In the Interest of H.B.R. v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)
Date FiledJuly 9, 2026
Docket09-26-00077-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-26-00077-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF H.B.R.
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On Appeal from the 88th District Court
Hardin County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 65701
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Father appeals an order terminating his parental rights to his minor child,
“Hank.” 1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory
grounds exist for termination of Father’s, G.S.R., parental rights and that termination
of his parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (2).2
1
To protect the identity of the child, we use pseudonyms to refer to the child
and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights, but she is not a party
to this appeal.
1
Father’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there
are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967);
In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730–31 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (noting
Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). The brief presents the
attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and explains why no arguable
grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The attorney represented to the
Court that she gave Father a copy of the Anders brief she filed, notified Father of his
right to file a pro se brief, and provided copies of the clerk’s and reporter’s records.
The Court likewise notified Father of his right to file a pro se response, and the
deadline for doing so. Father did not file a response with the Court.
We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by
Father’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988)
(citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009,
no pet.). Based on our review of the record, we have found nothing that would
arguably support an appeal and agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit.
See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by
indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and
reviewed the record for arguable error but found none, the court of appeals met the
requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346
2
S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new
counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991).
We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights. Should
Father decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, his counsel’s
obligation can be met “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for
an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (citations
omitted).
AFFIRMED.
W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice
Submitted on June 10, 2026
Opinion Delivered July 9, 2026
Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.
3