Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-26-00133-CV TERRIE L. FISCHER, KENDALL FISCHER, AND JASMINE FISCHER, APPELLANTS V. CITY PARC @ KELLER APARTMENTS, APPELLEE On Appeal from County Court at Law Number 3 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025-002442-3, Honorable Mike Hrabal, Presiding1 September 18, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ. Appellants, Terrie L. Fischer, Kendall Fischer, and Jasmine Fischer (the Fischers unless otherwise designated), proceeding pro se, unsuccessfully sued Appellee, City Parc @ Keller Apartments, for damages and health issues resulting from mold and water in their apartment. The trial court granted City Parc’s no-evidence motion for summary 1 This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court by a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. In the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. judgment and issued a final judgment dismissing all the Fischers’ claims and rendering they take nothing by their suit. By three issues presented in their original brief, the Fischers contend the trial court (1) erred in granting City Parc’s no-evidence summary judgment because they produced more than a scintilla of evidence on each challenged element, (2) failed to consider competent summary judgment evidence, and (3) improperly required expert testimony to defeat summary judgment. By their reply brief,2 they belabor their original arguments. We affirm. BACKGROUND On February 24, 2023, the Fischers entered into an apartment lease with PBH PARC, LLC. Several months later, Terrie noticed water damage on her carpet. The Fischers filed suit on April 1, 2025, asserting damages from mold resulted in personal injury, property loss, out-of-pocket expenses, mental anguish, and loss of use of their apartment. On June 6, 2025, the trial court ordered the parties to mediation. The case was not settled and was set for trial. After adequate time for discovery had passed and the parties had exchanged some discovery, City Parc filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment on January 2, 2026. City Parc alleged the Fischers had failed to designate an expert on causation and an expert on the presence of mold entitling it to summary judgment as a matter of law. It also alleged there was no evidence of any of the elements of a breach of contract claim. 2 The Fischers also address a typographical error in City Parc’s brief regarding the date their notice of appeal was filed. It is not relevant to disposition of the issues. 2 The Fischers responded they had produced competent summary judgment evidence. Their response included a copy of their apartment lease, a City Code report of bacterial growth,3 records and expenses of mold remediation, medical records of illnesses for themselves and Terrie’s grandchildren, photographs, evidence of damages, Terrie’s affidavit, and unsworn declarations from Kendall and Jasmine. They admitted they were not offering “expert medical causation opinions” and instead relied on medical records, photographs, and other evidence. They also alleged expert testimony was not required to defeat City Parc’s no-evidence motion. And even if expert testimony was required on some claims, they argue it was not required on all claims and summary judgment was improper on the remaining claims. NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT A party may move for a no-evidence summary judgment when, after adequate time for discovery has passed, there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166(a)(i).4 The no-evidence motion must state elements of the claim or defense for which the movant asserts there is no evidence. Id. The trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant produces evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Id.; Helena Chem. Co. v. Cox, 664 S.W.3d 66, 72 (Tex. 2023). A genuine issue of material fact is shown by producing “more than a scintilla of evidence establishing the existence 3 The Fort Worth Code Compliance Department inspected the Fischers’ apartment and found it was in violation of the City’s Code of Ordinance for a water leak and a damaged wall. An inspection revealed “black bacterial growth in the water closet and in the back bedroom.” 4 Rule 166a was amended and applies to motions for summary judgment filed on or after March 1, 2026. Because this case was decided prior to the amendments, we apply the Rule as it existed before the changes. 3 of the challenged element.” Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 551 (Tex. 2019) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004)). More than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in the conclusions.” Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). We review summary judgments de novo. Cox, 664 S.W.3d at 72–73 (citing Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005)). In doing so, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging reasonable inferences and resolving doubts against the movant. Cox, 664 S.W.3d at 73 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 804 (Tex. 2005)). APPLICABLE LAW A negligence claim relating to mold exposure is in the nature of a toxic tort claim which falls outside a lay person’s general knowledge and experience. Cerny v. Marathon Oil Corp., 480 S.W.3d 612, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied). Toxic tort claims require proof of both “general” and “specific” causation. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 714; Plunkett v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 285 S.W.3d 106, 120–21 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2009, pet. denied). General causation addresses whether a substance is “capable of causing a particular injury or condition in the general population,” while specific causation addresses whether a substance “caused a particular individual’s injury.” Id. In 4 a toxic tort case, the ultimate issue is always specific causation. Bostic v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 439 S.W.3d 332, 351 (Tex. 2014). The general rule has long been that expert testimony is required to establish causation of medical conditions outside the common knowledge and experience of jurors. Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 665 (Tex. 2007). The effects of mold are matters outside the knowledge of laypersons in toxic tort cases, so causation must be proven using reliable expert evidence. McNitt v. Lakeline Crossing Phase 2 LP, No. 03-23- 00308-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 2927, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin April 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). A medical expert must personally examine a plaintiff to determine with a reasonable degree of medical probability that mold exposure caused a plaintiff’s health complaints. Plunkett, 285 S.W.3d at 119. A non-expert’s testimony and affidavit that mold exposure caused conditions such as nosebleeds is not evidence of causation. McNitt, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 2927, at *6. ANALYSIS As the Fischers issues overlap, we will address them simultaneously. They contend the trial court erred in granting City Parc’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment because they produced more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a fact issue in the form of photographs, code enforcement records, remediation records, affidavits, unsworn declarations, and other evidence, and the trial court misapplied the law by requiring expert testimony on all their claims. We disagree. While it may be within general experience that water can cause mold, it is not within the general experience and common sense of a lay person that exposure to mold causes 5 the type of injuries allegedly suffered by the Fischers. Starr v. A.J. Struss & Co., No. 01- 14-00702-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7084, at *19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). The Fischers argue that even if expert testimony was required, dismissal of all claims unrelated to health or medical issues was erroneous. But the same evidentiary standard applying to personal injury claims applies to property claims. Cox, 664 S.W.3d at 76 (applying the same standard to property damage and personal injury cases). Thus, expert evidence was required on all their claims. The Fischers’ failure to present expert testimony was fatal to their case. They failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the element of specific causation. Sweeney v. Geon Co., No. 01-00-00315-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 319, at *12–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 17, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op.). Without such evidence, the trial court properly granted City Parc’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Issues one, two, and three are overruled. CONCLUSION The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. Alex Yarbrough Justice 6