Tex. 2024) (A parent’s pattern of drug use may pose a danger to a child’s physical or emotional well-being.); see J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 550 (“[D]rug use and its effects on the parent’s life and ability to parent and care for a child may establish an endangering course of conduct.”); In re R.R.L., No. 11-25-00263-CV, 2026 WL 616107, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 5, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Evidence of endangerment is relevant to the best interest analysis.). Notably, a parent’s use of “so-called hard drugs” such as methamphetamine is treated differently than the use of “less destructive ones” like marihuana. E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 608. In this case, the mother’s endangerment of the children and disregard for their health and safety permitted the inference that she is unable to meet the physical and emotional needs of the children in the future. See In re U.G.G., 573 S.W.3d 391, 12 402 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (“In reviewing the parenting abilities of a parent, a fact finder can consider the parent’s past neglect or past inability to meet the physical and emotional needs of the children.”); see also In re S.B., 597 S.W.3d 571, 584 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied) (“Neglect can be as dangerous to the children’s well-being as direct physical abuse.”). Because of the mother’s neglect, the children were subjected to persistent exposure to illegal drug use. As we have held, persistent drug use by parents poses infinite potential dangers to their children, and the possibility that the parents may be impaired or later imprisoned. In re C.M., 11-24-00009-CV, 2024 WL 3187335, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 27, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551); In re S.B., No. 11-24- 00267-CV, 2025 WL 920044, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 27, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Thus, a parent’s continuing pattern of illegal drug use may support a best interest finding. S.B., 2025 WL 920044, at *6 (collecting cases). Contrary to the mother’s vehement denial of illegal drug use, her hair follicle test results were consistently positive for illegal drugs, including amphetamine, cocaine metabolites, marihuana, heroin, and methamphetamine. She admitted to overdosing on fentanyl in September 2025. Further, her last hair follicle test on January 19, 2026, was positive for methamphetamine at a level nearly twenty times higher than the results from her November 2025 hair follicle test. The children were drug tested after removal and B.B. was positive for amphetamine, cocaine metabolite, and methamphetamine, and J.B. was positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Thus, the trial court could have reasonably found, based on the mother’s history of positive drug test results, that she used methamphetamine in the months before the final hearing commenced and while the final hearing was ongoing. Indeed, the mother’s decision to engage in illegal drug use during the pendency of the underlying termination suit, when she was at risk of losing her 13 children, supports the trial court’s best interest finding. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551 (citing In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)). Nevertheless, there are other considerations. A parent’s failure to comply with a court-ordered service plan for reunification may also be considered in the trial court’s best interest determination. In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249–50 (Tex. 2013); C.M., 2024 WL 3187335, at *6 (collecting cases). According to the mother, she was making every effort to be “clean” and improve her parenting skills. However, and despite the Department’s attempts to accomplish reunification, the evidence we have outlined above dispels her contention. Moreover, evidence of improved conduct, especially of short duration, does not negate the probative value of a parent’s long history of drug abuse and irresponsible choices, and, alone, is not sufficient to avoid termination of one’s parental rights. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 346; M.A., 2026 WL 2339171, at *13; see also In re A.H., 679 S.W.3d 817, 830 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. denied) (The mother’s voluntary admission to an inpatient program after removal did not counteract her history of relapses and “pattern of decline upon receiving [the] children back into her care.”). And as we have said, the trial court need not discount the mother’s lack of stability simply because she complied with some of her service plan requirements—here, such compliance was insufficient to alleviate the Department’s and the trial court’s concerns for the children’s safety. See In re G.H., No. 11-26-00012-CV, 2026 WL 1992098, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 10, 2026, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 742 (Tex. 2022) (considering the parent’s unstable and uncertain living situation in upholding the trial court’s best interest finding). It cannot be ignored that, while under the mother’s care, the children endured three removals, several foster-care placements, and the mother’s stints in various 14 residential treatment centers. This history only emphasizes the necessity to focus on the children’s emotional well-being and needs, which, unlike the mother, the children’s foster family is and has been addressing. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 554. Further, the Department had investigated circumstances involving the mother and the father since 2015. A parent’s history with the Department and their refusal or inability to address the issues that caused the Department’s concerns and years of involvement weighs in favor of termination. See In re A.D., No. 11-25-00383-CV, 2026 WL 1752038, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 18, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied) (A parent’s years of illegal drug use, criminal history, and history with the Department supported the trial court’s best interest finding.); J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 552 (The factfinder may consider a parent’s prior history with the Department.). In addition to the considerations that we have already discussed, the mother’s plans for herself and the children were ill-defined. See U.G.G., 573 S.W.3d at 402 (“The fact finder may compare the parent’s and the Department’s plans for the child[ren] and determine whether the plans and expectations of each party are realistic or weak and ill-defined.”). Although she claims to have the possibility of securing a three-bedroom home for her and the children in the hopes of achieving stability, she instead has relapsed repeatedly and in turn blamed the high level of methamphetamine that was detected from her January 19, 2026, hair follicle test on being homeless and in the presence of others who use methamphetamine. Regardless of the circumstance, neither is acceptable. Further, during the pendency of the final hearing, the mother was either homeless or living at the Noah Project and had not secured a stable home as she claimed. Thus, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the mother failed to demonstrate her ability to provide the children with a safe, stable, drug-free home environment, and that her behavior 15 would not change in the future. When compared to the Department’s plan for the children—to be adopted into a safe and stable home environment by a family with whom they have bonded—this factor weighs heavily in favor of termination. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d at 257 (“Stability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of children.”). Finally, we recognize that the children have stated that, although they are very happy and wish to remain with their foster family, they would prefer that their mother’s rights not be terminated. But they understand that this result was inevitable. While we do not ignore a child’s desires, it is only one factor that we consider in the overall best interest analysis. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 553 (citing Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372). And although a child’s desires or wishes for residing with a parent is an important consideration in determining the children’s best interest, “it cannot override or outweigh evidence of danger to the child.” Id. (quoting In re F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d 716, 732 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied)); In re A.M., No. 11-25-00253-CV, 2026 WL 545550, at *8 (Tex. App.— Eastland Feb. 27, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, given the mother’s conduct that endangered her children, and the children’s needs and desires for a safe and stable environment, this factor does not weigh against the trial court’s finding of termination. In this case, the evidence demonstrates the children’s bond and attachment to their foster family, who have provided a safe, stable, and caring home and environment for them, while also meeting their physical and emotional needs, which included protecting the children from illegal drug exposure and users. And though we do not discount the children’s desires, we conclude that the trial court could have rationally found that preserving the mother’s parental rights is not in the children’s best interest. Therefore, upon considering the evidence as it relates to the mother’s 16 actions and inactions, the emotional or physical danger to the children now and in the future, the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future, the mother’s lack of demonstrable parental abilities and stability, her prior and ongoing illegal drug use, and the Department’s plans for the children, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we overrule the mother’s second issue. IV. Sections 161.001(f) and (g): Reasonable Efforts and Continuing Danger In the mother’s first issue, she challenges the trial court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children to her before the commencement of the final hearing, but a continuing danger remained in her home that prevented their return to her. See FAM. § 161.001(f). Pursuant to Section 161.001(f), the trial court may not terminate the parent- child relationship unless: [T]he [trial] court finds by clear and convincing evidence . . . that . . . the [D]epartment made reasonable efforts to return the child[ren] to the parent before commencement of a trial on the merits and despite those reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents the return of the child[ren] to the parent. FAM. § 161.001(f)(1). Enacted in 2023, subsection (f) imports the phrase “reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent” from Section 161.001(b)(1)(N), the “constructive abandonment” statutory termination ground. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(N), (f); In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 321, 328 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied). Consistent with the prevailing judicial interpretation of that phrase, the Department’s implementation of a family service plan is generally considered a reasonable effort to return the child to a parent. D.F. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 731 S.W.3d 726, 742 (Tex. App.—Austin 2026, no pet.); M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 329 17 (collecting cases); see also In re T.R., No. 01-25-00924-CV, 2026 WL 958570, at *11–12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2026, pet. filed); In re H.B.S., No. 12-26-00007-CV, 2026 WL 960744, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 8, 2026, pet. denied) (mem. op.). However, evidence of a service plan is not absolutely required nor is it the exclusive means of establishing the Department’s reasonable efforts to return the child. M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 329 (collecting cases). Instead, the pertinent inquiry “is whether the Department made reasonable efforts, not ideal efforts.” Id. (quoting In re J.A., No. 04-20-00242-CV, 2020 WL 5027663, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 26, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)); In re J.H., No. 01- 25-00854-CV, 2026 WL 968923, at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 10, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Here, the Department’s efforts at reunification are well documented and supported by the evidence. As Mason and Gott explained, the Department: (1) implemented a service plan for the mother; (2) offered and provided her with referrals for the required services (which she only either partially completed or refused to participate in); (3) arranged parent-child visitation for her with the children; (4) scheduled drug testing (which she often refused even when required); (5) contacted over a dozen friends and relatives of the mother to assess their suitability for the children’s placement (none of which were determined to be appropriate or suitable because they had either Department, criminal, and/or drug use histories and the mother presented no evidence to the contrary as to their alleged suitability); and (6) assisted her with transportation for her various needs. Thus, the trial court, as the factfinder, could have reasonably found that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children to the mother, which is all that the statute requires. See D.F., 731 S.W.3d at 742–43 (collecting cases); M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 18 at 332–33; In re C.L., No. 06-26-00068-CV, 2026 WL 2661103, at *7 (Tex. App.— Texarkana Sept. 10, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Further, the trial court was entitled to credit the undisputed evidence of the mother’s positive hair follicle test results in November 2025—before the final termination hearing commenced—and on January 19, 2026—before the final termination concluded. We, as an appellate court, have no basis to overturn or question the trial court’s credibility determinations that are supported by the record. See K.N., 2026 WL 1614378, at *8 n.2; see also In re D.K., 696 S.W.3d 787, 796 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.) (The law recognizes the factfinder’s unique position to observe and sense the credibility and demeanor of witnesses.). Thus, the trial court was permitted to disbelieve the mother’s denial of continuing illegal drug use and consider her positive drug test results in determining that a continuing danger existed in her home that prevented the children’s return to her. See T.R., 2026 WL 958570, at *15. Accordingly, we overrule the mother’s first issue. V. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the order of the trial court. W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE September 24, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 19